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THE FIRST P ASE <1955-59> - 
... colonial and semi-colonial states 
have either won national independence 
or are engaged in the struggle- for 
national independence. Both the 
Chinese people and the people of these 
countries have for a long time been 
subjected to the oppression and 
exploitation of imperialism and have 
suffered long enough... They share a 
common interest in the wiping out of 
colonialism, and there are no basic 
areas of conflict among them... ' 
The interval, 1954-55, constituted a watershed in 
China's international relations and heralded a new phase 
in China's foreign policy (1955-59), --2 which was 
characterised by China's peaceful coexistence with the 
newly independent states of the Third World and aimed at 
forging a wider anti-imperialist front. This second stage 
of China's foreign policy coincided with the opening of 
Sino-African relations. These relations developed within 
a framework of China's intensive campaign to contain 
politically and diplomatically, imperialist designs - 
particularly in Asia and Africa. Africa, which for the 
most part was under colonial rule, presented the major 
challenge, provoking a policy of determined opposition to 
colonialism and imperialism on China's part. 
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12.1. 
Six African countries were represented at the Bandung 
Conference, (18-24 April 1955) which provided the first 
occasion for a formal and direct meeting between their 
representatives and those of China. They were Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gold Coast (which became Ghana after 
independence), Liberia, Libya and the Sudan. Kwame 
Nkrumah, who led a delegation from the Gold Coast 
government, (well on its way to independence then): 3' and 
the Egyptian leader, Jemal Abdul Nasser, were the only two 
major African statesmen who later took the lead in the 
struggle for African liberation. At this conference, 
China's representatives approached for the first time not 
only African statesmen, (State-to-State relations), but 
also made direct and specific contacts with observers and 
representatives belonging to national independence and 
liberation movements. Among these was Moses Kotane, l a 
leading South African figure who ten years later (1965), 
became the representative of the African National Congress 
(ANC) in Dar es Salaam. r- Also, among African observers at 
the conference, there was an Algerian delegation led by 
Mohammed Yazid, '-- a leading Algerian politician who held 
various high posts before and after independence, and 
Salah Ben Youcef, a prominent Tunisian figure. 
With respect to the two major issues of colonialism 
and racism in South Africa, Zhou Enlai affirmed at the 
conference China's strong support for African liberation 
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and condemned "racial discrimination and racism in the 
Union of South Africa". --' Zhou Enlai went on to say that 
people, irrespecti 
' ve of race or colour, should enjoy fundamental human rights 
and not be subjected to discrimination 
... one should say that now the common 
desire of the awakened countries of the 
peoples of Asia and Africa is to oppose 
racial discrimination and to defend 
human rights, to oppose colonialism and 
to demand national independence, to 
firmly defend their own territiorial 
integrity and sovereignty. " 
During the conference, China could be reasonably 
expected to take a pure and uncompromising revolutionary 
stance on questions relating to Africa, unlike non- 
communist countries such as Egypt, Gold Coast and 
Indonesia, or observers from national independence and 
liberation movements. However, as a matter of f act, 
China kept a low profile. This was an appropriate tactic 
on China's part, given the divergent political and social 
orientations of the various representatives attending the 
conference. The stand taken by China at the conference 
was interpreted by some observers as a sign of its lack of 
concern with Africa. For example, Larkin has argued that 
It does not appear that Africa was 
important to China at Bandung. 
Although Bandung marked the beginning 
of significant Chinese initiatives in 
Africa, there is no evidence that China 
forsaw this with clarity. "" 
However, China's failure on this occasion to open up 
contact with Africa, "0 or to make a special effort to 
. 
bring African issues" forward at this conference must not 
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be interpreted as evidence of its lack of concern f or 
Africa and interest in African problems. Rather, it 
should be evaluated i-n the -context of ý the general 
objectives of the Bandung Conference. '-ý Bandung was the 
meeting place of representatives of governments and 
national independence and liberation movements from 
different social and political systems in Africa and Asia. 
They were all united by their oppositionlýý to colonialism 
and Big Power domination threatening Africa and Asia. 
Since these major issues also constituted some of the 
ideological priorities for China, the Chinese 
representatives did not feel the need to lay special 
emphasis on African matters, although they would certainly 
have preferred more activities and discussions emphasising 
the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist viewpoints. 
They would certainly have welcomed with enthusiasm the 
adoption of firm action and hard policy, including armed 
struggle. But this was not politic. Most states 
represented there were led by r-6, glmes hostile to any 
revolutionary activities or policies, socialist or 
communist in character. In fact, some representatives, 
prior to the conference expressed some opposition to 
inviting China. " 
Had China adopted a tougher line at the conference 
its earlier efforts to establish friendly relations with 
other Third World countries (including peaceful 
coexistence with the Afro-Asian world with a view to 
widening the anti-imperialist front) might well have come 
to a bad end. It might also have alarmed those 
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representatives who had just begun to make cautious 
contacts with the communist world. China was already 
regarded as a hardliner in the communist movement. Fawzi, 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister, voiced reservations about 
inviting China to Bandung. 'r- The Egyptian debate was, 
however, disarmed by China's concilliatory attitude 
towards the non-communist forces in Asia and Africa at the 
Conference. Not surprisingly, Nasser described Zhoull 
Enlai as "not an aggressive communist". 1-7 
Whatever may have been the true extent of China's 
concern with Africa manifested at the Bandung Conference, 
the Bandung spirit itself was unmistakably generative of 
meaningful Sino-African relations. 
Two major international developments influencedýPRC's 
early overtures to Africa. The first was the momentum 
gained by the forces of African nationalism in opposition 
to the forces of colonialism. Thus, by the time Sino- 
African relations entered the agenda of international 
politics, armed struggle had already begun to be employed 
in Algeria as the means of achieving liberation. 1*3 China 
evaluated the political situation in Africa during the 
period following the Bandung Conference in the following 
terms 
The people of Egypt and the Sudan, 
countries in what used to be considered 
"dark Africa", have achieved 
independence. The - people of Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Rhodesia and 
many countries of Africa have awakened. 
Their heroic struggle against- colonial 
oppression has shaken the whole 
world. '"", 
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Secondly, the development of the initial phase of Sino- 
African relations coincided almost exactly with the 
-development of the first phase of the Sino-Soviet 
ideological rift which can be dated back to Khruschev's 
Secret Speech at the 20th Congress of /\CPSU <1956). 
These differences increased China's freedom to play an 
international role virtually independent of the Soviet 
Union's new policy of D6tente. China continued its policy 
of uncompromising opposition to the leading anti-comnunist 
and anti-liberation forces of the West. 
It was in such a general international atmosphere 
that the seeds of Sino-African diplomatic relations were 
sown. * China established diplomatic relations with the 
first African country, (Egypt: 30 May 1956), three months 
after Khruschev's de-Stalinisation speech (February 1956). 
It must, however, be remembered that China's campaign 
against D6tente did not become overt until the Soviet 
Union rejected China's appeal to halt its conciliatory 
policy. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's campaign to win 
the approval of anti-colonialist forces (hitherto regarded 
by China as its main ideological allies outside the 
Communist world) for Khruschev's first summer meeting with 
Eisenhower (Camp David, 1959) simply fuelled China's 
ideological resentment against its senior communist ally. 
However, Sino-Soviet differences did not come out into the 
open in a big way on the international scene until China 
entered the third stage of its international policy or the 
beginning of the second stage of Sino-African relations 
(1959-66). 
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12.2. State-to-State Relations Between China and African 
States - or 'United Front From Above,. 
Out of the eight African countries which were already 
independent during the first period of Sino-African 
relations (1956-59), China had established full diplomatic 
relations with four: Egypt, (May 1956), Morocco (November 
1958), the Sudan (February 1959), and Guinea (October 
1959). ý--' 
12.2.1. Relations with 'progressive' states 
12.2.1.1. Relations with nt -B9YYP-t2--`-' 
For basically ideological reasons, (i. e. Nasser's 
indecisive policy of opposition to Western powers (and 
especially the United States), no diplomatic relations 
between China and Egypt--2c3 had been in existence until the 
mid '50s and, for similar reasons, Sino-Egyptian relations 
reached their peak during the first three years after 
Bandung (1955-58). Again, for ideological reasons Sino- 
Egyptian relations reached their nadir following Nasser's 
anti-communist campaign (1958-59), in Egypt and his 
increasingly moderate line an international issues in co- 
operation with Nehru and Tito. 
12.2.1.1.1. Egy1at's Relations (under Nasser) with the 
West Before and After Bandung Conference, 
Before discussing the development of Sino-Egyptian 
relations during this period (1955-59), it is important to 
consider the development of the political and ideological 
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orientation of Egypt following the July 1952 revolution. 
Egypt's new leaders, after the revolution, made a 
political about-turn. They abandoned the policy of co- 
operating with European powers, especially by making 
overtures to the United'States; in effect, they replaced 
their pro-Western orientation by a policy of more or less 
active hostility towards the Western powers. This 
reversal of policy contains a clue to the fluctuations in 
Sino-Egyptian relations before and after 1955. ý; ý11 
The major and immediate factor which led to the 
overthrow of King Farv?. was the defeat of Egypt and other 
Arab countries of the Middle East in their first war 
against Israel (1948). By 1952, Egypt found itself in a 
situation that required nothing short of revolution to 
regain a sense of national pride shattered by its military 
defeat and to rid it of the corrupt r-6gime of Faru? 
Political parties spent most of their time vying for 
power, instead of finding ways and means of halting the 
rapidly intensifying political and economic decline of 
Egypt. Thus, it should have come as no surprise when, 
independently of any political party or organisation, the 
'Free Officers' who had experienced defeat in the war 
against Israel forced Farouk to abdicate the Egyptian 
throne as its constitutional monarch (23 July 1952). This 
signified an end to Egypt's predominantly pro-British 
policy of long standing and to the monarchical rule which 
was followed by a new -6glme led by 'Free Officers', who 
were Egyptian nationalist in the first and last instance. 
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The new leadership (known as the Committee of the 
Free Officers) were guided in the determination of Egypt's 
internal and external policy by their opposition to 
colonialism, imperialism, and monopolies, strong support 
of justice, a democratic way of life, and a strong army.: 2#- 
Nasser explained the domestic political orientation and 
the revolutionary objectives of the new Egypt in the 
following terms 
... to build up the 
fatherland in the 
form of a healthy democratic society 
where there would be no place for class 
wars; where no man could feather his 
own nest at the cost of misery to 
others; where no minority would have 
power over the destiny of the majority; 
and there would be no chance for man to 
exploit his fellow countrymen. ý; ý-' 
In spite of its strong nationalistic character and its 
determination to remove colonialism from Egypt and the 
rest of the Arab world and its anti-Western tendencies 
(including opposition to military alliances), the new 
. r6glme 
(under Mohammed Nejib's leadership) initially 
seemed to admit the possibility of co-operation between 
Egypt and the West in general and the United States in 
particular. 
In American policy making circles however, the change 
of r6Eime in Egypt was seen as providing an opportunity 
for the United States to increase (at the expense of 
Britain and France) its influence in the strategically 
important region surrounding the Suez. Immediately after 
the overthrow of King Farouk, Caffers, the American 
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ambassador, established contacts with the new government. 
CIA officialsý113 dispatched to Egypt were entrusted with 
the task of finding ways and means of dealing with the new 
r6EIme. 
At the same time, William Forster Dulles, the 
American Assistant Secretary for Defence, visited Egypt, 
having been assured by Nasser that the United States "need 
have no fears of using American arms against Israel"; he 
promised to recommend military assistance to Egypt to a 
total of $100 million. ý2-'11 An Egyptian delegation led by 
Ali Sabri, Nasser's Chief Aide, was sent to the United 
States to follow up Dulles's offer. ý'D 
In May 1953 John Fo -ster Dulles, the newly appointed 
Secretary of State, paid a visit to Egypt. His aim was zo 
win Nasser's support for anti-communist alliances under 
the leadership of the United States. Nasser, however, was 
only interested in getting American military aid and 
modern weapons to be used in case Britain refused to 
accede to Egyptian demands that it should unconditionally 
withdraw its troops from Egyptian soil. Nasser saw no 
danger to Egypt from international communism; it was 'the 
Western [British] dominance' which constituted the 
'greater danSer'. ýý' Nasser asked Dulles in Cairo: 
How can I tell my people that I am 
going into a military pact in 
collaboration with those who are 
occupying our country? ý3ýý 
As far as Nasser was concerned, the United States was the 
only possible source" of military aid (and modern 
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weapons) and the only power capable of exerting any 
pressure on Britain in international relations. 
it was not until July 1953, following the 
establishment of the Republic of Egypt, that the Free 
Officers were able to put into effect their policy of 
opposition to Western influence in the Arab world as a 
whole and in Egypt in particular. In the economic field, 
the early promise of economic reform had begun to be 
carried out. Agricultural co-operatives were set up, 
whilst more than 11 million people benefited from the 
policy of distribution of land.: 311 In 1954, a project to 
produce iron and steel was launched with the construction 
of blast-furnaces at Heiwan.: 3r- 
In October 1954, Britain agreed to withdraw its 
troops from the Suez canal before June 1956. " This 
agreement was welcomed by the United States, which 
advocated a peaceful settlement of the Canal issue. For 
the United States, an Egyptian-British military 
confrontation would only aggravate Nasser's anti-Western 
proclivities. At the same time, the United States hoped 
that economic aid to Egypt would perhaps lessen Nasser's 
determination to oppose military pacts involving the 
region which were being sought by the United States and 
its allies, (including the Bahgdad Pact). ý3_7 
Thus, after Britain signed the Suez Base Evacuation 
Agreement with Egypt, the United States promptly advanced 
a loan of $40 million; ý11 to the latter. - However, it was 
already clear that these attempts of the United States to 
win Nasser over to the Western orbit could not wholly 
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succeed. For Egyptian opposition to military pacts and 
its preference for a neutral stance in the Cold War had 
already been put into- ef f ect - with the conclusion of the 
Indo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendshipý"ý (April 1953). Thus 
Egypt became the first African and Arab country to confirm 
its support for a neutral Afro-Asian region in world 
politics. Such a development flew in the face of the 
strategy by which the Western powers actively engaged in 
creating zones of containment of communism. 
Nasser's anti-Western tendency received a boost when 
the Soviet Union made an offer of arms to Egypt (18 May 
1955) through Czechoslovakia. Nasser no longer needed to 
engage in frustrating attempts to obtain military aid 
which might have to be used against a Western power such 
as Britain or an ally of the West such as Israel. 
Even when the possibility of a Soviet-Egyptian arms 
pact loomed on the horizon, Britain and America 
entertained hopes of saving Egypt from falling 
irredeemably under the influence of the communist world 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union. They initiated 
talks with Egypt six months after the Soviet Union made 
its offer of arms, (21 November 1955), on the construction 
of the Aswan Dam. In December, Britain and the United 
States, along with the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IDRD), offered to help 
with the project-" 
The offer, however, did not lead to Nasser moderating 
his anti-Western position, especially as he had, by then, 
already secured arms from the Soviet Union. On the 
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contrary, Nasser was becoming increasingly anti- 
imperialist, urging Arab countries to repel Western 
military designs and pacts in the area. The Western 
powers had made a serious miscalculation in believing that 
they could successfully overcome Nasser's strong 
nationalist ambitions which were decidedly anti-Western 
and anti-Zionist in orientation. A" Thus, it came as no 
surprise when six months later (19 July 1956), the United 
States and Britain withdrew their offer of aid in respect 
of the Aswan Dam. 
On 21 July 1956, Nasser made the historic decision to 
nationalise the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime 
Canal. At the same time, he strongly attacked imperialist 
exploitation of Egypt in the past. Before the Canal's 
national isation, Egypt was receiving only a suin of $3 
million per annum. 11 Immediately after national isati on, 
Canal revenues soared to figures of more than $100 million 
per annum. ` Western influence in Egypt, already 
seriously undermined by the nationalisation of the Canal, 
waned even further in the face of the widespread 
realisation in Egypt of the extent of exploitation that 
Western control over the Suez had represented in the past. 
Not unexpectedly, the nationalisation of the Canal 
made Egypt vulnerable to a direct threat by Britain and 
France which were its major shareholders. This threat 
culminated in the 'Tri-partite Aggression' in the form of 
a British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt, (October- 
November 1956). '" Immediately after the nationalisation 
of the Canal, Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, 
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informed President Eisenhower (27 July) that only force 
could put an end to the threat posed by Nasser to Western 
interests andthat 
I have this morning instructed our 
Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military 
plan in order to recover our 
interests. Ir, 
Britain not only lost face and access to an area of 
vital strategic importance, but also stood to suffer 
economic hardship. For 70 per cent A, -- of the oil required 
by Britain came through the Canal; A7 its closure or even 
restrictions on the transit of goods through it would 
vitally affect the British economy. 
The prime motive underlying France's decision to 
intervene militarily in the Suez however, lay in its 
opposition to Egypt's support to the forces of national 
liberation in Algeria., """ An end to Nasser's rule would 
mean an end to the major source of support for Algerian 
liberation fighters; in the words of Robert Lacoste, the 
French Resident Minister in Algeria, 
Better one French division in Egypt 
than four divisions in Algeria. -11ý 
France also had strong military links with Israel, 
especially after Guy Mollet, a 'socialist' and strong 
supporter of Zionism and Israel, became Prime Minister. r-ý 
During the period July-October 1956, Britain and France 
appeared to be contemplating a peaceful settlement of the 
Canal issue, but, in fact, this proved to be only a 
tactical move to draw- attention away ýf rom their 
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preparations for an attack on Egyptian airfields as well 
as Ismailia and Port Said, along the Suez (31 October 
1956). 
In the meantime, Israel had received military 
provisions needed for the invasion of Sinai in the eastern 
part of Egypt (29 October 1956). In fact, Britain 
seriously considered invading Egypt even in 1953 before it 
became involved in negotiations with Egypt for the 
evacuation of British troops from the Canal. According to 
a secret document excerpted in The Quardian J 
(19 
January 1985), the only reason given by the British 
Foreign Secretary against the immediate invasion of Egypt 
was lack of adequate preparation for a successful 
operation. Eden argued that: 
provisions ought also to be made for a 
more powerful follow-up operation, 
which would preserve British and 
foreign lives and property in Cairo and 
Alexandria by restoring order in these 
cities. If a situation arose which 
called for intervention by us, we might 
have an opportunity to set up an 
alternative government and we should be 
ill-advised to miss such an 
opportunity. "' 
Despite its agreement with the general line advocated by 
its allies (viz Britain, France and Israel) in opposition 
to Nasser's r68-lme the United States opposed the use of 
force against Egyptr-ý since it was likely to attract the 
Soviet Union to the area. It would also, the United 
States feared, create anti-Western feelings, even among 
moderate Arab countries which felt that Israel was their 
common enemy. In addition, the 'Tri-Partite Aggression' 
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was widely condemned by, Afro-Asianl: 3 countries, including 
those which were generally pro-Western in their 
orientation. 
Finally, the timing of the invasion coincided with 
the American Presidential elections (November 1956). The 
last thing Eisenhower and his associates wanted in the 
circumstances was to become involved in such an 
unpredictable conflict. In fact, according to Mohammed 
Hessenine El Haikel, known as 'Nasser's right arm, 
` timing of the nationalistaion of the Canal was Nasser'sL 
deliberate. The possibility of a British military 
response was real enough, but American military 
intervention, alongside its ally, during the decisive few 
months from Eisenhower's presidential campaign was quite 
out of the question. In the event, American non- 
t: 0 5CCUTe- 
intervention in the war - 
11 P-1 e. ci Eisenhower"j'Ja renewal 
of his mandate (1957-61) as American resident. This nay 
not have been the case had the United States intervened 
militarily, for its allies had suffered a humiliating 
defeat (at the end of December) which caused an anti- 
Western reaction even among loyal governments in Africa, 
Asia and other parts of the world which were loyal to the 
USA. Egyptian resistance, coupled with the Soviet threat 
both to use intercontinental missiles---*- and to send a 
voluntary army against the Anglo-French invasion, as well 
as world-wide condemnation of the 'Tripartite Aggression', 
forced the British and the French to withdraw their troops 
from Egypt. They were replaced by UN emergency forces (23 
December 1956). Israel followed suit later (March 1957), 
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by effecting a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. In April 
1957, the control of the Canal was turned over to the 
Egyptian army. In the same month Egypt decreed the 
nationalisation of foreign property and issued (24 April) 
a declaration on the administration of the Canal. 
12.2.1.1.2. Sino-Egyptian Relations Before The Bandung- 
Conference (195r 
During the initial phase (1952-54) of the Egyptian 
revolution, China was not inclined to establish close 
relationships with the new r-6glme, which was still well 
inside the Western orbit; nor was PRC in any position to 
encourage Nasser to develop into an anti-imperialist 
leader. " At the time of the Egyptian revolution , China 
was already deeply involved in the Korean war, (1951- 
53). 
When Nasser was casting around for alternative 
sources of military aid, China's limited energies were 
fully committed to the cause of national liberation in 
Indo-China where the First Indo-China war was then 
reaching its end (1953-54). -E--3' Also, given its policy of 
'leaning to one sidelt--cl and Stalin's hostility to national 
bourgeois r6EImes, China refrained from making contact 
with such r6gimes in the initial phase of their emergence. 
During the first period of its role in international 
relations (1949-55) China concerned itself only with such 
non-communist countries as India and Burma, which it 
deemed to be vital to national security, or Indonesia with 
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its overseas Chinese population of 3.8 million who had 
close links with their mother country. 
China's policy of not becoming involved in the 
initial stage of the Suez crisis (prior to 1956) and 
China's lack of concern with the Egyptian revolution and 
not recognising the new Egyptian government, did not stop 
Nasser from recognising PRC as the sole representative of 
the Chinese people. Nasser viewed the absence of China in 
UN as an 'international Joke'. --' In an interview with 
John Law of I, U5 News and World Report (3 
September 1954) Nasser stated that 
I have met some people who have visited 
communist China and informed me that 
Chinese people love their government 
and that the Cold War is the cause of 
their problems. You recognise the few 
people in Formosa and neglect millions 
in Red China. This is a joke. " 
In the wake of the Bandung Conference Zhou Enlai, 
Nehru and Nasser were viewed by the Egyptian press as 'the 
three champions of Af ro-Asian independence' . "-' By the 
time Zhou Enlai and Nasser met, Egypt had already actively 
demonstrated its opposition to imperialism and Western 
military alliances. Egypt's position was viewed by China 
as a firm and positive contribution 'entirely in the 
interests of the whole Middle East'., ', ' 
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TýAnr ] 2.1 
A FRIC A, ') C QUERIE S WITH OTPUMAT IC R; LAT IONS WI TH W (AS A Pý lqpýs)* 
,T 
DFCEM8 R 
Chronological Name of Da te o f Prior to Date of 
order by Date of Country In depe ndence Independence, Establ ishment Remarks 
Establishment of under the of Dip lomatic Mlosatic Colonial Relations in 
-Re ations 
Control of Ch ina 
I Egypt 28 Feb 1922 Britain 30 May 1956 
2 Morocco 2 Mar 1956 France I Nov 1958 
3 The Sudan I Jan 1956 Britain & 4 Feb 1959 
Egypt (jointly) 
4 Guinea 2 Oct 1958 France 4 act 1959 
5 Ghana 6 Mar 1957 Britain 5 Jul 1960 Following this coup on 20 October 1966 Ghana 
suspended its relations with China. biplomatic 
relations between Ghana and China were resumed on 
29 February 1972. 
6 Mali 22 Sep 1960 France 25 act 1960 
7 Soma I ia 26 Jun 1960 Italy S 14 Oct 1960 On I June 1960 Italy conceded independence to Italian . Britain Somaliland, in the same month (26 June) Britain foll- 
8 Zaire 30 June 1960 Belgium 20 Feb 1961 
owed suit b independence to British Somaliland. 
On 18 Septelgriv19i6n? China withdrew its personnel from , Kinshasa, RelationS between Zaire and China were 
restored on 24 November 1972. 9 Algeria 5 Jul 1962 France 3 Jul 1962 Relations between China and the Provisional Government 
of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA) were established on 
20 December 1958, 
10 Uganda 9 act 1962 Britain IS act 1962 
11 Kenya 8 Dec 1963 Britain 14 Dec 1963 
12 Burundi I Jul 1962 Belgium 21 Dec 1963 
13 Tunisia I Jun 1962 France 10 Jun 1964 On 26 September 19E7 
, relations 
between the two 
14 The Congo (B) 15 Aug 1960 France 22 Feb 1964 
countries were suspended, ` 
Is Tanzania. 9 Dec 1961 Britain 26 Apr 1964 On 22 Aýril 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were constitu- 
tional y united to form the United Republic of 
. Tanzania 
16 Central 13 Aug 1960 France 29 Sep 1964 , Relations with China 11 ere suspended on 6 January 1966 African Repub 
, and resumed on 20 August 1976, 17 Zambia 24 Oct 1964 Britain 29 act 1964 
is Benin I Aug 1960 France 12 Noy 1964 On 3 January 1966 Dahomey (now Benin) decided to sever 
its relations viih China, Relations were restored on 
29 December 1972, 
19 Mauritania 28 Nov 1960 France 19 Jul 1965, 
20 Eqyatorial 12 Oct 1968 Spain 15 Oct 1970 
Guinea 
21 Ethiopia 31 Jan 1942 Italy 24 Nov 1970 Italyccupied Ethiopia for a period of 6 years 
(19 -41), 22 Nioeria 10 act 1960 Britain 10 Feb 1971 
23 Caieroon I Jan 1960 France A 26 Mar 1971 Germany occuýied the country but was subseqyently ousted 
Britain by France w ich in turn was replaced by Britain, 
24 Sierra Leone 27 Apr 1961 Britain 29 Jul 1971 
25 Rwanda I Jul 1962 -Belgium 12 Noy 1971 26 Seneaal 20 Aug 1960 France 7 Dec 1971 
27 Mauritius 12 har 1968 Britain 15 Apr 1972 
28 To 27 Apr 1960 France 19 Sep 1972 
29 
r 
a Ma agascar 26 Jun 1960 France 6 Nov 1972 
30 Chad 11 Aug 1960 France 28 Nov 1972 
31 Burkinb-Fas'. o If Dec 1960 France 15 Sep 1973 
fiuinea-Bissan 24 Sep 1974 Portugal 15 Mar 1974 
33 Gabon 17 Aug 1960 France 20 Apr 1974 
34 Niger 3 Aug 1960 France 20 Jul 1974 
35 Gambia 18 Fe5 1965 Britain 14 Dec 1974 
36 Botswana 30 Sep 1966 Britain 6 Jan 1975 
37 Mozambique 25 Jun 1975 Portugal 25 Jun 1975 
38 Sao Tome and 12 Jun 1975 Portugal 12 Jul 1975 
Principe 
39 Comoros 6 Jul 1975 France 13 Noy 1975 
40 Cape Verde 5 Jul 1975 Portugal 25 Apr 1976 
41 S chelles 5 Jun 1977 Britain 30 Jun 1976 
42 
% 
Li eria 26 Jul 1847 17 Feb 1977 Founded in 1847 by black immigrants (many of whom had 
been freed slaves f rot the United States or from 
British and American warships patrolling the Atlantic). 
Althouýh independent ever since its formation, Liberia 
, was un e US domination until the coup ofOiat 
(26 April 1986). See Cha ter ]0.1. ) 
43 Lib a g 24 Dec 1951 Ital y 9 Aug 1978 
g 
f Britain ruled Libya for a rie period (1942-49), 
44 D, out, 27 Jun 1977 France 8 Jan 1979 
45 Zimbabwe 18 Apr 1980 Britain h 18 Apr 1980 
white minority 
r6gime of 
Ian Smith 
46 Angola 11 Nov 1975 Portugal 12 Jan 1983 
47 
48 
Ivori Coast 7 Au? 1960 France 2 Mar 1983 
Leso ho A Oc 1966 Britain 30 Apr 1933 
t China does not have diplomatic relations with only 2 out of a total of 50 independent African countries - viz. Malawi and Swaz iland (South Africa not yet lib erated), . 
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(in million JS $) 
. Juty Country Year 1952 1953 19.54 1955 1956 1957 19.58 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Algeria 0.3 10.7 8,2 4,2 6.3 8,1 31.1 O, 2 2, I 14,0 15.9 16.9 17,3 32,0 35.0 48,0 88.0 175,0 100.0 85,0 52,0 
Angola 9,0 1,0 1,0 4.0 
Benin 6.0 1.2 1 2.3 7,0 4,9 2.8 3,1 3,4 18.59 17,63 25,03 26,0 25,0 13,0 14,0 Eotswana 1.0 
Burkino Faso 0,1 0,1 01 0,2 LO 0,4 0,8 2,2 2,4 2,6 1.63 4,00 6,6 5.53 6,6 5,02 1,04 
Burundi 0.1 0.3 0,5 2,0 2,7 1,5 '0.3 3,33 5,82 5,96 5.0 6,0 3,0 3.0 '. Cameroon 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,9 0.6 1,9 2,7 5, 9,5 5,1 12,6 12,1 30.1 26.0 29.1 31.3 29.7 14,1 9.5 4,8 
Cape Verde 1.2 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Central African 0.1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,36 0.33 0,4 0.42 0,65 1,0 0.38 
Republic 
Chad 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,7 1,0 0,8 0,7 1,0 0,8 1,3 1,4 1,5 3.16 1,0 0,9 0,43 0,7 
Coaoros . 3,0 1.0 
Congo (B) 0,6 2,7 1,6 Li 3,3 2,9 2,9 5.1 4,4 '3,7 3.75 3, 3,94 1,0 12,0 13.0 11,0 
Djiboutj . . 3,0 6,0 7.0 4,0 
Egypt 0.7 0,7 0,4 0,8 10,4 19,4 23.6 22,3 18,3 17,8 18,1 18,7 16.2 24,1 35,3 21.2 18,6 11.7 4,8 16,2 23,2 23,6 16,8 33.7 40.9 48,1 54,0 69,0 215,0 173.0 256.0 205.0 167,0 98,0 
Equatorial ' . 2,0 0,03 3,0 
Guinea - 
Ethiopia 0,1 0,2 0,3 1,0 1.7 2,2 2.4 2,0 2,4 2,0 2.3 2,0 2.8 3,7 5,1 4,4 4,9 5,4 6,45 10,02 8,35 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 
Babon 2,0 2.1 4,7 5,8 6,9 2,4 5,7 3,6 7,0 3,0 2,0 3,0 
6abia, The 1.0 1,2 1.7 2,5 3,3 4,2 7,3 8,1 9.4 10,86 18,85 27.05 16,0 14.0 12,0 8.0 
Ghana 0.8 0,7 2,1 2,8 2,3 3,6 2,0 2.5 13,5 6,8 7,0 1,5 3,9 5,5 5,5 3,3 7,3 33.5 14,1 13.7 13.3 14.1 10,6 17.6 4,0 1.0 2,0 3,0 
Guinea 09, 4.3 0,5 3,9 0.5 0,2 15,0 2,0 4,0 1,0 
Guinea-Bissau 0,8 2,5 0,3 0.743 0,218 0,651 0,35 7 1,0 2,0 1.0 
Ivory Coast 1,2 1,2 1,6 0,2 0.2 5,3 5,8 6.3 42,0 14,0 12.0 52.0 
Kenya 0.1 0.1 0,5 1,8 2.5 4,9 2.3 4.1 2.9 3,0 3,6 2.9 3,9 10,7 3,3 6.7 13,0 10,6 12,9 19,4 15.0 13,0 9,0 13,0 
Liberia 0,7 0,9 2,2 4,2 4,2 5,1 49 5,3 5,7 16,5 16,2 14,2 8,5 13.0 48,0 19,0 
Libya 0,1 0.3 0,3 1,4 4,4 7.2 9,2 11.2 13.7 16,2 16,2 23,5 32.2 51,6 10,0 74,5 139,0 22,0 37.0 50,0 126,0 168,0 47,0 59,0 121.5 
adagascar 1,5 1.5 1.0 1.3 
" 1.1 1,1 1.1 11,0 10.0 4.0 12.0 
ali 0,1 0,8 1.1 2,5 8.9 9,3 9,4 10.6 4,1 3,3 5.8 12,4 14,2 16.0 17,6 19,2 36.77 8,31 8,0 7,0 4,0 5,0 
Plauritania' 6.1 6,0 3.1 4,9 2.1 0.8 2,0 15,9 9,5 13.9 0,9 3,3 4,4 2,8 I2 1,3 1,4 22,0 23,0 20,0 10,0 
auritius 12,8 1.2 24, 3,9 3,2 8,3 9.3 10,6 23,32 8,50 17,06 21,20 21,53 20.02 23,40 
orocco 11.8 15,0 7,5 6,7 8,1 8,4 6,4 10,8 10,8 15.6 12.0 10,9 12,0 13,1 10,8 17,0 13.7 18,9 25,7 18,6 24.6 32,5 40,2 38.5 65.8 49,7 34.6 54,9 35,3 
ozambique 0.1 0,1 8,0 3,0 3,0 12.0 5.0 2,0 8.0 
Nicer 0,2 1.7 2,3 2,3 2,5 1,3 1,1 1,7 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,1 6,83 5.56 10.62 6,72 6,22 6.34 4,19 
Nigeria 4,7 6,0 4,1 4,1 8,0 12,3 9.6 25,6 24,0 32,7 43,8 63,5 128,0 184,5 44,0 25,0 52.0 68.0 39,0 17.0 13,0 4.0 
Reunion 1,0 4.3 0,6 2,2 7,2 4.2 1,3 1,3 1.3 2.59 4.24 3,45 3,0 2,0 3,0 3,0 
Rwanda 0.1 0,1 2,0 2,7 3,3 4.8 10,61 12.03 21,34 15,0 10,0 14,0 15,0 
Sao Toé and . 1,0 1.0 
Principe 
Senegal2 2.1 3,0 2.7 3,6 11,9 5.2 6,1 7,0 5.6 6.5 17,5 16,5 7,9 5,5 31 12,11 16,99 19.49 21,0 32,0 20,0 25,0 
Seychelles 0,2 0,8 1.1 1,0 2,0 1,6 2,4 1,8 
Sierra Leone 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,8 1,2 1,4 1,7 2,1 3.5 2,5 2,5 3,5 4,3 9,8 13,9 15.3 16,7 12,0 4.0 4,0 3,0 
Somalia, Rep, 0,2 2,2 0,5 1,8 1,3 0,8 4,0 -18,7 8,2 8,7 9,6 10,5 8.05 7,46 15,0 19,0 9,0 10.0 Sudan 2,1 4,4 3,6 3,6 6,0 5,9 11,4 " 11,6 15,6 15,6 10,0 18,8 33,0 26,7 58,9 42.3 25,3 30,5 24,0 16,0 35,0 64,0 46,0 30,0 27,0 11,4 
Tanzania3 . 0,3 0,9 4,5 11.2 10,0 12,0 11,1 37,1 76,0 64,2 88,7 80,2 71,2 378 11,9 38,0 45,0 9,0 10.0 13.0 13,0 17,0 12.3 
Togo 0.3 0,6 0,6 1,2 2,1 2,0 1,5 1,0 2.5 1,7 1,8 4,9 5,9 5,0 4,1 10.02 11,82 12.77 22,0 18,0 15,0 15,0 
Tunisia 0.6 0,5 1,3 0.8 1,2 0,6 0,9 0,2 1,5 1,6 1.1 0,5 0,1 0,4 2.0 3,2 6,9 2.0 8,8 9.8 14,6 19,1 26.0 22,0 22.0 23.0 21.7 
Uganda 0,8 0.7 2,5 4,4 2,0 2.6 2,3 2.0 1.8 0,4 1,3 3.0 5,4 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 3,0 
Zaire 0,1 1.1 0,2 2.8 10,0 9,0 40.0 34,0 
Zambia 0,2 0,7 1,5 1,1 0,7 5,7 13,8 14.7 37,8 26.5 13,2 10,3 2,0 2.0 16.0 5,0 3,0 1,0 1.0 1,4 
ZImbabwe 3,0 8,0 7,7 2,9 7,3 4,9 2,7 1,3 2.0 
Africa Not 3,66 3,0 1.0 12.0 
Specific 
Figures shown in this table have been compiled from those most commonly cited in the sources given below; 
I. Figures for the period 1952-1962: Ci) A. Eckstein, Coiunist China's Eno ic Growth an Forigh Trade (London: 
Ncatath-HiL1 Book Coipany, 1966), p. 282 (Table B. 1), 
(ii) W. A. Nielsen, Th 6reat Ppwers and Af rita (London: Pall flail Press, 1969), 
p. 230 (Table " 1w11 
2, Figures for the period 1963-1966: International Monetary Fund, D irectio n of 1rade 1967 ('China, People's 
Raublic'] (Washington D. C.: IMF, 1967), p. 371; 
3, Figures for the period 1971-1977: International Monetary Fund, D irectio n of Trade 1978 ('China, People's 
Republic'] (Washington 0 "c " LIII 1978), pp, 98-99; 
4, Figures for the period 1978-1985; International Monetary Fund, D irectio n of Trade 1985 ('China, People's 
Raublic'] (Washington D. C.: IMF, 1985), pp. 137-138, 
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TABLE 12.3 
impnRTs pRnm AFRTCAN COUNTRIES TO CHTNA 1952-1985 
(in millions US 
Country Year '52 43 '54 '55 'SG '57 '58, '59 '60 '61 '62 163 '64 '65 '66 '67 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 17S 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 
Algeria 6.9 3,2 10.3 13,9 10.7 5.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 24,0 22.0 4.0 1.0 2.7 
Benin 0.2 1.8 4.9 8.0 8.8 9.6 
Burkino Faso 1.0 6.0 
(upper Volta) 
Burundi 0,7 1.1 1.0 
Cameroon 1.9 2.9 4,4 2,2 2.0 4.0 
Cape Verde 
Central 1.0 1.0 1'0 
African Rep, 
Chad 110 1'0 
Comoros 1.0 1.0 
Congo (8) 0.3 0.4 0.1 2.9 5.8 0.3 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 
Djibouti 
Egyptian 8,9 10.4 11.4 24.5 24.2 42.1 34.9 33.8 44. S 14.6 )9.1 16,4 18.9 49.6 35.7 20.7 18.2 15.4 12.6 29.2 27.6 21,0 37.9 67.7 66.5 SS, 3 63.0 57.0 97.0 126.0 61.0 68,0 7.9 
Arab Rep, 
Equatorial 2.0 
Guinea 
Ethiopia 0.1 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 5.5 7.8 2,3 1.6 3.2 4.8 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Gabon 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 11.0 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 1,4 0.2 1.2 0.5 3.0 6.2 5.7 0.8 0.7 1.2 2.3 2.8 2.0 7,1 1.8 13.7 20.9 28.1 3.0 22.0 3,0 6.0 
Guinea 2.1 0.6 0.9 
Guinea- 0.1 1.0 3.0 2.0 
Bissau 
Ivory Coast 3.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 
Kenya * 1.0 0.2 O's 1.2 1.9 2.8 3.4 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.9 4.5 8.0 6.4 4.2 2.8 3.9 3.0 1.0 4.0 6.0 
Liberia 2.0 5 .0 
Libya 2.0 21.0 34.0 
Madagascar 10.0 7.0 3.0 
Mali 2.2 0,7 1.6 3.6 12.1 20.6 22.7 24.8 9.0 4.0 S. 0 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 3,1 6. S 6.6 3,7 4.2 6.2 1S. 5 10.1 8's 
4 
9.1ý 8.0 S. 2 2.4 20.4 20. S 29,3 28.0 7.0 3.2 14.0 26.0 32.0 42.0 36.0 8,7 
Mozambique 2.0 5.0 
Niger 
Nigeria 4.9 3.8 1.0 1.8 2.2 2.8 0.8 O. S 5.3 8.5 6.4 8.6 
1.1 13.0 8.0 S'O 2.0 4,0 8.0 4.0 1.3 
Reunion 
0.1 0.2 3.0 6.0 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Senegal 
Seychelles 2.0 1.0 
Sierra Leone 
0 1 0 1 0.6 0.5 0.6 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.4 20 3.0 5.0 7.0 Somalia Rep, 
12 9 72 1 9 4 9 6 9.0 5.3 16.9 
. 12.4 8.3 . 15.3 20.3 25,3 3.7 39.4 71.8 37.3 41.2 26.6 62.0 18,0 2.0 61.0 28.0 39.0 50.0 39.0 0.7 Sudan . . . . . 
Swaziland 10.5 7 3 14 7 10 5 8.4 8 5 12.0 9.0 12.5 20.2 15,3 13. S 16,4 15.1 20.4 55.0 $9.0 10.0 3.0 21.0 1.0 4.4 Tanzania . . . . 0.5 1.0 1,0 2.0 
Togo 
0 8 0 5 0.2 0.3 2.7 0.8 0.6 0.9 1,4 0.2 6.6 
0.9 3.9 26.0 24.0 19.0 14.0 27.0 
Tunisia . . 11.2 10 0 19.2 3.7 4.4 5.4 1.9 1.6 1.2 6.6 5.9 9.1 1.6 3,7 5.8 Uganda 0.2 , 34.0 22.0 68.0 63.0 Zaire 0.7 9.6 2.6 16,3 30.0 49.3 19.4 22.8 37.4 22.3 29.8 40.8 32.0 60,0 90.0 23.0 44,0 71.0 45.0 99.0 Zambia 56.0 3.0 5.0 35.0 
Zimbabwe 
Source: See Tablg 12.2. 
3 Until 1963 Kenya's figures are shared with those of Tanganyika. 
( 
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12.2.1.1.3. Bandung and Sino-Egyptian Relations. 
Sino-Egyptian relations began at the Bandung 
Conference (April 1955) when, for the first tine, ", r- China 
and Egypt found themselves in the same Afro-Asian camp 
united against colonialism and imperialism. During this 
conference, their representatives were in frequent contact 
with one another, and they exchanged invitations to their 
opposite number's country. L--r- 
Three weeks after" the Bandung Conference, Sheikh 
Hassan El Baqouri, the Egyptian Minister for Religious 
Foundations, visited China (11 May 1955) where he saw for 
himelf the 'satisfactory living conditions of Chinese 
Mos 11 rns I. I-- "I In August 1955, another Egyptian delegation, 
led by Mohammed Abu Nosseir, the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry, also visited Beijing and signed a three-year 
agreement between Egypt and China. In the protocol of the 
first year of the agreement, both parties agreed that 
each side is to give the other most 
favoured nation treatment, and that 
trade representative's offices shall be 
established in each other's country. 
The total value of business transacted 
in the Five Years will amount to t20 
million sterling. 
In the spirit of this agreement 
and protocol, contracts were also 
concluded by which China will supply 
Egypt with 60,000 tons of rolled steel 
and Egypt supply China with 45,000 
bales of cotton (15,000 tons). '--': 3' 
Following this agreement, the value of Chinese 
imports from Egypt increased from $8.9 million in, 1952 to 
$24.2 million in 1956. At the same time, Chinese exports 
increased from S 0.7 million in 1952 to $10* 4 million in 
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1956. '7c, In July 1955, China agreed to buy 13,000 tons of 
Egyptian cotton. 71 This was of special commercial value 
to Egypt because it came precisely_ at the time when 
Western powers refused-7ý1 to agree on the question of the 
price of Egyptian cotton. It is appropriate to note here 
that 80 per cent of Egypt's foreign exchange7: 3 was derived 
from the sale of cotton. 
The Bandung Conference, then, represented a watershed 
in the development of PRC's diplomatic, economic and 
cultural contacts with Africa. Egypt was the first 
country to receive a Chinese Cultural Mission which then 
went on to visit four other African counties - viz The 
Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and Ethiopia. ý- 
12.2.1.1.4. China and The Suez Cri5ls (1956).. 
Anti-imperialist War. 
Sino-Egyptian relations reached their peak of 
friendliness during the Suez crisis (July-December 1956). 
The Chinese conviction that the colonial powers would give 
up their interests only after their defeat in armed 
struggles, and China's ideological strategy of a united 
front against the common enemy in the form of communist 
and national liberation forces. carried an irresistible 
appeal f or Egypt. Immediately after the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal, China voiced its strong support for 
Egypt's initiative. At the same time, Nasser was also 
praised for his firm stand against British imperialism-" 
China took the view that the 'Constantinople 
Convention' (1866) was one of the many unequal treaties 
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imposed on weaker countries by the colonialist powers in 
order to legitimise their exploitative interest in their 
economies. Thus, Nasser's decision, for China was just 
and legal. China's support was based not only on the 
ideological merits of the nationalisation policy (i. e. on 
the merits of socialism as contrasted with capitalism) but 
also, on China's own direct experience of semi- 
colonialism. " Four days after the nationalisation of the 
Canal (30 July 1956> the People's Daily wrote as follows: 
Everyone knows that the agreements 
about the Suez Canal Company in 1866 
and afterwards are typical of the 
unequal treaties used by the 
colonialists to shackle and exploit 
oppressed people. Today, the unequal 
treaties, concluded ninety years ago, 
are not worth the paper on which they 
are written. The Egyptian people who 
have become independent, have the full 
right to declare such enslaving 
treaties null and void. --' 
The nationalisation of the Canal was viewed by the Chinese 
0--y. 
-1, as: V 
a tremendous inspiration to all who 
oppose colonialism... The Suez which 
served international monopoly capital 
for eighty-six years, has now been 
liberated... the speech of President 
Nasser on July 26 at Alexandria was a 
historic document, the vow of the 
Egyptian people determined to stand 
against imperialist intervention. -7*11 
Within three months (30 May-28 July 1956) of 
establishing official diplomatic relations with the first - 
African country (Egypt), China was in a position to focus 
on a concrete issue in line with its ideological 
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objectives of an anti-imperialist nature. China gave not 
only moral support by praising the nationalisation of the 
-Canal' I but also gave material help to Egypt, described 
by 
.1q 
one author as 'very impressive'. 
Three weeks after the nationalisation, the Chinese 
Shenyang Rolling Mill sent 500 tons of rolled steel to 
Egypt. *ýýll In the wake of the outbreak of the Suez crisis, 
China offered Egypt a gift of 95 
warmly received. In iq (17 
Egyptian Ambassador, A. Hassan Ragab, 
he said that 
millioff"' which was 
November 1956) the 
affirmed this when 
New China is writing a clean new page 
in the history of humanity as seen in 
the prompt and generous help it is 
giving to relieve the war casualties in 
Egypt... within 24 hours of the appeal 
of the Egyptian people for their help, 
China responded in a glorious way 
Twenty million Swiss Francs were Q(Oýý3 
by the Chinese government in the name 
of Egypt to buy whatever material she 
needed in- her distress... Thousands of 
tons of food and other rescue materials 
were on their way to that country... The 
Chinese Red Cross had donated the 
Egyptian Red Crescent 170,000 Swiss 
Francs as a relief fund for war 
casualties... A mission of nurses and 
doctors is being prepared in case Egypt 
still needs this help. ': ýý 
A few weeks before the Anglo-French- Israeli invasion 
of Egypt , lcliincý -- offered 
(5 September 1956) 29 pilots 
to serve in the Suez Canal with the aim of adding to the 
strength of Egyptian forces protecting it. " In the same 
month, addressing the Standing Committee on the Suez Canal 
F 
Issue of the National Peoples Congress, Zhou Enlai 
affirmed that: 
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the Chinese people resolutely support 
the Egyptian government's action of 
nationalising the Suez Canal ... The Chinese people cannot let pass any move 
encroaching upon the sovereignty of 
Egypt and armed intervention against 
Egypt. 13, 
Zhou Enlai's statement confimed that China was 
prepared to provide Egypt with military help if requested 
to do so by the Egyptian government. "", Radio Beijing 
broadcast (7 November 1956) that over 250,000 Chinese had 
volunteered to join the Egyptian forces. 191-- At the same 
time, a special committee was set up in support of the 
Egyptian resistance to the 'Tripartite Aggression' . it 
began (11 November 1956) to register military, medical, 
engineering, transport and other personnel to go to 
Egypt-` 
In an interview given to a Chinese Journalists' 
Delegation (23 January 1957), President Nasser expressed 
deep appreciation of China's efforts to help Egypt, adding 
that since the Bandung Conference, the relations between 
China and Egypt had speedily developed. *"*a Indeed, until 
the beginning of the campaign against the Egyptian 
Communist Party by Nasser's government (1958-59), China 
and, Egypt seemed to be in agreement on the major 
international issues, and especially the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialism. 
Egypt went even further by expressing agreement with 
China even on matters pertaining to D6tente between East 
and West which at the time was being initiated by the 
Soviet Union. At the first Afro-Asian Solidarity 
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Conference (Cairo: 26 December 1957), Khalid Mchieddin, 
member of the Egyptian Parliament and deputy leader of the 
Egyptian delegation, expressed views identical with those 
of the Chinese delegation. He said that in the global 
balance of power, imperialism was being weakened by 
independent countries, blows by 
nationalist movements in the liberated 
countries and the world at large. *3ý ' 
12.2.1.1.5. 
The relationship between Egypt and China,, which 
became extremely friendly during and after the Suez 
crisis, started to decline after the union of Syria and 
Egypt (1 February 1958) into the 'United Arab Republic' 
(UAR), and Nasser began a policy of persecutio. n of the 
Egyptian Communist Party and its supporters (1958). China 
waited for nearly a month (24 February) before welcoming 
the formation of UAR. "co This delay in the Chinese 
recognition of UAR was no accident. 
The anti-communist character of the merger between 
the two Arab countries must have preyed on the minds of 
the Chinese decision makers. For China, Arab unity and 
soldarity against Western powers constituted a 
fundamentally and ideologically desirable development; but 
not Arab unity at the cost of oppression of the communists 
in Arab countries. 
China was in favour of Arab unity made up of a united 
front of all forces - communist and non-communist - 
struggling against Western influence in the area. This 
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was apparent for example, in a report carried by the 
People's Daily before the proclamation of UAR (19 June 
1957> which stated that 
only by maintaining unity can the Arab 
states safeguard their independence. 
Otherwise, the Arab states will- fall 
into the colonialist trap of divide and 
ru 1 e. 's"' 
For Nasser, however, Arab unity against colonialism 
and imperialism and their local collaborators did not 
include the communists, whom he described (May 1954) as: 
the best allies of Zionism in this part 
of the world. In fact Zionism and 
communism are indistinguishable as to 
ideology... They are opportunist ... Any 
individual who calls for communism or 
propagates it is an opportunist. 'ý: 2 
During the first two years (1957-58) of the Egyptian 
government's campaign against the communists, and 
throughout the first year of its existence, China avoided 
a direct conflict with UAR. Two major ideological 
considerations lay behind this policy: 
The Algerian war of liberation, of which Egypt 
was the major supporter, had entered a 
decisive stage, and the headquarters of the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Algeria (PGRA) was in Egypt. Less than 
cordial relations with Egypt would have the 
effect of undermining China's relations with 
PGRA and support for FLN in its anti-colonial 
war of national liberation. 
An active disavowal of Nasser's campaign - 
which until the end of 1958, did not go beyond 
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the verbal level, and confined only to attacks 
against the Egyptian communist Party, would 
only provide an opportunity for 
impe-y-jal2sts to regain the influence that ý-Výj 
had lost subsequent to the Suez crisis. The 
highly unpopular and tendentious Eisenhower 
Doctrine, had already been initiated (January 
1957) with the aim of restoring Western 
influence in the Arab world. Under it, the 
United States offered financial assistance (of 
between $400 to $500 million) over a two year 
period, ': '3 to those Arab countries (including 
Egypt) which were prepared to join the Western 
campaign against international communism. 
China viewed the Eisenhower Doctrine as 'a symbol of 
American Imperialisml. ý- During his visit to Moscow, 
(January 1957), Zhou Enlai gave expression to China's 
opposition to the policy of imperialist United States in 
the Middle East. On that occasion, both the Soviet Union 
and China stated in a joint communique, that 
although Britain, France and Israel 
have suffered defeat in their 
aggression against Egypt, United States 
imperialism is attempting to make use 
of- the situation to take over the 
British and French colonial positions 
in the Near and Middle East, to 
suppress the national independence 
movement and enslave the peoples in 
this region, and is also attempting in 
this region to step up its policy of 
aggression and war preparations. This 
is the essence of the so-called 
' Eisenhower Doctrine' 
Not unexpectedly, the moderate Arab countries of- 
Tunisia, Morocco and Libya did not heed the advice given 
them by the Soviet Union and China to reject the American 
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of f er. During a visit to these countrie (March 1957), 
Vice-President Nixon found them only too ready to accept 
the terms of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'. 
There is no area in the world today in 
which the prestige of the United States 
is more uniformly high than in the 
countries which I visited on this trip. 
The President is respected as the 
acknowledged leader of the Free World. 
There is a most encouraging under- 
standing of our programs and 
policies. " 
In 1958, the United States and Britain found a much 
more practical means of reviving their declining influence 
in the Middle East and of containing anti-Western 
tendencies when Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
sought Western intervention in order to roll back 
nationalist movements which were rocking the foundations 
of their monarchical and pro-Western r6gimes. As soon as 
UAR was formed, Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and Syria. Iraq and Jordan Joined together to form 
the Arab Federation (14 February 1958) as a counter to 
UAR. 
Despite its anti-communist character UAR's 
ideological grounding in moderately anti-imperialist Arab 
nationalism threatened the monarchical r6glmes of Jordan 
and Iraq as well as Western influence in the region. King 
Hussein of Jordan had already survived (with the help of 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq) an uprising (April 1957) aimed at 
overthrowing his r-6glme and establishing a republic. In 
June 1958, King Hussein sued for military help to combat 
the growing threat to his kingdom. 
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King Hussein's alliance with his cousin, King Fiesal 
of Iraq, proved a total failure. It only gave a fillip to 
popular upheaval in the country which virtually put an end 
to the monarchy (14 July 1958) and heralded the 
establishment of a revolutionary government under the 
joint leadership of Brigadier-General Abdul Karim Qassim 
and Colonel Abdul SaAm Arif. 
T11CUAR's increasing influence on Arab nationalism in 
general and the Iraqi rev, olution in particular deepened 
the fears of pro-Western ý-6gimes in the area even further. 
Less than a month after the Iraqi revolution, Kamil 
Shamoun, the Lebanese President, invited (August) the 
United States Marines to occupy Lebanon in order to 
protect the r6glme. American intervention in Lebanon was 
regarded by China as concrete evidence of the imperialist 
character of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
In the Suez, the USA pretended to take 
exception to the Anglo-French invasion 
of Egypt and posed as a friend of the 
Arab people. Now the Yankee 
imperialists are out in front in 
launching confusion in the Middle East. 
This shows what the notorious 
Eisenhower Doctrine really is. 
Washington and London made no secret of 
the fact that they resorted to armed 
intervention in order to cope with the 
"highly explosive" situation arising 
from the birth of the new Republic of 
Iraq. It is therefore only too clear 
that the US-British aggression against 
Lebanon and Jordan represents only one 
aspect of their military adventure. 
Their objective is to crush the 
national independence movements in the 
Middle East and to bolster up their 
colonial rule in that part of the 
world. '91-7 
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Following the above developments, China (and the 
Soviet Union) found itself on the horns of a dilemma. An 
attack on Nasser's anti-communist campaign would only help 
the case of Western penetration of the area, whereas not 
opposing such a policy would be tantamount to a betrayal 
of China's ideology at an especially sensitive juncture. 
On the Sino-Soviet front, China was already involved in a 
vehement criticism of conciliatory moves initiated by the 
Soviet Union towards non-communist forces in different 
regions of the world. 
Eventually, China's concern with the Algerian 
situation and desire to limit Western influence in the 
Arab world prevented it from rushing into headlong 
opposition, at least during the initial phase of the 
Egyptian government's campaign against communism. China 
held its fire until late 1958 when Nasser's verbal abuse 
against the Egyptian communists gave place to active 
persecution including the imprisonment of Egyptian and 
Syrian communists in Egypt and Syria, as well as 
persuading other Arab countries to follow suit, 
The third factor underlying China's resolution to 
týxe- 
come out publicly against/\UAR's policy of persecuting 
communists lay in Egypt being the only African and Arab 
country with which PRC had diplomatic relations at the 
tine. ý' Any serious difference with Nasser could well put 
paid to China's efforts to broaden diplomatic contacts 
with the ultimate objective of establishing Afro-Asian 
solidarity on a politically acceptable footing. 
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Relations between China andf\UAR continued normally 
until late 1958. In April, a UAR Government Mission, led 
by Lieutenant -General- Mohammed Ibrahim, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces, visited China. " 
During this visit, Mao told his guests that: 
the Chinese people feel very happy to 
have the friendship of the UAR... We 
stand in the same front in the struggle 
against colonialism. lcO 
In the same month a Chinese Government Delegation paid a 
return visit to the UAR. 11011 Three months later (July) a 
Chinese Moslim Delegation stopped at Cairo on their way to 
Mecca. In August China and UAR signed a Postal Agreement. 
In December, China and UAR extended their 1955 Trade 
Agreement by another three years. Part of the Agreement 
read as follows: 
Chinese exports to the UAR will include 
frozen beef and mutton, canned goods, 
cereals, machinery, chemical raw 
materials, tea, silk, etc. UAR exports 
to China will include cotton, cotton 
yarn, staple fibre and minerals. A 
trade protocol will be signed 
separately every year. 1101ý1' 
By the end of 1958, China had become the second biggest 
buyer of Egyptian cotton. 'Iclý', Under the Sino-Egyptian 
Cultural Agreements signed earlier, a UAR Teacher's 
Delegation, led by the Assistant Under Secretary of the 
Ministry of Education, paid a three-week visit to China in 
December 1958.110-1 
However, by the end of 1958, as Nasser's campaign 
against the communists intensified, China broke its 
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silence and voiced its disapproval. Nasser was warned 
that his true enemies were the Western powers and their 
'12A 
local allies and not the communists. Writing on the 
Middle East situation, Peng Ti (15 December 1958), the 
NCNA correspondent explained that: 
A military and political cordon is 
being thrown around the UAR and Iraq 
and other Arab countries simmering with 
national liberation movements. In 
Lebanon and Jordan the Americans and 
the British are making active 
preparations for long-term 
occupation. "' 
With the outlawing of the Communist Party and the 
imprisonment of its members, " and the possibility that 
the revolutionary government of Iraq might be pressured by 
L-ý 
Nasser into JoiningLYAR, the Sino-UAR relations took a 
turn for the worse in 1959. At this point, Qassim was 
opposed to unity with)JJAR at the expense of the communists 
who were working closely with him. Instead, like China, 
he called for Arab solidarity against the fundamental 
threat posed by the Western powers to the nationalistic 
movement of the Arab world. '-- 
Following his visit to Iraq (December 1958), Nasser 
launched a vehement attack on Qassim's co-operation with 
the communists and his refusal to join UAR. He believed 
Iraq to be a base for the activities of the communists 
directed against the Arab nationalist movement. Nasser 
gave as the reason for extending anti-communist campaign 
to cover other parts of the Arab world besides UAR 
Chinese support f or the Iraqi 
communists to use their political force 
to take power... and to destroy the Arab 
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nationalist movement in the Arab 
world. "0'13 
-As a reaction against the Chinese support for the 
communists, Nasser recalled the UAR Charg6 d'Affair-es from 
China. At the same time, he sent a message to 25 
countries in Africa and Asia to withdraw their Ambassasors 
from Be iji ng. "'0- 
China attacked Nasser for persecuting communists and 
for his hostility towards Iraq for its unwillingness to 
join UAR. The People's Daily wrote (March 1959) that 
the recent utterances and actions of 
the UAR against Iraq and some other 
Arab countries did not promote the 
unity but seriously harmed it... Only 
the imperialists and their Yugoslav 
henchmen are rejoiced over this. 110 
China accused Nasser of attempting to coerce Iraq into a 
merger with UAR against the wishes of its revolutionary 
government. 
President Nasser has time and again 
stated that he does not demand 
annexation of Iraq. This is a good 
statement... The point is that the very 
many facts of current UAR-Iraqi 
relations do not conform with the 
spirit of these statements. It seems 
that official UAR utterances, including 
those of President Nasser himself, seek 
to depict all relations between the 
Arab states and even the foreign and 
domestic affairs of all Arab states 
other than the UAR as the internal 
affairs of the UAR... In other words, 
they not only want to annexe Iraq, but 
virtually regard Iraq as already 
annexed. And not only Iraq, they also 
regard all the Arab states as though 
they were already annexed! "' 
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L-ý, c 
Not surprisinglyLUAR adopted an anti-Chinese posture 
when rebellion broke out in Tibet in 1959'1'1ý and the 
conflict between India and China grew in intensity during 
the same year. China's unification of Tibet was viewed by 
UAR as an 'Eastern version of the Hungarian 
revolutioW. "' 
China, for its part, strongly objected to the 
attempts made by the UAR press to alienate Asian opinion 
by insisting that a revolution was under way in Tibet. "' 
The NCNA correspondent wrote as follows (23 April 1959): 
The Information Department of the UAR 
and newspapers under its direction have 
launched scurrilous attacks on China 
and tried to alienate her from other 
Asian countries following the rebellion 
of Tibet. 
The UAR Information Department 
recently issued a special sixty-page 
pamphlet which termed the rebellion in 
Tibet "the Tibetan Revolution". it 
said "The red dagger with which the 
communists stabbed Iraq is the same 
with which the communists stabbed 
Tibet... It predicted that Nepal and 
later India would be the next victims 
of communist aggression if Tibet was 
crushed. "L 
As far as China was concerned, Nasser's position on the 
Tibet question was a confirmation of his increasingly pro- 
Western tendencies and of a softening of his general 
attitude towards Western powers in line with that adopted 
by Tito and Nehru, the other two leaders of the non- 
aligned triumvirate. The Hsi4a N. A. (Cairo) issued a 
statement strongly protesting against reports in the UAR 
press of Nasser's policy of supporting India in the Sino- 
- 
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Indian conflict which seemed to be gathering momentum 
towards the end of 1959.111 . 
Relations between China and UAR deteriorated even 
further following the arrest of Farjala Helou, a Lebanese 
communist, by the UAR authorities (August 1959). The 
People's Daily (August 1959) carried the following 
comment: 
World opinion has been outraged by the 
illegal and brutal torture of Farjala 
Helou ... and demands that the UAR 
authorities release Helou immediately 
... Helou was kidnapped in a street in 
Damascus and was immediately thrown 
into a secret prison... So far, the 
authorities of the UAR have flatly 
denied the arrest and persecution of 
Helou in an attempt to evade their 
responsibility... 11-7 
Relations between China and UAR reached their lowest 
ebb when Khalid 9>pýdash, Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of Syria, was invited to attend China's 
National Day (1 October 1959). In the presence of Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai, -Ea3d; sh launched a vehement attack 
on the foundation of the United Arab Republic. '"', In his 
speech, which was broadcast over Radio Beijing, he stated 
that 
The attempt to merge Syria and Egypt, 
the intrigues of the ruling clique of 
the UAR against the Arab Republic, the 
understanding between Nasser and King 
Saud and King Hussein, the opening of 
the door to imperialist capital, and 
the slanders against the Soviet Union 
and People's China - all this 
shows... that the bourgeois monol5bly 
clique of Egypt are actively 
distorting, under the slogan of Arab 
unity... For carrying out their policy 
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based on narrow-minded and selfish 
class ambition. 
Today Syria is suffering from a 
despotic and chaotic system never 
before witnessed in her modern 
history. ""' 
UAR government retaliated against Baghdash's visit to 
China by ordering its diplomatic officials to boycott the 
National Day celebration at the Chinese Embassy in London. 
In Beijing, the Chai-E6 d'Affalr-es of "AR absented himself 
from the ceremony. "ý'c' On the same occasion, i. e., 
Baghdash's visit to China to attend China's National Day 
celebration, the UAR official newspaper RI Jnmhnria wrote 
(13 September 1959) as follows: 
... the most unexpected thing from China 
was its adoption of a policy against us 
and co-operation with a few communists 
at the expense of a people who were the 
first to recognise it. "' 
Unlike China, the Soviet Union's reaction to UAR's 
policy of persecution of the communists was not only 
delayed but also mild in tone. It was only after his 
visit to Iraq (March 1959), that Khruschev expressed the 
Soviet Union' s concern with the UAR anti-Iraq' and 
communist campaign"ý in the following terms: 
... sense will gain the upper hand and 
everything will be done to abolish this 
conflict and not allow the imperialists 
to use it in their own interests-It 
must be admitted that we are all 
grieved by the recent speeches of 
President Nasser in Damascus. When he 
speaks of Communism and communists in 
these speeches he arms himself with the 
tongue of the imperialists. "2,4 
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The Soviet Union' s main concern seemed to be to 
preserve State-to-State relations between itself and the 
Arab countries in fact, while mustering- international (and 
i, n particular Third World) support for its campaign to 
establish an American-Soviet D6tente. Nasser's anti- 
communist campaign did not stop the Soviet Union offering Llug- 
UAR a loan of $175 million. In October 1959, the 
Soviet Union offered UAR technical and financial 
assistance for the High Dam of Aswan. China's policy 
Lvlý 
towards(NAR stood in stark contrast to the Soviet Union's 
strategy of ignoring the latter's anti-communist policy 
and strengthening its state by offering aid and loans on 
favourable terms. 
12.2.1.2. China's Relations with Guinea 
With the exception of Algeria which was already 
deeply involved in a war of national liberation against 
the colonial power, Guinea was the only""ý French colony 
in Africa to reject de Gaulle's proposal for a Communaut6 
Frangaise unequivocally (1958). "ý-7 The Partle 
D6mocratique de GuIn6e (PDG>, under the leadership of 
Ahmed Sekou Tour6, demanded total independence without any 
political, economic, or other conditions imposed by the 
French colonial power. 
PDG led the campign against the referendum proposed 
by France (September 1958) for the admission of all their 
remaining colonies into the French community. 95 per cent 
of the Guin6an electorate voted for absolute and immediate 
independence. 'ý21111 
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A month later (2 October), the Republic of Guinea was 
proclaimed, but the country had to face adverse reaction 
from Western countries. France responded to Guinea's 
independence by withdrawing its technological experts and 
suspending trade relations with the new country. At the 
same time aid was cut off, telephones were ripped out, 
technical equipment was smashed, and even the police were 
stripped of their uniforms. According to Legvold, the 
French burnt (and destroyed) everything which could be 
burnt, and what could not be burnt was dumped into the 
sea. "' 
Internationally, France launched a general policy of 
economic blockade and U r3ej -- 
its allies to adopt a 
hostile position towards the newly independent Guinea. 'a' 
The French behaviour towards their former colony of 
Guinea, described by one author as an 'appalling act of 
spite' , 1: 3f., only increased the new government Is 
determination to implement its nationalist policy of 
independent development guided by socialist tendencies. "ý13' 
Despite the fact that Guinea's refusal to join the 
'French Community' led to undesirable economic 
consequences, it gained considerable political prestige 
among radical and anti-colonialist forces. Communist 
countries, and especially China (which was the only one 
among them with no diplomatic relations with France and 
which then adopted a non-conciliatory attitude towards the 
West), became a major source of support to Guinea. 
Guinea's resistance to pressure from the West could be 
maintained whilst its political isolation was relieved to 
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a certain degree by China's offer of friendship. Sekou 
Tour6 was already known for his communist sympathies. "3,4 
Under his leadership, Guinea became the centre of militant 
trade unionism in French West Africa. By the end of 1956, 
Sekou Tour6 succeeded in establishing the first 
independent Pan-African Trade Union organisation. "ýr- 
Zhou Enlai sent a message (9 October 1958) to Sekou 
Tour6 supporting Guinea's defiance of France. 
The fact that the people of Guinea have 
attained independence is another 
important evidence that the national 
independence movement in Africa is 
rising to a new upsurge. May Your 
Excellency and the people of Guinea 
achieve new successes in your cause of 
safeguarding national independence"3,1-- 
Guinea was immediately recognised by China and in turn 
Guinea recognised PRC. - In October 1959 both countries 
established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial 
1 eve 1.1 -c"*' 
As a token of support for Guinea, China sent (April 
1959) a gift of 10,000 tons of rice'ýý1511 followed by another 
5,000 tons which the Chinese ambassador to Morocco 
presented to Guinea (April 1959). 1-0 
Guinea became more and more friendly and aligned to 
the socialist countries, not only in the political but 
also in the economic spheres. The following table shows 
how Guinean foreign trade with the West dramatically 
declined while foreign trade with the countries of the 
East made rapid strides within a brief period of three 
years. 
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PERCENTAGE OF GUINEAS IMPQRTS OVER TOTAL IMPORTS 
FROM FRENCH ZONE AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 1959-1961 
Year French Zone Socialist Countries 
1959 74% 8% 
4 
1960 60% 26% 
1961 16% 33% 
Source: J. Suret-Canale, 'Les relations international 
de la Republic de Guin6e, in K. Ingham, (ed. ), 
'FrPnch Relations with African Stateal (London: 
Butterworth, 1974), p. 266. 
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12.2.2. Relations with 'Non-Progressive' States 
12.2.2.1 China's Relations with Moroccn 
Effective and united national-polit-ical resistance to 
French colonialism on Morocco's part began in January 
1944, when moderate and radical nationalist forces formed 
the Nationalist Independence Party (NIP). NIP wa s 
dominated by the moderates who were in favour of reviving 
the monarchy after the departure of the colonial power. 
As a result of NIP's political resistance to French 
colonialism Sultan Mohammed V was deposed and exiled - 
first (August 1953) to Corsica, and subsequently to 
bile 
Madagascar. At the same time, INIP was banned by the 
French authorities. 
Inspired both by the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu 
(April 1954) and the Algerian war of liberation which 
began in November 1954, politically-conscious Moroccans 
held a series of demonstrations against the ban on NIP and 
oppression of its leaders by the colonial power. NIP's 
resistance against the French colonial power was praised 
in the despatches published in the Chinese press as the 
rising nationalistic consciousness against colonialism. "' 
France was anxious to avoid the repetition in Morocco 
of political developments that were under way in Algeria 
with which it was being increasingly preoccupied. In an 
attempt to defuse any potential forces of resistance that 
might be lurking in NIP, France . (August 1955) 
beSan negotiations on the granting of independence to 
Morocco. Mohammed V was brought back to Morocco to head 
the Moroccan government. However, France finally 
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abolished the Protectorate of Morocco and recognised the 
country's independence much later (March 1956). 
Political differences within NIP, which were 
initially ignored in the interest of a united national and 
political resistance to French colonialism, came to the 
fore after the gaining of independence. Internal 
divisions arose. Two groups emerged. One was a moderate 
and traditionalist group led by Allal Ell-FaSi, and the 
other a radical group, headed by El MAhdf1*Ben Barka. This 
division led to a fall of the moderate government, and the 
formation of a new one led by Abdullah Ibrahim (December 
1958). One of the first measures introduced by Ibrahim 
was the legalisation of the Moroccan Communist Party which 
had been proscribed by the previous government. 
The radical government, however, could not work 
freely in the face of combined opposition from the 
UNQ 
monarchy and the moderate forces within/INIP. Ibrahim's 
government was dismissed with a view to containing the 
radical forces in NIP, and King Mohammed V made himself 
Prime Minister. 1121 At the same time, he nominated Crown 
Prince Mulay Hassan II, his. son, as Counsellor to the 
Throne. The latter became King when the father died 
(February 1961). 
Despite the reactionary character of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, China was more than willing to recognise it and 
established full diplomatic relations with Morocco. A 
second major transit route for arms and military equipment 
from friendly powers (e. g. China) to Algerian liberation 
fighters passed through Morocco. I `ý China counted itself 
-369- 
blA- 
among the major supporters ofZFLN in Algeria. Diplomatic 
relations with Morocco were necessary for China to 
maintain its contacts with the FLN forces in western 
Algeria. Thus, with the help of the influential radical 
forces in the Moroccan government, China established 
diplomatic relations with Morocco (November 1958). IAA 
Morocco's recognition of PRC did contravene the 
wishes of the United States and other anti-China forces. 
China's contacts"'*r- with Morocco, however, depended on 
events in Algeria, and in particular, on the activities of 
the Moroccan authorities along the Moroccan-Algerian 
border in facilitating the transfer of arms and other 
supplies for the Algerian FLN. 1,111-- Towards this end, 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Morocco, China set up a Consulate in Wejda and bases for 
military training along the Moroccan-Algerian borders. 11-7 
Trade also played an important role in promoting 
Sino-Moroccan relations. In August 1958, four months 
before the establishment of diplomatic relations (October 
1958), between the two countries, a commercial agreement 
was signed between Morocco and China. "I"I In October, 
another Trade Agreement was also signed. 1--9 Since then 
Morocco has been one of the largest trade partners of 
China in Africa. 'L', O Chinese exports to Morocco had 
usually consisted of green tea, silk imports and consumer 
goods. Moroccan exports have mostly been phosphates and 
sardines. "I 
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12.2.2.2. Relations with The 
The Sudan was one of 
represented at the Bandung 
presence at this conference 
its non-independent status. 
independent of British and 1 
1956.111 
Sudan 
the six African countries 
Conference (1955). IE; m -Its 
was, however, restricted by 
The Sudan became fully 
ý'gyptian rule only in January 
In contrast to the attraction Morocco held f or it, 
there was no strong objective reason for China to seek 
close relations with the Sudan. The Sudan's pro-Western 
policy on the one hand, and on the other, China's 
preoccupation with the Suez crisis and the Algerian war of 
national liberation account for the absence of diplomatic 
relations between China and the Sudan during the first two 
years of the latter's career as an independent state. 
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were, 
however, established in November 1958, "-r-11- following the 
coup d6tat in the Sudan led by Ibrahim Aboud. Trade 
provided the main impetus for Sino-Sudanese relations. In 
fact, trade relations between the two countries had begun 
as early as 1956.11--r- By 1964, China became the sixth"" 
largest purchaser of Sudanese cotton. '--7 Politically, 
however, the two countries did not come together until the 
second phase (1959-66) of Sino-African relations. 'r-113 
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12.3. People-to-People Relations or 
fUnited Front From Below'. 
12.3.1. China and the Algerian War of LiberRtion 1054-62 
Winning China over to our side is 
winning over a great power that 
frightens colonialists, but it does not 
frighten us because it stands against 
colonialism, not against liberation. lr-ý 
The Algerian war of liberation provided the major 
ideological impetus for China's early approach not only 
in Africa, but also in the world as a whole"--O (post- 
Bandung period) to non-communist national movements 
against colonialism. It also provided the occasion for 
the first successful case of supportive relations between 
China and an African liberation movement. It should be 
stressed that the ideological character of FLN (Algeria) 
and its adoption of armed struggle as the method of 
achieving liberation from colonialism provided the basis 
for militant solidarity embracing a number of countries in 
North Africa and _Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Týe FLN's position 
became even clearer following Algerian liberation. 
Algeria, under FLN's leadership, became the Macca of 
African liberation and revolutionary forces. ', ý-' 
Before discussing China's policy towards the Algerian 
war of liberation and the relations between PRC and FLN, 
it would be appropriate to survey in brief the development 
of the national movement in Algeria and the protracted 
struggle of the Algerian people against French colonialism 
(1830-1954). This struggle was described by Zhou Enlai 
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(29 September 1960) as a 19valiant and indomitable 
revolutionary 
- By 1954, it became clear to Algerian nationals that 
they had no option but to use armed struggle as the means 
to liberation. This was in conformity withACCP's ideology 
and practice of armed struggle. A consideration of the 
similarities and differences between the development of 
the Chinese and Algerian revolutions is also relevant to a 
proper understanding of the dynamic feature of the 
political relationship between China and the Algerian 
people during this period. 
12.3.1.1. 
France needed only a swipe with af ly-swatter at its 
Consul (29 April 1827) by the Dey (Governor of Algiers) to 
have an excuse to occupy Algeria for 132 years (14 July - 
1830 -5 July 1962). This incident was viewed by the 
French as an insult not only to their Consul, but also to 
their King (Charles X). The incident took place when the 
Dey submitted a protest to the French Consul, Deval, ' 
against France's failure to repay debts dating back to a 
year of famine in France (1792), when Algeria sent aid 
(mostly wheat)1`3 to the French. France sent an armada in 
retaliation. On its arrival, Admiral Koli demanded an 
open apology from the Dey and permission to allow the 
French flag to fly over El Kasba, a suburb of Algiers and 
the Headquarters of the Dey's office. These were 
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described by the Dey as most unwise stipulations that 
could come only from 'stupid politicianal. 'r-11 
The reasons for the harsh French reaction against the 
Dey, however, lay in their pursuit of colonial, economic, 
strategic and trade interests in what was, to the French, 
an important country. 'r-E-- 
Although an open and eventually successful struggle 
against French colonialism in Algeria began on 1 November 
1954, the resistance of the Algerian people politically 
and militarily went back to the very beginning of the 
French invasion (July 1830). It took the French colonial 
power more than' 20 years to dominate the fertile areas 
(mainly in the North) completely, and 86 years (1830-1916) 
to squash the resistance of the Algerian people as a 
whole. 
Among the resistance movements prior to 1954, was the 
one (1830-1847) led by jtýl Amir Abdul qZad'j r. "-ý 
Unlike other Algerian revolts"--7 before 1954, (? Cadlrls 
resistance was not a passing or local one. It was well 
organised; and, politically and militarily it was very 
successful. Right from the beginning, i7adir formed a 
government (with its capital in Maascar in north-west 
Algeria) consisting of ministers and secretaries dealing 
with internal and external affairs. "--" 
Militarily, (? ad s., r Is Peoplels Resistance was a 
peoples war in the correct sense of the term. It bore a 
close similarity to peoples wars which took place later 
in China and other parts of Asia and Africa. (? a. dir relied 
on the countryside as a strategic base for resisting the 
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colonial power, on the peasants as the major force in the 
army, on guerrilla operations as the means of resistance 
in towns, and on marches as the means of spreading 
resistance over larger areas. It was these factors that 
enabled Kader to lead a people's resistance in 38 
successful battles against the powerful French army. "---" 
The French colonial, authority was able to put an end 
to Kader's Peoples' Resistance (1847) only after a 
ruthless campaign against the masses which gave political 
and logistical support to Kader. The French, like the 
Japanese in China during the late 130s, pursued the policy 
of oppressing and killing inhabitants who refused to obey 
them, seizing their assets and land, and destroying any 
obstacles encountered by the French army. 170 
The second major resistance movement that took place 
before 1954 was led by Mohammed Al Mu? rl; ni, Xl She, . 1., kh 91 
Haddad, and BVmarza ? (1871), who succeeded in liberating 
many parts of the southern region of the central part of 
Northern Algeria (from BU -rj Du AvlalC*to McBl, U za near Sidi 
Aisa This revolt however, had no chance of succeeding 
in its objective in the face of the well-equipped French 
army which was despached to the area in the same year. 
Algerian Political Resistance 
Algerian political resistance began right from the 
day on which the Dey signed the Document of Surrender (5 
July 1830). On this very day a Committee was founded, 
which demanded the return of the French milit4ry forces to 
their own country. At the same time, it protested to the 
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French government against the humiliation suffered by 
Algerians at its hands and the crimes committed by the 
French against Algerians. 
Five major political parties and organisations 171 
were involved in the development of the national movement 
of Algeria before 1954. 
The'. Z? toile Nord A fri ca IneI Party (ENA 
literally, the Northern Star of Africa) was 
founded in Paris (1924). Initially, ENA 
consisted of immigrants belonging to North 
Africa living in France. 17M By 1927 ENA 
assumed a specifically Algerian character 
under the leadership of Massali El Hadj. 1-7ý1' 
ENA demands included the independence of North 
Africa, confiscation of big estates owned by 
the colons, opening of Arab schools, 
encouragement of small enterprise, and an end 
to the system of racial discrimination. 1741 
The Association of Muslim Olama (or, broadly 
speaking, intellectuals) (MOA). Formed in El 
Djezair (Algiers) (1931). Its objectives can 
be found in the following slogan given by 
Abdul El Hamid Ben Badis, its founder: 
Algeria our country 
Islam our religion and 
Arabic our language. 
The Party of the Algerian People (PPA) founded 
in Algiers in March 1937. PPA was originally 
founded by members of ENA, including Messali 
El Hadj, who played a leading role in founding 
both parties. PPA's political activities 
included the publication of its own paper, FL 
ShaAb (The People) in Arabic, demonstrations, 
and flying the Algerian flag against the 
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French authorities. The French colonial power 
responded by banning (1939) the Party. 
iv. The Manifesto Movement founded in February 
1943. This was a political organisation 
rather than a political party, and its 
strategy differed from that of the other 
political organisations. It attempted to make 
its views and demands known through internal 
and international channels and contacts. Its 
objectives included condemnation of 
colonialism, respect of the people's right to 
determine their own future, recognition of 
Arabic as an official language, freedom of the 
press, free education, Algerian participation 
in their government and the release of all 
political prisoners. '-7-s The list of these 
demands was sent (March 1943) to the French 
authorities in Algiers and to de Gaulle's 
government in exile which was based in London 
at the time. It was also copied to the 
American, British, &S)oviet and Egyptian 
representatives in 
_fMq;, 
erS ,, The Manifesto 
Movement's aim was to raise a worldwide 
awareness of Algerian problems in order to put 
pressure on France, which was itself then 
under Nazi occupation. 
Algerians hoped that the Nazi Occupation 
of France would make the French colonial power 
appreciate the burden of oppression and 
domination, and lead to their abandoning their 
racial and colonial practices in Algeria. 
During the Nazi occupation of France, 
Algerian participation in a joint struggle 
against Nazism and Fascism reinforced these 
-, fought hopes. More than 300,000 Algerians"IL 
alongside the French Army. Algerians believed 
i. 
-377- 
that once France was liberated, their own 
liberation would automatically follow. 
V. The 'Amis du Manifeste et de la Llbert6l 
(Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty - 
FML) was founded by Ferat Abbas in Setif (East 
Algeria) in March 1944-1ýCFML consisted of ex- 
members ofý. APP, (which was banned in 1939), 
MOA, and youth organisations. The mixed class 
structure and political orientation of L ML 
made it more of a united front than a 
political party. It held its first Congress 
in January 1945. Its major demands included 
the abolition of the system of mixed mairies, 
an end to the military rule in the south, and 
introduction of Arabic as an official 
language. "77 
/ In the event, however, the political means pursued by 
various Algerian political parties or movements with a 
view to achieving reform or independence came to nought.. 
On the very day on which victory over Fascism and Nazism 
was celebrated in Europe (VE Day -8 May 1945), and even 
as the closing stage of the signing of the UN Charter in 
San Francisco had been reached 'amid pious declarations of 
self-determination for subject peoples' , 1-7*11 Algerians 
prepared for a double celebration: of the victory over 
Fascism and Nazism, and of their own imminent liberation. 
The French authorities did not take kindly to 
Algerian people assuming that the victory of the Allied 
powers over Fascism-Nazism brought the hour of their own 
liberation from colonialism near. Algerians had to pay 
for waving their flag at demonstrations in the towns of 
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Setif, Galma, Kharrata and other nearby areas with the 
lives of 45,0001-7"', civilians who were put to death by the 
French soldiers and police within less than 60 hours. '1130 - 
Thousands of people, including their national leaders, 
were sent to prison or deported to isolated areas in other 
French colonies. 
After this massacre, Algerians realised that a 
civilian political struggle would not lead them to 
independence. The only alternative left to them was 
military action. It was left for the national leaders to 
form a united front in order to fight for Algeria's 
independence. 
12.3.1.2.11tFLN and the Algerian War of Liberation 
1954-1962 
Nine years after the infamous incident of 8 May 1945, 
armed struggle for the liberation of Algeria from French 
colonial rule was initiated by the Comlt6 R6VOIUtlonnaire 
pou. r I'Unit6 et d'Action (CRUA) founded in March 1954 by 
the 'Club des Neuf"r" (the Club of Nine) which was 
committed to armed resistance. 
76- 
CRUA divided Algeria into six wila7as (provinces> and 
appointed a commander for each wl la7a. From El Aouras 
(wilaya 1) mountains in the east of Algeria CRUA, under 
its new name - the National Liberation Front - (FLN), 
launched its first guerrilla attack (1 November 1954>"Il 
on the French police and army and their headquarters. 
This marked the beginnning of the first war of liberation 
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against colonialism not only in Algeria but in Africa as 
a whole. 
The success of the Chinese revolution of 1949, its 
challenge t C3 the United States, the most powerful 
imperialist country, during the Korean crisis (1951-53), 
and the defeat of French colonial power aý Dien Bien Phu 
were the major sources of inspiration for the Algerians in 
their war of liberation which was described by Fanon as 
the most hallucinatory war that any 
people has ever waged to smash colonial 
aggressi on. I ': a 
At the same time as Dien Bien Phu ended in a major 
historical defeat for French colonialists, and marked the 
end of their rule in Indo-China (1954), the seeds of a 
second major defeat for French colonialism were sown in 
the far more important outpost of Algeria. In Cairo (1 
t11R 
November) AFLN called upon all Algerians from each and 
every social section, political party and political 
organisation to join the national liberation struggle. 
FLN listed'its objectives as follows: 
Algerian independence and the founding of a 
democratic republic within the framework of 
Islamic principles. 
Preservation of all fundamental liberties 
without any social or religious 
discrimination. 
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A political cleansing operation and 
mobilisation of all the people for the task of 
destroying the colonial system. 
i. Awakening the world to the Algerian problem. 
Ensuring the unity of North African people 
within the Arab-Islamic framework and 
assurance of sympathy to all nations 
supportive of the Algerian cause through the 
UN Charter. 
In accordance with revolutionary principles 
and with due regard to internal and external 
conditions, the Algerian national liberation 
forces vowed to continue their struggle by 
every means until they realised [their] 
objective. 11311 
Less than two weeks (12 November) after the beginning 
of the war (1 November), the fighting spread to Jerjera's 
mountains in the eastern region (wila7a 2). "ýIr- By the end 
of the year, FLN made its voice heard and its objectives 
were embraced by a vast majority of the people throughout 
the country. 
týlp 
aN Like ?, ad IrIs Resistancee Movement earl ier, 
ý, FLN 
concentrated its activities in the countryside and on the 
mountain slopes. Its military organisation, the Army of 
National Liberation (ALN) consisted mostly, if not 
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entirely, of peasants representing the vast majority of 
the Algerian population, and who constituted the most 
deprived segment of Algerian society. 
UndoubtedlyZ. F_LN's success sprang from its reliance on 
the peasants and a systematic understanding and 
recognition of their revolutionary potential. 11ý17 The 
revolutionary potential of the Algerian peasant was at the 
core of Fanon's analysis of the developing situation in 
colonial areas. 
... in the colonial countries the 
peasants alone are revolutionary, for 
they have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain. The starving 
peasant, outside the class system, is 
the first among the exploited to 
discover that only violence pays. For 
him there is no compromise, no possible 
coming to terms; colonialisation and 
de-colonialisation are simply a 
question of relative strength. The 
exploited man sees that his liberation 
implies the use of all means, and that 
of force first and foremost. When in 
1956, after the capitulation of Guy 
Mollet to the settlers in Algeria, the 
Front de Llb6-ration Nationale, in a 
famous leaflet, stated that 
colonialisation only looses its hold 
when the knife is at its throat, no 
Algerian really found these terms too 
violent. The leaflet only expressed 
what Algerians felt at heart; 
colonialism is a thinking machine, not 
a body endowed with reasoning 
faculties; violence is its natural 
state, and it will only free them when 
confronted with greater violence. "BIB 
In August 1955, the FLN struggle reached a critical 
point when Algerianý3 went out into the streets (20 August) 
demonstrating their loyalty to and support for FLU 
liberation forces in opposition to French propaganda and 
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L- ke, 
f latly contradicting rumours thatLFLN had been crushed. 
The colonial authorities reacted - to these popular 
demonstrations by massacring 12,000 civilians, many of 
them were herded into a stadium in Skikda (in east 
Algeria) and mowed down. 
This incident worked to)FLN's advantage. Support for 
the struggle was intensified in all sections of the 
masses, including leading 'moderate' politicians (amongst 
them, Ferhat Abbas) who had been initially opposed to 
6ý< 
armed struggle. Abbas became a prominent,! FLN leader and 
the first President of'the Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Algeria (September 1958). 
Unequivocal support for FLN was demonstrated by 
traders, workers and small businesses in their unanimous 
response to its call for a General Strike (July 1956). 
In August 1956,2-F-ýN held its historic Congress of El 
Somam, '"11"5" at which the war of liberation took on a more 
organised and consistent shape. "'ý1: 11 The strategy was to 
work towards 
... the weakening of the French 
soldiers, an undermining of French 
economy, an isolation of France 
internationally and mobilisation of the 
masses in response to daily French 
massacre and other crimes against the 
Algerians. "' 
At the same time, a National Council of the Algerian 
Revolution (CNRA) was constituted at the Congress. CNRA 
held its first meeting on the spot, an Executive Committee 
was formed. In July 1957, this Committee was sent abroad 
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to Cairo where it could function effectively out of reach 
of the French authorities. 
Ufitil victory ofý'\FLN became imminent, it did not 
intensify its campaign for international political and 
material support. Self-reliance was the hallmark of the 
Algerian armed struggle until the point of no return. 
China greatly respected thiq\FLN strategy as revealed in 
the speeches and comments of Chinese leaders on the 
Algerian war of liberation. 
It was only in Cairo, at its second conference 
(1957), that/ýNRA decided to put more energy into bringing 
the Algerian issue to international attention and securing 
international support. The Algerian liberation struggle 
had already entered a new phase. _ýkd_FLN and the new 
provisional government (PGRA), founded an 19 September 
1958, embarked on the task of forging links with forces 
that were prepared to work towards the advancement of 
their armed struggle against the French colonial power. 
This development coincided with China's decision to 
continue its anti-imperialist policy rather than embrace 
the Soviet Union's conciliatory approach towards the 
Western world. Thus, FLN and China were thrown together 
into a situation that could only cement their 
relationship. 
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12.3.1.3. China and the First Stage of the Algerian 
Four maj or factors have influenced China's 
ideological posture towards the Algerian war of liberation 
(Jý 
and its relations wit LN. 
i. The FLN's adoption of the correct nethod for 
liberation, i. e. , armed struggle through the 
people's war, guerrilla warfare, and trust in 
the ability of the masses to confront a 
powerful French army consisting of 80,000 
troops. ""ý A similar strategy was used by CCP 
against both Japanese imperialism and Jiang 
Jieshi's army before liberation, subsequently 
urged by China as a practical example for 
other countries under colonial rule to follow. 
China's appreciation of Algerian tactics was 
clearly expressed by Zhou E lai in his speech 
at the Meeting of Cadres ofAI N (Algiers: 25 
December 1963) when he said that 
the great victory of the Algerian 
peoples' revolutionary struggles shows 
that confronted with imperialist armed 
oppression, the oppressed nations can 
win independence and liberation by 
fighting the counter-revolutionary 
armed forces with revolutionary armed 
forces. The Algerian revolutionaries 
have defeated colonialism precisely 
because they firmly relied on the 
peasants and all revolutionary people 
launched and persisted in armed 
struggle with the countryside as their 
base, and combined the other forms of 
struggle with armed struggle. "ý'ý 
The Algerian -war of 
liberation provided a 
practical example demonstrating the validity 
of China's insistence that armed struggle was 
an effective means for true liberation from 
colonialism in Africa and other parts of the 
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world. 'Peace can only be achieved by 
fighting for it, not by begging... '"'A 
In the above speech, Zhou Enlai stressed that 
The independence of Algeria is a great 
event in the contemporary African 
national liberation movement. It has 
set for the other African Peoples a 
brilliant example of daring to wage an 
armed struggle and daring to secure 
victory, and indicated to the oppressed 
nations throughout the world the 
correct road to win independence and 
freedom. "'3" 
The Algerian war of national liberation was 
viewed by China as a part of a nationalist 
wave spreading throughout the Afro-Asian 
world. It required the support of communist 
as well as all other anti-imperialist forces. 
In a commentary, Ta Kung Pao (June 1956) 
explained this in the following terms: 
The struggle of the Algerian people for 
national self-determination is part and 
parcel of the wave of national 
awakening that is sweeping the Asian 
and African continents. As an old Arab 
saying has it "when a horse smells 
water in the desert, no rein can check 
him". It is unthinkable that when 
Morocco and- Tunisia their neighbours. 
have won their independence, the 
Algerian people should continue to live 
under foreign rule. 111c, 
V. The Algerian war provided early evidence for 
China's opposition to the Soviet Union's new 
policy of peaceful negotiation as the best 
means of achieving liberation from colonialism 
and imperialism. 
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12.3.1.3.1. Soviet Attitude Towards the Alger: lan War: lsb-7 
An Algerian Point of View 
The Soviet, position towards the Algerian war of 
liberation was greatly influenced by the following two 
factors: 
The Soviet Union was certainly conscious of 
its Big Power status during the Cold War. it 
exploited any opportunity that presented itself for 
provoking splits and exploiting seeming contradictions 
within the imperialist camp. For the Soviet Union, 
France's commitment to the aim of achieving a united 
Europe as a bulwark against the expanding influence of 
the United States, provided an early occasion for 
attempting to experiment with a policy of providing 
encouragement to France in the achievement of its 
European objectives. Thus, the Soviet Union's 
friendly overtures to France during this period had 
the result of its condoning French colonialism by 
k: *R 6-10 
adopting a luke-warm attitude toPkLN. As one6AN 
journalist put it 
The Algerian problem was the victim of 
Soviet global concern, not mass 
concern. ""' 
It is interesting to note in this context 
a point of view towards the Soviet Union 
expressed by Dr. Abdull?. adir Zabadia, (October 
1983), Director of Documentation in the Arab 
League (Tunis), and a former Professor in the 
Politics Department at Algiers. He argued 
that the Soviet Union's policy of D6tente with 
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Western powers, whether under the leadership 
of Stalin or of Khruschev, would have held 
sway. The Soviet Union could not survive 
solely on a policy of committing its energies 
to the maintainance of a balance of power with 
the West as a whole in the Cold War. The 
Soviet Union needed some relaxation in the 
tension between East and West in order to 
realise its economic targets. 
According to Zabadia, the Soviet Union's 
position during the 160s was not dissimilar to 
that adopted by China during the 170s, but 
differed fundamentally from that during the 
150s and 160s. Unlike the Soviet Union, China 
was under direct threat from the United 
States. In order to overcome its feeling of 
insecurity, China needed to forge links of 
solidarity with forces which were prepared to 
resist instead of being content to coexist 
with imperialist forces. Sino-Algerian 
relations during the Algerian national 
liberation war were fundamentally guided by 
this neccessity. 
Strong criticism of the Soviet policy 
towards the Algerian war and warm appreciation 
of China's support for the Algerian struggle 
was expressed by Soukhal, LN- Director of 
the Department of Foreign Relations and an 
influential diplomat during the war. He 
argued that: 
Before the Soviet Union supports any 
movement or country, first and foremost 
it satisfies its global strategy and' 
interests as a Superpower. The FLN 
during the war did not fit into - 
the 
Soviet scheme because we could not be 
interested in -more than our daily 
struggle for liberation. The Chinese, 
despite our non-communist nature, 
understood our nationalist striving 
perfectly, and provided us with all 
-389- 
possible means of support for an anti- 
imperialist war. "311- 
In an article appearing (April 1958) in 
the FLN organ, the editor 
strongly criticised the Soviet Union's policy 
of appeasement towards France at the expense 
oft\FLN, for the sake of winning over the so- 
called 'French socialist government' led by 
Guy Mollet to its side. The editorial went on 
to argue that this Soviet position served no- 
one but the French colonialists. It was 
foolish of the Soviet Union to expect France 
to take an anti-American stance in view of the 
fact that the United States was the major 
source of finance for the costly French war bVC 
againstAFLN. The Soviet press was strongly 
criticised for misrepresenting Mollet's 
statement, during his visit to Moscow (May 
1956), to the effect that he was genuinely 
interested in finding a solution to the 
Algerian problem. The editorial concluded its 
argument by going even further and asserting 
that the Soviet Union's reservations about the 
Algerian nationalists were motivating the fear 
that America might replace France had the 
latter been expelled by Algeria. -ý12-1 
Another major factor which determined the 
Soviet attitude towards the Algerian 
revolution was closely related to a desire not 
to offendý2'0'1 the Communist Party of France 
(PCF), and its branch in Algiers. -PCF was 
-N 
clearly committed to winning seats in the 
French National Assembley, in accordance with 
Khruschev's doctrine of la parliamentary 
process' of socialism. 
Influenced by the decisions of their 
Soviet comrades, Algerian communists failed 
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both to understand the nationalist character 
of Algerian struggles, and to give their 
support to'ýýLN. Throughout the war, the 
Algerian communists spent most of their time 
analysing the FLN leadership' s class 
character, while the people were being 
massacred daily. They failed to u derstand 
that neither the masses as such, nor/TLN which 
represented their revolutionary force, could 
at that time, be preoccupied with class 
struggle or social change. Throu hout the 
period of nearly 8 years during which/\ýLN was 
engaged in its anti-colonial struggle, only 
one major congress was held (El Somam, 1956). 
This conference was geared to the purpose of 
leading a successful national liberation war, 
and not to formulating an ideology for a 
future, post-war Algeria. Right from the 
beginning, FLN made it clear that it was a 
national front which welcomed any individual 
who was prepared to put the national interest 
of liberation from colonialism above all 
ideological and social differences. In 
practical terms, communists in Algeria 
contributed almost nothing to the Algerian 
struggle and offered no credible challenge to 
French colonialism. 
Unlike the French and Algerian communists, 
CCP leaders repeatedly stressed that national 
liberation struggles waged in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America were inseparable from the 
interests of the working people in the 
capitalist countries. China urged socialist 
countries and Marxist-Leninists everywhere to 
support 
these j ust struggles resolutely, 
without reservation* Failure to 
support them would not only be 
detrimental to socialist interests, but 
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also serve the interests of the 
capitalists in the Western world. ý11ý1,4 
Had the Algerian communists adopted a 
positive attitude towards the Algerian war, 
FLN would have welcomed their contribution to 
the Algerian revolution after independence, 
a position they not only desired but 
died for, in accordance with the 
parliamentary road to socialism' 
(sic. ). 
In short, the Soviet Union's orientation 
to the Algerian war was, as one comnentator 
put it 
the realistic and typically un-heroic 
attempt of a great power to serve 
contradictory interests at the same 
time. ý" 
The above analysis of the Soviet position on the 
Algerian war was echoed in an early statement of 
Khruschev's in an interview withAPravda (4 October 1955), 
two months af ter the French massacre of Algerian 
civilians, ý201 (20 August). Khruschev stated the Soviet 
Union's view on the Algerian question in a way which could 
k=ý 
only be rejected byjýFLN as taking, on balance, the side of 
the French colonialists. 
... concerning events in North Africa, 
my first consideration was and is that 
the USSR does not intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other states and 
that a correct solution to this 
question can be found which will take 
account, of course, of the legitimate 
rights and national interests of the 
peoples of the French Union. ý11*11 
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12.3.1.3.2. China's Attitude Towards the Algerian War 
Unlike the Soviet Union, China's concern with the 
W 
Algerian situation and support for/\FLN dated back to the 
earliest stageý1ý1ý11`1 of the Algerian war. At the Bandung 
Conference (April 1955) Zhou Enlai reaffirmed his 
country's support for North African demands for 
independence. He argued that: 
The people of all independent countries 
should enjoy all fundamental human 
rights and not be subjected to 
maltreatment and discrimination... 
However, we cannot help being aware 
that the peoples of Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria and other dependent peoples 
have ceased to be suppressed with 
violence. ý"'O 
-IýCFLN regarded the Bandung Conference as constituting 
the initial basis for its solidarity and close relations 
with anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa, 
independently of non-Afro-Asian forces, (including the 
ýM $I 
6ký 
j_q _d4ýFLN's Soviet Union). EJ -Lhj weekly Journal, argued 
that, for the first time, Afro-Asian peoples 
had a conference initiated by 
themselves not an execution of a 
foreign idea. Significantly, no 
European, American or Russian was 
represented. -11 1 
In the same article pointed out that 
the Bandung Conference did not only 
demonstrate Afro-Asian solidarity for 
its common objective of liberation from 
colonialism, but it also demonstrated 
that Africa and Asian countries -became 
no longer committed to United States 
non-recognition of China and that 
allegations of communism as a danger in 
the world was irrelevant when Nehru 
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proclaimed "resistance to colonialism 
as the major task". --21-ý 
At Bandung itself the Algerian delegation, led by Mohammed 
Yazid, played an active part in the Bandung Conference. 
They met Ho Chi Minh, who led an inspiring victorious war 
against the French colonialism. Among the statements he 
made during his long conversation with them was "Les 
Franqais... that is a problem we know allll. ý'ý 
The Bandung Conference strongly supported the 
Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan right to independence and 
urged France to seek an immediate solution towards self- 
determination of North African territories. The Joint 
Communlqu6 of the conference contained the following view 
of North African independence: 
In view of the settled situation in 
North Africa and of the persisting 
denial to the peoples of North Africa 
of their right to self -determination, 
the Afro-Asian conference declaims its 
support of the right of the people of 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self- 
determination and independence and 
urges the French government to bring 
about a peaceful settlement of the 
issue without delay. zal-a 
The Bandung Conference not only marked the beginning of 
FLN's solidarity with the anti-imperialist forces in 
African and Asian countries. but also InnartPd 
international status for the first time to the Algerian 
issue and to FLN itself as the legitimate voice of 
Algerian independence. Five months after the Bandung 
Conference, the Algerian issue was formally included in 
the agenda of the UN General Assembly (October). ý2'1f- 
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After the Bandung Conference, China's concern with 
North African problems in general and the Algerian 
question in particular assumed great importance in China"s 
anti-colonialist struggle and its support for liberation. 
The Chinese leaders found the resolutions of the 
conference to be highly satisfactory as they had Af ro- 
Asian solidarity against the colonialist powers as their 
major objective. In his report on the 'Afro-Asian 
Conference' to the Standing Qnmnittee of the National 
People's Congreaca (13 May 1955), Zhou Enlai reaffirmed 
this orientation in the following manner: 
The phrase 'in all its manifes- 
tations'ýI'r- here denotes colonialism in 
all its political, military, economic, 
cultural and social manifestations and 
there cannot possibly be any other 
interpretation. The Asian-African 
conference supported the cause of 
freedom and independence of all 
dependent peoples, especially the fight 
for self-determination and independence 
of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. -" 
During the Suez crisis, (June-December 1956) the 
Chinese leaders, their press and propaganda seemed to have 
given little attention to the Algerian problem. This, 
however, should not be attributed to a lack of concern. "' 
The major aim behind the French invasion of Egypt during 
the Suez crisis was to put an end to Nasser's r6gime in 
Egypt which provided the main external base and acted as a 
major source of support for the Algerian FLN. ý'1'9' After 
all, China's support for Egypt as an Arab country 
constituted, at this stage, an indirect contribution to 
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the Algerian cause (even though China was not as yet a 
direct protagonist of FLN) not only because of the support 
W 
that 'FLN received from Nasser as the leader of the 
Egyptian anti-colonialist revolution. but also because of 
Algeria's Arab character. 
For these reasons, there was no reason whatever for 
Algerian national leaders to question in any manner 
China's support for Egypt against Israel and France, their 
common enemies. When the Suezz crisis was over, China was 
able to devote attention to the Algerian national 
liberation struggle in an explicit manner. This became 
evident when the Algerian question was discussed (February 
1957) by the UN Political Committee (UNPC). Under 
pressure from France and its allies, UNPC did no more than 
express the hope that: 
a peaceful democratic and just solution 
would be found through appropriate 
means, in conformity with the 
principles of UN Charter. ýý--"ýý 
This UN resolution i 
was far from compatible with FLN's demands. China viewed 
the resolution as an integral part of the designs of the 
NATO allies, under the leadership of the United States, to 
block the national demands of liberation forces and to 
protect the joint Western-capitalist interests by 
perpetuating the colonial system. On the day following 
the UNPC resolution, (15- February) the Peoplp's Daily 
wrote (16 February) as follows: 
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US opposition to any practical UN 
decision on the Algerian question was 
in fact support for the French colonial 
policy. 
The resolution in the UN Political 
Committee with the American support 
disregarded the essence and the ways of 
solution of the Algerian colonialism... 
The US was an arch supporter of 
colonialism. it had all round 
supported France's Colonial Policy 
towards the Algerian people and 
subsidised the French government's 
heavy war expenditure. `1 Through NATO 
the US had continuously supplied France 
with arms which were used to slaughter 
the Algerian people. 
The Algerian people have taken up 
arms against French colonialists 
because they can no longer endure 
colonial slavery and want to free 
themselves from the dark prison of 
oppression. The UN should check the 
French colonial atrocities, meet the 
national aspirations of the Algerian 
people and safeguard peace. ý-ý---2 
For China however, the Algerian nationalists had 
already taken on board the correct political strategy 
i. e., of armed struggle, in order to force French 
colonialism and its allies as well as UN, to recognise the 
independence of Algeria. International pressure on France 
and support for the Algerian struggle, as a secondary 
neccessity, could come only through direct solidarity with 
L%%4ý 
anti-imperialist forces outside and not through/\UN, 
dominated as it was by the leading anti-imperialist 
forces. 
Accordingly, China intensified its relations with FLN 
and solidarity with the Algerian people. In March 1957, 
Oujina Dris, Secretary of the General Union of Algerian 
Trade Unions, (UGTA): 2ýzzl, visited China where he was 
promised all means of support for a 'Complete victory'. ý2ý2- 
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During his visit, Dris addressed a meeting in Beijing of 
over one thousand workers' representatives for solidarity 
with the Algerian struggle. In June_, a five-member 
Algerian Students' Delegation, led by Mohammed Khmisti, 
Secretary of the General Union of Algerian Moslim 
Students, was received by prominent Chinese leaders 
leaders, including Zhou Enlai. ý-"-- 
In the same year, China offered (as it had done 
during the Suez crisis) volunteers to take part in the 
struggle of the liberation fighters in Algeria, including 
fighter bomber pilots, and those well versed in techniques 
of guerrilla warfare. ý2ý- In line with China's general 
policy, such an offer was strongly conditional one)FLN 
wishing for it; in no way was it sought to be imposed on 
the Algerian freedom fighters. In the event, this offer, 
was neither taken up by/YLN, nor was it ideologically 
compatible with China's emphasis on self-reliance. The 
very fact that such an offer was on the table, however, 
had the effect of lifting the morale-3, of the Algerian 
fighters, and causing alarm in French colonial circles. 
China did not usually publicise (or, for that matter, 
does not at the present time in the few areas of the world 
such as Kampuchea where it is involved) its material aid 
to African and other liberation movements which usually 
took the forml: 21 of weapons, military equipment, financial 
help and material supplies, for two reasons. 
Security, as mutually understood between China 
and the liberation movements concerned; and, 
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China regards it as its duty and as being in 
its ideological interests to support anti- 
colonialist and imperialist forces in whatever 
manner appropriate. This was clearly 
explained by Zhou Enlai in his speech at the 
Meeting of the Cadres of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (December 1963): 
Our Algerian friends have often 
mentioned the Chinese people's 
assistance to Algeria. In our opinion, 
to give assistance to the fighting 
Algerian people is our bounden duty. 
Assistance is always mutual. In fact, 
the help the Algerian peoples' struggle 
has given us takes first place. Our 
assistance to the Algerian people has 
been limited. The struggle and victory 
of the Algerian people are a great 
support and assistance to the people of 
China, the other socialist countries 
and all oppressed nations and peoples 
of the world. ý2ýýIc' 
The news of the size and content of military and 
financial aid given by China to any particular liberation 
movement is usually derived from unconfirmed sources or 
from individuals attached to, or active in it. It could 
also be gleaned from delegations, especially military 
ones, visiting China from time to time. 
In relation to the FLN, it was reported that the aid 
given initially by China (i. e., before 1958) was estimated 
at $4.9 millionl: ý" in addition to arms and military 
equipment provided through the Chinese embassy in 
Cairo-"' A visit to China by an FLN Military Delegation 
(March 1958), led by Ibrrahim Ghafa,: ý`ý': ý was undertaken in 
part with a view to arranging such military aid ancl 
equipment. Another reason for Ghafals visit was to attend 
-399- 
a big rally 'Support Algeria Day' , held in Bejing (30 
March 1958). Addressing the rally, Ghafa stressed the 
G0mm0n Sino-Algerian cause and the interest of both 
countries in opposing the NATO allies led by the United 
States which gave major military and financial support to 
the French colonial authorities. ýý- On the same occasion 
Peoplel-s Daily (30 March) wrote: 
The French decision to carry its 
suppression of Algeria to the bitter 
end is largely due to the backing of 
the United States... Washington has 
poured into France huge quantities of 
arms and millions of vehicles and 
hundreds of millions of dollars in 
loans and 'aid' to make up French 
losses in Algeria and meet the costs of 
the Algerian war. "-- 
12.3.2. Afro-Aaian PeQple's Solidarity Organisation 
(AAPSO) 
In the absence of any effective communist party or 
movements in Africa following the international line of 
CCP, especially in relation to armed struggle against the 
forces of imperialism and colonialism, the Afro-Asian 
People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) founded in 
January 1958 was valued highly by China for its contacts 
and solidarity with national independence and liberation 
movements in the continent. Some analystsý: ýý, ý- went even 
further by viewing the organisation as the principal 
vehicle for China's influence in the Afro-Asian world as a 
whole, and in Africa in particular.! --'-- 
The AAPSO served as an important outlet for attempts 
to mobilise anti-colonialist forces for more positive 
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action (e. g., armed resistance) and for extending material 
support to freedom fighters. It also served as a major 
channel for the Chinese policy of pronoting Afro-Asian 
solidarity, not only at a people-to-people, but at a 
State-to-State level. Most African governments had 
official or non-official representatives accredited to the 
organisation. China hoped to exert political influence on 
LIM 
African countries throught\AAPSO, along lines similar to 
the Soviet Union which had a powerful following in other 
international organisations, such as&WFTU andkXWPM. 
It must be stressed that AAPSO was by no means the 
only channel open to China for extending its support for 
anti-colonialist forces. OAU's Liberation Committee has 
also been an important outlet through which aid to 
liberation movements has been delivered and received. 
Progressive African r6Eimas such as Ghana under Nkrumah 
(until 1966), Algeria, and Tanzania, have also served as 
effective venues for facilitating the transfer of aid from 
socialist and other sympathetic countries to liberation 
forces, whilst acting as the headquarters of a number of 
liberation organisations and as bases for guerrilla 
training-"' 
The first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in 
Cairo (26 December-I January IQ-57), was attended by 500 
delegates representing 45 entities, organisations and 
national independence as well as liberation movements. ý'ýý` 
Among the issues discussed in the preparatory stages 
of this conference, was whether or not an invitation 
should be extended to the Soviet Union. It was, however, 
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eventually settled when the Soviet Union hastily 
established, in its domestic sphere of relations, a Soviet 
National Asian Solidarity Committee. ý40 Initially at 
least, this was sufficient to give the Soviet Union an 
Asian status and the qualification to attend the Afro- 
Asian Solidarity Conference. 
China was concerned that the presence of the Soviet 
Union might transform it into yet another Soviet-dominated 
international front. Until 1959, however, (i. e., until 
Khruschev's visit to the United States), Sino-Soviet 
ideological differences were still contained within the 
bounds of friendly public debate, ýýA' without seriously 
undermining the relations between the two countries. They 
had not yet reached a stage at which each would openly 
condemn the other's world view or compete with the other 
for influence or leadership in international peoples' 
organisation, or in the world as a whole. 
Thus, at this first conference, neither the Soviet 
Union nor China engaged in explicit criticism of one 
another. China would ideally have liked the Soviet Union 
excluded from the AAPSO, in order that its specifically 
Third World character was not compromised. In believing 
so, China was inspired by the example of the Bandung 
Conference which three years earlier, had succeeded in 
excluding the Soviet Union without causing offence. 
People's Daily (27 December 1957) gave expression to 
China's strong support for, and clear understanding of the 
aims of the conference: 
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Delegations from more than 40 African 
and Asian countries or areas, 
representing two thirds of the world's 
population, are attending the Congress. 
Alt-hough these countries or areas have 
different social systems, ideologies, 
languages and customs, the people there 
share a similar experience and a common 
desire. The overwhelming majority have 
suffered -or are sufferi. ng from 
imperialist oppression, enslavement and 
slaughter... Common experience and fate 
has joined all the African and Asian 
peoples together at heart. Their 
common demand is to fight for and 
safeguard independence and freedom, 
consolidate world peace and promote 
friendly coexistence among the people 
of all countries. ý'-ý 
This conference adopted three important resolutions, all 
pro-Chineseý`ý3 in character: 
A resolution giving expression to a general 
stance opposing colonialism, imperialism and 
the Western powers. The general theme of this 
resolution was based on an adherence to the 
ten maj or--211 principles of the Bandung 
Conference - but more emphatically to 
liberation from colonialism, including the 
advocation of armed struggleý, Ilr- "to oppose 
imperialism and colonialism".! "--',, "-- 
The conference made a strongly worded demand 
for the restoration of China's legal and Lwz 
rightful place in UN. ý-, 11'7 rý 
The third major resolution concerned the 
emphasis on direct revolutionary action 
against colonialism and imperialism and 
Western policies as a whole, in opposition to 
policies emphasising D6tente, disarmament and 
a ban on nuclear weapons. 7ý, 11191 
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China hailed the outcome of the conference and its 
resolutions with characteristic enthusiasm. People's 
Daily wrote immediately after the conference thus: 
The people of the two continents want 
to take their destiny into their own 
hands and want to take an active part 
in determining the destiny of all 
humanity. They are profoundly aware 
that in the present peace is 
unadvisable. The establishment of 
lasting peace is inseparable from 
national independence movements. Only 
when the people of all countries have 
gained independence and equality can a 
stable and lasting peace come into 
being. This is a good for which all 
our nations in Asia and Africa should 
jointly fight. ý"- ' 
China did not seem to consider the favourable results 
of the first conference of the AAPSO as transit. it 
placed a high value on the resolutions of the conference 
as fundamentally important for the anti-imperialist front. 
Zhou Enlai chose the National People's Congress (February 
1958) as the forum for communicating China's understanding 
of the positive revolutionary role that could be played by 
Afro-Asian solidarity. 
The conference maintains that all 
people are entitled to the same rights 
of freedom, self-determination, 
sovereignty and independence. These 
resolutions without doubt voiced the 
common will of the hundreds of millions 
of people in Asia and Africa. There is 
still a long struggle ahead in the 
national independence movements in Asia 
and Africa and there will inevitably be 
more twists and turns in their future 
development, but the Asian and African 
peoples have-already stood up and will 
never again be crushed. ý--r-la 
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Despite the failure of the conference to endorse its 
early moves in the direction of D6tente the Soviet Union, 
too, seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of the 
conference. This is understandable in view of the Soviet 
Union's much publicised though not yet practiced, policy 
of peaceful coexistence at the time of the conference; 
(Khruschev confirmed his non-hesitation regarding D6tente 
when he visited the United States in 1959 (a year after 
the conference) and from its attempts to win over the 
organisation to the Soviet camp. Rashidov, the head of 
the Soviet Delegation, explained the Soviet support for 
the conference in the following terms: 
this Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, 
its spirit and its ideas are supported 
by all honest men throughout the world, 
because it is... anti-colonial and anti- 
imperialist and thus at the same time 
just, progressive and humane... 
The Soviet people support the 
consolidation of those forces in the 
Afro-Asian countries that will 
henceforth play an important role by 
extending the zone of peace in the 
struggle against the rotten system and 
piracy of imperialism... Brothers, 
Comrades and Friends, lift up your 
heads, the end of your enslavement is 
at hand. -ý"` 
The conference was endorsed not only by the 
progressive and socialist forces, but also by anti- 
communist ones. The shared objective was an Afro-Asian 
solidarity for independence and liberation. In an 
interview with one commentator, John Kale, the General 
Secretary of the Uganda National Congress, for example, 
explained: 
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For those of us who were taking part in 
such an important international 
conference for the first time, and 
rubbing shoulders with cabinet 
ministers, presidents -and prominent trade unionist, scientists, artists, 
and writers from countries all over the 
world, Cairo was a tremendous 
experience. For the first time we felt 
we were being taken seriously.. They 
all treated us as equals, whether they 
had won independence forty years ago or 
perhaps only a couple of years 
back... Although many of us 
instinctively, and some of us even 
consciously, rejected Soviet 
interference in our works, although 
many of us distrusted the communists, 
this mistrust was outweighed by a 
feeling of real gratitude that a great 
world power should support our 
demands. ý-'-ý 
At this conference, Cairo, as the first host, and as 
a strategic centre splicing Asia and Africa together 
politically, was chosen to be the permanent headquarters 
of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Council (AAPC). Anwar As-Sadat 
was nominated as President of the Council (with 
representatives of the Soviet Union and India as Vice 
Presidents). 
Youcef As-Sibai, ý2--: 3 another Egyptian, was elected 
t; N.. A 
Secretary General ofAAAPC. ýr- The members of the 
permanent Afro-Asian Secretariat (initially proposed by 
the Soviet Union) were either communists representing 
China, the Soviet Union, Japan, India and the Sudan, or 
militant nationalists (in opposition to colonialism and 
imperialism) representing Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq and 
Syria. Yang Shuo, the Chinese representative, arrived 
in Cairo in April 1958-111 China's initial financial 
-4M- 
I, - k4 - 
contribution toAAAPSO ($28000) was larger than that of the 
Soviet Union ($25,000). ýr-7 
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9 
Country of Origin Year 58 59 
Algeria 5 6 
Angola 1 1 
Botswana - 
Burundi - 
Cameroun 1 6 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Congo Kinshasa 2 1 
Central African Republic 1 1 
Chad - 
Dahomey 
Ethiopia 
Gabor. 
Gambia - 
Ghana 1 3 
Guinea - 3 
Guinea (Bissau) 
Ivory Coast - 
Kenya 1 2 
Lesotho - 
Libya 1 
Malawi - 
Mali 1 1 
Mauritania 1 1 
Mauritius - I 
Malagasy 1 2 
Mozambique - 
Morocco 2 4 
Niger - 
Nigeria 1 
Rhodesia - 
Rwanda - 
South Africa 1 1 
Senegal 3 1 
Sierra Leone 1 1 
Somali Republic I 
Sudan 2 3 
South West Africa - 
Swaziland 
Tanganyika 1 
Zanzibar - 
Tunisia 1 2 
Uganda 1 2 
United Arab Republic 9 1 
Togo 1 
Zambia - 
Blk. African Youth 3 3 
Blk. African Trade Un. 1 2 
Annual total 
General Total 
44 50 
94 
Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China' s Policy in Africa 1958-71 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974>, 
p. 270 (Table 2). 
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TABLE 1.21.8 
CHINESE DELEGATIONS VISITING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1958-1959) 
Country Visited Year 58 59 
United Arab Republic 
. 
11 3 
Morocco 3 2 
Tunisia 2 2 
Sudan 2 1 
Ghana 2 
Guinea - 2 
Algeria 
Congo-Kinshasa 
Ethiopia 
Mali 
Somali Republic 
Dahomey 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Tanganyika 
Zanzibar 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Burundi 
Gabon 
Ivory Coast 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Cameroun 
Central African Republic - 
Congo-Brazzaville - 
Zambia - 
Mauritania - 
Mauritius - 
Equatorial Guinea 
Libya 
Annual total 20 10 
General total 30 
Source: A. OSunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 
t 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
269 (Table 1). 
-409- 
Chu Jung-eu, 'Foreign relations of New China during 
the past five years', World Culture <5 October 1954), 
in Cur-rent Background 307 (6 December 1954), pp. 1-9. 
2. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work. 
3. Following many strikes and anti-colonial disturbances 
in 1948, Nkrumah formed the Convention People's Party 
(CPP) in 1949. _kZPP led a campaign of positive action 
against the colonialist power which included strikes, 
boycotts, civil disobedience etc. Britain was, as a 
consequence, obliged to grant internal autonomy to 
Gold Coast (1952). Nkrumah became the head of the 
first 'responsible government' . Four years later, 
CPP's continuous demands for complete independence 
forced Britain to grant independence to Gold Coast 
(1956). Nkrumah was elected the first Prime Minister 
of Gold Coast, then renamed Ghana. 
4. With Kotane were two other South African observers 
representing OAANC and the South Af rican Indian 
Congress (SAIC>. 
5. B. D. Larkin, o12. cit., p. 17. 
6. A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-196Z 
(London: Macmillan. 1977), p. 131 and p. 246. 
7. 'Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the Bandung 
Conference' (19 April 1955), in People's China (16 
May 1955), p. 9. 
8. Jbidem. 
B. D. Larkin, o12. cit. , p. 14. For a similar view, 
see A. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 14. 
10. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Chinese representatives at the conference made any 
specific attempts to open up contact with Africa, it 
would be reasonable to assume that the conference 
must have provided a number of occasions f or 
repResentatives to meet informally and exchange views 
onrNmatters. 
11. B. D. Larkin, op. cit. , p. 19. 
12. See Chapter 5 of this work. 
13. Tbidem. 
14. At Bogor Conference some countries (e. g. Pakistan, 
Thailand and the Philippines) suggested that Taiwan 
should also be invited to the conference. However, 
this was opposed by the vital majority including Arab 
-410- 
countries which succeeded in preventing Israel being 
invited to the conference. See G. H. Jansen, Non- 
Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (New York: 
Praeger, 1966), pp. 173-176. 
15. Ibid. , p. 176. 
16. Zhou En-lai, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno emerged from 
the Conference as the four major champions of the 
Afro-Asian independence movement. 
17. cited in G. H. Jensen, OP-cit., p. 220. 
18. Mau Mau in Kenya was a short lived movement and it 
did not constitute a positive contribution to the 
development of a strategy of liberation. It failed 
to lead the country to independence. See Chapter 
13.3.2.8 of this work. 
19. People's China (21 January 1956), cited in B. D. 
Larkin, op. cit., p. 23. 
20. See Chapter 5 of this work. 
21. China also established diplomatic relations with the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria 
(GPRA) in September 1958. See Table 4.1. 
22. References to Egypt in this thesis should be viewed 
in the light of internal developments which led to 
the formation of the United Arab Republic WAR) in 
February 1958, from which Syria effectively withdrew 
in September 1961, and of the fact that Egypt 
continued to refer to itself as UAR until 1972, when 
Sadat altered its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
For consistency's sake, we refer to African countries 
by their geographical names rather than by their 
changing political nomenclature throughout this 
thesis. 
23. There was no possibility of China establishing 
diplomatic relations with King Farg?!. 5 government. 
See Chapters 3 and 4 for the rationale underlying 
this observation. 
24. Similarly, a brief discussion of the character of the 
political regime or movement is included in every 
case dealt with in Part III. 
25. For a succinct discussion of Far%J' role, 
Hopwood, Egypt: Politins-, 
' and ý nniety 
1-9Z 
(London: George Allen Unwin, 1982), pp. 19-33. 
see D. 
R- 1 OR I 
26. Nasser Mon I'm Eddine, Arab-chineýse Relations 1949- 
1979 (Beirut: Institute for Research and Publishing, 
1980), p. 40. 
27. Ibid., p. 4.1 
-411- 
28. A. Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972), pp. 
45-6. 
29. Ibid., p. 46. 
30. Ibid., p. 50. 
31. quoted from R. R. Bowie, SUPZ 10911 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), p. 8. 
32. cited in A. Nutting, op. cit., p. 50. 
33. Until the death of Stalin (1953), for ideological 
reasons, the communist world was not prepared to 
support or recognize national bourgeois regimes and 
non-aligned countries of the Third World. Thus, 
military aid from the Soviet Union and its allies as 
an alternative source was out of the question at this 
juncture so far as Egypt was concerned. 
34. J. (Ed. 
35. Prensa Latina, The Non-Aligned Countries (A 
publication by Harney and Jones, translated from 
Spanish by Dr. Ivo Dvorak) (London: Harney and Jones 
Limited, 1982), p. 208. 
36. R. R. Bowie, o12. cit. , p. 5. 
37. This pact was virtually as good as signed by Turkey 
and Iraq, even though it did not formally take effect 
until February 1955. Britain (February), Pakistan 
(September) and Iran (November) followed suit by 
joining the pact. The United States acted as the co- 
ordinator of the pact. In Nasser's view the pact 
constituted an integral part of imperialist and neo- 
colonialist designs against the Arab people. 
38. R. R. Bowie, op. cit -, p. 8. 
39.0. Aluko, The Foreign Polici; -f--, of Afrjran States 
(London: Hodder amd Stoughton, 1979), p. 44. 
40. R. R. Bowie, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
41. This is widely emphasised by Arab academic observers 
and ordinary people, certainly those whom the author 
interviewed in Tunisia (October 1983) and Algeria 
(various dates 1983-6). 
42. R. R. Bowie, op. cit. , p. 2. 
43. Ibidem. 
44. For details on the Suez Crisis, see, for example, C. 
Pineau, 1956/Sue-- ' (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1976); T. 
-412- 
Robertson, Crisis: Inside the Story of the Sup-, 
Consl)iracy, (London: Hutchinson, 1965); H. Thomas, 
The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1967); L. L. Whatten, The Canal: Four Power Conflict 
in the Middle Ea-. t (London: The MIT Press, 1974); J. 
Massu (Ed. ), V6rit6 sur Suez 1ID56 (Paris: Librairie 
Plon, 1978); S. Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1978); and A. Nutting, 
op. cit.. 
45. M. H. Ha4kal, Qissat OýOJL9'ýL_ (The History of Suez-) 
[(Beirut: Sharikat clý_rnaý%: ýaaVjc 1%MaWZ: PWa 401-nashr) (Publishing and Delivering Company), 19771, p. 138. 
46, R. R. Bowie, op. cit. , p. 18. 
47. The Company's main office was in Paris and its 
General Manager was a French person. 
48.48 per cent of the French oil supply came through 
Suez; France shared about 50 per cent of the shares 
of the company. See R. R. Brown, op. cit., p. 26. 
49. cited in R. R. Dowie, op. cit., p. 26. 
50. X. H. Halkell, o12. cit. , pp. 198-203. 
51. S. Milne, 'Egypt Invasion Already Planned', 1he- 
Guardian (2 January 1985), p. 3. 
52. For a detailed account of the implication of American 
links with the Suez crisis and its relations with its 
Western allies, see, for example, S. Lloyd, op. cit. , 
passim; T. Robertson, 012. cit., passim and M. H. 
Haikel, ojý. cit., passim. 
53. Yeh Po-t'ang, 'Peking Policy Towards Africa as viewed 
from the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique' Issue and studi,.,, 10 (December 1974): 
15, p. 3. 
54. M. H. Ha5 kel 1, op. c it. , pp. 147 FF. 
55. Eisenhower served as an American President for eight 
years (1953-1961). 
56. Yeh Po-t I ang, 012. ci t-, p. 2. 
57. The Egyptian revolution was still viewed by China and 
the communist world as a whole as springing from 
Anglo-American or inter- imperialist competition for 
expanding their spheres of control rather than as 
carrying the seeds of genuine socio-economic change 
or change of international orientation. The Soviet 
Union's Encyclopaedia (1952) characterised the Free 
Officers as a "reactionary group of officers in 
alliance with the United States". cited in A. 
Hutchison, op-cit., p. 8. 
-413- 
4,3W 
58. See ChapterAll of this work. 
59. See Chapter 4 of this work. 
60. See Chapter 4.1 of this work. 
61. Ch i na Is dec isi on in 1952 (see I. Fedda, op. cit. , p. 
104), to let the Chinese Muslims go on pilgrimage Al 
Haj in mecca) through Cairo must have contributed to 
the building of goodwill between China and Egypt. 
62. Author's translation from I. F. Mdda, ibid., p. 105. 
63. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1()58- 
Z1- (London: Cambridge University Pr ess, 1974). p. 8. 
In admiration of their heroism, the photos of Nehru, 
Zhou En-lai and Sukarno hung on the wall of Nasser's 
office. 
64. Ta Kung Pao (Peking, 18 July 1955), reproduced in G. 
P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, 
E New Delhi: School of International Studies, 
Jawahavlal Nehru University, 19731 [unpublished Ph. D. 
Thesis], p. 26. 
65. Zhou En-lai and Nasser first met in Rangoon (capital 
of Burma) on their way to Bandung. See B. D. Larkin, 
China and Africa 1949-1970 op. cit., p. 8. 
66. Ibid., p. 17. 
67. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong 11 May 1955), reproduced in G. 
P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, 
op. cit,., p. 27. See also King-lip Hsu, 'Communist 
China's Diplomacy in the Middle East', T, --; --ue and 
Studies 16 (March 1980): 3, pp. 73-4. 
68. Less than three weeks (1 April 1955) before the 
Bandung Conference (1 
,8 
April), People' s China (later 
Peking Review and now Beijing -Review 
) published a 
report on the historical ties between China and the 
Arab world tracing Sino-Arab relations as far back as 
the closing century B. C. and developed further after 
the introduction of Islam. See Pai Shou-yi, 
'Historical Ties between Chin and the Arab World', W 
People's China 1955 Q Apri k 24 7 PP - 
1956 
69. People's China (16 SeptembetV: 18, P. 24 
reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, Chin a's Policy in 
Africa 1949-1964, op. cit., p. 127. 
70. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work. 
71. See A. Hutchison, - op. cit. p. 15; and B. D. Larkin, 
p. cit., p. 21. 
72. Ibid., p. 15. 
-414- 
73. Ibid., p. 198. 
74. A. Ogu nsanwo, OP .ciI-, p-9; and G. P. Deshpande, 
China's Policy in Africa 1049-1954, op. cit., p. 28. 
75. New China News Agency 28 July 1956) in Survey of 
China Mainland Fýresý., No. 134 <1 August 1956), 
reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, 'Strategy of the 
United Front Against Imperialism: A Study of Sino- 
UAR Relations 1956-1959', IDSA (India) 14 (1975): 3, 
p. 357. 
76. See Part I. 
77. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., p. 136. 
78. cited in J. E. Khalili, 'Sino-Arab Relations' , Asian 
Survey- 7( August 1968>: 8, p. 680. 
79. G. P. Deshpande, 'Strategy of the United Front 
Against Imperialism: A Study of Sino-UAR Relations', 
op. cit. , p. 358. The canal was nationalized on 
26 
July 1956. The Chinese papers carried reports of it 
beginning on 28 July. 
80. Ibid., p. 358. 
81. See Table 12.4. 
82. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1064, 
op. cit. , P. 31 - 
83. New China News Agency (5 September 1956) cited in 
ibid., p. 31. 
84. New China News Agency (20 September 1956) cited in 
ibid., p. 32. 
85. See also A. Ogunsanwo, 012. cit., p. 9 and pp. 21-22; 
Z. Brzezinskir, ) OP. cit., p. 157; and B. D. Larkin, 
op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
86. King-yi Hsu, 012. cit -, p. 74. J. E. Khalili reported 
that as many as 280,000 volunteers offered to fight 
on Egypt's side, see his 'Co=unist China and the 
United Arab Republic'. Asian Survey 10 (April 1970): 
4, p. 3 11. 
87. New China News Agency (11 November 1956), reproduced 
in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949- 
1964, op. cit., 
88. New China Ne s Agenc_x (Cairo: 23 January 1957) 
cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
8g. Hsinhua News Age" no. 59 (30 December 1957), p. 17. 
-415- 
90. See, for example, Peking Review 1 (11 Xarch 1958); 
and New China News Agency (24 February 1958) in G. 
P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, 
op. cit., p. 48. 
91. cited in ibid., p. 47. 
92. cited in ibid., p. 52. 
In the same year, in an article in Foreign Affairs, 
Nasser affirmed his strong opposition to communist 
infiltration. 
There would not be any communist 
infiltration in any part of the 
Middle East and Africa if the 
United States could develop a 
courageous policy -and the only 
morally correct one - of 
supporting those who are anxious 
to get rid of foreign domination 
and exploitation. 
see his 'The Egyptian Revolution', Foreign Affairs 33 
(April 1955): 3, p. 211. 
93. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, 
op. cit. p. 41. 
94. Peoi2le's China (12 January 1957) cited in ibid. , p. 
41. 
95. New China News Agency (19 January 1957) cited in 
ibid., p. 42. 
96. cited in ibid., p. 45. 
97. Peking Review 1 (22 April 1958): 21, p. 3. 
98. See Table 4.1 of this work. 
99. Peking Review 1 (April 1958): 5, p. 21. 
100. Survey of China Mainland Prea-- no. 1766 (May 1958), 
p. 30 reproduced in A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 34. 
101. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Afri, -. a 194g-lg64, 
QP. Cit., P. 49. 
102. New China News Agency (15 December 1958), cited in 
ibid., p. 49. 
103. Peking Review 1 (2-1 October 1958): 34, P. 13. 
104. A. Ogunsanwo, 012. cit., p. 34. 
105. Survey of China Mainland Preaa no. 1819 (23 July 
1958), cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy ijj 
Africa 1949-1964, op-cit., pp. 50-51. 
-416- 
106. King-yi Hsu, op. cit., p. 74. 
107. Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign policy in the 
Arab World, 1955-75 (London: Kegan Paul 
International Ltd., 1981), pp. 3-5. 
109. Thid., pp. 111-112. 
(author's translation)ý)b 
110. New China News Agency (Peking: 19 March 1959), 
cited in G. P. Deshpande, China'---; Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., p. 58. 
People's China (20 March 1959), reproduced in Peking 
Review, 2 (24 March 1959): 12, pp. 6-9. 
112. See, for example, A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. , p. 25; A. Hutchison, o12. cit. , p. 21, G. P. Deshpande, China' s 
Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
113. cited 
114. Pekin 
115. cited 
11949- 
116. Pekin 
117. cited 
1949- 
118 cited 
in A. Hutchison, op. 
g Review 2 (13 October 
in G. P. Deshpande, 
1964, o12. cit. , p. 60. 
g Review 2 (13 October 
in G. P. Deshpande, 
1964, op. cit. , p. 61. 
in A. Ogunsanwo, op. 
Lt. , P. 2 1. 
1959): 41, p. 25. 
China'--; Policy in Afric 
1959): 41, p. 25. 
Chln, al-: ý Policy in Afri 
Lt. , p. 26. 
110. JMJP (Jen-min Jih pao: People's Daily 30 September 
1959) cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in 
Africa 1949-1964,6p. cit., p. 62. 
120. A. Ogunsanwo, op-cit., p. 26. 
121.1. FRdda, op. cit., p. Ill (author's translation from 
Arabic). 
122. See, for example, D. R. Hopwood, OP. cit -, pp. 67-70; 
A. Hutchison, OP. cit -, p. 22; A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. , 
pp. 24-25; and G. P. Deshpande, China'a Policy in 
Africa 1949-1964, OP-cit., pp. 53-54. 
123.1. Deutscher, 012. cit. , p. 218 and passim. 
124. cited in G. P. Deshpande, Chinals Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, Qp, cit., p. 54. 
125. A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 23 (note 1). 
-417- 
126. Tunisia and Morocco had won their independence before 
de Gaulle proposed a Union of African Colonies under 
French protection (see Table 12.1). Other French 
colonies accepted membership of de Gaulle's 'French 
Communi-ty'. S-ee Wei Liang-Tsai, op. cit. , p. 110 and 
A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. , p. 30. 
127. In September 1958, de Gaulle submitted the 
constitution of the Fifth French Republic to a 
popular referendum. It provided for the admission of 
French colonies into a 'French Community'. 
128. Prensa Latina, op. citop. 2.66. 
129. A. Hutchison, op-cit., p. 53 and A. Ogunsanwo, 
op. c i-t. , p. 3 0. 
130. R. Legvold, Soviet Policy in-Wpst Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), cited in Wei 
Liang-Tsai, op. cit., p. Ill. 
13 1. Prensa -Lat 
i na, op. ci t. p. 2 65, 
132. A. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 53. 
133. (4be. 2-615 
134. See A. Hutchison, 012. cit., p. 53, and C. R. Allen, 
CQmmunist China and Africa [Washington D. C.: 
Political Sciences General, The American University 
19691 [unpublished M. A. Thesis), pp. -06-97. 
135, C. R. Allen, op. cit. , p. 96. 
137. Peking Review 2 (13 October 1959): 4 1, p. 2 6. See 
also Table 12.1. 
1318. P. Ri cher, op - e-. it-p. 26 1. See also B. D. Larkin, 
o12. cit., p. 40. 
A. Ogunsanwo, up. cit., p. 40. 
140. Ibide . See also B. D. Larkin, op. ci: t., p. 40. 
141. See Chapter 12.1 of this work. 
142. Expecting the failure of the radical government of 
Ibrahim, Ben Barka broke with the NIP (January 1959), 
In the same year Ben Barka formed (September) his own 
party, the Nýktiorjql Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). K 1CSho6pV4k*: A 
Until he__WA. S i by the Joint French-Moroccan secret 
police(UOctober 1967), Ben Barka played a major role 
in the African, Asian and Latin American movement 
against imperialism. 
143. This was similar to Burundi's role in 1964. See 
Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work. 
-418- 
144. Peking Review 1 (4 November 1958), p. 22. 
145. In July 1959, a Chinese K slim group visited Morocco. 
See Peking Review 2 <11 August 1959): 32, p. 2 1. 
Also, in the same year (18 November), Ahmed Belfrag, 
a former Moroccan Prime Minister, paid a visit to 
China. Belfrag was praised by Zhou En-lai for his 
anti-colonialism. See Peking Review 2 (24 November 
1959). 47, p. 21. 
146. The author had a prolonged conversation with an ex- 
FLN Commander (at the time of the meeting, a taxi 
driver) on the way from Wahran oran, in the Western 
region of Algeria, to Algiers: similar views were 
expressed by F. C. Schatten, Communism in Africa 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , lQ-66), p. 198; 
A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 28; W. A. C. Adie, 'Chinese 
Policy Towards Africa', in S. Hamrell (Ed. 1jit, - 
Soviet Bloc. China and Africa (Uppsala: the 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964), p. 
50; C. R. Allen, op. cit., p. 82; and R. Lowenthal, 
'China', in Z. Drzezinskiýý-)op. cit., p. 65. 
147. A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 30. See also I. Fedda, 
012-Cit-P p- 119. 
148. Peking Review 2 (25 August 1959), p. 20 
149. Peking Review 1 (21 October 1958): 34, p. 13; and 1 
(4 NoveTnber 1958): 36, p. 22. 
150. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work. 
151. A. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. p. 38 and p. 89, and C. R. 
Allen, cp_cit., p. 92. 
152. See , 
Map of this work. 
153. See Table 12.1 of this work. 
154. Peking Review 1 (9 December 1958): 4 1, p. 16. See 
also Table 7.1 of this work. 
155. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work. 
156. After West Germany, India, Britain, Italy and Japan. 
See Wei Liang-Tsai, op. cit., p. 192. 
157. At the level of economic cooperation, it was reported 
in 1958 that China offered some aluminium technicians 
to the Sudan. 
158. See R. Lowenthal, ojý. cit. , p. 157. See also Chapter 
13.3.2.6 of this work. - 
159. L--ftUjZ)hid (FLN's weekly journal) no. 39 (12 April 
1959), p. 7. 
-419- 
160. The first war of liberation in Indo-China ended (7 
Xay 1954) before the Bandung Conference. Unlike the 
Algerian war of liberation, the Indo-Chinese wars of 
liberation were, from the beginning, communist-led 
and communist-orientated. 
161. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work. 
For a brief but valuable analysis of Algeria's major 
contribution to liberation struggles in Africa, see, 
for example, R. A. Mortimer, 'The Algerian Revolution 
in Search of the African Revolution', The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 8 (1970): 8, pp. 363-387. 
162. Premier Chou En-lails speech at banquet in honour of 
Premier Trký. rV\. 4L. AjOb-6_S (29 September 1960), in 1ha 
Chinese Resoiutely Suj2port the Just Struggle of the 
African Peopla (a publication compi led by the 
Chinese-African People's Friendship Association), 
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1961), p. 19. 
163. K-a-jfa teharraret hl__JazEýIr? [(How Algeria was 
li8erated? ) a publication by Wizarat Al-ICAWIN. \ýZ 
'rhaqafa (Ministry for Information and Culture)] [AlgierE\: Al Sharika Al Wata"qa. U1 f\aL5\h_V- Wa. 8ý 
(SND), December 19791, p. 9. 
164. Ismail Al Arabi, Al MU 
I Amir Abdul Oa-divz (Algerian Resistance, under I. Lie 
leadership of '41 Amir Abdul gadl r) ( Ptkaiet$f 5r4. Vo \42) FAO 
165. For English sources on the development of the 
Algerian National movement during the period 1830- 
1954, see, for example, A. Horne, 012. cit., pp. 23-60; 
C. H. Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria. 
Morocco and Tunisia (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1970), pp. 1-132; A. Humbaraci, Algeria: a 
Revolution that Failed (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1966), pp. 1-31; W. B. Quandt. Revolution and 
Political Leadershij2: Algeria 1954-1968 (London: 
The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 1-148; J. Dunn, Modern 
Revolution: An Introduction to the Analysis- nf a 
Political. Phenomenon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), pp. 146-172. 
166. Al Amir Abdul f. adjr is honoured in independent 
Algeria by his portrait being used on Algerian paper 
currency. 
167. Among other insurrections were the MatIja Rebellion 
(near Algiers) (1830-2); Bounaaza's Resistance (1845- 
1947) in Wahran District (Oran) (1845-47); People's 
Resistance, under the leadership of Al Haj Ahmed Bay 
in Cansantina (Constantine) District (in the East) 
(1837-1848); Ibn Nasser's Revolt in El Aghu'at and 
Boughar (centre of Algeria) (1846-1875); the Revolt 
-420- 
of-, , 'l Zaatisha and Ziban in Biskra (towards the 
desert from the centre of Algeria) (1849-1850); the 
Revolt of Acl Sharif Mohammed Abdullah (north-eastern 
part of the desert) (1815-1871); Lalla Fatima's 
Revolt (north-centre of Algeria) (1851-1871); the 
Revolt of ShdyU, kh Al Zawia Al Rahimia in the Jarjbra 
Mountains (north-central Algeria) (1856-1857); 
Revolts of Al Khanga and Biskra (1858-1859); the 
Revolt of Mohammed Ben EGkn3sh in Al Hudna near 
MISila (central Algeria) (1860); Revolt*of Awlad Sidi 
41 Sheikh (it spread from the east to the west of the 
country) (1864-1884); the Revolt of Ben Hamzas in 
Wahran District (19862-1867); LazraT Bel IIajIs Revolt 
(near Wahran) (1864); Revolt of Mohammed Tawmi 
Boushasha in north-east district (1870-1871); Revolt 
of Ibn Khaddama in Ghalizan district (north-west) 
(1881); Revolts of Al Sabayhi in the centre and east 
of Algeria (1870); the Revolt of Ahmed Aidoune Beni 
Tlilan in Mililya, in the east of the countrý1(1871); 
Casantina's Revolt (1871); Revolt of Wahat Umran, 
near Biskra (1871); the Revolt of Sheikh Bouamama, in 
Wahran district (1881-1904); and, many other revolts 
which took place during the period 1914-1916 in 
different parts of the country. 
168. See Ismail jl Arabi, o7p. cit., p. 44, ýl Hashmi 
INOraya, At k" cl -a -- -'i 
W keat. ý A) II 
v 
ýý. -i - 
j- 815ý80_ 
CF, a. d: v. r- (The 100th Commemoration of the Death of Prl 
ýkmir Abdul 'ad r); (a monthly bulletin of 
the National Popular Army of Algiers - ANP) no. 231 
(June 1983), pp. 66-71 and A. Horne, op. cit., pp. 30- 
31. 
fa 
Iteharraret 
AU azai op. cit., p. 13. 
170. Ibid., p. 16. 
171. Among other political organizations and parties 
founded before 11954 were those of the conservative 
alliance (1900), the 'Elite Association (1907), the 
Reformist Party (1919); the Algerian Mosl&m Congress 
(19-36); the Algerian Movement (1925); the Rally of 
Algerian-French Moslims (1938); the People's Union of 
Algeria (1939); the Liberal Party (1927); and the 
French Communist Party of Algiers (1924). 
172. KO-jf- teharrar2e_t_ýktj__I; kzILtn?, op. cit. , p. 51. 
173. E. O'Ballance, The Algerian Tnsurrection 1954-1962 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 29. 
174. Keý,, If_a__Lýeharraret op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
175. , p. 57. 
176. Prensa Latina, op-cit. 
177. OP-cit., p. 58. 
-421- 
178. A. Horne, op. cit -, p. 25. 
179. Kajj_&_týgharraret 1 J14ZZLm?. op. c it. P. 59. 
According to Horno 's interview with Bourguiba, 
President of Tunisia, the figure was more than 50,000 
people. See A. Horne, op. cit., p. 27. 
180. This incident represented the d6nouenent of a week of 
demonstrations and protests against French arrest of 
prominent Algerian leaders such as Ferhat Abbas and 
Saada"n Ben Khalil. The 8 May was chosen because it 
was the day of German surrender and an open market 
day (Tuesday) in most Algerian towns. 
181. These were Mohammed Bu Di5f, Mohammed (known as 
Ahmed) Ben Bella, Bel Karem Drim, Mohammed KbOlder, 
. 0, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Rabah Bitat, Al Arbi Ben Khali-fa, 
I Murad Didvsh . and 
Hustfa Ben $o lf'Id. 
182. This night was particularly chosen because it was All 
Saints' Day. Rabah Bilat, member of the 'Club of 
Nine' (see note 181 above), and currently President 
of the National Popular Council of Algeria, 
'Interview with Pil ShaAh' (official daily paper of 
the Algerian government) no. 6919 (15 January 1986), 
p. 12. 
183. F. Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (NeW York: Grove Press 
Inc., 1967), p. 23. 
184. Faý'ý (The Manifesto of ist 
November 1954) [a document from Moudiriat El Bahth 
(Direciion of Documentation and Research)) (El Jezair 
(Algiers): Wizaret El Moujehidine (Ministry of ex-El 
Moujehidine>, 19831 
185. See Mapý12.2. 
186. See Chapter 12.3.1.1 of this work. 
187. Interestingly enough, there was vehement coppetition 
among the peasants themselves to join1-'tK\ALN, /\military 
arm of*LN. One of the conditions for an Algerian to 
be an ALN XQ J-dhid (a faithful soldier) was to 
participate in operations against the military 
colonialists in ader to prove his genuineness and 
readiness to joinf\FLN's army. As the war progressed, 
the French army was mostly concentrated where FLN 
fighters were believed to be hiding, there used to be 
2 or 3 Algerians vying with each other to kill a 
French soldier, ih order that a place might be 
guaranteed him in, ' FLN as a true More 
interestingly still, some people went even further by 
attemptimg to bribe or use- mediation or personal 
contacts with leading figures of FLN to allow them to 
join ALN. 
-422- 
188. F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 47-48. 
189. The Congress took place in the Valley of 61 SU. nýam 
(see Wilayj 3 in Xap- 12.2), a strategic place 
isolated from the colonial authorities. By the time 
this congress took place, ALN had grown in strength 
from 450 (1 November 1954) to 10,570 (August 1956), 
whilst the strength of FLN militants (R-J, --XWj-ahidin-) had reached the figure 87,044. See 
(Report of Al SUnoam) [a document from MUd-Ij%, (jZ Al 
Bah4\ WZ (Diyctfon of Documentation and 
Research)] (A' Jaz ir (Algiers): Wizarat Prl 
ML)ý-dhidir,, (Ministry of ex-A-1 M, U, J'@hidin 19831, 
p. 3. 
190. #, 
_J_jjUinaj. 
U no. 9 (20 August 1957), p. 1. v---- 
d 
191. KZHfa-. - 
6harraret OP. cit. , p. 73. r- 
192. Hsinhua News Agen-Qy- no. 59 (30 December 1957), p. 26. 
193. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Inl2erialism, (a 
collection of documents, speeches and press 
interviews from the visits of Chinese leaders to 
thirteen African and Asian countries) (Peking: 
Foreign LanguageSPress, 1964), p. 67. 
194. New China News Agency, cited in A. Hutchison, 
o12. cit., p. 25. 
195. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperiali--m, op. cit. 
P. 66. 
196. cited in People's China (1 July 1956), p. 40. 
197. The following analysis is based an conversations and 
interviews with Algerian ex-El Moujehidin and 
observers. 
198. Author's conversation with Tahir ShbTra, an FLN 
journalist (21 November 1983). Similar views were 
expressed by academics in the Institute of Political 
Studies, University of Algiers. 
199. In an interview with the author in Algiers (21 
November 1983). A similar view was expressed (26 
November 1983) by Youcef Ben Khadda, former President 
of PGRA. 
200. Ptýj--JLD j ah id -a s%j Ia wa ýA,; 2ý0>- AI . 
Sa-28 
(Russian Policy and the Algerian ar) no. 19 Q March 
1958), p. 4. 
201. See, for example, B. D. Larkin, op. cit. , p. 27; and W. A. Nielsen, op. cit. , pp. 196-197. 
202. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work. 
-423- 
203.1 Unite under Lenin's revolutionary banner', Peking 
Review. 3 (26 April 1960): 17, cited in A. Ogunsanwo, 
OP. Cit., P. 100. 
204.1-blAan. 
205. Author's interview with a former ALN commander 
(November 1983). 
206. As quoted in A. Hutchison, op. cit.,. p. 26. Hutchison 
did not cite the co=entator's name. More of Soviet 
attitude towards Algerian war is discussed in 
Chapters 13.3.1.3.2 and 13.3.1.3.3 of this work. 
207. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work. 
208. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China, -- Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., p. 72. 
209. It seems likely that the Chinese press and 
broadcasting would have covered the news of the day 
of the instigation of the Algerian war (1 November 
1954). Yet the Arabic, the French and the English 
sources used in this thesis date the Chinese 
references to the Algerian war to the Bandung 
Conference and after. 
210. Chou En-lai, 'Speech at the Afro-Asian Conference' 
(19 April 1955), op. cit., p. 91. 
211. h-j--jL0; jahid no. 15 (1 January 1958), p. 5. 
212. Ibid. 
213. cited in A. Horne, op. cit., p. 131. 
214 'The Joint Communique of the Afro-Asian Conference' 
Supplement to People's China (16 May 1955), p. 5. 
215. A. Horne, op. cit. , p. 131. 
216. This phrase was stated in 'The Joint Communique of 
the Afro-Asian Conference' , Section 12, 'Problems of 
Dependent Peoples' no. 1. It read as follows: 
The Asian-African Conference 
discussed the problems of 
dependent peoples and colonialism 
and the evils arising from the 
subjection of peoples to alien 
subjugation, domination and 
exploitation land agreed] ... in 
declaring that colonialism in all 
i t. -- manifestations is an evil 
which should speedily be brought 
to an end. I emphasis added] 
-424- 
See the Supplement to PeOPlesS China, (16 May 1955), 
P. 5. 
217. People's China (16 Ju ne 1955) [Supplement], p. 3. 
218. For a contrary view that China ignores the Algerian 
question during this period - see G. P. Deshpande, 
China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op. cit., p. 74. 
219. See Chapter 13.2.1.1.1 of this work. 
During the 150s, Cairo was a sort of capital for 
liberation movements throughout the continent just as 
Accra and Dar es Salaam became havens of radical 
nationalist movements in subsequent decades. 
220. cited in KbAf a... 
bharrarfý-, t AU__jaLZL[JZ?. op. cit. , p. 97. f-- 
221. See Chapterlo-lof this work. 
222. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., p. 75. 
223. UGTA was established by FLN on 26 February 1956. 
224. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's; Policy in Africa 
1949-1964, op. cit., p. 78. 
225. Ibid., p. 78 
226. Ibidem., see also B. D. Larkin, op. cit., p. 38. 
At the end of independence, Mohammed Khemisti was 
appointed Foreign Minister. 
227. See I. Fedda, op. cit., pp. 119-120. See also A. 
Hutchison, op. cit., p. 27. 
228. See, for example, I. Fedda, op. cit., p. 119. 
229. See of this work. 
230. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, 
op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
231. W. Bartke, China's Economic Aid (London: C. Hurst 
and Company, 1975), pp. 8-9 (Table 1). See also W. 
A. C. Adie, 'Chinese Policy Towards Africa', op. cit., 
P. 51. Adie's figure is given in Yuan (Yuan 
500,000). 
232. Author's interview with Ben Khedda, former President 
of PGRA (26 November 1983). 
233. Peking Review 1 (8 April 1958): 6, p. 21. 
234. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, 
op. cit.., pp. 83-84. 
235. cited in Peking Review 1 (April 1958): 5, p. 20. 
425 
, 
Lj, j Af rica: 236. See, for example, C. Legum, 'China anc t 
symbolism and substance' , in A. M. Halpern Policies 
Toward China: Views from Six Countrit-r, - (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965>, P. 392; C. 
Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro- 
Asian Poeple's Solidarity Organization. 1057-lQ67 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 2; 
and A. D. Barnett, China Policy: Old Problens and 
New Challenges (Washington D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1977), passim. 
237. Africa provided the base of AAPSO (founded in January 
1956) because its headquarters have always been in 
Cairo. Also, during the first decade of its 
existence, large parts of Africa were still in the 
grip of colonial rule. 
238. This is markedly evident in the cases of China's 
relations with progressive states in Africa. 
23(). 1. Fedda, op. cit., p. 44; C. Neuhauser, op. cit., p. 
12; and A. Hutchison, o12. cit., p. 38. 
240. A. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 38. 
241. See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work. 
242. cited in Hsinhua News Agency p. 59 (27 December 
1957), p. 17. 
243. Not all the resolutions adopted by the conference 
were satisfactory as far as China was concerned. 
Thus, for example, confidence expressed by the 
conference in the United Nations as an agency capable 
of maintaining peace and human rights was undoubtedly 
not shared by China. For the text of the resolutions 
see Full text of R(-solutions adopted at the Afro=- 
Asian Conference in Cairo. Decem'ýer 26th. 1957 to 
January 1st. 1ID58 [unpublished pamphlet in School of 
Oriental and African Studies (21 January 1958) pam. 
Misc. 1762791. 
244. See Chapter5 of this work. 
245. Full Text of the Resolut: 
Asian Conference in Cairo, op. cit., p. 1. 
246. The People's Dail_v- (18 April 1961), cited in Peking 
Review 4 (21 April 1961): 16, p. 11. 
247. Full Text of the Resolutions Adopted at the Afro- 
Asian Conference in Cairo, op. cit., p. 21. 
248. Tbid. passim. See also C. Neuhauser, n12. cit. p. 
14. 
1349. cited in C. Neuhauser, op. cit., p. 14. C, 
-426- 
250. cited in A. OSunsanwo, op. cit., p. 40. 
251. cited in A. Hutchison, ol). cit., p. 38. 
252. F. C. Schatten, op. cit., pp. 274-27-5. 
253. Later during the same year Youcef As-Sibai was among 
honoured guests of the Tenth Anniversary of PRC in 
Peking (1 October 1958), see B. D. Larkin, op. cit., 
p. 4 7. 
254. R. Lowenthal, o12. cit., pp. 153-154. 
255. C. Neuhauser, op. cit. , notes 19 and 21. (Notes to Chapter 11, p. 84. ) 
256. Ibid., p. 14. 
257. A. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 46 note 4. 
-427- 
SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS: 
THE SECOND PHASE (1959-66) OF INTENSIVE INTERACTION 
When Zhou Enlai in Mogadiscio (Somalia) (February 
1964) claimed that "revolutionary prospects" were 
"excellent throughout the African continent", I it was the 
prospects of revolutionary liberation rather than 
socialist revolutionary prospects that he had in mind. In 
other words, China's ideological assessment of the 
situation in Africa was not based on the existence of ripe 
conditions for socialist revolution, rather it was based 
on the existence of ripe conditions for national 
liberation struggle in the continent. 
... the main content of what we refer to 
as a revolutionary situation in Africa 
is that African peoples are demanding 
complete destruction of colonial rule 
and through elimination of the colonial 
forces are striving for complete 
independence of all African countries. 
At present a number of African 
countries are waging a struggle to 
achieve independence and to win initial 
victories in the national democratic 
revolution. The people of many African 
countries that have won independence 
are pushing revolution forward, with 
the aim of carrying through the 
national democratic revolution and 
building their countries. ý-* 
China's ideological assessment of Africa and its 
revolutionary optimism were based on such developments in 
the continent 'as the victory of the anti-imperialist war 
in the Suezz (1956), the successful Algerian war of 
liberation (1962), the liberation struggles in the 
Cameroon (from 1960 onwards), the crisis in the Congo(L) 
(1960-65), the decision of national independence movements 
in the Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa to opt 
for armed struggle as the correct method for liberation 
(from 1960 onwards), the Zanzibar revolution (1964), and, 
finally, the policies and actions adopted by the militant 
independent African countries against the former colonial 
powers and imperialism as a whole. A new phase in Sino- 
African relations may be said to have begun in 1959. 
The Egyptian people thwarted the Anglo- 
French armed oppression and recovered 
their Suez Canal. The Algerian people 
are valiantly fighting on. The 
Congolese people are pressing forward 
with their just struggle. All Africa, 
from Capetown to the Mediterranean 
coasts, from Zambia to Gambia, are 
IIL with the flames of national 
liberation struggles. The final nails 
are being driven into the coffin of 
colonialism. *' 
This period (1059-66) constituted the most intensive and 
active phase in the history of Sino-African interaction. 
It formed the third phase of China's role in international 
relations as a whole and the second with special reference 
to Africa. 
Sino-African relations during this period were 
characterised by the following fiveAfactors: 
For the 
period 
inporta, 
Between 
African 
alone, 
first time in its history, during this 
Africa appeared to exercise an 
nt impact on international relations. 
January 1960 and December 1965,29 
countries became independent (in 1960 
16 of these gained their independence) 
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and were recognised by the UN. Thus, in a 
quantitive sense, they became an important 
forcL- in the decision-making of the UN. This 
change in the African international scene was 
important for China in the diplomatic sphere 
of its role in international relations. 
By 1965, more African countries recognised PRC 
and not Taiwan. They repeatedly urged the UN 
to restore China's seat in the organisation. 
At the same time, most African countries 
subscribed to the idea of a non-aligned 
foreign policy. Thus, African countries also 
developed into a major force in the non- 
aligned movement. At the First Summit 
Conference an Non-aliSnment (Belgrade: 
September 1961), 11 African countries took 
part as full members. At the second Non- 
aligned Summit (Cairo: October 1964), the 
number of African countries increased to 19. 
Another important development during this 
period contributed to the shaping of the 
international role of African countries. For 
the first time, they had succeeded in forming 
an Africa-wide inter-governmental 
organisation, the OAU (May 1963), with a long 
term political, social and economic agenda. 
This organisation was meant to symbolise 
African unity and African goals for 
independence and liberation. Towards this 
end, a Liberation Committee was set up in 
order to provide support for African 
liberation movements- I 
A number of national independence movements in 
Africa transformed themselves into national 
liberation movements adopting armed struggle 
against the forces of imperialism and its 
local allies (rather than negotiation with the 
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colonial power) as their general strategy. 
This development met with the approval of 
China. 
It was only during this period that China's 
insistance on armed struggle was widely 
accepted in those parts of Africa which were 
still under colonial rule. China also found 
ways of expressing its views which reflected 
an awareness of how radical African countries 
thought about problems of national liberation. 
It was also the case that only during this 
period did China find the leaders of countries 
such as Guinea, Algeria, Ghana and Tanzania 
identifying themselves with its international 
stance that the imperialist powers should be 
resisted and not placated. 
iv. It was only during this period that China 
found ways of extending its influence in 
Northern Africa to include Sub-Saharan 
Africa; ` and 
V. finally, it was only during this period that 
China put into practice its rejection of the 
Soviet Union's policy of D6tente. - Thus, the 
Sina-Soviet dispute became an influential 
factor in China's policy towards Africa. 
1.3.1. Sinn-Soviet Di--putL, and National ldberatJcm 
M(nvt, -=#-ntr3. 
The centre of the struggle against 
colonialism is Africa; the centre of 
the battle between East and West for 
the intermeadiate zone is in Africa; 
hence, Africa has become the focus of 
contemporary world problems. -' 
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If China's alliance with the Soviet Union proved to be 
both economically undesirable for China's ambitions for a 
rapid development of socialism and militarily unreliable 
for China's security and territorial integrity internally, 
internationally the alliance proved to be a disappointment 
to China's ideological objectives of forging a 
consolidated united front of global dimensions against the 
imperialist powers led by the United States. Instead of 
joining China in such a task, the Soviet Union was 
actively engaged in preparing the ground for D6tente with 
imperialism. 
During this period (and especially after the Belgrade 
Conference of 1961), the Western powers found themselves 
in a favourable position even among the leading non- 
aligned countries such as India and the UAR, which had 
begun to adopt an increasingly moderate attitude to the 
forces of colonialism and imperialism. In India's case, 
it might be said that its international policy and 
objectives were consonent with the aims pursued by the 
imperialist powers in their relation with the non-aligned 
world, especially during the period when Kennedy activated 
the policy of the American Administration towards the 
Third World countries. In fact, India reversed its 
earlier policy (following the Pancha Shila agreement) on 
the Tibet question by giving support to Tibetan 
separatists in 1959. 
The leading founders of the Bandung Conference such 
as India and Egypt (joined by Yugoslavia) were engaged in 
preparing the ground for moderating their approach to the 
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forces of colonialism and imperialism. Such a line 
culminated in the First Non-aligned Countries Summit 
Meeting in Belgrade (September 1961). 
By the end of the '50s, the Soviet Union was no 
longer prepared to accept China's ideological opposition 
to Pca(e, 
cocx(sv 
Nor were the leading co-founders of the 
Bandung Conference willing to push the Bandung spirit for 
positive action against colonialism and imperialism 
further along a more radical direction as suggested by 
leaders such as Sukarno. 
China continued to maintain its uncompromising line 
on the importance of continuous armed struggle against 
imperialism in opposition to the policy of D6tente pursued 
by the Soviet Union, the policy of physical containment of 
China and other liberation forces pursued by the United 
States, and the generally favourable orientation towards 
the forces of imperialism of the dominant conservative 
elements within the non-aligned movement. The Third World 
as a whole and Africa in particular, 113 directly or 
indirectly ruled by the colonialist and imperialist 
powers, was the area in which China believed that there 
was a golden opportunity for the forces of national 
liberation to confront the forces of colonialism and 
inperialism. 
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TABLE 13 1. 
CHINA AND AFRICA (195S-1986), MFOLOGY AND THF DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY OF UNITED FRONT' 
UNITED FRONT FROM BELOV UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE 
OR OR 
PEOPLE TO PEOPLE RELATIONS STATE TO STATE RELATIONS 
Phase 1: 1955-59 Phase 1: 1955-59 
Anti-State Policy2 
VAR" (1959): China vas 
opposed to Nasser'i anti- 
collunist campaign 
Anti-Stite Policy 
National Independence and Afro-Asiin People's Solidarity 
National Liberation Moments Organisation (AAPSO) 
Algeria A ujar vehicle for China's 
early approach to Africa 
Phase 2: 1959-66 
Anth FrontO 
National Independence and AAPSO Bandung II: Afro- 
National Liberation Novexents Asian Solidarity 
and Containsent of 
Isperilliss 
Cameroon Algeria (until 1962) Became a maJor link for 
The Congo Angola promoting Afro-Asian 
Niger 6uinea (8) and Cape Verde solidarity against 
Zanzibar Mozambique Imperialism 
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) 
Azania (South Africa) 
Phase 3: 1966-69 
Anti-Stats Policy 
siifra 
The Congo/Zaire 
National Independence and 
National Liberation Movements 
Angola 
Guinea (B) and Cape Verde 
Mozambique 
Zimbabwe 
AzInil 
Namibia 
AAPSO 
China loses interest in AAFSO 
because of its dispute vith 
the Soviet Unio". 
'Progressive' States- Active and 
positive contributors to the 
Anti-laperialist Front and 
National Liberation struggles 
'Non-progressive' States: useful 
for access to liberation forces 
'Ron-progressive' States: opening 
up of formal relations against the 
wishes of western powers 
UAR Egypt 
Buinea 
Morocco (access to FLN of Algeria) Morocco (pro-western) 
The Sudan Cooderate') 
'Progressive' States: Active and 
positive contributors to the 
Anti-loperiilist Front and 
National Liberation struggles. 
China for Arsed struggles and 
against the Soviet Union's policy 
of Monte 
Phase 2: 1959-66 
'Non-progressive' States: useful 
for access to liberation forces 
'Non-progressive' Stites: 10'sa 
diplomatic relations and s0ilU! t,. n 
for Afro-Asian solidarity 
I 
Egypt 
Algeria (1962 onwards) 
Guinea (pro-China) 
Mali (pro-China) 
Ghana (1960 onwards) 
The Congo (8) (1964 onwards) 
Tanzania (subsequent to the 
Zanzibar revolution which 
helped radicalise it and won 
the approval of China) 
Uganda 
Morocco: access for FLN of 
Algeria (until 1962) 
Burundi: access for revolutionary 
forces at the Congo (L)/Zaire 
Zaabia: access for liberation 
forces in Southern Africa 
Phist 3.1966-69 E6FcR1 
Morocco (pro-vestern) 
Tunisia (pro-western) 
Benin (Dahosey) 
Central African Republic (CAR) 
(pro-vestern) 
Burundi Okoderate') 
The Sudan (pro-western) 
Sotali ('moderate') 
Kenya (pro-western) 
Malawi (pro-vestern) 
Zaabia Vooderate') 
Progressive' States 'Man-progressive' States: useful 'Non-progressive' States: formal I 
for access to liberation forces diplomatic relations 
I 
Egypt 
Algeria 
"ali 
6uinea 
Ghana 
The Congo (B) 
Tanzania 
Zambia ('moderate') Mauritania ('moderate') 
Somalia ('moderate') 
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13.2. Ppnplp-to-People Relations or 'United Front 
From Below'. 
13.2.1. Relations Detwpen China and National Liberation 
Movenents 
13.2.1.1. China and the Final Stage of the Algerian War 
Between ; September 1958 [following the proclamation of 
the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria 
(PGRA>3 , and July 1962 (when Algeria became independent), 
three major inter-related developments in the Algerian war 
of liberation leading to the second and final stage of the 
Algerian struggle contributed to a strengthening of the 
Sino-Algerian relationship. 
The proclamation of PGRA (19 September 1958) 
signified that FLN's struggle for liberation 
had become irreversible and that negotiaitions 
with the French within the framework of a 
'French Federal State' or IA1&6. rIe Frangalsel 
was no longer possible. Such a transformation 
of the Algerian national liberation struggle 
occured as a response to France's implacable 
determination to liquidate the liberation 
fighters (41 X-UjRhidin physically. By 
1959, the FLN liberation fighters found 
themselves facing a well-equipped French force 
consisting of 800,000"' soldiers, reinforced by 
a full NATO unit (the 'Division Lorrinae'), 
armoured vehicles of every description, and 
radar detection equipment-"' Most of the NATO 
military equipment was supplied by the United 
States, its leader. " 
... we have not forgotten that the United States stands at the head of 
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NATO. Facts show who are our sincere 
friends and who are our enemies, we 
shall never forget this. 'ý 
As in the case of Japanese imperialism in 
China during the late '30s, 11 the French 
colonialists destroyed or burned houses. used 
or suspected of being used by FLN fighters and 
massacred or imprisoned their inhabitants. 
Electric fences were built along the Algerian- 
Tunisian border (Morice Line) in order to 
stop the infiltration of guerrilla forces 
trained and based in Tunisia. More than 
280,000 Algerians were forced to leave the 
country and live in Tunisia and Morocco. In 
1958 alone, more than 200,000 people were 
imprisoned or sent to internment camps. 1,4 
However, neither the powerful French Army 
which massacred thousands of Algerian people 
nor de Gaulle's proposal (16 September 1959) 
of la self-determination' undermined FLN's 
determination to lead the Algerian people to 
complete liberation (5 July 1962). The 
liberation war was won at the cost of 1; 6 
million Algerian lives and ended in another 
great and humiliating defeat (after Dien Bien 
Phu) to French colonialism. 
_TVg7LN's success in Algeria "opened the 
gates"'-F- for other African anti-imperialist 
forces and movements to follow suit. Not only 
revolutionary uprisings in the Congo (1960-65) 
Cameroun (1960-65) and Zanzibar (1964) but 
also the transformation of national 
independence movements in the Portuguese 
colonies dnd in southern Africa were inspired 
by the victory of FLN in Algeria. 
If the people of Algeria went through 
all the annihilation and torture at the 
hands of the French and succeeded, we 
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shall also go through it, unless we are 
made of a different material. "r- 
China had no doubt that: 
The path to which they (the Algerians) 
adhere and their indomitable spirit are 
of extremely great significance to the 
development of national liberation 
movements in Africa. 1-P 
It is interesting to note that some 
observers appeared to believe that FLN's 
success was due more to divisions within 
France over the Algerian question and the 
costly nature of the war, than to the 
correctness of the strategy adopted by the 
liberation forces (i. e. armed struggle through 
people's war and guerrilla warfare exercised 
in the countryside and the mountains). 
Thus, for example, J. Dunn has argued 
The Algerian revolution was successful, 
in so far as it was at all, Abecause of 
the extent of its military triumph - 
which even after seven and a half years 
of fighting was exiguous, but because 
of the internal divisions of France and 
the vast cost to the metropolitan 
country which the struggle had meant, 
simply made its continuat ion 
intolerable. 11 
He failed to consider that weakening France 
economically and financially on the one hand, 
and creating contradictions within the French 
people on the other, constituted a major *part 
of FLN strategy right from the beginning. 153, 
The second development of the Algerian war 
during the period 1958-62 related to the 
national liberation struggle acquiring a more 
and more systematic amd revolutionary 
f 
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character not only in the military field but 
also in the economic and social fields of 
reconstruction -of Algeria after liberation. 
It was only during this period that one could 
characterise the Algerian war of liberation as 
a revolution' 
-in 
the socio-economic context. 
Influenced by the revolutionary spirit-20 
of the masses which was developed in the 
battlefield, and guided by the strong voices 
of radical leaders such as Ben Bella and 
Boumedienne, the FLN leadership during this 
period envisaged a socialist future for 
Algeria. The social content of the Algerian 
revolution was put forward for the first time 
in formal terms by the National Council of the 
Algerian Revolution (CNRA) which adopted the 
"Tripoli Programme"I" (Tripoli, July 1962). 
Armed struggle through people's war had 
thus given rise to a revolutionary situation, 
which rejected not only the political and 
administrative institutions of the colonial 
era, but also (and more importantly) the 
social, cultural and economic structures of 
capitalism. FRELIMOýý of Mozambique and 
XPLAý; a of Angola were other obvious instances 
of similar kinds of strategy. A maj or 
distinction thus arises in practice in former 
colonies between independence movements and 
national liberation movements. Whether or not 
the revolutionary spirit created through 
people's wars was subsequently channelled into 
the task of socialist construction is a 
separate question which deserves careful 
consideration in its own right. But the two 
isssues of the character of a national 
liberation movement itself on the one hand, 
and on the other of how the society actually 
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develops after liberation should not be 
conflated. 
The third development related to the fact that 
the war of national liberation in Algeria 
reached its- decisive and succesful phase 
(1958-1962) at a time when the Sino-Soviet 
ideological differences had already become all 
but irreconcilable. Algerian victory 
certainly contributed much to Chinese 
insistence that armed struggle for liberation, 
as opposed to the Soviet campaign for a 
conciliatory policy towards the colonialist 
and imperialist powers, was the wayof the 
fu ture. 
Against the background of the three developments outlined 
L-V%A- 
above, that is, the proclamation of PGRA, the 
transformation of the struggle of Algerian liberation into 
a wider revolutionary confrontation between the two sides 
and the increasingly sharp ideological conflict between 
the Soviet Union and China - the relations between China 
and Algeria (FLN) became closer and closer until they 
reached a point at which the two sides found themselves in 
some sort of ideological partnership with one another in 
most areas of international affairs, especially those 
linked to independence and liberation. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, which took more than three 
years (October 1960)MIII to recognise f\PGRA, China's 
recognition of the Algerian government came only three 
days (22 September 1958)--, "'-- after it came into existence 
(19 September 1958). Unlike the Soviet Union which was 
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clearly afraid that France might in fact carry out its 
threat of breaking off diplomatic relations with any 
country which recognised PGRA, ý-- China viewed the birth of 
the Algerian Provisional Government as a major development 
that would: 
exert a tremendous influence on the 
national independence movement of 
African people. The armed struggle of 
the Algerian people has always been a 
source of great inspiration to the 
other African peoples under the yoke of 
colonialism. --21 
At the same time, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sent 
congratulatory messages to Ferhat Abbas, President of 
PGRA, through China's Ambassador in UAR. In his message, 
Mao wrote as follows: 
On behalf of our country and the entire 
Chinese people... I warmly congratulate 
you on the establishment of the 
Provisional Governmant of Algeria. May 
the heroic Algerian people win more 
brilliant and still greater victories 
in the struggle for national 
independence against colonialism. ---"'ý 
Abbas responded to China's recognition by expressing his 
deep appreciation of Chinese solidarity with the Algerian 
revolution. 
... we consider the recognition of the 
Provisional Governmant by the six 
hundred million Chinese people a great 
encouragement and we believe that it is 
only the beginning of friendly co- 
operation between the two countries.: --"'=, 
Chinese recognition of the PGRA was described by Ait 
Sý a-Alal, Chairman of the Union G6n6r-ale des -týtudlants 
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Musulmans Alg6r-iens (UGEMA), who was in China at that 
time, as a proof that 
the Chinese government is always on the 
side of the just people and against 
imperialism and colontalism.; 30 
The birth of PGRA not only intensified the militant 
stance of non-reconciliation with imperialist forces to 
which both China and Algeria subscribed, but also 
contributed to a strengthening of Sino-Algerian relations 
in the diplomatic sphere. Both the PRC and the PGRA 
governments were faced with the problem of the refusal by 
the United Nations to recognise them as sovereign members 
of that body. In the face of international isolation, 
China and Algeria identified with each other. 
Countries which refused to recognise the PGRA, 
including the Soviet Union, were sharply criticised by 
China. Two days after the proclamation of the independent 
Algerian Government, the People's-Daily (21 September 
1958) wrote as follows: 
Let those colonialist overlords cling 
to their ostrich policy of 6 non- 
recognition'. Their hue and cry is but 
groaning despair in the face of surging 
tide of the national independence 
movement. 
The Chinese people know this 
policy of 'non-recognition' by heart. 
Throughout the nine years since the 
founding of the Chinese People's 
Republic, the United States and some of 
its partners have blindly refused to 
recognise it... What loss does this 
bring to the Chinese people? None 
whatsoever... This policy of $non- 
recognition' of France and its 
colonialist partners cannot possibly 
halt the forward pace of the Algerian 
people towards victory. 
-442- 
What is more, the position taken 
by the colonial powers... will help the 
Algerian people see even more clearly 
who are their friends and who are their 
enemies. -In the past... the United 
States paid lip-service to its 
'friendship' for the Algerian people. 
Now this mask of hypocrisy is torn off. 
Compared with the excitement and 
rejoicing... in the Asian and African 
countries and of the progressive forces 
in every corner of the world, the 'non- 
recognition' of the colonial powers is 
trifling and unimportant. *" 
L_IMQ 
China's criticism of Soviet non-recognition of /TGRA was 
criticised in the above statement as the 'ostrich policy 
of non-recognition' , which was aimed not only at the 
colonialist and imperialism powers but also at any other 
force or country withholding recognition from the new 
Algerian government. 
India, as a leading force in the Afro-Asian movement, 
was also one of the targets of China's criticism of 
countries which had failed to recognise the Algerian 
government. India not only refused to recognise the 
Algerian government, but also sought to exclude it from 
Afro-Asian meetings. Nehru's conciliatory policy towards 
UýQ 
the colonial powers was in sharp contrast torTLN's use of 
force in order to secure the liberation of Algeria. 
At the preparatory meeting for the First Non-Aligned 
Conference (scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 
September 1961), which was held in Cairo (June 1961), 
India took the lead in a minority group which was opposed 
to the admission ofOGRA and'of Gizenga's -government in 
Stanleyville. India's position was influenced by Nehru's 
conviction that: 'The enemy was no longer colonialism, but 
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the Cold War' However, India and its followers failed 
to prevent the Algerian and Stanleyville governments 
attending the preparatory meeeting of the non-aligned 
Su=it. 
Less than three months (7 December 1958) after its 
birth (19 September), a PGRA delegation led by Youcef Ben 
Khedda, Minister of Social Affairs, paid a three-week 
visit to China at the invitation of the PRC government. 
The delegation was given an extremely warm and tumultuous 
welcome. Ben Khedda was greeted as a hero and given a 
reception by the Chinese which could only have been given 
to a major statesman.: 3111 The Chinese press and media 
greeted the visit of the Algerian government's delegation 
as the biggest event of the day. ýIlr- At a banquet held in 
honour of the Algerian delegation (7 December 1958), Chen 
Yi, China's Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
reiterated its unequivocal support for Algeria's 
inevitable victory, and its condemnation of France, and 
the United States, France's major ally. 
Ever since the Algerian people began 
their armed uprising against French 
colonial rule, the Chinese people have 
looked on the Algerian people's 
struggles and victories as their own. 
Because of their own experience in the 
protracted struggle against 
imperialism, the Chipese people are 
utterly convinced that, no matter how 
tortuous the progress of that struggle, 
the Algerian people, who have raised 
the banner of national liberation, -will 
surely triumph. 
The birth of the Republic of 
Algeria is another sign of the new 
stage of the victorious development of 
the national independence movement in 
Africa. Although the French 
colonialists have mobilised several 
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hundred thousand colonial troops armed 
with modern equipment, and although the 
United States imperialists have given 
all-out support to France i rL its 
aggression against Algeria, the 
victorious struggle of the Algerian 
people proves that a people which has 
stood up to fight imperialism 
resolutely is invincible. ar- 
At the end of the Algerian delegation's visit the 
PGRA and PRC governments issued a joint communiqu6 (27 
December 1958) stressing their 
United stance towards the liberation of 
the Afro-Asian territories and their 
co=on approach to international issues 
as a whole. " 
019- 
This was the first joint communiqu6 issued byt-PRGA with a 
foreign country.:: 211 During its visit to China the PGRA 
delegation was given arms worth 2 million French francs. ý1'9' 
Ben Khedda, the head of the PRGA delegation to China on 
this occasion who later (27 August 1961) became President 
W- 
- of /-ýGRA, summarised the experience of his visit in an 
interview given to this author (Algiers, 26 November 1983) 
in the following words: 
We deeply appreciated the Chinese not 
only for their material support, but 
also, and more importantly, for their 
moral encouragement and campaign for 
support for our war and government. In 
addition exchanges of views and 
listening to their experience of a 
people's war were highly beneficial for 
our peoples war and guerrilla 
warfare. lcý 
In March 1959 another Algerian delegation led by 
E; ýJ- 
Omar Oussedik (one of the State Secretaries of PGRA) paid 
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a visit to China. The aim of the visit was to arrange the 
transfer of military and financial aid tohFLN in the 
Algerian war of national liberation. -' During this visit, 
the Algerian delegation attended the 'Support Algeria 
Week' (13-20 March 1959) organised by the Chinese 
authorities. 1"-' According to 
Rj__jLUJ_Djtd, FLN's weekly 
organ, the purpose of this visit was 
to learn from the Chinese leaders and 
people and to study their experience of 
a long peoples war against colonialism 
and reactionism. -*" 
The Algerian delegation was received by Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi. 11-11 China undertook to provide 
support for FLN forces in the form of increased military 
aid and medical staff. -4-ý- Financial aid at an estimated 
$12 million was also promised., 41- In September 1959, 
another Algerian delegation visited China through which 
FLN was promised more support in the form of automatic 
weapons, rifles and infantry equipment. - 
At the 14th session of the UN General Assembly 
(September-December 1959), the United States which claimed 
to be the 'Champion of Freedom', declared unequivocal 
support for French colonialism which it was prepared to 
support not only militarily and financially but also 
diplomatically. """ At this session, the United States not 
only voted in favour of its ally (France), but also took 
the lead* in a campaign against the Algerian issue being 
discussed in the forum of the General Assembly. Thus, in 
the United States, both Algeria and China were faced with 
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a common enemy not only militarily (as evidenced in the 
threat posed by the United States to Algeria through NATO, 
and to China through the 7th Fleet), but also 
diplomatically by blocking the discussion in the General 
Assembly of the Algerian issue and the admission of China 
to the UN. On this American position, Aj--JLLJj. 4hjd, the 
FLN weekly Journal, under the title 'We will not forget 
America' wrote as follows: 
This American act did not puzzle us, 
nor did we want the so-called 'Champion 
of Freedom' to have the honour of 
having its name on the list of the 
defendants of liberation. The United 
States stance did not surprise us 
because it is huge arms and military 
supplies from the United States that 
have been behind the massive massacres 
of Algerian people and the destruction 
of their houses. What angered us was 
United States pressure on other 
countries to vote against us. "' 
As the liberation war progressed and the guerrilla forces 
engaged in a 'fiercest struggle"', against French 
colonialism backed by NATO, China's moral and material 
support was highly valued by Algerians. China became the 
most reliable ally in the Algerian struggle. Sino- 
Algerian relations during this period were characterised 
by feeliings of deep friendship and a sense of common 
purpose. The ties between Algeria and China were so 
strong that even Egypt could not undermine them. The 
close ties forged between China and FLN thus played a 
notable part in the Algerian struggle leading to the 
proclamation of the PGRA. 
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According to Ben Khedda, r-I one of the major reasonsr-ý 
for transferring the headquarters of/VGRA from Cairo to 
Tunis lay in the fact that the Algerians refused to 
subject themselves to Nasser's foreign policy orientation 
in general and especially to the imperatives underlying 
Egypt's policy towards China. r-: 3 Do-spite the suspicions 
which communists entertained against Bourguiba, r-A the 
President of Tunisia, Algerians saw no'obstacle in the way 
of conducting foreign policy on the basis of alignment 
with anti-imperialist forces and solidarity with those 
communist forces which were prepared to support the 
Algerian cause and the methods adopted by FLN to achieve 
liberation through armed struggle. 
When the Algerian struggle reached its decisive stage 
(i. e. from 1958 onwards), the Soviet Union was actively 
engaged in pushing forward its policy of accommodation 
with the West. At the same time, the leading champions of 
non-alignment such as India, Egypt and Yugoslavia departed 
from the Bandung spirit and had become more and more 
active in their campaign to appease rather than oppose 
colonialism and imperialism. Like China, Algeria 
identified itself with those who opposed the policy of 
compromise towards colonialist and imperialist forces 
which the Soviet Union, the supposed leader of the anti- 
imperialist front, vigorously espoused. The Soviet Union 
was reminded by AýI_AOýAbLtd, (30 October 1958) that it was 
pursuing a friendly approach towards France at the expense 
of the Algerian struggle. The Soviet Union, " 11ýahi_CL 
argued, 
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must not forget that in Algeria there 
were hundreds of its people dying every 
day at the hands of French 
indiscriminate massacre and facing the 
most brutal torture and, destruction. 's 
14-FLN 
made it clear that it was opposed to the Soviet POlicY 
C0exk4, eN, U,. 
of Po'cem /11\1 and supported China's uncompromising line on 
imperialism and Khruschev's claim (31 October 1959) that 
(t1he recent 
Gaulle for a 
question on 
determination 
in Algeria 
role. . 
proposal of General de 
solution of the Algerian 
the basis of self- 
and a peoples referendum 
can play an important 
LI. AP- 
%- F- 
was roundly rejected byAFLN. Khruschev failed to realise 
that France's approach to the Soviet Union was dictated by 
its strategy of isolating r)FLN internationally and 
obtaining support to defeat the Algerian liberation 
fighters. Friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the 
nominal leader of anti-imperialist forces, would well 
serve the French interests. Khruschev was far more 
interested, in DeutsAv-r's words, in playing 'de Gaulle 
against Eisenhower than Cin] using Abbas against de 
Gaulle"'. For Khrushchev: 
To side with Abbas against de Gaulle 
was in Khruschev's eyes, tantamount to 
driving de Gaulle into Eisenhower's 
arms. " 
Khruschev attempted to justify his rather ambiguous 
position with the following assertion: 
In this area of the great retreat of 
imperialism, when so many colonial 
peoples are obtaining independence, de 
Gaulle will have to honour his promise 
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of self-determination for Algeria. In 
any case, the Algerian conflict must 
not be used to estrange Gaullist France 
from the communist bloc and to cement 
the solidarity of the Atlantic 
Alliance. a'ý' 
The Soviet Union' s real convictions were however based on 
the fact that the Algerian struggle contributed to an 
undermining not only of its D6tente obJectives in general, 
but also of its relations with France in particular. 
Soviet failure to give direc 
assistance to the Algerian, 
and Angolan progressives is 
of Khruschev's calculus of 
gains. 11 
ironically, Khruschev viewed the 
t military 
Congolese 
revealing 
roles and 
war of national 
liberation in Algeria as 'a tiny spark' that 'can cause a 
world conflagration"' and thus 'he will work hard... to 
put out the sparks that may set off the flames of war'. -ý-' 
[Khruschev) conveniently failed to 
distinguish between just wars of 
national liberation as in Africa and 
unjust wars initiated by imperialism. r-a 
Whilst France was thus well placed to exploit the Soviet 
Union's self-made dilemma, the United States stepped up 
pressure against China by provoking a fresh crisis in 
Quemoy and Matsu islands, off China's coast (August- 
October 1958). Within a few years, the United States was 
to intervene directly in Vietnam (1963-5) following the 
conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (NTBT) (April 
1963). " 
In sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, China viewed 
de Gaulle's plan for a ceasefire and self-determination 
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as Issugar-coated poison" aimed at 
maintaining French colonial interests 
in Algeria, a political trap designed 
to induce Algeria to surrender. Under- 
cover of this plan which tries to 
deceive public opinion both inside and 
outside France, the French Government 
is intensifying its campaign of bloody 
military suppression in Algeria. 
De Gaulle's new plan only 
represents a change of tactics. De 
Gaulle reluctantly made this change 
because he has failed in his previous 
attempt to get a quick settlement of 
the Algerian question by a double- 
barrelled attack of military 
suppression and political chicanery. 
The Algerian question has landed the 
French ruling clique in insuperable 
difficulties. " 
As far as China's understanding went, both Eisenhower and 
de Gaulle shared the common aim of crushing the Algerian 
Liberation Army (ALN), Khruschev's attempts to provoke 
friction between de Gaulle and Eisenhower, the leading 
imperialists, were viewed by China and the Algerian FLN 
with serious misgivings. 
L-4 
Addressing the Second Conference of AAPSO (Conakry: 
April 1960), Liao Chleng-Chih gave clear expression to 
China's assessment of the Algerian situation and the 
immediate priorities of the anti-imperialist front in that 
country. 
We pay special homage to the heroic 
Algerian people and their gallant 
National Liberation Army. They are 
standing at the forefront of the 
struggle against imperialism. They 
have won admiration and support from 
the Afro-Asian peoples and the whole 
world... The imperialists dream they can 
crush the struggle of the Algerian 
people by "superior weapons" and save 
their colonial empire by means of armed 
suppression. But they are digging 
their own graves for history has shown 
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that justice always prevails over 
injustice, the weak over the strong and 
the new-born forces over the decaying 
one. The people of Vietnam have-shown 
this in Dien Bien Phu and the 
experience of long years of struggle of 
the Chinese people has proved that 
11millet plus rifles" can defeat 
"airplanes plus tanks". The decisive 
f actor in the struggle against 
imperialism is the people and so long 
as the people are determined and 
persist in their heroic fight they are 
invincible. 
The Chinese people entertain 
especially close warm feelings for the 
African people in their struggle 
against colonial rule and for national 
independence. We were regarded by the 
imperialist aggressors as a so-called 
"inferior race" and our peoples 
suffered the same bitterness of 
slaughter, plundering and enslavement 
at the hands of foreign colonialists... 
In the past two years, since the 
first Afro-Asian People's Solidarity 
Conference, the world situation has 
undergone a tremendous change. The 
forces against colonialism and 
imperialism are forging ahead from 
victory to victory while the 
imperialist bloc headed by the United 
States is tumbling down and nearing its 
doom. I-- I'-- 
During his visit to China (30 April 1960) Krim 
Belkacem, Vice President of NGRA, made it clear to the 
Soviet Union and other advocates of negotiations and 
peaceful means towards independence, that the Algerians 
would never lay down their arms until complete and 
unconditional independence was achieved: 
French colonialist forces are supported 
by- the Atlantic bloc, particularly by 
the rulers of the United States of 
America... Our people, (however) 
confident of the justice of their 
cause, are more resolute than ever in 
carrying on the struggle until they win 
national independence. ---7 
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In the same speech, Belkacem listed the factors that were 
inportant for the nainta inance of good relations between 
Algeria and China. 
The vast distance which separates 
Algeria and - China is only 
geographical ... In reality, our two 
countries are very close to each other. 
A common struggle against the 
reactionary forces of colonialism and 
imperialism, a common aspiration for 
peace based on independence and 
progress and a sincere desire for co- 
operation based on mutual respect - all 
this has forged close ties between our 
two countries and sealed a solid 
friendship. *--' 
0_ý 
Ho Lung, Delkacem's counterpart infNFRC and Vice-Premier, 
expressed China's great admiration for the Algerian 
6ý& 
struggle for national liberation. He praised JVLN's 
ability to 
[keep] down the main force of the 
French colonial army, thus constituting 
powerful aid to the independence and 
freedom of other peoples of Africa 
under French colonialist oppression, 
(and] also provide a brilliant example 
for the national liberation cause 
throughout Africa and the world, 
encouraging other people in 
independence struggle. " 
iýý 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai praisedt, ýLN for its reliance on 
the masses as the 'decisive factor, in its 'protracted and 
arduous struggle' and as the 'correct strategy of defeat 
of colonialism'. 711 During its visit, the Algerian 
delegation had talks and exchanged views with prominent 
Chinese leaders, including Mac Zedong, whose reception of 
the delegation was described by Aa--XLUýihia on its front 
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page as a salute of sincere friendship and support' by a 
great revolutionary leader'. 71 
The continuing Algerian war C3 f liberation, in 
opposition to the conditional ceasef ire advocated by the 
Soviet Union, constituted the central theme of the visit 
to China (October 1960) by Ferhat Abbas, President of the 
PGRA. '7ý1 China used Abbas's visit to put forward a more 
direct criticism of the Soviet Union's advocacy of a 
policy of conciliation and a peaceful approach to 
liberation. A similar strategy had already proved a 
failure in the Congc? ýL)afew months earlier (July 1960) now 
expected to lead to Algerian liberation. 
The tremendous change that has taken 
place in Algeria proves once again that 
the situation in which the enemies are 
strong while we are weak is only 
temporary; - it will change to its 
reverse. This is because imperialism 
which represents forces of decay, 
though outwardly strong, is actually 
weak. Its temporary ascendancy is 
merely a death-bed struggle. It is 
absolutely not decaying imperialism, 
but the awakened, united and fighting 
Algerian people that is truly powerful 
and invincible. " 
Abbas clearly voiced Algeria's disapproval of the Soviet 
line on negotiated independence, because 
The Algerian people know from their 
long experience that, in order to 
compel the imperialists to give up 
their criminal undertakings, it is 
necessary to arm ourselves with guns. 
In fact, all colonial domination is a 
matter of force, and what has been 
established by force can onl be 
destroyed by force. To f orget this 
principle is to commit a tragic error, 
to expose oneself to a great illusion 
and to leave the people to chance. 7`1 
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This position was given expression in the Sino-Algerian 
joint connuniqu6 at the end of the Algerian delegation's 
visit. Ir, Abbas's stance favouring China's general line 
was not only confined to the international sphere; it also 
extended to the sphere of Algeria's internal problems. 
I The) Chinese mode 1of development 
could be practical even in those non- 
communist countries especially in the 
Third World. 7'-, 
Less than a week after Abbas's visit to China, a big rally 
was held in Beijing. More than 15,000 citizens attended. 
An Algerian delegation took part. -77 
In May 1961, a PGRA diplomatic mission led by Kioune 
Abderrahmane visited China. --1*11 Kioune expressed his deep 
appreciation of China's contribution of moral and material 
support for the Algerian cause which formed the basis of a 
strong and solid friendship between China and Algeria at a 
'decisive period in Algerian history,. -- 
French oppression-'31 (e. g., the massacre on 24 October 
1961) of Algerians residing in France because they dared 
to demonstrate publicly against French colonialism in 
Algeria) was viewed by China as consisting of 
outrageous acts by the de Gaulle 
government constituting an open 
challenge to the Algerian people; such 
brutality and flagrant disregard of 
human rights and Justice cannot but 
anger the Chinese people and all other 
peoples of the world. " 
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By late 1961 the French colonialists became aware 
that neither their conditional negotiations nor their 
continuous oppression and massacres of Algerian people 
were leading their country out of a seven year dilemma. 
Algerian leaders rejected any solution short of complete 
and unconditional independence. The outcome was the 
conclusion of the Evian Agreement (18 March 1962) between6ke, 
PGRA and France recognising Algerian independence and 
liberation. The Algerian %FLN's struggle was the first 
successful anti-colonial movement in Africa to receive 
China's support. It was, according to Zhou Enlai 
the result of armed struggle waged 
heroically by the Algerian people for 
more than seven years, and of their 
perseverence in insisting on 
negotiations on an equal footing and an 
the basis of armed struggle. *3ý 
We conclude this session on Sino-Algerian relations and 
China's policy towards the Algerian war of national 
liberation (1954-1962) with a brief comparison of the 
Chinese (especially during the period 1935-1949) and 
Algerian revolutions (1954-1962), based on Ben Khedda's 
impressions. 
Ben Khedda argued that while both Algeria and China 
fought successful people's wars based in the countryside 
and led by the peasants, they differed in the concrete 
conditions facing them. Algeria had no option but to 
adopt the people's war and guerrilla warfare as its sole 
revolutionary strategy against a colonial power with 
immense military power and backed by its NATO allies. The 
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Algerians did not, at least in the initial stages of the 
struggle, have any organised military troops or arms which 
they could use to liberate the cities which were dominated 
by French settler-colonialists under the protection of one 
of the most advanced armies in the world. Thus, guerrilla 
warfare and people's war were the only options open to 
Algeria in order to launch a successful revolution. 
According to Ben Khedda, China differed from Algeria 
in an important respect. Although Mao and his followers 
insisted that the rural areas and peasants were to form 
the backbone of the Chinese revolution against Japanese 
imperialist invaders and the Guomindang troops supported 
by the Western imperialist powers (and especially the 
United States), this course of action was not followed 
until other strategies had failed. Moreover, at the time 
of the Algerian war, the population of Algeria was less 
than 10 million, whereas China's population, during CCPIs 
struggle against Japanese colonialism and the reactionary 
Guomintang government, was cAbDtA-- 4151) million. Ben 
Khedda argued that in view of its much larger population, 
China, unlike Algeria, offered more favourable conditions 
for the conduct of people's war in an adventurous spirit. 
The Algerian revolutionaries could not afford to launch a 
national liberation struggle on a trial and error basis as 
the much smaller Algerian population had a much lower 
tolerance of loss of lives and experimentation. cl: ý11 
Ben Khedda's comparison however, did not ineintion the 
maj or difference between the Chinese and Algerian 
revolutions stemming from the communist character of the 
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former and the nationalist character of the latter. 
ýKFLN's 
fundamental objective was to put an end to colonialism. 
Until 1962,11 its policies did not explicitly mention 
social reforms or other domestic ideological objectives. 
It gave much greater importance to the struggle against 
French colonialism than to the kind of post-colonial 
Algerian society it hoped to create. 
filt oký 
Unlikef\FLN, 1ý CCP (particularly following the Long 
March and the establishment of Mao's leadership of the 
party) had a fairly clear commitment to social reforms 
based on an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to suit Chinese 
conditions. Its fight against Japanese imperialism and 
Guomindang reaction were means to the end of Isocialist 
construction' in China. 
tý101 
The pled noir problem was unique to Algeria, and/)FLN 
had to adapt its national liberation strategy to take 
account of the entrenched settler population. Except 
during the brief Int erreEn um of Japan's physical 
occupation of China during the '30s, the Chinese 
revolution did not have to grapple with a settler 
population of foreign origin in China. 
However, if the options open to, and conditions faced 
by the Chinese revolution and the Algerian national 
liberation war were different, the rural nature and the 
peasant character of the two countries constituted the 
basis of similarities necessitating the-use of 'people's 
war' strategies. The victory of both these revolutions, 
would, perhaps have been put in doubt had the rural factor 
and the peasant character of society been neglected. 
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It is worth adding that another similarity between 
the Chinese revolution and the Algerian national 
liberation struggle lay in the fact that both societies 
had a long history of revolutionary uprisings dating back 
at least to the Taiping insurrection 1851-53 in the case 
of China, and to the People's Resistance of Amir Abdul 
Kader 1830-47 in the case of Algeria. 
Finally it is worth pointing out that in both cases, 
victory was followed by stability without any effective 
domestic challenge to the new order. In this respect, the 
aftermath of the Algerian revolution, like that of the 
Chinese revolution, was strikingly different from the 
aftermath of the Russian Revolution. 
13.2.1.2. China and National Liberation Movenents in the 
Portuguese Colonies 
13.2.1.2.1. Angola 
Having witnessed the successful means of armed 
struggle in Algeria and the failure of negotiated 
independence in the Congo (L), the Angolan national 
independence movement became convinced in 11961 that the 
only possible real guarantee of independence and 
liberation lay in physical resistance. No one was more 
satisfied with this decision than China, which had shown 
itself to be intensively active in finding ways and means 
of refuting the-Soviet Union's advocacy of peaceful means 
of achieving liberation. The emergence of a movement 
committed to armed struggle in Angola added weight to the 
view espoused by CCP that the main contradiction between 
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capitalism and imperialism on the one hand, and socialism 
on the other, was centred in the oppressed peoples of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. In view of the fact that, 
by the mid-'70s, Angola proved to be the most 
controversial case in Africa illustrating the ideological 
vagaries of China's policy, it is appropriate that the 
historical and ideological basis of Angola's major 
national independence movements should be briefly 
considered here. 
Three national liberation movements became involved 
in the process of Angolan independence. These were: the 
Frente de Libertagao Naclonal de Angola (FNLA), led by 
Holden Roberto; the Movimento Popular de Llbertai; ao de 
Angol a (MPLA), led by Agostino Neto, and the UnIA'o 
Naclonal Para de Angola a Independecia Total (UNITA) led 
by Janos Savimbi. 
MPLA: The f irst Angolan movement with a 
national-political character was formed in 
1953, following the foundation of a secret 
party - the Part1do da Luta UnIda Dos 
Afýricanos de Angola (PLUA) - by a group which 
followed Marxist ideas. ý-ý- Three years later 
this group - including Viriato Franciso 
Clemente da Cruz, ': '-- (who described himself as 
being 'absolutely possessed by a communist 
mentality'), Mario Pinto de Andrade`21-7 (who had 
had links with Portuguese and French 
communists during his student days in Lisbon 
and Paris), and Agostino Neto - Joined by 
national-political activists, organised a 
common front by the name of the Novemento 
popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA). 19*3 
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Despite its early career when it adopted 
peaceful methods for independence, right from 6wa 
the beginninSOPLA believed that Portuguese 
colonialism 
wouldn't fal-1 without a struggle. it 
would not gracefully leave through a 
series of peaceful negotiations: the 
Angolan people must force it to 
leave. "" 
64- 
Another important aspect ofJ)MPLA was its 
non-racial and non-ethnic character. 9c' 
National 
L4 
unity constituted the fundamental 
basis ofl)MPLA's objectives and strategy. MPLA 
strongly believed that the failure of the 
Angolan national movement hitherto had been 
due to 'tribal' divisions. "IýtMPLA's initial 
physical resistance began when its leader Dr. 
Angostino Neto was placed under detention by 
the colonial authorities in 1960. The 
demonstrations of the Angolan people against 
Neto's detention were crushed by the 
Portuguese troops. " After this incident, 
XPLA'ý"ý3 decided to use armed struggle as the 
ultimate means for liberation. 
... political struggle alone could go no further. It was time to take up 
ar Ms. -I 
The first serious resistance to Portuguese 
colonialism took place in Luanda (4 February 
1961). UnderMPLA's leadership, an attack was 
launched on the prisons in the city with the 
aim of releasing the political prisoners. ý-r- 
The Portuguese authorities unleashed terror by 
gunning down 3,000 people within a week. 'ý- 
The independence (in June 1960) of 
neighbouring Congo(L), under Lumumba's anti- 
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imperialist leadership, provided the onlys'-7 
hope for Angolan liberation movements to base 
themselves in hospitable territory from which 
they could offer effective resistance to 
Portuguese colonialism. Andrade (MPLA's 
acting President) in the place of Neto who was 
in prison, and da Cruz, moved the headquarters 
ofUKý'MPLA headquarters from Conakry to i\ 
L6opoldvi 1 With Lumumba's murder 
(February 1961), however, the new government 
ruled by anti-Lumumba forces were no longer L-K 
prepared to give any quarter to/, XPLA. 
b KC 
-FNLA: The historical foundations of/ýFNLA were 
'tribal' in character'ý"-9' and dated back to the 
appearance of the Union of Populations of the 
North of Angola (UPNA) in L&opoldville. UPNA 
consisted of those immigrants from the north 
of Angola who escaped from the deplorable 
conditions prevailing in that area. "c1c, In 
1958,6UPNA, led by Holden Roberto, was re- 
named the Uhlgo das Pqpula_, =_ý6e de Angola (UPA). 
OjL UPA did not show any clear 
. 
ol itical 
commitment; not until late 1960 didAUPA adopt 
a moderate anti-colonialist line 
After the liberation of Ghana, Guinea, 
Cameroun, Togo, the Congo and Somalia, 
European colonialism has been in swift 
retreat. 
Accordingly, no people in Africa 
has any longer the right to mark time 
or to play around with the ruling 
powers. Thus Portugal must stop 
dreaming of subjugating millions of 
Africans indefinitely and must realise, 
as have all other European States, that 
the Angolan people and all others under 
its control at the rendez-vous, having 
understood that freedom is an 
inalienable right which the Creator has 
accorded to all human beings to enjoy 
in this earthly sojourn. 11011 
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Tk'UPA began its political activities in 
Congo(L) in close association with the pro- 
Western government of Abdula, Mobutu and 
Kasavubu. The 'moderate' UPA was more 
acceptable than the radical MPLA. In March 
1961, only 5 weeks after the first Angolan 
attack on Luanda's prisons, a similar attack 
was spearheaded in the north of Angola by UPA. 
Although its target was the Portuguese troops, 
the end proved to be disastrous and highly 
undesirable. 200 European civilians were 
killed. VVC-UPA had shown itself to be 
adventurist in character and lacking in 
revolutionary discipline and ideological 
maturity. "I 
The Portuguese army reacted to this 
incident by killing 50,000 Angolans and by 
driving more than 300,000 into exile in 
Congo(L). "Ilcl In November 1961, Holden Roberto 
was responsible forAUPA's attack against an 
XPLA detachment (which went to take part in 
Ur, ý UPA's resistance to intensive Portuguese 
reprisals). "' 0-t 
_A, %"PLA, unlike (NUPA, found itself in a 
difficult situation in Congo(L). The 
government of Congo(L) was rapidly becoming 
anti-MPLA and pro-UPA. "O'E- The radical 
leadership of 
)tPLA 
was subject to frequent 
criticism by the pro-Western government under 
Adoula's leadership. With Gizensals arrest 
(January 1962), 0, LMPLA's presence in 
L6opoldville became even more precariousAtUPA 
was given facilities for communication and 
contacts and enjoyed the propaganda edge overk"V-0- 
MPLA as the leading national independence 
movement of Angola. kjý 
In an attempt to isolatel\MPLA, Holden 
Roberto was able to win over a small group - 
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Part1do Democratico de AnEola (PDA) - with 
which UPA formed a coalition'under the name of 
the National Front of Angolan Liberation 
(FNLA) (March 1962). '01- 14"PLA's attempts to 
form a national front failed. Holden Roberto, 
the UPA leader, felt that his well-established 
position in the Congo(L) would enable him to 
isolate if not complýetely eliminate,; 
ýIPLA. 
IC17 
In April 1962, /-,, FNLA was able to improve 
its political and diplomatic position by 
creating a Revolutionary Government in Exile 
(GRAE) with Holden Roberto, the President of 
UPA as its Prime Minister. Division within 
the MPLA leadership reduced the effectiveness 
of its opposition topfNLA which appeared to 
grow in strength. 101 
The support given he pro-Western 
government of the Congo(L> 9ýwith almost 
'. T ý. " 
ýI 
completeA isolation of/\MPLA. 
KFNLA made itself 
appear as the leading force in the Angolan 
national movement -t-(,, FNLA was able to win the 
support of even such radical African countries 
as Algeria. In January 1963, Holden Roberto 
visited Algeria where he received promises of 
unconditional moral and material support. 
In July 1964, /\OAU recognisedfý FNLA and its 
government (GREA) as the sole representative 
of the Angolan national movement. 1110 
_%L FNLA 's position thus consolidated and 
strengthened, did not last for long. This was 
not only because of divisions within its 
leadership, but also because of the 
restrictions on its internal and external 
activities imposed by the new government under 
Tshombe's leadership. Tshombe was a close 
ally of the Portuguese authorities which had 
extended assistance to him when he led the 
secessionist government in Katanga. 111 FNLA's 
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political credibilty was seriously weakened 
and its growing popularity was contained by 
the new turn of events in the Congo(L). 
UNITA: in protest against Cruz joining(ýFNLA, 
Jonas Savimbi, GREA's Foreign Minister 
resigned (July 1964). Savimbi perhaps feared 
that China might well divert its support to 
Cruz because he was the more radical of the 
two. 11ýz Another reason for Savimbi's 
resignation was his opposition to the moderate 
character of Roberto's leadership. Savimbi 
was especially critical of Roberto's 
concentration on political activities 
neglecting the task of offering physical 
resistance to Portuguese colonialism. "ý 
Savimbi was strongly opposed to FNLA's 
readiness to subordinate Angola's interests to 
the American interest. "' 
In March 1966, Savimbi created a new 
organisation - the UnlAo Naclonal Para a 
Independence Total of Angola (UNITA)II-r- with 
its office in Lusaka (Zambia) and its 
headquarters based among the Ovimbundu people 
of central Angola. "*-- The people of the 
southern part of the country also gave support 
to UNITA. The peasants in this region had a 
history of fighting for their land and 
offering resistance to the Portuguese laws. "' 
China made its first direct contact on a personal 
level with the Angolan nationalist movement through Mario 
Pinto Andrade, a prominent MPLA leader, at the 
conference of Afro-Asian _countries 
held in Tashkent (in 
the Soviet Union) in 1958.1 1,55-4 Andrade and Cruz were 
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already known to the international communist movement for 
their communist tendencies. 
Direct organisational contacts between China and 
Angolan liberation movements, however, only began 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and Guinea. '1ý0 In September 1960, months 
before the February uprising in Angola, Radio Beijing was 
the first to broadcast (in Portuguese)'ý' the development 
of Angolan national resistance to Portuguese colonialism 
and to express China's strong support, without naming any 
specific Angolan national movement. The objective of 
the resistance was described as a limited national 
struggle which would eventually lead to inevitable 
victory. 
In May 1961, in a rally held in Beijing in support of 
the Angolan struggle, and attended - by the Angolan 
delegation, Li Chien-po (Vice President of the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions) expressed the view that the 
instigation of armed struggle in Angola was another 
decisive step forward in bringing about the imminent 
destruction not only of colonialist rule, but also of the 
imperialist penetration of the country. 
The imperialist colonialist system... is 
fast collapsing in Africa. The day is 
not far off when the imperialists will 
finally be driven out of the continent 
of Africa. "' 
Angolan resistance to Portuguese colonialism was viewed by 
China as an important new development in the progress made 
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by national liberation movements1`1 and as a 'historical 
point in the Angolan national independence movement. 'Iýr, 
During the period 1959-66, which constituted the 
second phase of China's policy in Africa and the first 
stage of the Angolan struggle, China showed no concern 
with winning one movement or the other in favour of its 
ideological position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This 
was especially interesting because China's main interest 
lay in the fact that all the national movements active in 
Angola recognised the necessity of armed struggle for its 
liberation. China's concern was with a united national 
resistance against Portuguese colonialism. 
The 650 million Chinese people 
resolutely support armed uprising of 
the people of Angola against colonial 
rule and for national independence; 
they support the national liberation 
movements of the people of the other 
Portuguese colonies in Africa. "! -"-- 
The Chinese press': ýý- gave equal support to XPLA and 
FNLA"21 and as the leading liberation movements in the 
Angolan struggles for liberation. On 4 February 1965, 
the 4th anniversary of the Angolan struggle was celebrated 
in different parts of China. 'ý, D 
13.2.1.2.2. Hozambiqu-e- 
Following the independence of Tanganyika (December 
1961), Dr. Eduardo Mondlarfe was able to mobilise 
Mozambican groups and parties in a national united front 
for Mozambique's independence under the name of the Frente 
de Ll berta 9, ýo de Mozambique (FRELIMO, June 1962). 
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FRELIMO has been unquestionably the most popular and 
effective liberation movement and politi cal organisation 
in Mozambique both before and since independence (June 
1975). "'1 Right from the beginning FRELIMO believed that 
only direct action"' against Portuguese -colonialism (and 
not negotiations with it) would guarantee the complete 
independence of Mozambique. FRELIMO leaders were 
convinced that 
they must answer colonialist violence 
with a counter-violence, and prepare 
for a guerrilla war. ': aýý' 
Towards this end FRELIMO 
[set up] a clandestine political 
organisation within Mozambique; 
[established] a military training 
program to produce a corps of 
freedom fighters t C3 undertake 
armed struggle; and 
iii. endorsed a crash educational 
program at all levels to prepare 
leadership cadres for the needs of 
a liberated Mozambique. '*"- 
By 1964, like its partner PAIGC (in Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde) FRELIMO had prepared the ground for carrying 
armed struggle into Mozambique. A group of freedom 
fighters, including Samora Machel and Alberto Chipande 
(who were to play a leading role in FRELIMO after 
Mondlane's- assassination) entered Mozambique after 
receiving training for a period of two years (September 
1962-September 1964) in Algeria.. ' FRELIMO launched its 
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6 
first attack on the Portuguese troops in northern 
Mozambique (September 1964). 3: 31-- 
China's relations with FRELIMO began almost two years 
(January 1963) before the beginning of guerrilla warfare 
in Mozambique (September 1964). In 1963, five FRELIMO 
delegations visited China, one of which (January) was led 
by Mondlane himself. "l-I On his return from China, 
Mondlane described the Chinese model for national 
liberation as stimulating to the African people and that 
he was 
very much impressed by the enthusiasm 
of the Chinese people towards the 
national liberation movement in Africa 
and their willingness to support the 
African people's struggle. 1a, 13 
FRELIMO was not only an anti-colonial but also an 
anti-imperialist movement. As far as FRELIMO was 
concerned, Portuguese colonialism could not be separated 
from its NATO allies in the Mozambican people's struggle 
for national liberation. In February 1964, seven months 
before launching the armed struggle for the liberation of 
Mozambique, FRELIMO condemned the United States, Britain 
and other Western powers for their policy of co-operation 
with Portuguese colonialism. Such co-operation 
cannot but signify the coincidence of 
the interests of an imperialist 
alliance against the popular will. 'a- 
FRELIMO's use of a strategy of people's war and armed 
struggle, coupled with its condemnation of imperialism 
under the leadership of the United States, lay at the root 
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of the close relationship that it was in a position to 
forge with China. Through Tanzania with which it had 
friendly relations, '-0 China was able to provide financial 
and military support to FRELIMO. When FRELIMOIs armed 
struggle had begun, Tanzania's relations with China 
deepened to the point of the former accepting military aid 
from the latter. I, '" This development made arms transfer 
to FRELIMO easy. The pro-Chinese character of FRELIMO and 
its admiration of the Chinese model of people's war were 
expressed in the following words by Manuel Mahluza, 
Education Secretary of the Mozambique Revolutionary 
Committee 
By arming ourselves with Chairman Mao's 
great thesis on people's war, we can 
defeat the Portuguese colonialists who 
are nothing but paper tigers. ', ýý 
13.2.1.2.3. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde 
Throughout its history, the national independence 
movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was the only 
Portuguese colony in Africa in which there were no 
'rialls internal dissensions among the leadership. The national 
movement, spearheaded by the African Party',, "" for the 
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde'-4-4- (PAIGC) 
under Cabral's leadership took great care not to let the 
Sino-Soviet dispute affect its foreign policy. Its united 
leadership contributed much to its success in obtaining 
support from both the Soviet Union and China. 
Though founded in September 1956, PAIGC began a 
career of effective physical resistance to Portuguese 
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colonialism only in January 1963. During the intervening 
period (1956-63), it had been engaged in the task of 
mobilising the masses. During the same period, PAIGC 
organised and led strikes and demonstrations demanding 
political and economic reforms to ameliorate the appalling 
conditions under which the people lived. "r- Four maj or 
factors inspired and encouraged the PAIGC to launch 
guerrilla operations and people's war against Portuguese 
colonialism in 1963. 
The victory of the liberation war in Algeria 
(1962) provided a great stimulus to PAIGC's 
conviction that people's war would 
unquestionably guarantee the achievement of 
liberation. 
By 1963, two years had elapsed since the 
beginning of armed struggle in Angola (1961). 
The Angolan struggle was particularly 
inspiring for PAIGC; Angola and Guinea-Bissau 
and Cape Verde faced the same enemy - 
Portuguese colonialism. 
Unlike Mozambique [prior to Tanganyika's 
independence (1961)], PAIGC found the 
neighbouring Guinea, independent since 1958, 
prepared not only to allow it to have a base 
in its territory but also to facilitate 
external financial and military support. In 
Guinea, China was very active in channelling 
financial aid to the PAIGC. 111-7 
vi. PAIGC was encouraged to launch armed struggle 
in 1963 by the formation of the OAU Liberation 
Committee (May 1963) for providing material 
support for African liberation movements. 
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By 1965, the PAIGC liberation Fighters were able to 
control a third of the country. By 1969 the PAIGC 
forces were able to liberation the entire length of the 
frontier with Guinea. 
Prior to 1963, of all the Portuguese colonies in 
Africa PAIGC based in friendly Guinea offered the easiest 
access to China. PAIGC's first contact with China took 
place in Guinea. 'Ir-ý11 In July 1960, a PAIGC delegation 
visited China. "-' From the following year, PAIGC 
guerrilla forces received training in China. lr-ý In 1963 a 
group of PAIGC guerrilla fighters went to China for 
advanced training after undertaking their initial training 
in Ghana. I 
Although supported by both China and the Soviet 
Union, PAIGC was, on balance, rather more pro-Chinese in 
character. "' China's advocacy of armed struggle and its 
own experience of people's war provided inspiration to 
PAIGC in adhering to its ideological position on people's 
war. On the eve of Zhou Enlails visit to Guinea (21-6 
January 1964) Amilcar Cabral expressed his admiration for 
China's readiness to support African liberation struggle. 
The China delegation will surely be 
accorded the warmest welcome... this 
welcome will express the active 
solidarity of the African people with 
the Chinese people in their struggle. 
The Chinese people have consistently 
shown their firm solidarity with the 
African peoples in their struggle for 
national liberation and consolidation 
of their independence. "--r- 
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Accordingly, the Chinese press, Radio and propaganda 
instruments too, widely publ_icised and praised PAIGC's 
determination to engage in an armed struggle for which 
China was ready to give support. In October 1964, 
Aristedes Perreira, a member -of the Political Bureau and 
Deputy General Secretary of PAIGC visited China where he 
attended China's National Day (1 October). Ir--l 
13.2.1.3. China and the National Liberation Movements of 
Zimb , -=-: -and Azania 
Unlike the national liberation movements in the rest 
of Africa, those of Zimbabwe, Azania and Namibia faced a 
much more difficult task in their struggle against 
imperialism, racism and colonialism. They were not only 
faced with the task of destroying their colonialist and 
imperialist roots, but also, with the task of overthrowing 
a firmly entrenched racist r6gime in which white minority 
government was determined to maintain its power. 
13.2.1.3-1. Zimbabwe 
The whole of Rhodesia - named after Cecil Rhodes 
(1888), the British colonialist - remained under direct 
British rule until 1923 when the white settlers in the 
southern part of the colony (since 11980, Zimbabwe), were 
given internal autonomy at their request. 
Serious African resistance to the exploitative and 
racist rule of the white colonialists, coupled with 
demands for independence and the establishment of a 
majority government, did not begin until 1957 when the 
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African National Congress (ANC) was founded under the 
leadership of Joshua Nkomo, Robert Chikerema, and George 
Nayandor. ANC also included among its founding members 
Robert Mugabe and Ndbaningi Sithole, both of whom were to 
play a leading role in the liberation of Zimbabwe. 
However, it did not survive for long. In February 
1959, it was banned and its political activists were 
detained. "' Nkomo escaped detention because he was then 
in Cairo where he was attending the AAPSO conference. In 
London (January 1960), after a year's campaign, Nkomo was 
able to f ound a new movement under the name of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP). In less than a year 
(December), ýNDP was banned. "'-'-` 
Immediately afterwards, Nkomo formed another party 
named the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 
1962, ZAPU was banned and had to move to Dar es Salaam 
where it became a political movement in exile. 14--cl The 
united leadership of the national movement in Zimbabwe did 
not last for long. Nkomo seemed to be more concerned with 
wooing international support for ZAPU"--' rather than with 
forcing the pace of social and political change inside 
Zimbabwe. By concerning himself with the international 
dimensions of the problem and forgoing the revolutionary 
task Nkomo's leadership had put the cart before the horse. 
Nkomo and Sithole fell out in 1963. Their 
ideological differences culminated in Sithole founding (8 
August) the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with 
Robert Mugabe as the Secretary General. '-----: 2 Sithole 
summarised the purpose of the new party as follows: 
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African politics in Zimbabwe, as well 
as in European-ruled Africa, began as 
'reformist politics', but now we have 
entered the phase of 'take over' 
politics, as it is impossible for the 
present minority to rule Zimbabwe 
for... the benefit of the voteless 
African majority. We have entered the 
period of political confrontation. 
ZANU represents the fighting spirit 
which began with an imposed rule in 
1890 and shows the unity of spirit 
between those who have gone and those 
who are still living. We have a duty 
to ourselves and to the urban 
generation of Zimbabwe, and that duty 
is to free Zimbabwe. We are our own 
liberators. 'r-z' 
As with most national liberation movements in Africa, 
China's initial contacts with representative of Zimbabwe 
took place at AAPSO. At the Conakry Conference, (April 1ý 
Lvq 
1960), Joshua Nkomo was elected to/)AAPSO's Executive 
Committee along with Liao Ch eng-chi (China), Ouandic 
(Cameroon), Oginga Odinga (Kenya), J. Kozonguizi (South 
West Africa i. e. Namibia), Ahmed Tlili (Tunisia), and 
Patrice Lumumba 1Congo<L)1. '11'--4 In support of the national 
independence movement in Zimbabwe, China organised a 
, Zimbabwe Day' rally in Beijing (17 March 1963). 1"r- 
At the third AAPSO conference held in Moshi (FC6n_x: AfJ 
k01453)), Sithole was among the representatives of the 
African national movements who made useful contacts with 
representatives of China. China condemned the 
imprisonment of Sithole (September 1964) followed by the 
1: ý\Cl (_Alcz 
banning of bothNAPU andNANU by the Southern Rhodesian 
government. "' At the same time, it expressed strong 
support for both/\ZAPU andAZANU for their determined stance 
against Britain's support for white minority rule. "--13 
-475- 
With the removal of Sithole and Mugabe from the scene, 
ZAPU became increasingly moderate in its stance on the 
nature of politcal resistance to be offered to colonialism 
and imperialism. 
1b9 
As ZAPU became more and more moderate, China became 
more and more actively pro-ZANU, and less and less 
interested in ZAPU- ZAPU, for its part, was more and more 
attracted to the Soviet view that liberation could and 
should be achieved through peaceful means. China regarded 
ZANU as the most 'important nationalist party'"c' in 
Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. 
In September 1963, the first ZANU guerrilla group 
went to China for training. It was followed by the second 
and third groups of trainees in 1964 and 1965 
respectively. "' It is worth noting that China laid a 
great deal of emphasis on the formation of united national 
front with the aim of engaging in concrete positive action 
against white minority rule. Thus, even though China 
appeared to be more favourably inclined towards the more 
revolutionary ZANU, it hoped that ZANU and ZAPU would 
unite in order to consolidate the national movement of 
Zimbabwe. In February 1964 when James Robert, a ZAPU 
leader, visited China on his way to Moscow, China offered 
a financial contribution of $19,700 to ZAPU. In April 
1966, five months after Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence, (UDI) (November 1(965), ZANU effectively 
demonstrated its revolutionary character by laUnching 
(April 1966) a full-scale"7`1 guerrilla war against the 
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Smith r6glme from its bases in Zambia. China viewed UDI 
as an act of the white colonialist authorities: 
(to] carry on a fascist rule of the 
South African type in a more unbridled 
way than before and to go further with 
oppressing the struggle of the Zimbabwe 
people for genuine independence, that 
constitutes a wild attack on the 
Zimbabwe people and a grave threat to 
all African peoples. The Chinese 
government and people strongly condemn 
the colonialist authorities in Southern 
Rhodesia for this criminal act and 
express firm support for the Zimbabwe 
people in their struggle against 
imperialism, colonialism and for 
national independence. '"7-4 
On the same occasion, the People's Daily (13 November 
1965> wrote that the aim of UDI was to: 
cloak their bloodthirsty rule with sham 
independence, thus giving a legal 
figleaf to their barbarous rule, so 
that they may maintain Southern 
Rhodesia as their 'paradise' where they 
can continue to rule suprene. 1-7-r- 
At the saTne time, China urged that the consolidated racist 
r6gime could be overthrown only by a united national front 
guided by positive political and physical actions: 
The independence of Southern Rhodesia 
can only [be achieved by] the 
unremitting struggle of the Zimbabwe 
people. The minority rule of the white 
settlers must be overthrown... Final 
victory certainly belongs to the 
Zimbabwe people so long as they 
strengthen their unity and persevere in 
their struggle. "' 
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13.2.1.3.2. Azania 
Like ZAPU and ZANU, the African National Congress 
(ANC) founded in 1912, "" the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) founded in 1921,171 and the Pan African 
Congress (PAC) founded in 1959,17SO faced the basic task of 
overthrowing the South African apartheid r6gime. However, 
unlike ZAPU and ZANU, ANC, SACP and PAC, faced and still 
continue to face, one of the most powerful military forces 
in the world, and certainly the most powerful in Africa. 
In March 1960, both ANC and PAC began their effective 
resistance by urging the people to challenge'63c' the 'pass 
laws', under which Africans were required to carry their 
identity cards at all times. The South African r6gime 
reacted by killing at least 69 unarmed Africans injuring 
more than 180 people"01 in the Sharpeville Massacre. At 
the same tine, (, ANC andf'*ýPAC were both outlawed and their 
leaders, including Mangaliso Sobuke, PAC's founder-leader, 
arrested"' (April). 
Until the mid-'605 ANC was much influenced by SACP 
which strictly followed the Soviet international line. "I 
PAC, however, seemed to be much more militant and 
revolutionary in character. As a matter of fact PAC was 
founded as a result of an ideological disputd within the 
leadership of ANC. ""TýAC's aim could be found in its 
manifesto which aimed at creating a society 
... socialist in content, democratic in form and creative in purpose -a 
democracy in which man shall at long 
last find his own true self, and in 
which the human personality shall 
blossom to the full. "3s 
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Aý4 By virtue of its opposition to/)ANC's (and SAP's) 
moderate character, PAC attracted popular support among 
militant African nationalists as well as progressive 
forces outside Africa, including China. China, however, 
1ý1 kle-a- 
was keen thatjý, ANC and PAC should unite together in a 
common front. "". It extended equal support to both 
organisations. As has already been noted, China's early 
contact with Africa was with ANC on the occasion of Walter 
Sisulu's visit to China (1953). 1*1-7 
Two years later, at the Bandung Conference (April 
1955), the Chinese delegates met representatives of the 
South African national movements. By its strong 
opposition to racial discrimation, and its campaign for 
adopting effective means for eliminating the apartheid 
r6glme of South Africa, China made a strong impression on 
the South African leaders. "BI It viewed struggles against 
colonialists and imperialists as inseparable from those 
against racists, as all three were monopolist and 
imperialist in character: 
The policy of racial discrimination and 
oppression is aimed at further 
enslaving all people other than the 
white, turning them into the cheapest 
labour force for the mines, factories 
and farms owned by the white man. it 
aims at turning them into slaves 
deprived of all rights so as to 
maintain the reactionary and predatory 
rule of the facists and monopolists. 'IEII'ýý' 
it was, however, not until 1ID62, "-'-" following the creation 
of the Republic (31 May, 1961), that ANC became convinced 
that change could no longer be achieved by peaceful means 
in South Africa. 
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Armed struggle is the only means for 
the, people to recover their lost rights 
and gain freedom land that) assault and 
violence -are the- methods to be used in 
their political struggle for 
freedom. ""' 
China issued a strongly worded statement attacking 
the establishment of the Republic of South Africa and its 
Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd. "I At the same time, it 
strongly criticised those who advocated the view that 
pressure on the South African minority r6glme or UN 
resolutions could bring about any change because: 
The United Nations, controlled by the 
United States, have not taken and never 
will take any measure of sanctions 
against the South African 
authorities. 
This statement came in the wake of attempts"", ' made 
by UN and many of its members to apply pressure on the 
South African authorities to release Nelson Mandela before 
his trial (June 1964) at which he was sentenced to life 
iimprisonment. 
A conference of an 'international trade union 
committee for solidarity with South African workers and 
people' was organised by China to take place in 
Accra"I'March 1964). 
In the absence of any easy access to South Africa 
(especially before the 170s when, with the exception of 
Botswana, "3"-- all the neighbouring South African countries 
were still under direct colonial rule), China urged the 
South African national liberation movements to adopt self- 
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reliance as the fundamental means and method of achieving 
their aims. 
The Chinese people are full of 
confidence in the liberation of the 
South African people. The oppressed 
nations should not count on anyone but 
themselves to win freedom. The aid 
that comes from the outside is 
important, but it can only be a 
secondary and auxilliary factor in the 
struggle conducted by the people 
themselves. It cannot replace this. 
We are sure that the South African 
people, thanks to their own strength 
and to the experience that they 
accumulated during their long struggle, 
will certainly find a true pathway to 
their liberation. "-5`1 
EVIX 
13-2.2. China andA4APS0 
The meetings, conferences and activities of AAPSO 
were directly affected by the Sino-Soviet ideological 
dispute from the beginning of this period (1959-66). 
Soviet efforts and activities in the arganisation were 
guided more by their glob. al concerns than by a concern 
with AAPSO's fundamental objectives of unity and 
solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As far as 
the Soviet Union was concerned, these objectives were of 
secondary importance because they conflicted with its 
, relentless effort to reach D6tente with the United 
States'. "' 
The first direct Sino-Soviet clash over ideological 
issues in AAPSO took place at its second conference 
(Conakry: April 1960). Both the Soviet Union and China 
attached a great deal of importance to this conference as 
a forum for explaining and drawing support for their world 
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views from the 68 Afro-Asian representatives of parties, 
associations, committees and trade unions present. 'fIf' For 
the Soviet Union, any solution short of complete support 
for disarmament and peaceful coexistence with imperialism 
was less than desirable. For China any solution short of 
opposition to Soviet D6tente policy and without $a 
definite line on the struggle against imperialism"" 
would be a major setback to the anti-imperialist front. . 
During the conference, the Chinese representativesýDl 
actively promoted resolutions condemning imperialism and 
opposing D6tente. Chu-Tzu-cLi, the Chinese representative 
in the organisation's Secretariat, argued as follows: 
It' is imperative for the Asian and 
African peoples first of all to oppose 
and end colonial rule, liquidating the 
control and bondage of the imperialist 
forces of aggression, and completely 
wipe out its influence in all fields 
before they can obtain a solution to 
the social problems facing them and 
achieve a social program. ýcl-ýý 
The Soviet delegation, for its part, attempted to 
include D6tente and peaceful coexistence as important 
deside. rata for economic development. It proposed a 
resolution stating that the economic development of the 
newly independent countries could be greatly speeded up if 
the Cold War and the arms race were ended. "' 
China regarded the Soviet proposal as propagating an 
illusion regarding the fundamental nature of imperialism. 
Its general argument seemed to be more logical and 
convincing to the Africans and Asians present. In the 
words of Ogunsanwo, 
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Events have shown that the Great Power 
D6tentes and the relaxation of tension 
usually led to a decline in competitive 
aid-giving to the developing countries 
- the Great Powers find other uses for 
their resources when the bogey of world 
communism or imperialism has been 
removed. ý2c` 
Another major issue raised at the conference related 
to the removal of AAPSC's headquarters from Cairo to 
Conakry where Sekou Tour6 was becoming an increasingly 
militant leader. Tour6 was prepared to provide all 
possible support for liberation movements involved in 
armed struggles for their liberation. China gave strong 
support to this proposal. ý213`-- 
Sino-Egyptian relations had already reached a nadir 
following Nasser's anti-communist campaign. ýc-- For China, 
AAPSC' s presence in Cairo, where Nasser was increasingly 
identifying himself with such leading moderate figures as 
Nehru and Tito, would only lead to an undermining of its 
militant character. The issue was, however, eventually 
dropped without China offering any resistance. --2c'-7 As the 
Chinese delegation was concentrating its activities on 
consolidating Afro-Asian solidarity and unity, a direct 
challenge to Egypt would have made it difficult for China 
to pursue its main objectives. 
The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council (AAPSC) 
was re-named the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity 
Organisation (AAPSO) at the Conakry session. An Executive 
Committee was constituted consisting of 14 African and 13- 
Asian representatives. Also, at this conference, an Afro- 
Asian Fund Committee (AAFC) was created. ý2cla China was 
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able to use AAFC as an important channel through which 
moral and material support for armed struggles for 
liberation could be extended under the terms of the 
resolutions passed at the conference. 
The AAFC created an Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund (AASF) 
which was sponsored by Chinaýclý (Conakry: February 1961), 
with Ismail Tour&, Guinean Xinister of Public Works as its 
Chairman, Mehdi Ben Barka, the Xoroccan opposition leader 
of UNFPýIcl and Chu Tzu-C-6i6 of China as his deputies. =" 
AASF's aim was to channel aid to national liberation 
movements which were engaged in armed struggles and in 
urgent need of help to consolidate their resistance to 
colonialism and imperialism. 
As stated by the Fund Committee, the purpose of the 
AASF was to provide 
EmIaterial and financial aid to 
organisations and persons who 
participate in the struggle for the 
objectives and principles of the AAPS 
movement... priority will be accorded to 
those organisations which are 
confronting armed aggression launched 
by imperialism and colonialism and are 
therefore in urgent need. The 
Committee may take all such actions as 
(are required) to reinforce the 
solidarity of the Afro-Asian people. 
The Fund is destined to help in cash or 
kind: those political organisations, 
sydicates and others, national or 
international, of Asian and African 
countries which are struggling in their 
own countries for the liquidation of 
imperialism and colonial and neo- 
colonial systems, in all their forms 
and manifestations, and desire to 
accelerate the liberation and 
progressive development of the peoples 
of Asia and Africa; and those who 
become victims of persecution or are 
obliged to leave their own countries as 
a result of those activities, as well 
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as the families of partisans of the 
national liberation movements who 
become victims in that struggle. ý"ý 
L-0- 
China responded tof., AASF's appeal for financial aid by 
donating a sum of $40,000 and offering scholarships. -ý10 
As the Sino-Soviet dispute was becoming more and more 
difficult to reconcile (especially from 1961 onwards), the 
Soviet and Chinese delegations began to clash openly with 
each other athAAPSO meetings and in AAPSO branches. 
T"APSO 
f ound the views expressed by the Chinese delegates to be 
more convincing than those espoused by the Soviet 
delegates. At an emergency session of the AAPSO Council 
(Cairo: January 1961), the activities and involvement of 
6kUN in the Congo(L) were strongly condemned. ý1-4 At 
consecutive meetings of the Council and of the Executive 
6K OIL 
Committee oft)AAPSO (Bandung: April 11960)fýJN was again 
condemned for its controversial role in the Congo, where 
Lumumba's government was being sacrificed to satisfy 
imperialist countries. At the same time, liberation 
movements were urged to intensify their struggles against 
colonialism and imperialist intervention in Africa and 
As i a. China's proposal for the inclusion of Latin 
America inýAAPSO was also endorsed. ='Ic- 
At the conference of Afro-Asian Writers (Cairo: 
February 1962), China sharply attacked the Soviet Union 
for supporting a resolution introduced by the Tunisian 
delegation in support of disarmament. ý" At an Afro-Asian 
Lawyer's Conference meeting (Cairo: October 1962), the 
Chinese delegation supported resolutions in support of 
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armed struggle for national liberation movements. At the 
same time, they urged the meeting to adopt resolutions 
condemning disarmament and coexistence with imperialism as 
advocated by the Soviet delegation. Yang Yu-yu, the 
Chinese delegate, argued that 
we are absolutely opposed to such 
remarks that the struggle for general 
and complete disarmament is all- 
embracing and supreme or that the 
struggle for winning and safeguarding 
national struggle is subordinate to the 
struggle for international disarmament. 
For countries that are not independent 
it is imperative that they conduct the 
struggle in various forms, including 
armed struggle; for those countries and 
peoples which have independence, it is 
necessary to strengthen their national 
defence in order to safeguard and 
strengthen their national 
independence. ý211E' 
tkc- 
At the third conferene of OAPSO (Moshi, Tanganyika: 
4-11 February 1963) only three months after the border 
conflict between India and China (October 1962), a new 
dimension of international conflict was added to the 
debate. This conference was of great significance for 
China's campaign to put pressure on the Soviet Union not 
to give effect to its D6tente policy and to influence 
Afro-Asian countries to withhold their support for the 
Soviet Union's policy. China vehemently criticised the 
Soviet Union's collusion with the United States by using 
D6tente as a vehicle for exercising Big Power chauvinism 
on major international issues, without-the consent Jof the 
majority of the people of other countries. 
The attempt to decide the maj or 
problems of the world and to manipulate 
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the destiny of mankind by one or two 
countries runs counter to the trend of 
our times and is against the interest 
of the peoples. "ý 
In his speech at the opening of the conference, 
Nyerere, in line with China's stance, indirectly 
criticised the Soviet Union's use of its power and 
prestige, which he described as capitalist in character, 
when he said: 
I believe that the socialist countries 
themselves, considered as individuals 
in the larger society of nations, are 
now committing the same crimes as were 
committed by capitalists before. On 
the international level they are now 
beginning to use wealth for 
capitalistic purposes, that is, for the 
acquisition of power and prestige. 12ý2ý11 
The 'use of wealth for capitalistic purposes' aimed at 
'the acquisition of power and prestige' clearly referred 
to the Soviet Union. During the '60s China was still a 
weak and poor country. It was one of the first, if not 
the first, to be subjected to the powerful Soviet Union's 
abrupt punishment in the form of a withdrawal of aid to 
and experts from China (1960). 
The results of the conference represented a setback 
to both the Soviet Union and India. Neither the Soviet 
priority for disarmament and world peace, nor India's 
attempts to get the conference to discuss its disputes 
with China were considered. -ýý" The -conference gave 
priority to the question of the liberation of the 
remaining areas under colonialism. The means to achieve 
such an objective was, the conference emphasised, to force 
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the colonialist powers out of Asia and Africa, not to 
negotiate with them. ý: 2ý2 The conference declared that the 
struggle for national liberation would constitute a 
... mighty force in achieving peace and disarmament. ý2ý: 3 
The resolutions passed at the conference were in 
conformity with a speech made by Liu Ning-ji head of the 
Chinese delegation in which he advanced the following 
argument: 
It is impossible for the peoples of 
Asia and Africa to realise genuine 
independence, nor for the newly 
independent countries to consolidate 
their independence, if they do not 
shake completely imperialist and 
colonialist enslavement and domination 
and eliminate the influence of 
imperialism. Any words or acts aiming 
at weakening or doing harm to the Afro- 
Asian people's anti-imperialist 
struggle will never be countenanced by 
the peoples of Asia and Africa and will 
certainly be opposed and rejected by 
them... The decisive factor in the 
development of history is always the 
people. What is really powerful is the 
strength of the masses of the people, 
and not that of the decadent 
imperialists and reactionaries, nor any 
kinds of modern weapons... we are 
against any Great Power "using aid" as 
a means to barter the rights of a 
recipient country in international 
bargainings. At a time when the 
imperialists are frantically carrying 
out arms expansion and war 
preparations, we have every reason to 
say that the proposition of aiding so- 
called underdeveloped countries with 
money supposd-dly saved from disarmament 
is an unrealistic illusion and 
deceitful nonsense... The attempt to 
decide the major problems of the world 
and to manipulate the destiny of 
mankind by one or two countries runs 
counter to the trend of our times and 
I 
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is against the spirit of the 
peoples. ý2ý, * 
China also won a highly important revolutionary 
objective when the conference condemned Cyrille Adoula's 
government which the Soviet Union had already recognised. 
The Soviet UnionAfailed to persuade the conference to 
convene a tri-continental conference including Asia, 
Africa and Latin American countries. It must be noted at 
this point that, China had already reversed its earlier 
position in favour of including Latin America in AAPSO 
because it faced the penetration of such Soviet sponsored 
organisations as WPC in an expanded organisation. 
China had reason to be satisfied with the results of 
the third conference of- AAPSO. Addressing a rally 
(Beijing: 7 March 1963) to celebrate the success of the 
conference, Liu Ning-yi said that the decision of the 
conference represented 
... a 
frontal blow at the revisionists 
who persistently advocated that the 
people should not fight, but should 
wait for the bestowal of independence 
by imperialism. 
The Soviet Union showed its displeasure with the 
conference by accusing China of seriously undermining 
AAPSO's peaceful character. In an article in Tass (19 
August 1963), V. Chriiradze, a former Soviet Secretary of 
WPC, wrote as follows: 
The Chinese try to liquidate 
organisations and replace them with 
their own executive groups. In 1959 
their objectives began and in December 
1961 Liu Ning in Stockholm attacked the 
olp- f AAPSO 
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whole WPC. The Chinese have 
practically withdrawn from 
participation in the activities of the 
world pea(5e movements and use its 
meetings merely to undermine it. They 
aim particularly at the Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Movement. ýý--"-- 
At the Afro-Asian Journalist's Conference (Djakarta: 
April 1963), the Soviet Union again failed to win the 
delegates to its side. Before the opening session of the 
conference, the Afro-Asian journalists made it clear that 
they were opposed to D6tente and disarmament and to the 
existence of colonialism and imperialism. The conference 
banner raised the slogan: 'We Love Peace but We Love 
Freedom More'. "' 
The Soviet delegates were not even recognised as full 
and equal members at the Djakarta conference. ýý20 
Representatives of national liberation and revolutionary 
movements looked upon China, and not the Soviet Union, as 
their reliable revolutionary friend. --- 
In the following year, at the 6th session of the AAPS 
Council (Algiers: March 1964), Mm. Kuo Chien made an 
unprecedentedly sharp and vehement attack against the 
Soviet union's policy of peaceful coexistence, and the 
reactionary nature of the D6tente policy towards Western 
imperialism. 
At the fourth conference of the AAPSO (Winnaba: 9-16 
May 1965), China was able to put its ideas across in an 
effective manner on matters relating to the second Afro- 
Asian conference which was scheduled to take place in 
Algiers in June. China needed the support of the Winnaba 
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Conference to prevent the Soviet Union's participation in 
_the 
Algiers Conference. 
The Winnaba Conference also took place at a time when 
the United States had already become directly involved in 
-Indo-China. The United States (in collaboration with 
Belgium) had also intervened directly and militarily in 
the Congo against the revolutionary forces based in 
Stanleyville (November 1964). These events were fresh in 
the minds of the conference delegates. China hoped that 
the conference, alarmed by such events, would adopt firm 
and positive policies against the Soviet Union's 
accommodation with the imperialist powers, and in favour 
of a widening of revolutionary struggles. -m! 3<> 
Afro-Asian meetings and conferences became highly 
important for China to make its international position on 
world issues of peace and freedom understood. 
At the Winnaba Conference, Liao Cheng-r-hih, head of 
the Chinese delegation, made an impressive speech - at 
least in the eyes of militant anti-imperialists - when he 
argued that: 
we believe that all friends of 
patriotism and justice will certainly 
not be mislead by United States 
imperialism's plot of "peaceful 
negotiation" once they understand the 
truth of the Vietnam question. How can 
it be imagined that so-called "peaceful 
negotiations" will be held at a time 
when United States imperialism hangs on 
in South Vietnam, sends more troops 
there, is bombing the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam? "' 
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In the same speech, Liao also strongly attacked the 
oppressive role played by the United States against 
liberation movements in the Congo(L), Indo-China, and 
other parts of the world. -ý*11ý The conference ended by once 
again standing behind China's views and policies and 
against those of the Soviet Union. ýý3a The Soviet Union 
again failed to persuade the conference to give its 
endorsement to the policy of D6tente and disarmament. 1211 
The conference expressed the view that 
I il t is the legitimate 
Afro-Asian peoples 
imperialist violence by 
violence in their struggl 
liberation and for 
national independence.: 23'G 
right of the 
to answer 
revolutionary 
e for national 
safeguarding 
AAPSO's confirmation that China would play host to 
its fifth conference in 1967ýý3r- was another feather in its 
cap. ýZ: S-7 
13.2.3. China and Africa: -- 
Anji-State poliry 
During this period (1959-66), China's intensive 
campaign for a broad and united Afro-Asian solidarity at 
State level (i. e. a strategy of a united front from 
above), was not extended to the oppressive r6EImes Pfk--%leir 
local militant anti-imperialist and radical forces. China 
did not seem to be too concerned with promoting State-to- 
State relations with such governments. When local 
uprisings against such r6Eimes took place, China 
invariably neglected its interest in State-to-State 
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relations preferring to give support to anti-government 
revolutionary forces. --30 
13.2.3.1. Cameroon 
Cameroon was one of the early cases in which the 
Soviet and Chinese views and methods of opposing 
imperialism sharply differed. As in the case of Algeria, 
the Soviet Union failed to support armed struggle waged by 
the national liberation movements in Cameroon, preferring 
instead to seek good relations with the rabidly pro- 
Western and pro-imperialist government of Ahmadou Ahidjo. 
In sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, China gave 
unequivocal support to the advocates of total liberation 
from French colonialism. 
Dominated by the Germans before the First World War, 
and ruled by the British and the Frenchý-: 3'ý' between the 
wars, Cameroon was made into a UN Trust Territory in 1946. 
Since then Cameroon's demands for complete independence 
began to take a more political character and organised 
manner. The Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC), 
founded by Ruben Um Nyobe in 1947, became the first 
effective political party to lead the country towards 
independence and the re-unification of the two 
Cameroons. 11' 
UPC's radical character and communist inclinations 
developed at a time when even the Ra ssembl emen t 
1)6mocratique Afr-icain (RDA), known for its close ties with 
communist countries, broke relations with the French 
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Communist Party and the international communist movement 
as a whole (1950). ýA' 
As a reaction to the rise of nationalism and 
resistance to colonialism, the French colonial power, as 
in the case of Algeria ten years before, =A= was 
responsible for the 'Douvala Massacre' (May 1955). At the 
same time, UPC was banned. ý2,4a 
This ruthless and oppressive behaviour of the French, 
gave UPC no option but to undertake an armed struggle. 
LýP_ 
From Cameroon's thick forests, AUPC organised and launched 
a guerrilla war (1956). Nyobe was among the victims in a 
battle between the UPC liberation fighters and French 
troops (Autumn 1958). 
'ýAUPC, 
s armed struggle against French 
colonial rule (from 1958 onwards) coincided with China's 
early approach to African liberation. It also overlapped 
with the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet 
Union in (among others) the question of the best means for 
an end to colonialism and imperialism. China urged UPC to 
intensify its guerrilla activities and People's war. In 
1958, Ernest Ounadie the Vice President of UPC paid his 
first visit to China where he was promised its continuing 
and resolute support.: ---- 
The Soviet Union, too, gave financial and political 
support to UPC. ý; ý, "' This support was, however, aimed not 
at encouraging UPC's commitment to a war of liberation but 
rather at persuading it to follow a lesf belligerent 
course of action. As in the case of the Algerian War of 
Liberation, the Soviet Union was more concerned with 
creating conditions favourable to the immediate 
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independence of Cameroon through negotiation. For the 
Soviet Union, a negotiated settlement by peaceful means 
sought by the moderate and anti-UPC elements in Cameroon, 
was compatible with its conciliatory policy towards 
imperialist powers in general and France in particular.. 
Rejecting the Soviet Union's overtures, UPC drew 
closer to China. ý--`- In February 1959, Jean Paul Sende, a 
UPC leader, visited China where he attended a mass rally 
in Beijing organised by the Chinese Committee for Afro- 
Asian Solidarity to commemorate 'Cameroon Day' (18 
February). In his speech, Sende expressed his deep 
appreciation of China's support for Cameroon's struggle, a 
support that made the 
Cameroon people stronger than ever in 
their fight for national independence 
and against the imperialists. ýý', 11-7 
Under the leadership of the radical and pro-communist 
Fel: K-Ronald Moumi6 (who came from a peasant background), 
Nyobe's successor, UPC became much more determined to 
continue the practical armed struggle. Moumi6 advocated 
the view that a truly independent Cameroon could not be 
created through negotiations, but only through armed 
struggle. "' Khruschev's thesis of peaceful coexistence 
and D6tente was viewed by Moumi6 as 'nonsense'. In 1959, 
moumi6 visited China where he was not only 1wooed', but 
also given financial assistance. - 
MOUMWS initial step was to remove UPC's 
headquarters from Cairo to Accra, a location which was 
strategically better suited to the organisation of 
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guerrilla operations and armed activities. Ghana had by 
then become a maj or base for African liberation 
move me nt s. It had also become (along with Guinea) 
China's major ally, following the deterioration of 
relations between China andNAR (1958-59). ýr-41 
By 19519, UPC's guerrilla activities were developing 
into a large full-scale liberation war. More than 80,000 
French troops were sent to the colony. Over 50,000 
Cameroonians were thrown into concentration camps. French 
oppression of UPC supporters only made the latter the most 
popular party in the country. ýr-l 
Thus it came as no surprise when the French, 
realising the inevitability of the independence of 
Cameroon, quickly moved to find an alternative party to 
UPC that would guarantee a perpetuation of French colonial 
interests in their country after nominal political 
independence was granted. Founded in 1958, the National 
Cameroon Union (UNC) was the obvious choice for the French 
authorities. In January 1960, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the UNC 
leader, was made the first President of the French- 
occupied eastern region of Cameroon, A year later 
(October 1961), the British-administered southern part was 
integrated with the eastern Cameroon into the newly- 
established Federal Republic of Cameroon. ý21----2 French 
troops remained in the country at the request of Ahidjols 
government, allegedly to safeguard internal security. "' 
The granting of independence by France was described by 
UPC as 'fictitious'-ý` 
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The first step taken by Ahidjo's government was the 
suppression of UPC and other radical forces in the 
country. As a result of the oppressive measures taken by 
the government a crisis errupted, culminating in a civil 
war between the ruling-party and the populisttUPC, which 
was determined to continue its struggle for a united and 
liberated Cameroon, free from the 'bourgeois and French- 
loyal government of Ahidjo'. 
China's response was to give weapons and financial 
aid to UPC--' in addition to training its guerrilla forces 
in Ghana. 
Cameroon was the first instance of a country in 
Africa in which China openly took the side of a national 
liberation movement led by militant party (UPC) against 
the established government. ýs- 
In 1960, China opened a special department for 
contacts with UPC. 'ý'-__7 At the same time, UPC promoted 
strong links withj\DVR, China's ally. ý-- At an AAPSC 
meeting in April 1960, China strongly attacked Ahidjo's 
government for its oppressive role in Cameroon and loyalty 
to the French colonial power. 
During midjq60, Moumi6 visited China again where 
he was pledged more material support and given moral 
encouragement. In the same year, Ounadie, Moumi6's 
deputy, also visited China; these two visits were followed 
by visits by Cameroonian trade unionists loyal toAUPC. ý"` 
Unlike China, the Soviet Union supported the 
government of Ahidjo and urged UPC leaders to give up 
their armed struggle and join the central government.: 211 
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Instability and revolutionary. struggles were 
incompatible with Soviet efforts to bring about D6tente 
with the West, and the exercise of its influences as a 
global power. The Soviet Union urged UPC to reach a 
compromise -with Ahidjo's government on practically any 
terms. ý', ` Khruschev advised Moumi6 to 
( r] eturn to Cameroon... and come to 
power legally through elections! ý, --a 
Having failed to convince UPC to Join the government, 
the Soviet Union began to encourage moderate elements 
within UPC to split away from Mournit-is leadership. 2"A 
This policy led to a deterioration in the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and UPC. In an interview with 
Schatten, Moumi6 expressed his deep appreciation of and 
full praise for China, whilst failing to mention the 
Soviet Union. ýý11 In an interview with the NCNA (11 
September 1960), Byiavve-Nicanor, UPC's Permanent 
Representative in Morocco, made UPC's pro-Chinese 
character clear in the following words: 
The Chinese people have never hesitated 
to support our struggle ... The daily 
growing interest of the Chinese people 
in our struggle is tangible proof of 
their attachment to the principles of 
anti-imperialist struggle and of 
proletarian solidarity. The great 
Chinese contribution encourages the 
people of Cameroon to continue and 
intensify their revolutionary struggle. 
The rich experience of China amassed 
during twenty eight years of victorious 
battle against imperialism and its 
lackeys, and China's great economic 
successes with the Great Leap Forward, 
and the establishment of the people's 
communes, add up to a valuable example 
for the peoples of Africa, particularly 
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as the conditions of life and struggle 
in Africa do not differ greatly from 
those which existed in Pre- 
revolutionary China. "Glemphasis added] 
By late 1960 (especially af ter the death by 
(a NVVýCmk3e? tck(K) 
poisoning-ý'E--7 of Moumi6 in GenevaA, the revolutionary 
situation in Cameroon and the UPC' s struggle began to 
weaken. In the absence of Moumi6 the UPC leadership 
became more and more divided internally. UPC's political 
and organisational shape suffered with the rapid decline 
in its revolutionary character. 
Factionism and rivalries between members undermined 
UPC from within. Despite such bleak prospects for 
revolution in Cameroon, China continued to support 
radical forces in ý, UPC, urging them to continue the 
struggle in UPC's original spirit of revolution. Mouni6's 
widow, and other radical leaders continued to work closely 
with China; and, China continued to be the central theme 
of Ahidjols attacks on what he described as 'terrorism in 
Cameroon'. "' 
In September 1963, the UPC leaders seemed to play 
down their differences when they were able to hold the 
Party's People's Assembly. The Cameroonian people were 
urged to use armed struggle to bring down Ahidjo's 
oppressive r6gime. China continued to be the reliable 
01 
source of support forOPC- In March 1964, the editorial 
of La Voix du Kamerun the Party's newspaper, highly 
praised 
... the militant action of the advance 
guard of the Cuban, Chinese, Algerian 
and Ghanaian peoples at the side of the 
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revolutionaries of Latin America, Asia 
and Africa. ý--7101 
The same issue of La Voi.. x- du Kam-rtin revealed in detail 
Ahidjols crimes againstt\UPC and the execution of its 
6ýt- 
members. At the same time, f, OAU was urged to investigate 
the military occupation of the Cameroon by the French and 
NATO troops. 
"T-6, UPC's i=ediate objectives were to secure 
the release of all political prisoners, to seek an end to 
the presence of French troops and military bases in the 
country, and to ensure land reforms. -ýý-71 
China's continued support for UPC and Zhou Enlai's 
revolutionary predictions for Africa, during his African 
tour (December 1963-February 1964) were the main reasons 
for Ahidjo's refusal to recognise China. 
if we do not recognise the People's 
Republic of China it is not because it 
is communist. It is because we have 
observed that it interfered in our 
internal affairs... if we have proof 
that China will no longer interfere 
with our internal affairs, we will not 
find it inconvenient to recognise 
Communist China and vote for its 
admission to the United Nations. ý-7ýý 
At the same time, Ahidjo appealed to China to stop 
M 
its support f or (-, UPC, quoting China's claim that 
'revolution is not for export'. He argued that if 
the Peking government acts in 
accordance with what Chou Enlai said, 
we shall recognise it at once.: 2-7:: 31 
However, Ahidjo's appeal to China to stop its support for 
UPC was bound to be ignored, especially in view of the 
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fact that China was moving into a phase in which it was to 
adopt an even more hardline policy towards bourgeois and 
pro-Western governments than during the previous decade. 
Ahidjols offer of recognition did not lead to a moderation 
of China's support for UPC. State-to-State relations did 
not seem to matter to China at this stage. 
13.2.3.2. The Congo(L) Crisis <196Q-65) 
In 1960,17 African countrieSý7- gained independence 
and made an impact onA UN which they Joined as full 
members. 1960 was also the year of undesirable 
developments in Africa. Congo, one of the newly 
independent countries, faced direct and indirect external 
threat, not only from Belgium, the ex-colonial power, but 
also from the United States, the leading NATO power. This 
threat was embodied in the controversial role played by UN 
during the Congo (L6opoldville) crisis (1960-64). 
Congo(L), renamed the Republic of Congo following 
independence, ý-7f- was one of the most important examples of 
an African country in which revolutionary opposition 
forces were actively supported by China which effectively 
abandoned State-to-State relations. 
Congo was the eighth African state to gainýý'" 
its independence. By the end of June 1960, a Congolese 
government was formed. ý--71B The two leading figures, 
Lumumba and Kasavubu, held opposing views based on their 
political and ideological beliefs about internal and 
external matters. 
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In the domestic sphere, Kasavubu was in favour of a 
Federal System with a capitalist economic orientation; by 
contrast, Lumumba advocated that all the political and 
economic forces should be mobilised towards the building 
of a strong nation. 1273' Lumumba, a political leader 
committed to a non-tribal nationalist ideology, insisted 
on a centralised government, and sought a non-capitalist 
path inspired by socialist ideas. ý; 11ý10 In the international 
sphere, Kasavubu favoured a pro-Western policy; by 
contrast Lumumba preferred a positively and actively anti- 
imperialist posture for independent Congo. He was a 
strong advocate of Continental unity in the form of a 
United States"' of Africa, a continent free from 
colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, hegemonism and 
oppression. ý*"ý2 
In the presence of the Belgian King Baudouin, on the 
day on which the independence of the Congo was proclaimed 
(30 June 1960), Lumumba directly attacked Belgian 
colonial crimes (and racist policies) as well as their 
King's claim that the newly won independence had been 
unhesitatingly granted. In his speech, Lumumba claimed 
that 
no Congolese worthy of the name will 
ever be able to forget that 
independence has only been won by 
struggle, a struggle that went on day 
after day, a struggle of fire and 
idealism, a struggle in which we have 
spared neither effort, deprivation, 
suffering or even our blood. 
We have experienced contempt, 
insults and blows, morning, noon and 
night, because we were 'blacks'. We 
shall never forget that a black was 
called Otul, not because he was a 
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friend, but because only the whites 
were given the honour of being 
called 'vous 1. ý13ý3 
Unlike Lumumba, Kasavubu addressed the King in a 
conciliatory manner, with a moderate speech complimenting 
the Belgians. 
Your majesty... the independent Congo 
which you have all worked SO 
magnificently to create thanks you with 
an infinite gratitude and solemly 
assures you that you will never be 
forgotten. ý*-: " 
13.2.3.2.1. 
Five days after independence, Congolese soldiers in 
the Congo Is Force Fublique revolted (especially in 
L6opoldville and Thysville), against the continuing 
dominance of the army by the old colonial officers, under 
the command of General Janssens and his Belgian staff. 
For the Congolese soldiers, independence had not made 
muchý" difference, for their national army still 
continued to be the colonialý"ý`- Force Publique. 
They wanted the army, although renamed the Congolese 
National Army (ANC>, to become effectively the 
responsibility of Lumumba, as the Minister of Defence, and 
the leadership of the army to be Af ricanised. They 
protested to the government and disobeyed orders given by 
Jansenns and his officers. General Jansenns reacted by 
issuing a direct warning to Lumumba about the dire 
consequences of such mutiny. At the same time, he 
confronted the Congolese troops in person and wrote on a 
blackboard 'Apr6s Ind6pendance = Avant lnd6pendancel. 200 
As the revolt gathered momentum and General Jansenns 
was taken captive, the government unanimously decided to 
Africanise the leadership of the array. It must be 
remembered that Lumumba regarded the Belgian dominance of 
the army as a necessary evil, to be corrected in the 
future by the Congolese taking over the leadership. 
This view, however, seems to have been21131- shared only 
by the more progressive cabinet ministers (e. g., Gizenga 
and Mulele), so that when Lumumba urged, at a meeting of 
the Council of Ministers "there can be no question of 
merely reforming the Force Publique... it must be 
revolutionised', he was opposed"I by a majority of 
government ministers. 
Not until General Jansenns, and other Belgian officers 
took total commandý'" of ANC, and the direct clash between 
Belgian officers and Congolese soldiers threatened the 
very existence of the government, did cabinet ministers 
unanimously approve changes in the structure of the army 
(July 1960). Joseph Mobutu was nominated Chief of Staff 
of the army, with Victor Lundula as Commander- i n-Chi ef in 
place of General Jansenns. ý'-, ý--' Other high army posts, 
however, continued to be occupied by Belgian officers. 
As a retaliation against these changes in ANC by the 
government, Belgium sent (10 J-uly 1960) its paratroopers 
to Congo. -Immediately after landing in Elisabethville, 
they disarmed the Congolese troops and occupied the 
town. `0`31 Thus Katanga was subjected once more to a 
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Belgian colonial take-over, At the same time, Belgian 
troops occupied the town and the airport of 
LiL opo 1 dv 111 e. Belgium claimed that the aim of such 
action was to contain the mutiny of the Force Publique 
while protecting Belgian lives and property. 
However, the true motive behind Belgian intervention, 
as it turned out, was to gain a foothold in the country 
and provide encouragement for the secession of Katanga 
(now Shaba Province) - the richestý'ý'r, area in the country, 
which at that time held 80% of the country's mineral 
reserve (especially uranium and copper) 
Less than 24 hours after the armed intervention by 
Belgium, Moise Tshombe, with British and Belgian 
support,: --"' announced the formation of an independent 
government (11 July 1960). Along with the Belgians, 
Tshombe accused Lumumba's government of being pro- 
communist. Within a month (8 August 10-60), the 
secessionists in Katanga were joined by Emperor Albert 
Kallondji as the head of the Luba-inhabited Kasai province 
(south of Kasai), and formed a Federation consisting of 
what they claimed to be secessionist states. `ý`ý'31 
On the day of Tshombe's proclamation of his own 
government, the central government requested (11 July 
1960) UN to intervene. The L6opoldville government hoped 
that UN troops would put an end to both Katanga's 
separatism -and Belgian military intervention in the 
country. "' The UN response to the Congo government's 
request was immediate. The first UN troops arrived in 
L6opoldville on 15 July 1960. American Ralph Bunche, UN 
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Under Secretary for Special Affairs, one of Secretary- 
General Dag Hammerskj6ldls closer political advisers, -ýO' 
was sent as the head"' of the UN operation. 
Thus, within a fortnight of its independence, the 
Congo found itself in a crisis -involving UN in a 
controversial role. The United States, for its part, 
demonstrated its imperialist character towards the crisis 
by abstaining, along with its allies (France, Britain, 
Taiwan and South Africa) from a resolution before the UN 
Security Council calling upon Belgium to withdraw its 
troops from the Republic of the Congo. acll*ý 
The French (like the Americans) did not see Belgian 
intervention as an act of aggression by one member state 
of UN against another, or as interference in the internal 
affairs of an independent country. In fact, they were 
full of praise for the Belgian action.; 3131,1 
In the case of Britain, four conflicting factors seem 
to have influenced its position as a whole towards the 
Congo crisis: - 
The Katanga lobby, which was very active in 
Salisbury (capital of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe), 
Johannesburg and London sought to influence 
Britain's abstention from the vote on the UN 
Security Council resolution. 
Actually taking the side of the separatist 
-Sovernmentýý,: 
ýIr- of Katanga would have 
Jeopardised its position in other parts of the 
country under the leadership of the central 
government in L6opoldville controlling the 
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vast raw material wealth and the strateSically 
important centre of Africa. 
Had Britain supported(, -., TJN intervention in the 
Congo(L), it would have found it all the more 
difficult to resist a similar UN intervention 
in Rhodesia where armed resistance to its 
colonial and racist rule seemed imminent. 
V. Even more to the point, Britain feared that 
any support given to/ýUN in order to put an end 
to the secessionist 'government' of Tshombe 
would have an adverse effect on its economic 
interests in Katanga in the event of the 
latter's victory. 
I 
Having regard to the above considerations, Britain 
LM 
gave its support to 6 UN action in the Congo with great 
reluctance. It effectivelyý01 let its businessmen and 
bankers invest in Katanga and collaborate with the Belgian 
army and Tshombe's troops against the central government. 
13.2.3.2.2. The Role of th(- NATO Powprs under the 
Leadership of the Unitpd States 
in the Congo Crisis. 
The United States responded enthusiastically to the 
joint appeal of Lumumba and Kasavubu with the aim of 
undermining the government led by a Prime Minister who, in 
his speeches and statements, made no secret of his anti- 
imperialist and nationalist inclinations. At the same 
time, the Soviet Union coUld be kept in check only by 
t K( 
filling the political vacuum in the Congo withf-UN forces 
which would provide an effective cover for the activities 
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of American advisers. Furthermore, American interests in 
the Congo were, by and large, under the control of the 
central government in I. 6opoldville. ý0'7 In Katanga, 
American investors and bankers could not successfully 
compete with their French, British and Belgian. 
opposites. 
Like its NATO allies, the United States failed to 
condemn Belgian intervention. In fact, it saw such an 
action as legally Justifiable, In the words of the 
American delegate totVN 
We can understand the anxieties of the 
people and government of Belgium and 
their feeling that they had to send 
urgent contingents to protect their 
nat i ona 1 s. 
By the end of July (1960), the political situation in 
the Congo had seriously deteriorated. In the words of 
Lq 
Kanza (an Ambassador of the Congo toNN, under Lumumba): 
The Congolese crisis had proved how 
quick the Western countries were to 
unite when it came to the protection of 
their interests and privileges anywhere 
in the world. And Lumumba had 
discovered for himself that American 
businessmen, whatever assurances they 
might give to the Congolese government, 
distrusted him personally, and paid 
heed to the counsels of prudence and 
reserve emanating from Brussels, London 
and Paris. "' 
None of the NATO allies was prepared to condemn 
Belgium for its military intervention, or to usepýUN forces 
to get the Belgian troops to withdraw from the Congo. 
Their major concern was not with preserving the 
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independence of the Congo, but to overthrow the anti- 
Western government which proclaimed its determination to 
put an end tOb", -'%rnrev%a-(tst and neo-colonialist exploitation 
of the Congo. They opposed Lumumba's government not only 
because of his --ý commu-nist leanings, but also 
because of his insistence that foreign investments must be 
made to serve the interests of the Congo. Lumumba put 
this point clearly in a meeting with American businessmen: 
The exploitation of the mineral 
resources of the Congo should be 
primarily for the profit of our own 
people and other Africans. We have 
decided to open the gate of the Congo 
to any foreign investors prepared to 
help us get the fullest and most 
immediate value from our mineral 
resources and energy, so that we may 
achieve full employment, an improved 
standard of living for our people, and 
a stable currency for our young 
country. Belgium will no longer have a 
monopoly in the Congo. ý" 
The arrival (17 August 1960) of Soviet civilian aircraft 
and motor vehicles in the Congo at the government's 
request was regarded by the United States as constituting 
a Soviet military intervention*, whereas the Belgian 
military occupation of the country was resarded as 
justifiable. In the words of President Eisenhower: 
The United States deplores and takes a 
most serious - view of Russia's 
unilateral intervention which is 
thereby aggravating an already very 
serious situation.: a'L; -' 
The position adopted by the United States towards the 
Soviet Union, was supported not only by its allies but 
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also by(-ýUN itself. Major General Karl von Horn, the 
Swedish Commander ofojýUN forces in the Congo, protested 
against the government's acceptance of Soviet aid. 
No such incident should ever again 
occur-while he was in charge of the UN 
operation there. ý"ý 
In contrast to their anti-Soviet stance, neither UN 
nor the United States asked Belgium to justify its direct 
military assistance to Kasai and Katanga. The government 
of the Congo eventually came to the conclusion that UN was 
not only working with the United States, France and 
Britain against the central government, but also providing 
cover to Belgian troops. The government became 
increasingly impatient with the UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammerskj6ld's promises that the Belgian troops would be 
01ý 
removed from the Congo and i\UN forces would enter 
Katanga. "" Throughout July and August 1960, instead of 
taking armed action, Hammerskj6ld was engaged in 
negotiating with the Belgian authorities and the Katanga 
secessionists. The United States and its allies had 
increasingly become the dominant forces determining the 
E4- 
role of UN in the Congo. All decisions, resolutions, 
attempts at settlement or any move in or out of the 
Lo-- 
country by/\UN had to receive the approval of the United 
States. 'al -F- 
Following the eruption of the crisis between Lumumba WLý 
and Kasavubu, Andrew Cordier. the American UN Executive 
Assistant Secretary-General in the Congo, was given a free 
hand to strengthen Kasavubuls hand and work against 
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Lumumba. He closed down the National Radio and the 
national airports, with the exception of those in Katanga, 
where, with Tshombe's co-operation, they were already 
under Belgian occupation. Cordier showed his direct 
opposition to Lumumba's government when he prevented"' 
Lumumba from using the national radio for broadcasting his 
speech to the nation. Lumumba accused the UN of being 
directly against his government and declared as follows: 
We will not tolerate the occupation by 
the United Nations. i3l-71 
Ham. merskjbldls views and comments were revealed to 
and broadcast by Lumumba's internal and external 
enemies, " including Tshombe. Hammerskj6ld himself 
claimed that he could work fruitfully with Tshombe-ý"s' 
Hammerskj6ld seemed to accept the guidance of the United 
States. 
It became clear to the central government of Lumumba, 
that UN rule in the Congo was increasingly dictated by 
Western powers, rather than serving the interests of the 
Congo and its legitimate government. 
Throughout the period, Kasavubu had clearly been 
working with Lumumba's enemies, including Tshombe and 
Kalonjithrough their Belgian advisers. By September 1960, 
Kasavubu made public his anti-Lumumba tendencies. 
Lumumba's internal and external enemies were pleased when 
Lumumba's dismissal was announced by Kasavubu (5 September 
1960). Kasavubu accused Lumumba of 
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slipping I the country] slowly but 
surely towards dictatorship, and 
international co=unism-ý--21 
Lumumba responded to Kasavubuls decision by refuting 
all of his opponent's allegations. 
In Africa who is an the side of the 
people and against imperialism is a 
communist, an agent of Moscow! But 
anyone on the imperialist's side in 
their pay, is a fine man whom they 
cannot praise highly enough. ýý' 
Kasavubuls decision however was rejected by the 
Parliament. Both Kasavubu and Lumumba were thus compelled 
to continue working together. Lumumba was given full 
powersý3ý-'ý-- by the Parliament (13 September 1960). However, 
as it became clear that the role of the UN in the country 
was becoming predominantly pro-Western in character, 
progressive countries in Africa (namely Guinea, UAR and 
Ghana), which had initially favoured UN intervention 
withdrew (August 1960) their support. Sekou Tour6 called 
on all "democratic forces"'I and all African countries to 
stand by Lumumba's government as the struggle was 
no longer only a struggle of the 
Congolese nationalist movement against 
the imperialists and colonialists; but 
a struggle to gain complete 
independence and take full advantage of 
its freedom to oppose those who still 
want to dominate and exploit it. " 
Following Kasavubu's failure to dismiss Lumumba, the 
Western powers as well as Lumumba's internal enemies 
reached the conclusion that his government could only be 
removed through a military coup. Mobutu, the Chief of 
-512- 
Staff, was chosen to lead the coup. The UN forces in 
L6opoldville under Kettani, a Moroccan General, provided 
the- financial and military help with which a coup was 
organised to take place 14 September 1960. Lumumba was 
effectively placed under house arrest. The Soviet and 
Czechoslovakian embassies were closed. c'm Thus, by the 
end of September 1960, the Congo had become a satellite 
country of the Western bloc, ý11ý1r- especially after the 
overthrow of Lumumba's forces. It was not until 20 
September 1960, after making sure that a pro-Western 
government was in power, that the Western powers 
recoSnised the Republic of the Congo(L).: 31ý-7 
Despite his virtual imprisonment, Lumumba persisted 
in his refusal to obey Mobutu's orders. From custody, 
Lumumba wrote to his colleague Kanza as follows: 
I shall probably be arrested, tortured, 
and killed. One of us must sacrifice 
himself if the Congolese people are to 
understand and accept the ideal we are 
fighting for. My death will hasten the 
liberation of the Congo, and help rid 
our people of the yoke of imperialism 
and colonialism-ý2`-" 
By November, the situation in the Congo changed in 
favour of Kasavubu and he was able to consolidate his 
position after the coujp. Internationally, Kasavubu's 
r-6EIme was recognised (23 November 1960) by all Western 
powers and pro-Western countries as the only legal and 
legitimate government in the Congo. ý3ý- 
Having consolidated his position in the central 
government, Kasavubu proceeded to get rid of Lumumba 
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physically. Being imprisoned, or kept in custody, could 
only increase Lumumba's popularity. Kasavubu, in 
consultation with the Western powers, chose Katanga as the 
scene of Lumumba's execution. ýýO Lumumba was flown to 
Katanga (17 January 1961) where he, along with two other 
ministers (Okila and Mpopo) of his Cabinet was murdered by 
the Belgian and Tshombe's forces (13 February 
It was subsequently revealedý-ý'ý by an investigating 
commission of the United States Congress that CIA was 
directly involved in masterminding Lumumba's murder. 
Gizenga was able to escape to Stanleyville (since re- 
named Kisangani) where he formed (30 November 19el) a 
Lumumbaist government. Thus, by January 1961, the Congo 
had come under the rule of three governments - 
L6opoldville under Kasavubu and Mobutu, recognised by UN 
despite protests ofAAfrican nations and anti-imperialist 
states; a Katangese government under Tshombe (in 
federation with South Kasai) centred in Elisabethville 
(since re-named Lubumbashi); and the Lumumbaist government 
based in Stanleyville under GiZenga. *1: 31: 31 Gizenga's 
government was widely recognised by almost all anti- 
imperialist countries, including 24ý11ý31,11 socialist 
countries, African and Asian countries and AAPSO. '3"ý' 
Kasavubu nominated Joseph Ileo as the new Premier. A 
few months later, Ileo resigned (August 1961). He was 
replaced by Cyrille Adoula. Adoula was able to convince, 
presumably tTnder Soviet pressure, Gizenga to join his 
government. Surrounded by Lumumba's enemies, including 
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Kasavubu and Mobutu, Gizenga was dismissed and later 
arrested (February 1962). 
It was not until Kasavubu, Mobutu and Adoula 
consolidated their hold on the central government, and the 
Western powers as well as the UN made sure that Congo was 
under the rule of a pro-Western government, that UN forces 
entered Katanga (January 1963), in order to put an endýýIr- 
to the secessionist government in Elisabethville and to 
drive out Tshombe. At last, the time seemed ripe for UN 
to withdraw from the Congo (30 June 1964) after having 
witnessed the coming to power of a strong pro-Western 
government wherein even the Arm6e National Congolaiss (ANC) 
was being trained and commanded by Belgian and Israeli 
instructors-"' 
In an attempt to consolidate central power and to put 
an end to remnants of secessionist elements in Katanga, 
Kasavubu and Mobutu invited Tshombe to form a new 
government (5 July 1964). Within eighteen months, Adoula 
was dismissed in 1965; Tshombe and Kasavubu were 
overthrown by Mobutu, who made himself President (November 
1965). 
13.2.3.2.3. The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis 
Throughout all these crises involving NATO powers and 
UN's collective role in opposition to the legitimate 
government of the Congo, the main concern of the Soviet 
Union was to avoid direct confrontation with Western 
powers and to ensure that no step was taken which was 
likely to undermine its D6tente policy towards the United 
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States. The Congo crisis was chosen as an example of 
crisis in which the Soviet Union could prove to the United 
States the genuineness of its commitment to a policy of 
peaceful coexistence. 
On this basiz, the Soviet Union supported*, " the 
resolution of the Security Council favouring UN 
intervention in the Congo. The Soviet Union mistakenly 
believed that UN troops in the Congo, guided by Western or 
pro-Western Generals and Commanders, would ensure that 
Lumumba consolidated his hold on the government and 
brought unity to the country. Not until it realised that 
the UN role in the Congo was directed towards the aim of 
overthrowing Lumumba's government (an aim which 
Western powers were sharing), did the Soviet Union begin 
to question, and later attack, the UN role in the country. 
At the same time, under pressure from pro-Lumumba 
forces both within the country and outside, the Soviet 
Union began to channel limited funds and equipment to 
Lumumba, ýý: 31 without in any way wishing to intervene in an 
effective manner with arms. The Soviet Union was clearly 
prepared to sacrifice the interests of an independent 
anti-colonial Congo in order to placate the United States 
into accepting its D6tente policy. Even after Lumumba was 
jailed and finally murdered, the Soviet Union did not act. 
The Soviet Union, as described by Nielsenintended to 
probe an apparent opportunity, not to 
undertake a direct confrontation with 
the United States.: aAl-- 
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Stability and preservation of the status quo at a State - 
to-State level constituted a major preoccupation in the 
Soviet Union's perception of its international role. 
Changes of a revolutionary character, a-1 in such a 
scenari-o, could only undermine the Soviet Union's desire 
to play the role of a true Superpower in competition with 
its adversaries led by the United States. 
The Soviet Union equivocated in its attitude towards 
Gizengals government in Stanleyville. *', "ý By August 1961, 
the Soviet Union restored its relations with the central 
government in L6opoldville led by Kasavubu-Mobutu with 
Cyrille Adoula the new Premier. The Soviet diplomatic 
mission was transferred from Stanleyville to 
L6opoldville.: a`ý3 In fact, the Soviet Union, even when its 
Embassy was in Stanleyville, had continued to recognise 
the government in L6opoldville.: 31111 
13.2.3.2.4. China and tht- Congo before the Crisis. 
China's direct concern with the situation in the 
Congo dates back to 1958 when it attended the All African 
Peoples Conference Uccra: December 1958) as an 
observer.: ýI-I-r- At this conference, Yang Shuo, China's 
representative at AAPSO in Cairo, meVý-- Patrice Lumumba, 
the National President of the Mouvement Nationale 
Congolaise (MNC). --3'1-7 Lumumba impressed observers from the 
socialist countries and the other anti-imperialists 
present. He emphasised that the Congolese struggle for 
independence could not be separated from the struggles of 
all African and all Anti-colonial forces against 
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imperialism and racism. Thus, despite his nationalist 
credentials and non-communist tendencies, he was regarded 
by China as the unquestionable leader of the Congolese 
national independence movement. As a tribute to his 
positive anti-imperialist stance, he was appointed the 
Congo's representative on the Steering Committee of the 
conf erence. 
The bloodyý"-r-'O clash (4 January 1959) between the 
Congolese led by(,,, XNC and the Belgian police and armed 
forces, was viewed by China as a clear demonstration of 
the political character of the struggle of the people of 
the Congo against colonialism and racial 
discrimination. 1-11 
The struggle of the people of Congo 
shows that today there is no longer an 
'oasis' of stability in the world for 
the colonialists... the f lame of anti- 
colonial rule is burning in the oasis 
of stability. This flame though not so 
big at the moment will eventually 
develop into a scorching prairie f ire. 
Patrice Lumumba, delegate of the 
National Movement Party to the All 
African Peoples Conference, said last 
year: "After eighty years of colonial 
rule, we determined*to break with the 
old r6gime. We want to bring, a new 
countenance to our country, that of a 
people free from all yokes. " Last year 
witnessed the upsurge of a national 
liberation movement. Now the new year 
has dawned on us with the news of the 
people of Congo rising against the 
colonial rule and the Cuban people's 
victory in overthrowing dictator 
Batista's r6gime. This heralds the 
growth both in depth and breadth'of the 
National Liberation Movement in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America in the coming 
year. 
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The Congolese revolt of January 1959 was seen by 
China not merely as a political challenge to Belgium, but 
also as a promise of-future revolutionary acts inspired by 
the heat of international anti-imperialist struggles, 
which were already well advanced in Cuba, Algeria, the 
Cameroon, and Angola as well as in China itself (the 
Quemoy Crisis: August-October Under the title 
'Victory belongs to the Congolese', Peol2le's Daily wrote 
(24 January 1959) that African peoples' 
revolts have taken place in the French 
Duyo and Portuguese Angola. In the 
Central African Federation, the 
Nyasaland Africans have demonstrated 
and the Southern Rhodesian people held 
an anti-colonial rally protesting 
against the British colonial 
authorities' suppression, and demanding 
the breaking up of the CAF. In East 
Africa, the Buganda National Assembly 
has adopted a resolution demanding the 
abolition of the status of British 
Protectorate. In Mauritania, Chad and 
the Cameroons, armed struggles are 
being waged by the people against 
colonialism. 
The Congolese people are not 
isolated in their struggle for 
independence, their struggle and that 
of the African people have profound 
sympathy and support of the socialist 
camp headed by the Soviet Union the 
Asian countries and all progressive 
mankind. ar-1 
The Chinese became more and more impressed by 
Lumumba's anti-imperialist credentials and by his ability 
to unite the various national parties*'"--'-- for the sake of 
Congo's independence. ý3` At the second Afro-Asian 
People's Solidarity Conference (Conakry: 11-15 April 
1960), Lumumba had indeed represented all Congolese 
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national independence movements. He was elected to the 
executive committee along with China's Liao Cheng-chihýr-7 
and Kenya's Oginga Odinga.: 31--la 
By 1960, China had become increasingly interested in 
the Congo's anti-colonial struggle. In the same year, 
Alphonse Nguvulu, belonging to one of the leading national 
parties of the Congo, paid a visit to China. Nguvulu also mCL- 
On T-ien, the Chinese representative at the 30th Congress 
(V160 , k%R60) 
of the Belgian Communist Partyý China formedAa Congo- 
China Friendship Association in L6opoldville. -3r-`ý" 
When Congo won independence, China promptly 
recognised the new government headed by Lumumba. China 
firmly supported the Congo government's efforts to unite 
the country and, against the wishes of the United States 
and its allies and their local supporters, c'16ýý11 urged all 
countries in Africa and Asia to support a united Congo. 
The Lumumba government's recognition of Taiwancl"r-l did 
not seem to affect China, at least initially. China 
seemed to be more interested in Lumumba's potential as a 
revolutionary and anti-imperialist African leader. At the 
same time, Lumumba's anti-imperialism was viewed as 
holding a promise not only of the eventual de-recognition 
of Taiwan, but also of a close working relationship 
between the two countries to give concrete shape to 
China's major ideological objective of forging the 
solidarity of Afro-Asian countries in opposition to 
American imperialf-sm and its allies. 
In April 1961, the first Ambassador of the Republic 
of the Congo(garrived in Beijing. At his presentation 
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ceremony, both the Congolese Ambassador and Tung Pi-Wu, 
PRC's Vice-Chairman, expressed their solidarity in the 
fight against imperialism. Tung stressed that 
the imperialists and the 
colonialists... can never separate the 
people of our two countries. The 
common struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism has linked and will always 
closely unite our peoples. a"-2 
13.2.3.5. China's Stand on the UN intervention in the 
Congo 
China was openly opposed to the UN intervention in 
the Congo right from the beginning. ý'-ýý' The UN role in the 
Congo was seen as a substitute for Belgian colonialismý" 
serving the interests of the United States and its NATO 
allies. China was convinced that the UN operation, headed 
by Ralph Bunche, an American, would be dictated by his 
government in Washington. 
Chinese opposition to UN involvement was based on the 
belief that self-reliance and independence could be 
realised only through a consolidated and united country 
free from the interference of any external power. ýIr-- 
Lumumba was viewed by China as the only leader in the 
Congo capable of maintaining Congolese nationhood. c"-"-- 
China was aware of the undesirability oftUN intervention. 
China seemed to be aware of the controversial 
0- 
character of pU s role and of the composition of its 
forces which reflected Western interests and were opposed 
to the anti-imperialist government of Lumumba. China was 
convinced that the UN's role in Korea eight years earlier 
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had not really changed in the Congo. It was still 
dominated by the United States which, during this period, 
had become even more aggressive than during the I 50S. OS7 
China strongly criticised the Soviet Union and other anti- 
L-ýý 
imperialist countries which supportecIpUN intervention. 
.. some naYve people were inclined to 
believe that the UN intervention could 
help the Congolese people... They did 
not realise that the United States has 
always used the UN as an instrument of 
aggression, and inviting the UN means 
letting in United States 
imperialism. ý311 
As the situation in the Congo became increasingly 
frustrating, Gizenga, the PSA leader"'-" and Lumumba's 
deputy, requested (8 September 1960) military and 
financial aid from China in order that the government of 
the Republic of the Congo might protect itself from danger 
menacing its territorial integrity. cl-7c, China's prompt 
response to Gizenga's request took the form of a million 
pound fund placed at the disposal of the Lumumba-Gizenga 
government. *"' 
China, however, was unable to send arms, military 
equipment or volunteers as requested by GizenSa, not only 
because of the geographical distance, but also because of 
the refusal of the Sudan to allow Chinese arms and weapons 
to be transferred to the Congo through its borders. ýý-7- 
According to China, the situation in the Congo in late 
1960 constituted a true reflection of the frustration of 
African people with and anger against the forces of 
colonialism and imperialism. A Chinese spokesman claimed 
(November 1960) that 
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Ciln recent months the development of 
the situation in Congo provided a 
concentrated picture, reflecting the 
complex, tortuous-and strenuous nature 
of the African people's StrUggle. *17CI 
Under the title 'The Crimes of Aggression and 
Intervention Against the Congo Must Be Stopped 
Immediately', People's Daily (15 September 1960) listed 
six major crimes committed by the United States in the 
name of UN. 
The forcible occupation and 
closing down of all airfields in 
the Congo and banning their use by 
the Congolese government and 
troops. 
ii. Seizure of the Congolese 
government broadcasting station 
and forbidding the Congolese 
government to make nationwide 
broadcasts to its people. 
iii. Backing Congolese separatist 
cliques of such imperialist agents 
as Tshombe and others, shielding 
the Tshombe separatist clique's 
use of the Elisabethville airfield 
to transport weapons and other 
equipment, and protecting the 
Belgian colonialists in supplying 
Tshombe's army with large 
quantities of weapons and 
ammunition, aeroplanes and even 
colonialist commanding officers. 
i V. Allowing so-called "volunteers" 
led by Western colonial officers 
to give support to the Kalongi 
traitorous clique in Kasai 
Province. 
V. InstigatinS the radio station of 
Tshombe clique and secret radio 
stations of the other separatists 
to agitate for the dismemberment 
of the Congo. 
vi. Open support by UN Secretary 
General Dag Hammarskjbld for his 
illegal activities directed 
towards subverting the Congolese 
government. 0-711 
Based on the following assessment of the revolutionary 
situation in the specification of the Congo, China 
-outlined three possibilities for the unfolding of the 
revolutionary process. It is likely that China's 
assessment was known to Gizenga and Mulele who maintained 
close personal contact with the Chinese leaders, and paid 
visitsa7r- to China in April and October 1960 respectively. 
We estimate that there may be the 
following three possibilities in the 
development of the situation in the 
Congo. First, the people's strength 
may be very quickly developed and 
organised to undertake armed struggle 
to sweep away the imperialist and 
unity. The concrete process of this 
struggle will be for the nationalist 
party headed by Lumumba and Gizenga to 
overcome continuously its own wavering 
and utilize correctly all internal and 
external revolutionary forces and the 
support of all the nationalist and 
democratic forces; then to use the 
Oriental Province as a base and to rely 
on the people to concentrate forces and 
to follow the correct policy, to start 
and persist in opposing external 
aggression and the internal armed 
struggle for splitting up the country; 
and then to fight back from 
Stanleyville to L6opoldville to unite 
the whole Congo. 
Second, imperialism and comprador 
feudalistic influences may enjoy a 
certain period of superiority over the 
nationalist democratic forces in the 
Congo. They cannot exterminate the 
revolutionary forces of the Congo and 
the Congolese people cannot achieve 
national victory... (attempts will be 
made at a grand coalition). 
Third, the people's forces of the 
Congo will be in an inferior situation 
for a comparatively long period, the 
proportion of forces of the various 
-reactionary influences within the 
country will be more or less equal for 
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a certain period, the comprador 
feudalistic influences will. 
individually rely on imperialist 
elements, each occupying a place and 
advocating independence so that there 
will be many factions in the whole 
country of the Congo... 
No matter which possibility may 
materialise, the revolutionary forces 
of the Congolese people will achieve 
organisation, refinement and growth. 
The road of struggle of the Congolese 
people is winding, but the future is 
bright. The key to achieve final 
victory is the further awakening of the 
Congolese people and the question 
whether the nationalist party which 
leads the struggle will follow a 
correct policy or not. The situation 
is favourable but the leadership is 
weak. This situation will add to the 
permanancy of the revolutionary 
struggle of the Congo. "' 
Despite the fall of Lumumba's government which cane 
as a major blow to anti-imperialist forces in Africa as a 
whole, and in the Congo in particular, Chinese leaders 
believed that it carried a lesson for the mass of the 
people on the true character of the big powers of the 
world, and especially the United States. As a co=entator 
wrote in Remin Ribao 
Although the national liberation 
movement in the Congo has suffered 
setbacks as a result of United States 
imperialist intervention under the UN 
flag, the flames of revolution in the 
Congo cannot be put out.: a-1-1 
Thus, it was claimed in China that, even though the 
situation in the Congo following UN intervention appeared 
to be confusing and extremely problematical for 
progressive forces, it was potentially favourable because 
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lilt has tempered the Congolese people, 
made them realise who is enemy and who 
is friend, enabled them to 
differentiate right from wrong, so that 
they may further consolidate their 
triumphs and prepare to engage in a new 
struggle for national liberation. . The 
present situation in the Congo is 
advantageous to the development of the 
Congolese people's struggle against 
imperialism, advantageous to the 
revealing of the "new" colonialism of 
American imperialists in invading 
Africa, and advantageous to making the 
national independence movement of the 
Congolese people and the African people 
enter a new stage. a7'9 
Indeed, the situation in the Congo in the wake of the UN 
intervention and the controversial role played by UN in 
the Congo not only raised the revolutionary temper of the 
mass of the people against the imperialist powers led by 
the United States but also created a revolutionary 
atmosphere within the country against local capitalists 
and bourgeois and pro-Western elements. 
At the same time, Africans could see for themselves 
how Western powers clashed among themselves as a result of 
the competitive and exploitative nature of the capitalist 
system, whilst simultaneously uniting together in order to 
shore up their international interests collectively. This 
was evident from the fact that in the initial stages of 
the crisis, Britain, Belgium and France adopted different 
means of opposition to Lumumba's government from those 
adopted by the United States, their leading ally. Once 
they succeeded in overthrowing Lumumba's government and 
putting a puppet government, led by Kasavubu and Mobutu, 
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in power all the imperialist powers met in L6opoldville to 
consolidate their support for the latter. 
China' s- evaluation of the revolutionary situation in 
the Congo was not based solely on revolutionary optimism. 
It represented a serious attempt to examine the objective 
situation; the conclusion was reached that four 
unfavourable factors must be seriously considered before a 
systematic anti-imperialist policy (or, indeed, any action 
to bring about revolutionary change in the Congo) could be 
reached. 
At present the national liberation 
movement of the Congo is mainly 
led by the capitalist nationalist 
elements. Among them wavering and 
compromise prevail and so they 
cannot undertake correct and firm 
leadership. The strength of the 
nationalist party is also 
scattered and there is no single 
force to unite the whole country. 
As a result of long colonial 
control, there exist various 
places of the Congo the comprador 
class and the reactionary, 
feudalistic tribal influence. 
They are in collusion with the 
imperialists to oppose the people 
and occupying different places to 
engage in secession activities. 
iii. The struggle of the Congo people 
is extensive, severe and heroic, 
but at present there is no core 
guidance organised by the workers' 
class. 
i V. The Congolese people, in addition 
to the above unfavourable factors, 
also confront an enemy more 
ferocious, more crafty, than the- 
Belgians, and that is the new 
American colonialism. The 
Congolese people may need a 
process of struggle and tempering 
before they can understand clearly 
the real state of affairs of the 
new American colonialism and 
before they can learn how to 
struggle against it. a790 
The first stage of the Congo Crisis (1960-61) carried 
two important lessons, both of which were compatible with 
China's ideological argument. 
It became clear to Africans (especially those 
who were positively anti-colonialist in 
character) that US imperialism was no less 
dangerous to Africa than colonialism. In 
fact, the Congo crisis made it clear that the 
United States (the leader of NATO and dominant 
01-1: 1 power in UN) constituted a major threat to 
African independence and liberation. 
Armed struggle and people's wars, rather than 
peaceful negotiations, were the practical 
means of putting an end to imperialism and 
colonialism. The case of the Congo, along 
with the cases of Algeria and Cameroon, taught 
African national independence movements that 
unconditional and real liberation could 
effectively take place only by offering 
physical resistance to the colonial powers and 
forcing them out of African countries, and not 
by appeasement or conciliaýion with them. '311 
Imperialism will never easily give up 
its colonial rule and it constantly 
resorts to arms to deal with our 
struggles... we have to oppose armed 
imperialism with armed struggle.! ý11311 
r-hina- nd Gizenga's Government in Stanleyville 
Immediately after Gi-zenga announced (30 November 
1960) the formation of his government, China gave it 
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diplomatic recognition. China insisted that the Lumumba- 
Gizenga government continued to be the legitimate 
representative of the people of the Congo. 
The lawful Congolese government is 
still there; its Deputy Prime Minister, 
Antoine Gizenga, is acting on behalf of 
the Prime Minister (Lumumba) and the 
lawful Congolese government continues 
to exercise powers... the people in the 
Oriental Province have mobilised 
themselves to resist the imperialist 
aggression. Patriotic soldiers in Kivu 
Province have risen to action and 
fought heroically against the forces of 
imperialism and its agents there. ý11*11ý 
At the same time, China played a major rolea'ýIa in 
convening a meeting of thirty-two representativesýýO, ' from 
African and Asian countriesý3-r- (Cairo: 21-22 January 
OIL 
1961). At this meeting, a special thirteen-memberpAPSO 
International Committee for Aid to Algeriaa0l-- and the 
Congo was set up with the aim of devising ways and means 
of e; ftending support to the Stanleyville government.: 31--7 
Orl 
At this extraordinary session of6AAPSO's Council the 
intervention in the Congo by Western powers was condemned, 
and a message sent to the UN Secretary General protesting 
Výý 
against(--, UN's co-operation with the United States and its 
allies. which were act i ng against the Lumumba 
Sove rnme nt. Under pressure from anti-imperialist 
forces and fearing isolation from such radical countries 
as Ghana and Guinea, the Soviet Union felt compelled, much 
against its natural-inclinations, to accept the objectives 
of the meeting and to join the committee. 
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China was concerned to push forward a more positive 
and f irm action against the new central government in 
L6opoldville. It was strongly opposed to Gi=enga's 
participation in the ruling coalition. His initial 
refusal to join Adoula's government drew China's 
praise. ýýIIIEII-51 The PeOlPle's Daily wrote (2 January 1961) as 
follows: 
The legal Congolese government headed 
by Acting Premier Gizenga will never be 
liquidated, but this will certainly be 
the fate of the rebel cliques of 
Kasavubu, Tshombe and Mobutu, agents of 
the United States and Belgian 
imperialism, and are universally 
condemned by world public opinion. Oý'D 
China attacked the Soviet Union's recognition of the 
new government (along with India and Yugoslavia). ý111; 11 At 
the same time it warned that 
the United States is trying to make 
friends with the compromising countries 
of the Afro-Asian bloc (like the United 
Arab Republic, Ghana etc. ). These 
countries recognised and expressed 
their readiness to support the 
government of Gizenga, and they are 
also in conflict with the American plot 
to monopolise the Congo. But they 
still have illusions about the United 
States and the UN, and struggled among 
themselves for the leadership of 
African affairs. The United States now 
is utilising their weak points, to 
induce them to compromise and to 
influence Gizenga through them. a'ýý 
China tried hard to stop Gizenga from Joining 
Adoula's government; it was argued that the invitation to 
join the government in L6opoldville was a manoeuvre of 
Kasavubu, Mobutu, and other western allies, aimed at 
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preserving the status quo in the Congo in their own 
interests. 
A Congolese Embassy representing the Stanleyville 
government was opened in Beijing (February 1961), followed 
by China's despatch of Chang Vung, a senior colonel in 
PLA, as the new Chinese representative at its Embassy in 
Stanleyville. At the same time, it continued its 
campaign against the United States and its allies and 
their use of UN in the Congo to their own advantage at the 
ex. pense of the interest of the majority of the people of 
the Congo. The Peoplel-s Daily (I December 1962) argued 
that 
United States imperialism is stepping 
up its aggressive policy in Africa in 
the political, economic and military 
fields. The Kennedy administration 
continues to support the colonialist 
powers in their bloody suppression of 
liberation movements of the African 
colonies and at the same time professes 
"sympathy" for national independence in 
Africa and is using the UN as its tool 
for penetrating into that continent. 
To grasp colonies in Africa has become 
one of the major objectives of the 
Kennedy administration's ", grand 
strategy". The events in the Congo and 
the rest of Africa have shown that the 
United States is the most vicious and 
dangerous enemy of the African 
people. 
Under Soviet pressure, after having been deprived of 
diplomatic, political and military support which his 
government had initially enjoyed at the hands of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, Gizenga was 
forced to make a retreat and join the Ldopoldville 
government <5 August 1961). Thus, China was left with no 
-531- 
MAP 13,2 
ARPA, q Tixr)pp r-nNTRoT. nR THR RT7VnT. UTTONARY FORCPS 
-. 
IH C 110YO(L) KAS AT 1069) 
R2, tý 10 (April 1965), p. 6. 
t 
532- 
Source: X. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion", Africa 
option but to withdraw its mission from Stanleyville (18 
September 1961). China criticised the Soviet Union for 
r ; b-operating with the inperialist powers and pro-Western. 
elements and sacrificing the revolutionary element in the 
- Congo in the process. An editorial appearing in the 
People's Daily (22 October 1963) contained the following 
expression of China's viewpoint on the Congo question. 
Again, let us examine the part played 
by the leaders of the CPSU in the Congo 
Question. Not only did they refuse to 
give active support to the Congolese 
people's armed struggle against 
colonialism, but they were anxious "to 
co-operate" with United States 
imperialism in putting out the spark in 
the Congo. On 13 July 1960 the Soviet 
Union joined with the United States in 
voting for the Security Council 
resolution on the despatch of UN forces 
to the Congo; this helped the United 
States imperialists to use the flag of 
the UN in their armed intervention in 
the Congo. In a cable Khruschev said 
that "the UN Security Council has done 
a useful thing. " 
Clearly these wrong policies of 
the leadership of the CPSU rendered 
United States imperialism a great 
service in its aggression against the 
Congo. Lumumba. was murdered, Gizenga 
was imprisoned, and the Congolese 
people Is struggle for independence 
suffered a setback. Does the 
leadership of the CPSU feel no 
responsibility for all this? ý3: *r- 
13.2.3.2.6. China and the Mulele-Gbanye Insurrection 
The end of Gizenga's government did not mean that 
revolutionary struggle in the Congo had been brought to an 
end. Pierre Mulule, who helped Gizenga to establish the 
government of Stanleyville, continued to be active in 
Cairo where he was the representative of the Stanleyville 
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government. Mulele made intensive contacts with Chinese 
representatives in Cairo where he organised aida"I't- for the 
Gizenga government from China and other sources. 
Following Gizenga's failure in Stanleyville, Mulele 
went: 21'ý1-7 to China (1962> where he received training and 
military aid"' and was encouraged to launch guerrilla 
warfare. Mulele was described as 'one of the most 
prominent Chinese-trained African revolutionariesl.: 39r" 
At the same time, Christopher Gbenye, former Minister 
of the Interior in Lumumba's government (in co-operation 
with Gaston Soumialot, who had been Minister of Justice 
for Kivu Province in Gizengals government and who had also 
been previously in the Congo- Brazzavi 11 e) established the 
Congolese National Liberation Committee (NLC), 411>'1> in order 
to wage their campaign against the L6opoldville 
government. 
Initially, Gbenye and Scumialot sought 'Soviet aid for 
overthrowing the government. In November 1963, Gbenye 
made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Adoula's 
government. His forces kidnapped Joseph Mobutu, the ANC 
Commander, and Victor Nendaka, the Suret6 Chief. Both 
Mobutu and Nendaka escaped. NLC failed mainly because it 
concentrated its efforts in the capital (L6opoldville) 
where the central government was relatively strong. ""' 
In July 1963, Mulele had returned to the Congo, where 
he formed a Youth Movement (Jeunesse Pfouvement) in Kwilu 
Province (South-Western Congo - East L6opoldville). 111 
Mulele's movement was influenced by China's strategy of 
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people's war and Mao's 'Eight simple and straightforward 
rules' 
i respect all people; 
ii honest purchases from villagers; 
iii return in time everything 
borrowed; 
iv pay for anything damaged; 
v don't beat or curse others; 
vi don't destroy or damage farmland 
of villagers; 
vii respect women and don't insult 
them; and 
viii don't maltreat prisoners of war, 
don't confiscate or take their 
personal belongings such as rings, 
money, watches and other 
things. 
Despite their limited material resources, Mulele's 
guerrillas posed a serious threat to the central 
government in L6opoldville. They were able to control the 
entire area of Gungu and Idicfa., 4'01* Even the Soviet Union 
recognised Mulele's movement as a 'patriotic uprisingl, 13-1ýýIr- 
despite its pro-Chinese orientation. The Soviet Union 
however, failed to extend support to the movement led by 
Mulele despite the fact that its embassy was expelled by 
the hostile L6opoldville government. 
No wonder then that the movement under Mulele's 
leadership was highly critical of the Soviet Union and 
greatly appreciative of China. In a document which 
appeared in the African Mail (10 January 1964), Mulele's 
forces explained their position towards the Soviet Union 
and China in the following terms: 
We have done everything to get our 
Russian comrades to help us, but they 
have never comprehended our 
difficulties. That is the reason 
Comrade Mulele's left for China. China 
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gave him a course to enter a military 
school.. After having pursued the 
course, the Chinese friends gave him 
arms, munitions and material to make 
plastic bombs. We don' t have 
confidence in the Russians. 1113'r- 
China fully endorsed the means and methods pursued by 
the movement led by Mulele in opposition to the government 
and its Western allies: 
We never conceal our position and we 
regard it as our unshakeable 
international and honourable duty to 
support the revolutionary struggle of 
all oppressed nations and peoples. AOý7 
The Peol2l eIs Daily (28 January 1964) clearly 
expressed China's support for armed struggle in the Congo 
and its recognition of the revolutionary promise held by 
that country: 
Now a people's armed struggle has 
broken out in the Congo. The 
unyielding people have risen again. 
Although these patriots, in the Kwilu 
region east of L6opoldville, are armed 
with nothing better than bows and 
arrows, spears, and machetes, yet they 
have dared to fight the puppet troops 
equipped and commanded by us 
imperialists and have expanded their 
area of operation. "'*=' 
By 1964, the situation in the Congo had developed 
into a much sharper and wider"" revolutionary struggle 
affecting most parts of the country. "' The departure of 
UN 'troops' accompanied by UN recognition of -Adoula's 
government (June 1964), gave - rise to a new situation 
favourable to the nationalist and revolutionary forces. -" 
In a pitched battle (May 1964), Mulele's guerrilla forces 
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seriously threatened the L6opoldville government. -1: 2 This 
situation was described by the PeoplplcR Daily (6 May 1964) 
as 'a new upsurge in the Congolese liberation movement'. 
It is impossible for the Congo to 
achieve national liberation through so- 
called parliamentary struggle, but only 
through armed struggle. . 41ýa 
Inspired by Mulele's guerrilla operations, Gbenye and 
Scumialot, in co-ordination with pro-Lumumba forces in 
Kwilu, entered the Congo from northern Katanga and led 
offensive attacks on the government troops. 
Through its friendly relations with Tanzania, the 
Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi, 4L" China was able to 
supply military and financial aid to the anti-government 
forces led by Mulele and Gbenye., ""-r- China's financial 
support was estimated in the region of $3 million. "'At 
the same time, Chinese military instructors (led by 
General Wong Pingll"` an ex-pert on warfare) were active in 
training Congolese guerrilla forces in Tanzania and Congo 
(Brazzaville). -Ll-4 
In August 1964, new revolutionary forces known as- 
S1 mba_-z' (lions) launched attacks on the Stanleyville 
authorities. By this time, Gbenye had become greatly 
influenced'"'I by the Chinese strategy and model for 
national liberation by creating conditions (like Mulele 
before him) favourable for people's wars and continued 
guerrilla activity as the Ultimate means of practical 
struggle against the government. 
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Within a month (September 1964), in co-operation with 
Gbenye's -forces, the Simbas were able to capture 
Stanleyville and proclaim a 'People's Republic of the 
Congollý` with Gbenye as Prime Minister and Scumialot as 
Defence Minister. The Gbenye government and not the 
government in L6opoldville led by Tshombe was regarded by 
a large number of people (especially those in the 
Stanleyville region who were in direct contact with it) as 
the sole legitimate representative. The former also 
enjoyed wide international, '"" support especially in 
Africa. In the words of Max Close, Gbenye's government 
was 
ItIhe first purely African government 
to be installed in the Congo since the 
fall of Lumumba. ý1: 2ýý 
it was a well organised government with a 
revolutionary army (the Arm6e Populaire), largely 
consisting of soldiers who had defected from the National 
Army (ANC) o-j` the central government. It had its own 
newspaper (The Martyr)'ý-A which explained the government's 
world view and policies. The government ideology was 
based on struggles against the forces of neo-colonialism 
represented by the United States and Belgium in 
collaboration with their local allies. At the same time, 
it advocated 
ItIhe indi. spensibility of a "socialist 
revolution" to rid the Congo of 
bourgeois governments and false rulers 
and place the destiny of the country in 
the hands of the people. 14ztE. - 
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Based on Lumumbals ideas, the Gbenye government 
stressed that 
[w1e must create in the country new 
structures adapted to the exigencies of 
an African evolution, to reconvert the 
methods that were imposed upon us, to 
rid ourselves of mental attitudes, 
complexes, habits in which colonialism 
subjected our people for 
centuries... Lumumba is the conscience 
of the nation, the affirmation of the 
African personality. 'ý"ý', 
The tactics, strategies and methods used by the leaders of 
the Stanleyville government, including those concerning 
the prosecution of anti-revolutionary activists, the 
policy of cutting off ties with the Western powers, and 
the priority of liberating the country from the 
imperialist powers and Western influence in general, were 
inspired by China's model of liberationllý-7 and China's 
assessment of the revolutionary situation in the Congo. 
The revolutionary victories won by the Stanleyville 
Sovernment inspired even Mao personally to make a special 
statement conveying China's support for the Congolese 
struggles. 
Congolese people, you are not alone in 
your just struggles. All the Chinese 
people are with you. All people 
throughout the world who oppose 
imperialism are with you. us 
imperialism and the reactionaries of 
all countries are paper tigers. The 
struggle of the Congolese people will 
surely prove this too. By 
strengthening national unity and 
persevering in protracted struggle, the 
Congolese people will certainly be 
victorious, and US imperialism will 
certainly be defeated., "219, 
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By November 1964, the revolutionaries based in 
Stanleyville had established control over 60 per cent of 
the country. 
Towards the guerrilla operations of the Stanleyville 
revolutionaries and-their other political activities, the 
Soviet Union adopted a luke-warm policy. In fact, the 
Soviet Union criticised the guerrilla operations as 
adventurist and too revolutionary in character. 113"0 The 
Soviet Union avoided direct support f or the anti- 
L6opoldville government forces fearing that such support 
would undermine its State-tc-State relations with those 
countries in Africa which supported the L6opoldville 
government. The Soviet Union was keen to restore normal 
diplomatic and political relations with the L6opoldville 
government. 
However, the revolutionary success scored by the 
Stanleyville government was short-lived in the face of the 
joint offensive of the mercenaries from the United States, 
Belgium and South Africa (24 November 1964). The 
guerrilla forces were defeated and disbanded. Such a 
joint action by the United States, Belgium and South 
Africa was widely condemned, not only by progressive 
African countries but even by countries such as Ethiopia 
and Senegal which were pro-Western., 4a' 
The Soviet Union took advantage of failure of 
revolutionary action in the Congo(L) to attack China's 
policy towards the Stanleyville government. In an article 
in Literaturnaya Gazeta (2 June 1966), it was claimed that 
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I t] he uncontrolled efforts to 
Irevolutionisel all the process in 
Africa without any profound scientific 
analysis had their effect on the rebel 
movement in the Congo... The adventurism 
of the initiators of the $super 
revolutionary war' produced a crop of 
light-hearted performers. The tragic 
events in Stanleyville exposed the 
whole theory of the adventurist theory 
of Icertain victory' under any 
conditions grafted onto unprepared 
Soil., Mý1ý2 
In stark contrast to the Soviet Union, China once again 
took the view that such a revolutionary setback should be 
seen as containing an important lesson for other 
liberation forces in Africa as well as in other parts of 
the world engaged in the task of consolidating their 
liberation struggles and taking tougher action against the 
imperialist powers which were their targets. China 
continued its support for the struggles of the people of 
the Congo and urged all factions and organisations to 
unite in opposition to the central government in 
L6 opo 1 dv 111 e. '"3: 23 
In April 1965, Gaston Soumialot organised a Supreme 
Council of Revolution (SCR); he appealed to other 
revolutionary leaders of the Congo(L), including Gbenye 
and Mulele, to join SCR. In August 1965, Soumialot and 
six other members of SCR were invited to China where they 
received a warm reception from Xao Zedong., "ýall During this 
visit, the SCR delegation discussed with those whom they 
inet in China the possible means and strategy for the next 
stage of the revolutionary struggle in the Congo(L)., 401- 
Earlier the same year, Lumumba's widow was invited to 
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China (16 June 1965), where she was received with the 
warmth due to the widow of a great African revolutionary 
hero. I-"'- 
13.2.3.3. Niger 
Although independent since August 1960, Niger, unlike 
its neighbour, Mali, did not establish diplomatic 
relations with China until July 1974,, '"3-1 following the 
military coup (April 1974) which resulted in the overthrow 
of Hammani Diori's government. '"1119 As in the case of 
Cameroon and the Congo(L), the absence of diplomatic 
relations between Niger and f*, PRC was related to the 
latter's support for the liberation party (Swaba) under 
the leadership of Djibo Bakary, against the so-called 
Niger Progressive Party (PPN) which was led by Hammani 
Diori. 
Confrontation between Sawaba and PPN began in 1957, 
when the former won most of the votes in the Executive 
Council endorsing the rule of the country under the 
statutes of autonomy granted by the French colonial 
powers. Bakary, the Sawaba leader, became the President 
of the Executive Council. `"3`1 Immediately thereafter, 
Sawaba, along with the African Socialist Movement (ASM), 
demanded complete independence for Niger, rejecting the 
Statute of the French Community. 
The French government reacted to Sawaba's move by 
forcing Bakary's government to resign and helping Diori, 
the PPN leader to take power (September 1958). ILACI 
Predictably, Diori's government, launched an intensive 
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campaign against the progressive and radical forces in the 
country. Within a year (September 1958-September 1959), 
Diori prosecuted or jailed most of the progressive 
activists in the country. 
In October 1959, Sawaba was outlawed. 11-1 Bakary fled 
the country and tried to organise support in nearby Ghana 
and Mali, which were the only possible sources of 
strategic support. All the other neighbouring countries 
which were independent - viz, Libya, Nigeria, Benin, Upper 
Volta (now Bourkincl Faso), and Mauritania - were pro- 
Western in character, and were opposed to any progressive 
changes in Niger. 
China's first contacts with Bakary took place at the 
end of the AAPSCs second conference in Guinea (1959). At 
this conference, China affirmed its support for Sawaba's 
resistance to French colonialism and offered the 
equivalent of $1 million., allý Unlike the Soviet Union 
which was anxious to establish diplomatic relations with 
Niger when it became independent ( August 1960), China 
continued to support Sawaba I s-4-4`11 struggle for non- 
constitutional and complete independence, in opposition to 
the French-dominated r, 6, gime of Diori. Sawaba's guerrilla 
forces were trained by Chinese experts in Ghana, 
Algeria"' (after the latter's independence in July 1962), 
and in China, 13-41-- (Nanjing). 
The first serious resistance to Hammani's rtý, Tlme 
began in October 1964 when Sawaba commanders made an 
abortive attempt to overthrow his government. China, 
Ghana and Mali were accused by Hannani's government of 
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organising such a guerrilla action. --- Not surprisingly, 
unlike most of the governments of former French colonies, 
the government of Niger voiced its strong opposition to 
France's diplomatic recognition of China. 
You will easily understand that after 
being so attacked we are not prepared 
to establish relations with the PRC. 
We expressed to the French government 
how embarrassing and distressing its 
recognition of the PRC government is 
for countries like ours, which are 
exposed to Chinese subversion., 4,47 
Like Ahidjo in Cameroon, Diori's only reason for not 
recognising and establishing diplomatic relations with 
China rested on the latter's support for revolutionary 
forces in his country as well as in other parts of Africa 
during this period (1(959-66). Diori explained that his 
. r6, glme could not establish relations with a country 
that 
gives ideological and military training 
to nationals of other countries, and 
assists them financially. -411*1 
As in the case of the Cameroon, '"l- China was not concerned 
with promoting good relations with the pro-Western 
government of Niger as long as an active resistance 
movement to overthrow such a government was actively in 
existence. Thus, despite the fact that Niger did not 
establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan until July 
1963, (i. e. , for three years after independence)""' this 
did not influence PRC into rushing to establish -state-to- 
state relations with Niger. China's main concern was with 
Sawaba's revolutionary struggle. 
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13.2.3.4. Zanzibar 
Zanzibar was the only African country before 1964 to 
experience a successful revolution against a predominantly 
pro-Western government in an independent country in 
Africa. When Zanzibar became independent (10 December 
1963), the colonial power prevented, 4G' the majority of the 
African population, (80 per cent)AF-: 2 led by the Afro- 
Shirazi Party (ASP) from taking power. Alternatively, the 
British colonial authorities used their rule in the 
country to help the minority party, the Zanzibar 
Nationalist Party, "' led by Sultan Sayyid Djamshid Ben 
Abdullah. 111 
Inspired by mutinies in rapid succession against 
British officers in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika (late 
1963 and early 1964), leaders with communist leanings such 
as Abeid Karume and Rahman Mohamed Babu, "Gr- were able to 
bring about the overthrow of the monarchy (11 January 
1964) only a month after independence. They were 
helped in this task by Hanga'11--7 who had been educated in 
Moscow whilst it was John Okello, -1ý11 who stumbled into the 
realisation that the r6EIme could be overthrown by a 
minimum show of force. A new government was formed with 
Karume, (the ASP leader), as President of the People's 
Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. "- It 
initiated measures to break off diplomatic relations with 
the United States and to expel -the British High 
Commissioner-d'--1z" At the same time, it expressed a strong 
determination to stand against all 'imperialist 
machinations'. "' 
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China had already recognised the Sultan's government 
upon independence, establishing diplomatic relations (11 
December 1963) with Zanzibar. Ac--- However. when the 
revolution took place, China withdrew its recognition of 
the monarchy, and became the first socialist country"51 to 
recognise (17 January 1964) the new revolutionary 
government. The Zanzibar revolution was a victory for 
China's advocacy of a revolutionary approach to national 
liberation in contrast to the Soviet Union's advocacy of 
peaceful means. For the leaders of the Zanzibar 
revolution it was China. not the Soviet Union, that 
provided the inspiration for their success. Babu, the new 
Foreign Minister, put this view clearly when he said that: 
C t3 he victory of the Zanzibar 
revolution was only a step in the 
revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. The Zanzibar people send 
greetings to Chairman Mao because they 
learned a lot from his words. ', --r- 
Babu ' -- emphasis on revolutionary change was hardly 
compatible with Khruschev's hope that relations between 
the two countries, viz the Soviet Union and Zanzibar, 
would develop along lines of peaceful 
coexistence. "' 
The revolution took place during Zhou Enlai's tour of 
Africa (December 1963-February 1964). "7 This, along with 
the pro-Chinese orientation of some of the Zanzibar 
revolutionaries such as Babu, led some observersllf--ý' to - 
claim that China's was the hidden hand behind such a 
revolution. However, it does not appear that China had 
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any direct link with the revolution in Zanzibar. A-s" When 
Zhou Enlai, at a press conference (Mogadisco, Somalia: 3 
February 1964) was asked by an American correspondent 
whether China had any knowledge of the revolution he 
replied that 
ItIhe Chinese communists are indeed 
quite surprised at this unexpected 
honour., a-7 Ic, 
At the same conference, Zhou Enlai explained that the 
revolution in Zanzibar was the outcome of the work of its 
people and not that of outside communists because 
[rIevolution can neither be exported 
nor be imported; only when the people 
of the country have awakened can they 
drive the aggressors out and overthrow 
their oppressors. Of course we do not 
conceal the fact that we sympathise 
with and support the revolutionary 
struggles of the peoples. -4-71 
China's material contribution to Zanzibar consisted 
of a grant of $500,000 (February 1964)11`7-ý earmarked for 
easing the country's difficult economic situation after 
the revolution. This was followed by gifts of tractors, 
irrigation machinery and technical help., a-7c3l In the 
military field, by mid-1964, China along with the Soviet 
Union and East Germany was engaged in the task of training 
the Zanzibar army. ",, "- 
13.3. China and Africa: State-to-State Relations or 
'United Front From Above'. 
In order to isolate US imperialism the 
broadest possible international united 
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front must be established against US 
imperialism and its lackeys... 
We must unite with all the people 
in the world who are against 
colonialism and imperialism.... 47F- 
13.3.1. China's Relations with 'Progressive' States 
13.3.1.1. Relations with Egyj2t 
Despite China's hardline policy against national 
bourgeois r6gimes (especially those such as India and UAR 
which advocated a moderate or flexible line towards 
imperialist powers), and its antagonism toward----JNUAR during 
the latter's witchhunt against Egyptian communists... 
during the late '50s, there was a marked improvement in 
Sino-UAR relations during this period (1959-G6). By 1964, 
Egypt had again become, in China's eyes, one of the 
leading progressive countries of Africa. Five major 
factors contributed to such a characterisation of Egypt by 
China. 
China could not afford to disregard the pre- 
eminent position enjoyed by Cairo as a major 
base for African liberation movements, and 
AAPSO's headquarters and venue for meetings of 
Afro-Asian representatives. During the period 
1961-1964, the Congo crisis absorbed much of 
China's anti-imperialist activities in Africa 
including the search f0r venues"' for 
transferring arms and aid to the revolutionary 
anti-government forces in Stanleyville. Cairo 
was a major base for Gizenga, and later also 
for-Gbenye's revolutionary government. Strong 
Egyptian support for the revolutionary 
nationalist forces in the Congo(L) played a 
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significant part in restoring a friendly 
relationship between China and Egypt. Like 
China, ý4ýUAR strongly criticised UNIS 
controversial role which negated that of the 
militant nationalist government of Lumumba. 
Nasser, in a speech to the African Summit 
Conference (Casablanca: 4-7 January 1961) 
strongly attacked 
the UN [for closing] its eyes in order 
not to see the situation in the Congo; 
and sent in its troops which were used 
against Lumumba. Af ter the arrest of 
Lumumba the UN left the stooges 
entirely free to exterminate the 
nationalist elements. '&710 
In the same speech, he strongly condemned 
Kasavubuls collusion with the imperialists in 
murdering Lumumba. Like the Chinese 
leadership, Nasser argued as follows: 
We hold the imperialists responsible 
for the developments in the Congo. The 
United States supported and recognised 
Kasavubu as the legal President of the 
Republic of the Congo. We cannot help 
wondering what Kasavubu had done to 
deserve the support of the United 
States! 
Kasavubu usurped the Congo 
government, dissolved the 'legal 
government, yielded to the 
imperialists, and gave orders to hand 
Patrice Lumumba over to the imperialist 
stooge, Tshombe. Who is then, 
responsible for the murder of 
Lumumba? 1-71 
Nasser also urged that the situation in the 
Congo must be viewed in the whole context of 
imperialist attempts to contain the liberation 
forces in Africa. In this he concurred with 
China's assessment of the situation. 401ý 
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... it should not be forgotten that the 
struggle against imperialism in the 
Congo and Algeria is part of the 
struggle against- imperialism in the 
whole African continent. 
If imperialism wished to make of 
the Congo an example to terrorise the 
African struggle then we should all 
join to make the battle of the Congo an 
example of African victory in order to 
encourage the whole continent..., 4131 
The Algerian war of national liberation 
was yet another anti-imperialist cause which 
contributed to the rapid improvement of Sino- 
UAR relations. During the period 1959-62, the 
Agerian war of national liberation reached its 
decisive and final stage. 
1UUAR 
was a major 
supporter of bFLN both in a moral and in a 
material sense. It also constituted a base 
for the transfer of arms and material from 
other FLN supporters to the scene of the 
struggle for national liberation. Thus China 
needed friendly relations with J-VAR in order 
that the continuation of a successful Algerian 
stru. SSle might be encouraged and supported 
collectively by like-minded powers. At the 
same time, China was afraid that Nasser's 
increasingly moderate attitude towards 
imperialist powers could have the effect of 
undermining Wt-UARs strong support for 
continuous armed national liberation struggle 
in Algeria. It was imperative that Nasser 
should at all costs be discouraged from 
diluting his stance on Algeria to the extent 
of agreeing to any settlement likely to 
compromise FLN's revolutionary objectives., "13'm 
Nasser's neutrality towards the Sino-Indian 
border clash (October 1962) contributed to the 
restoration of the warm relationship between 
China andf-MAR. Even though he enjoyed the 
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confidence of Nehru and had only recently been 
attacked by China for his policy of 
persecuting local communists, he refrained 
from openly taking India's side in the 
dispute. Instead, Nasser urged an immediate 
ceasefire, and offered to mediate in the 
dispute. 1"3 In the wake of the Sino-Indian 
border clash, the Presidential Council of UAR 
issued a statement stressing that the conflict 
has caused the pain in the hearts of 
the sons of the UAR who are linked with 
Indian and Chinese peoples with bonds 
of friendship and closer co-operation. 
In view of the serious situation the 
UAR could not stand by as a spectator. 
The spirit Of Bandung and the 
principles of Afro-Asian solidarity 
impelled the UAR to take rapid action 
and carry out a positive role. 111ý111 
China's campaign (1961-65) f or the support of 
a second Afro-Asian Conference paid rich 
dividends in the form of a normalisation of 
Sino-UAR relations. As a co-founder of the 
Bandung Conference, and as a strategic link 
between Asia and Africa, Egypt's support for 
the Afro-Asian Conference was of paramount 
importance. At the same time, China hoped 
that Egypt's support for a second Afro-Asian 
conference as an important power at the 
Belgrade summit and as a leading campaigner 
for the second meeting of the heads of state 
of non-aligned powers would win the support of 
many who had reservations of a second Bandung- 
type conference, for fear that it would 
detract f rom their commit ment to non- 
alignment as such. 
iv. The conviction of the Chinese decision-makers 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
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commitment of the United States to Israel was 
bound to keep Nasser within the militant anti- 
imperialist front acted as an important 
incentive to the restoration of good relations 
between the two countries. China strongly 
condemned the shipping of large tanks and 
other weapons to Israel by West Germany in co- 
operation with the United States. 
The Chinese people strongly condemn the 
aggressive schemes of the United States 
and West Germany in Jointly fostering 
Israel and resolutely support the 
people of the UAR and Arab countries in 
their just struggle to oppose 
imperialism, old and new colonialism 
and in striving for and defending their 
national independence. ', "'- 
V. China approved of Egypt's decision (May 1962) 
to embark on domestic social and economic 
polio ies based on the principles of 
'scientific socialism' 111ý16, 
UARI s decision (October 1959) to return its Char-S6 
dIA ffa i r-e_c7 to Be ij ing, '"31 paved the way for the 
normalisation of relations between China and the UAR. 
Relations between the two countries improved further 
following Zhou Enlai's visit to Egypt (14-21 December 
1964),, 411ý`, which resulted in China offerinix (December 1964) 
Egypt the supply of machinery and incorporated industrial 
equipment in respect of some of the projects in its Second 
Five Year Plan. The offer, incorporated in a Sino- 
Egyptian economic and technical co-operation agreement, "' 
was to be financed by an an interest-free Chinese loan of 
$85 million. """ China perhaps hoped that such an offer of 
its greatest single offer of aid to an African country 
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prior to 1965"" would act as a counterbalance to the 
growing economic influence of the Soviet Union, 
particularly in view of its involvement in the gigantic 
Aswan dam project. It hoped that its initiative would 
encourage Nasser into taking a positive attitude towards 
the convening of a second 
the Soviet Union. On the 
conference, Zhou Enlai paid 
June 1965) on his way to J 
must have been in Nasser's 
Afro-Asian conference without 
eve of the second Afro-Asian 
49Z 
yet another visit to Egypt (19 
ýlgeria. China's ýLid to Egypt 
mind when, after some initial 
reluctance, he assured Zhou Enlai this time that 
the second Afro-Asian conference must 
be a success; it must accomplish the 
mission which it has pledged itself to 
accomplish, it must fulfill the hope 
attached to it by many peoples aspiring 
to a world of genuine peace, under the 
protection of which they can proceed 
with their political, social and 
cultural development with no threat 
from power policies or the domination 
of imperialist monopoly. As---[ 
13-3.1-2. AlZeria 
The following four major factors contributed to 
close, comradely and militant"91- Sino-Algerian relations 
during the post-liberation period (1962 onwards). 
The successful Algerian war of national 
liberation and China's unequivocal support for 
its continuation without any 'polemical 
disputes'. "' 
China's characterisation of Algeria as a 
fundamental base for its 'vision of a broad 
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based anti-imperialist front' and as 'the 
first successful- test-case of a national 
liberation movementA-ý"G in Africa' enabled it 
to use recent Algerian developments as armour 
in its ideological dispute with the Soviet 
Union over the need to oppose the leading 
anti-liberation forces. In his message of 
congratulation to Ben Khedda, PGRA's 
President, Liu Shaoq& stressed that Algeria's 
victory would exert a great impact on anti- 
colonialist forces. He argued that 
Algeria's independence is a great event 
in the African national liberation 
movement today. It shows that the 
people of Algeria and those of the rest 
of Africa are invincible and that 
imperialism and colonialism, old and 
new, can be defeated. The brilliant 
example set by the heroic Algerian 
people is sure to help bring about a 
further upsurge in the national 
independence struggle in Africa., "-9-7 
The emergence of Algeria as the major champion 
of and model for liberation forces in the rest 
of Africa. 
V. Algeria's adoption of socialism as the only 
path-reflecting mass struggles. 
China established diplomatic relations with the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (P(-', RA) 
four years (September 1958> in advance of the formal 
independence of Algeria (July 1962). This was in contrast 
to China's practice in relation to African countries_ 
before 1962.111 In the words of Hzkouari Boumedienne, 
President of Algeria (1965-78), during a visit to China 
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(February 1974), China's relations with Algeria developed 
at a time of 
Algeria's most difficult period, and 
Chinese solidarity with us and their 
deep understanding of the problems 
facing our people., 4'ý"ý 
Thus, when Algeria became independent (1962), the 
resumption of diplomatic relations with China was only a 
mere formality. "c" In response to an appeal by FLN to 
friendly countries for aid, China, two days (3 July 1962) 
before the formal announcement of Algerian independence (5 
July) gave Algeria a gift of 9,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 
tons of rolled steel for building purposes, and 21 tons of 
3nedicine. "-cl" 
The Sino-Indian conflict, culminating in the border 
clash between the two countries later during the year 
(October 1962), constituted the first major test facing 
Sino-Algerian relations. Despite its claim to remain 
neutral on this question in the interest of Afro-Asian 
solidarity, Algeria adopted a policy that seemed to 
satisfy China's position rather than Indials. Unlike 
India and the Western powers, Algeria did not view China 
as an aggressor. China's decision to call a ceasefire 
unilaterally was described by El Moujf-hjrj (quoted in 
Peking Review) as: 
(having furnished] indisputable proof 
of China's desire for the neacefu-1 
di-EPIL-ta... the interests of the Chinese 
and Indian people demanded that the 
border issue be solved by peaceful 
means through negotiations, in 
accordance with the spirit of the 
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Bandung Conference, because the 
continuation of this dispute could only 
benefit the imperialists, Asian and 
African solidarity must be upheld and 
the non-aligned countries should make 
efforts to enable China and India to 
maintain good neighbourly 
relations. r-c'12[emphasis added] 
Even although it would have preferred to see Algeria 
adopting a clearly pro-China line on the dispute, China 
did not wish to use third world countries' specific 
attitude on the dispute as a decision an which to base its 
own relationship with then. By the tine the Sino-India 
border clash took place (October 1962), China had already 
turned its back on the international line of the Soviet 
Union. The Third World as a whole, and Africa and Asia in 
particulart became the central focus of China's world view 
and constituted the fundamental base on which it moulded 
its role in international relations. r-0-a 
China was keenly interested in promoting general 
understanding of the effect that FLN's victory against 
colonialism was a successful example of liberation war, 
and that Algeria was a major champion of the world anti- 
imperialist front. This was evident in comments issuing 
from Chinese sources in the wake of the Sino-Indian border 
clash. Thus, for example, Liu Ning- yi, speaking at the 
8th Anniversary""' of the Algerian Revolution (1 November 
1962) stated that 
the experience of the protracted 
struggle of the Algerian people proved 
that all colonialists, even though 
armed to the teeth, can be 
defeated .... The victory of Algeria 
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also... proves that the national 
liberation movement is. an important 
force in smashing the policies of war 
and aggression of imperialism. r-cl" 
China's ideological expectations on fundamental 
international issues, especially those relating to 
resistance to colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism 
ý->A 
had been fully met by/ýFLN's struggle in Algeria. During 
the Cuba crisis (October 1962), China praised Algeria for 
condemning 'US aggression against Cuba' as 
aggression against all peoples waging 
constant struggle against colonialism 
in all its forms. ---- 
An editorial in People's Daily characterised Algeria's 
stance as being in conformity with 
not only their own interests but also 
the common interests of people 
throughout the world struggling against 
imperialism. What US imperialism wants 
is that the Algerian people should give 
up the goal of their revolution... and 
that they should part company with the 
other revolutionary people of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. E--10-7 
At the Moshi conference of AAPSO (January 1963), 
Algeria played a leading role in getting policies and 
resolutions'-10-1 urging struggles of a non-concilatory 
nature against the colonialist and imperialist powers 
adopted. It 'fully supported China in overt opposition to 
Soviet doctrines'. "' Soviet advocacy of negotiations and 
peaceful coexistence as an overall strategy of li-beration 
from colonialism and imperialism had already been rejected 
by Algeria during the war of liberation. Training 
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bases"' in Algeria were provided for African freedom 
fighters, arms were sent to national liberation movements, 
and people's wars were advocated by Algeria at 
international meetings and in its foreign policy 
statements. 
In January 1963, the Algerian government announced 
that it had sent arms to Angola and freedom fighters from 
Portuguese colonies were being trained in Algeria. "' 
During the revolutionary struggles in the Congo, Algeria 
played a major role not only by providing arms and money 
for those engaged in struggles against the Kasavubu-Mobutu 
government, but also worked hardl-'ý to persuade the Sudan 
to allow arms and military equipment to pass through its 
territory to the revolutionary forces in Stanleyville. By 
1965, Algeria had trained, with China's support, '-` more 
than 2,000 African freedom fighters while it had been 
handsomely contributing to the OAU Liberation Fund. The 
practical support given by Algeria to liberation movements 
was appropriately described by Humbaraci in the following 
passage 
There is no doubt that Den Bella and 
the Algerians generally were perfectly 
honest and sincere in their desire to 
liberate the whol e0f Af rica, to 
extinguish the racialist r6gime of 
South Africa and the Salazarist 
colonialism in Portugal's possessions. 
I cannot think of one instance where 
the fighters for freedom in African 
territories still under European rule 
have not acknowledged (in private of 
course) that the general help provided 
from Algeria was the best that they had 
received from anywhere, communist or 
not. (Though when it C0 me S to 
guerrilla-type help, they unanimously 
give the palm to China). 
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No wonder then, that, in March 1963, more than 15,000 
people rallied to welcome a delegation of Algerian 
journalists including Djamila Bouhired (a national heroine 
of Algeria) and the Maoist-inclined"16 Jacques Verg6s 
'Mansour' (who had played an active role during the 
Algerian war of liberation and who became director of the 
Algerian weekly R6volutlon A-fricaine after Algeria's 
independence) when it visited Beijing (China). At this 
rally, Bouhired praised China's contribution to the 
Algerian struggle, whilst Verg&s affirmed that Algeria had 
made common cause with China on the Congo question. He 
condemned the role of UN in the Congo. 
The African people do not believe in 
the UN. In the Congo, the UN has been 
an instrument of US imperialism. r-Il- 
In the same speech, he rejected the peaceful Soviet policy 
towards the colonial powers. 
There is no such thing as 
decolonialisation that is peaceful or 
w4 thout a struggle. We do not trust 
the 'goodwill' of the imperialists. r-1-7 
In October 1963, an Algerian government delegation 
led by Amar Ouzegane, Minister of State, paid a visit to 
China. During this visit, Ouzegane strongly criticised 
the French and Algerian communist parties for doubting the 
victory of the Algerian Peopl-els War and for advocating 
that Algerian independence should be negotiated through 
'parliamentary struggle' by Algerian representatives in 
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the French National Assembly. -'- Ouzegane's criticism of 
the Algerian and French communist parties constituted an 
indirect attack against the Soviet Union'. s advocacy of 
compromise during the Algerian war. 
At the end of the Algerian delegation's visit, China 
pledged to help Algeria in the construction of small-scale 
industrial plants. "" In addition, China gave Algeria a 
long-term, interest-free loan (repayable over a period of 
over 20 years) estimated at $50 million, '-ýO for furthering 
the relations of friendship and co- 
operation between the two countries and 
assisting the Algerian government and 
people in their efforts to develop 
their national economy. r-: 2! " 
Algeria and China also signed an economic and technical 
co-operation agreement (28 October 1963) on the occasion 
of a visit by a Chinese delegation to Algeria to attend 
the Ninth Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution (1 
November). Included in this agreement was a Chinese loan 
of 25,000 million Old Francs. --: 2: ý Abdel Aziz Boutefliga, 
the Algerian Foreign Minister, described the agreement as 
... a new page in the history of 
relations between the peoples of China 
and Algeria-"' 
China's aid came at a time when Algeria had just embarked 
on a policy of economic development based on the socialist 
promises contained in the 'Tripoli Programmell--ý- (1961). 
Algeria's initial socialist measures were to include a 
comprehensive land reform programme. At the same time, 
almost 3 million hectares from former owners (mostly 
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col ons) were confiscated (October 1963)nýQ and 
redistributed to 1,391 self -administration committees in 
rural communities. 'ý' These measures were viewed by China 
as a promising 
prelude to the new revolutionary 
struggles and national construction. r-27 
The Chinese experience and model was highly valued by 
the Algerians, not only in respect of how a liberation 
struggle should be waged, but also in respect of how 
economic development should be carried out. On the 
occasion of opening a Chinese trade exhibition"' 
(September 1963), Ben Bella, the Algerian President, 
expressed his deep appreciation of 
the just value of the experience of 
that country, that just as we had, 
learned from its experience during our 
liberation struggle, we would likewise 
learn with fitness and foresight from 
it in the building up of our 
country. -r-11 
Algeria's brief war with Morocco (October 1963) 
provided the occasion for the second serious test of the 
soundness of Sino-Algerian relations. Even as Algeria had 
advocated a peaceful solution of the Sino-Indian conflict 
in 1962, so too China favoured a peaceful solution of the 
Algerian-Moroccan conflict (1963) without any outside 
interference. This was motivated by China's vital aim of 
maintaining Afro-Asian 
_solidarity. 
-J, 
ýIOAU's 
success in 
bringing about a ceasef ire between Algeria and Morocco 
(October 1963) was welcomed by China. Pekina Ri-view (20- 
November 1963) wrote: 
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It is welcome news that the Algerian- 
Moroccan dispute is being solved by the 
Africans themselves... through peaceful 
negotiations and without interference 
from the imperialists. 
- 
Like the Asian 
countries, the African states need 
friendship and solidarity to wage a 
common struggle against imperialism and 
old and new colonialism. While force 
can settle none of their disputes, they 
can all be resolved by peaceful 
negotiations. The imperialists must 
not be allowed to set newly independent 
states at loggerheads. --ý3cll 
Despite its claim to neutrality in the Moroccan- 
Algerian border war, China, in effect, seemed to be more 
favourably inclined to Algeria than to Morocco. Thus, an 
Algerian military delegation led by Chadil Ben Djedid 
C Commander- i n-Charge (now President of Algeria)] of the 
western region [the second military zone] along the 
Moroccan-Algerian border paid an official visit to China 
(30 October) only two days before the declaration of 
ceasefire (2 November 1963). The delegation attended the 
celebration in China of the 9th Anniversary of the 
Algerian Revolution (1 November 1963). Ir-ý"' 
// 
Algeria was the 
second country (after Egypt) to be visited by Zhou Enlai 
in the course of his African tour which took place only a 
month after the ceasefire (21-27 December). Zhou Enlai 
was received by Ben Bella as the great hero of the 
revolutionaries 
At the dawn of its regained freedom, 
Algeria is proud and happy to welcome 
the messengers of those who took part 
in the Long March. "ý 
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Zhou Enlai was the firstr-: ý: ý foreign statesman to be given 
the honour of addressing the Meeting of Cadres of the 
Algerian national Liberation Front (25 December). r--AA 
During this visit, Al XU151LU (26 December 1963) 
published a long report entitled 'Honorable Attitudes by 
China During Our Struggle for Liberation'. In this 
article, the Chinese revolution was praised for its unique 
victory over imperialists and reactionaries both before 
and after China's- liberation. ---'-1F- 
The positive character of Sino-Algerian relations, 
however, has never reached the extent of Algeria taking 
sides, at least publicly, on the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Algeria, like most progressive countries in Africa has 
always viewed Sino-Soviet differences as a setback to the 
anti-imperialist struggles and as detrimental to Afro- 
Asian solidarity. China and the Soviet Union were urged 
to reconcile their differences in order to preserve the 
unity-2'r- and solidarity of the Afro-Asian world and the 
anti-imperiqlist front as a whole. Although Algeria, 
after independence, continued to advocate armed struggle 
as a practical option for national liberation, it never 
officially opposed the Soviet Union's policy of D46tente. 
FLN leaders however, made it a point to tell Soviet 
leaders, whenever the opportunity arose, that in their 
view liberation could not be achieved through peaceful 
negotiations as the Algerian example unquestionably 
proved. "I 
At the Preparatory Meeting for the second Afro-Asian 
Conference, (Djakarta: 10-15 April 1964) the Algerian 
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delegation stressed that nonýalignment and Afro-Asian 
conference 
should have the Sa me objective: 
liquidation of all sorts of domination 
and the promotion of equality among 
nations as a pre-requisite for 'eternal 
peace. 
At the second Non-Aligned Conference (Cairo: 5-10 October 
1964), Algeria (along with the 'progressive' countries of 
Ghana, Indonesia, Guinea, Mali and Uganda) focused 
attention on struggles against colonialism and 
imperialism. "' In his speech to the conference, Ben 
Bella put forward Algeria's understanding of non-alignment 
in the following terms: 
Non-alignment must be translated into 
constant struggle for national 
independence, a constant f ight against 
any attempt at subjugation. It implies 
that one must avoid playing the game 
of the power blocs or becoming an 
accomplice of the imperialist 
powers... For us, peace is indivisible. 
It requires first and foremost total 
liquidation of colonialism, neo- 
colonialism and imperialism. In cur 
view, to achieve this end it is 
necessary to , go 
beyond f ormal 
resolution and to launch concerted and 
rigorous action to give effective 
assistance t C3 the peoples who are 
fighting for their independence. -ý, 1'11 
Algeria (along with Egypt, Sudan, Congo(B), Ghana, 
Guinea, Tanz-ania, Mali and Somalia) also played a major 
role i-n giving effect to the decision to expel Tshombels 
government from the conference. This move left the 
Conference in no doubt about Algeria's clear stand on the 
Congo question. The L6opoldville government under Tshombe 
was strongly condemned by Algeria for the murder of 
Lumumba and the suppression of the revolutionary forces in 
the Conso. r-, 12 
Algeria's policy of uncompromising opposition to 
colonialism and imperialism contributed to the development 
of close co-operation between China and Algeria in the 
political and economic spheres. On the occasion of a 
visit to China (January 1964) by an Algerian delegation 
(led by Ben Abdallah Abdessamd, President of the 
Commission of the National Assembly of Justice and 
Legislation), "' Algeria was presented with 4 transport 
planes. "' In August 1964, a group of children belonging 
to the families of Algerian liberation fighters who had 
lost their lives in the revolution were invited to spend a 
summer holiday in China by the Chinese People's National 
Co=ittee in Defence of Children. ---"r- 
On the occasion of a visit to China (September 1964) 
by an Algerian delegation led by Bachir Boumaza, Minister 
of National Economy, a trade agreement was concluded 
between the two countriesF--1110- by which Algeria pledged to 
sell China 400 Beriet lorries. s, 4-7 In December, Den Bella 
sent Amar Ouzegane, Minister of Tourism of Algeria, to 
China as his special envoy, presumably for talks on the 
second Afro-Asian conference which was then being planned 
to be held in Algiers in the following year. r-"' This 
visit had been preceded by a visit to Algeria (Octaber 
1964) by a Chinese delegation led- by Chen'-I; Foreign 
Minister, to take part in the 10th Anniversary of the 
Algerian Revolution. "I An Algerian Militia Delegation, 
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led by Mahmoud Guenez, its Superintendant, paid a visit to 
China (December 1964), during which the Chinese hostS 
conveyed their admiration for the methods adopted to 
defend Algerian national sovereignty of forming the 
militia, which, along with Algeria's 
'People Is Army' wou 1d smash any 
aggression or subversion by imperialism 
or colonialism. f-r-c' 
In February 1965, China gave Algeria a cargo ship of 
13,000 RT and an an interest-free loan of $2 million. rlrl 
In 1965, the most significant development in the 
Sino-Algerian relationship consisted of the co-operation 
between the two countries in the Algiers Conference of 
Afro-Asian states. During Zhou Enlai's second visit to 
Algeria (Xiarch 1965), the hosts assured the visiting Prime 
Minister that the idea of convening an Afro-Asian 
conference in militant opposition to colonialism and 
imperialism was compatible with the international 
revolutionary situation. In their joint co=uniqu6, 
Algeria and China affirmed that 
[the] two parties are of the opinion 
that the main salient feature of the 
present international situat -ion is the 
staunch fight against imperialism, 
cplonialism and neo-colonialism being 
carried on by the peoples of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. r----2x 
Also In this communlqu6, us imperialism and its 
aggressive role in Indo-China, Congo(L), and other parts 
of the world were condemned. An Algerian delegation 
led by Mohamed Yazid, President of the Foreign Affairs 
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Committee of the Algerian National Assembly, visited China 
(6 June 1965) for consultations on the preparations for 
the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to comnencoh in three 
week's time (28 June 1965). r-r-r- Following this visit, 
China gave 1,000 tons of school equipment to-the Algerian 
Ministry of Education, and Chinese equipment to the 
Algerian Militia. 
The deposition of President Ben Bella (19 June 1965) 
by Houari Bounedienne, Vice President (responsible for 
National Defence), a week before the scheduled second 
Afro-Asian conference to be held in Algiers (28 June), did 
not undermine the positive and dynamic character of Sino- 
Algerian relations. China viewed the deposition of Ben 
Bella as a change of government, and not as a coup 
dl6tat as. was presented by the Western media. Tsang Tao, 
China's Ambassador to Algeria, meýt with Boumedi6nne the 
day after Ben Bella was removed from power, and affirmed 
China's support for the Algerian Council of the Revolution 
under his leadership. At this meeting with Boumedi6nne, 
Tao reiterated the view that 
China never interferes in the internal 
affairs of other countries. It has 
consistently supported Algeria's 
national liberation cause and the 
development of its national economy. 
We support all that is in the interests 
of the anti-imperialist and anti- 
colonialist cause. The Chinese 
government is convinced that the 
Frate, rnal Friendship between the 
governments of the two countries will 
continue to be consolidated and 
developed. "" 
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China was convinced that the new Algerian government 
under the leadership of Bounedienne was even more 
determined than its predecessor to push furthor the 
militant foreign policy of Algeria and to maintain a high 
profile of the Sino-Algerian relationship. At the same 
time, China perhaps hoped that immediate recognition of 
Boumedi6nne's government would result in Algeria's support 
for its campaign for the exclusion of the Soviet Union 
from the Afro-Asian conference. In fact, it was perhaps 
China's determination that the second Afro-Asian 
conference should materialise without delay which 
constituted the major reason for the immediate recognition 
given to the new Algerian government . Tac gave clear 
expresý-::; ion to China's view on this matter at his meeting 
with Boumedi6nne 
... we insistently advocate that the 
conference be convened as scheduled. 
In the present circumstances, we still 
hope that it will be held as originally 
planned. --ý, sl 
Unlike China, the Soviet Union distanced itself from 
Algeria when Ben Bella was deposed by remaining 
temporarily neutral, whilst its Eastern European allies 
were hostile to the Boumedi6nne government. Fearing 
China's influence in Algeria and that Algeria would 
support China's campaign for the exclusion of the Soviet 
Union from the Conference, the Soviet Union soon overcame 
its neutrality by recognisinýý Boumedionne's government. "' 
Throughout the summer immediately following Ben 
Bella's deposition, China and Algeria continued their warm 
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relations and contacts. In August, an Algerian government 
delegation led by Rabah Bitat, State Minister, paid a 
visit to China. During this visit, Bitat expressed 
Algeria's continuing close relations with China which 
were forged and 
difficult yearý, c 
struggle. The 
always advance 
Chinese people 
revolution. 
consolidated in the 
of revolutionary 
Algerian people will 
together with the 
on the road of 
13.3.1.3. Guinp-a 
In order that a genuine and just peace 
may be realised, imperialist aggression 
and the rule of colonialism must be 
terminated and the oppressed nations in 
the colonies and semi-colonies must be 
masters of their own country and 
exercise their state sovereignty. So 
long as colonialism continues to ex. ist 
and the colonial and semi-colonial 
peoples are oppressed it will be 
impossible for the world to achieve 
genuine peace. 1611--: 3 
Two important factors were largely responsible for the 
political and ideological co-operation in international 
relations between China and Guinea during this period 
(1959-66): 
As a result of its militant policies against 
colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, 
Guinea, after independence, (like China) found 
itself under direct pressure from imperialist 
powers and especially France. China and 
Guinea found common ground in their policies 
which were opposed to imperialism and neo- 
colonialism. 
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During this period, Guinea became the f irst 
sub-Saharan African country to express at a 
State-to-State level, dissatisfaction with the 
Soviet Union's doctrine of peaceful 
coexistence. Like China, Guinea urged the use 
of armed struggle for the achievement of 
national liberation. In Sekou Tourd's view, 
peace could not be achieved by appeasement 
with the targets of the liberation forces, but 
only by 'the political consciousness and 
struggle of the peoplel. r-'a 
Sino-Guinean relations became closer, 
especially as relations between the Soviet 
Union and Guinea deteriorated. r-1-r- In fact, 
Guinea even expelled Daniel Solod, the Soviet 
Union's Ambassador, accusing him of subversive 
activities against the state by stirring up 
unrest amongst students. ---'--'-- 
China's interest in Guinea did not stem 
from Sekou Tour6's communist background; "' 
nor did it signify China's recognition of 
Guinea's 'so, 7, ialism', rather it was based on 
Sekou Tour6's uncompromising and aSgressive 
posture against colonialist and imperialist 
powers, and on the firm support given by his 
sovernmt--nt to national liberation movements 
and revolutionary forces in the Cameroon, the 
Congo and other parts of Africa. During Sekou 
Tour6's visit to China (September 1960), both 
China and Guinea strongly condemned 
imperialism's schemes to interfere in 
the Congo and encroach on its 
territorial integrity. r-c-10 
In the case of Algeria and the Cameroon, Guinea was 
very critical of the wavering support given by the Soviet 
Ght 00- 
Union tof\FLN andtJýPC. 1-1- China's ideological perception 
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of Guinea was also influenced by the latter's position as 
a strategically vital base for the liberation movement in 
the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. 
Guinea's condemnation of the 'illegal occupation of 
Formosa'111 by the United States constituted yet another 
factor governing the militant friendship between the two 
powers. 
* Simultaneously with the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Guinea and China at the ambassadorial 
level, a cultural co-operation agreement was signed 
between the two countries (4 October 1959). It included 
co-operation in the fields of education, arts, culture, 
news broadcasting, medicine, public health and sports. It 
was also agreed that, by the end of 1959,10 Guinean 
students would be given scholarships for study in China by 
the Chinese government. 
Guinea and China also agreed that Guinea would send a 
delegation to China to 'study popular education' . China 
agreed to send in December 1959 an 'acrobatic troupe' to 
perform in Guinea-"' China's aid to Guinea in 1959 
amounted to $0.5 million. 1'--7ýAs a part of the cultural 
agreement signed between China and Guinea, the Guinean 
Minister of Education visited China in December 1959. He 
returned home full of admiration for China's experience, 
saying that he was 
quite convinced of the efficacy of 
Chinese methods. I was greatry 
impressed by the similarity of the 
economic problems that China has 
succeeded in solving and those that are 
now facing the peoples of Africa and 
China. I saw what can be done if you 
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mobilise the vital forces of a nation. 
With all due regard to the difference 
in nagnitude we now propose to do the 
same. E; `cýb 
Ahmed Sekou Tour6 was the first African Head of State 
to visit -China (10-15 September 1960), He was well 
received, with more than half a millionr-71 Chinese people 
rallying to welcome him as an anti-imperialist hero. He 
told them that 
the sentiments of fraternity that 
united the people of Africa and Asia 
have a political and historical 
basis... these sentiments have been 
reinforced by their common hatred of 
imperialism and colonialism and also, 
and above all. by their carnnn will to 
12ursue and ontinuFz thp struEgle until 
inl2erialism vanis-hea and each nation on 
earth can be master of its destiny with 
freedom and dignity. E-Ic- [emphasis 
added] 
Sekou Tour6 showed a deep appreciation of the Chinese 
revolution and the application of its principles to 
African struggles for liberation. 
... all the progress of your revolution, 
but to carry away lessons that could be 
applied to the actual conditions of the 
African struggle, so as to be able, in 
a unity of action and in understanding, 
to carry out more fully our programs 
for justice, democratic advance and 
civilisation for the benefit of all 
society... We already recognise the 
great contribution of your revolution 
and the unceasing efforts you have made 
at all times to push back the frontiers 
of misery and war, for the benefit of 
justice and peace. r--7l- 
In particular, Sekou TourC- greatly admired the unique 
character of the Chinese revolution. It was 
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a revolution at once political, social, 
cultural and humane. r. 77 
. Sekou Tour6ls visit ended with the signing of a Sino- 
Guinean Treaty of FriendshipL-71 which was the first of its 
kind between China and an African country. China. 
expressed the view that the signing of the Treaty 
constituted a 
momentous event, not only in the 
history of Chinese-Guinean relations 
but also in the history of relations 
between China and Africa. c-7"O 
Under this Treaty, both countries agreed to develop their 
cultural relations and contacts (Article 3). r, " During 
Sekou Tour6's visit, China and Guinea also signed an 
Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation under 
which 
the government of the PRC is willing to 
grant the government of the Republic of 
Guinea within the period from September 
13,1960, to June 30,1963, a non- 
interest bearing loan without any 
conditions or privileges attached. The 
amount of the loan is 100,000,000 (One 
Hundred Million Roubles) (i. e. $26 
million] The above loan shall be 
repaid within a period of ten years 
from 1970 to 1979. r-11ý11 
It was also agreed that the salaries of the Chinese 
experts, technicians and skilled workers, as well as their 
standard of living 'shall not exceed that of personnel of 
the same rank' of Guiftea <Article 
By 1966, China's aid to Guinea amounted to $32.5 
million. -'*"ý21 Guinea was the third"-*"' largest recipient of 
-573- 
4-) 
bO 
0 
. r4 
4--l 
U) 
(V 
4J 
to 
43 
w 
44 
0 
0 
(3) 
w 
0 
ý4 
cm 
.4 
r-4 
1-4 
4-3 43 
0 A0 4J (3) 
aW0 
10 -ýq " bo 
Toil 
C) ". 4 (d CIA a) m t4 0) 0 () uv P-13 9) a) 
ý-4 0000w 0) 1. "04 
VM Irt4l 
Q), co Mm (1) W CQd w 
gpý4 
0=11410 ým =M=- .4w old $-4 0 tia L4 0) 0) r4 a a) 0 -4 w0&. 1 m0a a) 0m .0w :) a) 19 10 (1) ý4 q: J ýQ " (L) V) CQ V 10 Co t. V. %(D Mo a "n (1 . 94 O-V 0HX. 8 " 4) 0N 91 
12) 
aslu (DOG) Id W L) --4 
La '2 a) 44 :3 93 :3 :3L. Ul c 
:30VM qw4j$. 4wwA ý4 A (L) 4J -0 ý(V 0 V) ýd 0 93 fa 0) :3 :300 molla n0 
A(0V10A10>L0(a(0: 
3ýtOWWC) OL*-v40W-r44-J WOsr :31.. 111 cq :3 10 -4 bC WM t4: 3 -=W Ir IcO 
ý4 W 0) 10 tie. 00 bO2 W. 13 - bC6.4 Nd -d Mg bO-: 9 V bC: l M (1) >4 Xq. 
Q r-4 bO2 M 0m t4 (1) tý lyd "d 0) ý! l f- +-, Ef) Id PQ 0 t'04 93 P4 0 'd 0 10 ýq 0 P4 f-4 a0 -4 x ý14 x 1- vu, f ý21 (1) 91 . 0: 4 (1341 Ea :1 
(aca 
.0a 10 4 ý4 P-4 11 0 r- -H (1) -4 Q -P U) 14 4.3 -w-4 :3M : 3-4 v-34 W p3 4 t. 4 L4 CO 0 i=l tO 2 4-) ý4 0 to- C? 0 4J N r-4 4J U) 
C0 . 3113 
:3 NQ 0.0 :: j ) :30 (1) Wid W 
'1 
+3,0 (1) ý4.0 4J 00 :3 ý4 0) -. -4.0 a) 0 13 0-4 ý-f A"W 41 a) 4) L4 :3 
+W, 
0 -44 0-4 94 
Nýd aO. 
-P44,4-4 Cd Cd = :3 clv) &. 0 : ý, Cj to "-f 1+4 &4 'd -P, 4 &4 -n 93 0 p4wr N, 
3 
Fl 4 
A "64. 
A 1: 1 ý1 00 
114 .0 
11-4-4111-4 0 
-4 (1) r-4 931-4 (d I CI'S - -0 1 -a 93 .0 93 
0.0 P-4.0 :1 0 :j CL) :3 (15 al 0 0-4 0 :3w0 00 ý4 01 0z00 
4" op I" go * so 014 "1 w on 410 4p 
ei pl 
., 4 (0 
0 0) 
te 0 ý-4 gd ". 4 (0 0 ei 
4-4 0) ei 4-4 (0 W- :)4.40% A 934-4 --IM cm 92 PQ 1 ei te te 03 ý-4 --- te %. - 
e 
-1211 
ýc 
(M 0 _H -p tu 0 tnLeH 0 tu -p 0 . -1 -ri 03 93 03. a 0 (0 04jo tew . 044 :1 Id (d im 4.3 0 OJ2 -p- 0) (13 C) 0 03 -4 tu -ý4 -H tu 00 ý4 0 ý-4 ý. 4 u) -H -i L4 ý-4 0. W tio AU 12 -m gl H0 to ct KI ý-4 -H 43- ý-4 Itl iz 0 91 4 rg 000 -o-t w ,40 03 m te 1. 
9: 3 93-4 bo(M N tl r. ý4,0 N edý-4 M b02. H $4 S. 4 9.4,0 ei (V C) 1.4 (L, 
to 
Id 
--4 td -4 a ci 93 q ni mHr. d 41 0 -4 0 ýi :3 ba bcýO ý4 93 42 91 t. 1 93 A :1 :2 ba 41 >e CM . 92 -m &. $ -4 z3.4 0 :3 (M 0 41 ;1 (d (U :l 4-2 00 CU (M CM lt 111 0 00 OM el rj 
C> -14 le ': il le, to n (0 t- t- CD C> ý4 cy MM M V) Me «41 «eee er ee -e (n tr) to D00 Kot. t'. e. t- tý t- Co Co Co Co CO Co CO (D oý C> 0 CD C> c> 0 CO .4« V qD (0 VV (0 e> (0 (0 v (0 t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- e- e- e- t- tý eý > t>ý tý t- t- tý t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- t- b- t- t- t- t- t- t- 00 CO CO CO CO CO tý CO CO CO (K) CC (5 (5 a, (7) (31 (5 oý eceec0bmcbb (» (34 0) 0) b cý (D cy, c ob Ch mbcc 01 a, c ä> ce ce 01 ceb c> im Cb a, C, 0,0 C, C, am 0 4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 "l -4 -4 -4 "4 -4 V-4 -4 -4 9-4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 "4 --4 -4 -4 --4 -4 -f -f -4 -4 
-4 
>N 
a) 
di 
C 
A4 4-3 0 bo 0 
:3 LO 0 m. C3 00 -4 V) -1 co V-4 
10 tz .0m -0 10 a) 
a) ol 
f. 0 (q Q) a) 0 :3 (1) 
12. 
ba 0 1.0 0W "A410 ý4 14m :3-- a) (L) 0 4) 0 t*, 0 a) (13 0m0 &4 to a) (D " a) H" (FJ 
.4 
ý11 0 rA id E-4 r: Xww 0) a) 
:; Is r- -W 0M (00 
R4 14 O-H 0. :ýd ý-, Q ;.. wo Cý (o ý, Srj 4 10 0) 4-), Da) 0 (9 00 tl CL, :500P, (1; 4 (1 0 ý-, $-I Wo 
0 
-'EJ 40 hOýC'd bo:: ý = (1) >4 0.0 -4 bOW M M, ý4 MWW ý- :3- :3 ý4 -0 (13 0) g 
0a 0) ý"' (U 
j 
'TJ :9 91 Id ý24 0 pe, Wý, bCb4 w 004 -1 
.: c C) :30ý. j 11 --4 
Q0W bGCQ a) 0 -4 X: ýd XH 01 
. -4 1-4 
p 
0 o(a(a Aw'dw 6: 3 (1) X ý4 Cl Q Lo 0 4-1 :3 4-1 4-3 (d '14 r-4 ý4 ý PCI 4-V Od al -tj 4 4. ' (n 0-ý4 0 S, 0 &4 4-) (1) tj fa r(L) ý4 :3 ý4 CO U) 0) -4 4-3 ýj ý4 ý4 Id -' (1) () Raý-H 
--j 
0A (0-- W ... 4 a? 1j) 
V) d =3 00 0) 0) ý4 
A0 (4) 
PVI a> 
Q (0 'tj (O'D 00 slQ-ýa :3 (IS 
RIZ. 
0 0 (OD >, v 
I tq-ýq al A :3 a): ) f., a (1) alocei4owedo: 3000034000-4: 7 UQ 
-, 0 
0 ýo -, x t. 4 -ý4 rz. g5 C5 C4 04 X0WU 
I" **** 10 * 
(U 0 (e 90 
U 0) u (Li Q (m: ý 
03 lw X ei oj -4 
v bo to cl >ý. (n " 1 bom 
.w 10, 0 ox-p 
Üb 
lý 
62 :3 
Pl w0 Q) 
, -4 ri > 
,4ý.. >-) 00 -ý4 :iw 
ýw - t-) 
gZ 
04. > 
Z ý4 413 -4 M ýA 
0R 4-4 0 34 G) -4d 0 MIO (13 :, al -0 -0 ý4 :i Q). o t2 ni a) -A 
0 :1 qj a) a=(: Yl -4 (D w (0 cy. >-, F- -, c> ** im *, 
(D P-4 
`4 al 
-4 
u ý. 4 
-4 P4 
$4 10-4 a) fj) 44 ga a) 0 1.4 
sý M 
0" (a to a) 0 aj -, q 0 93-4 (D-, ý -4ý -cl (D -. 
4 
0 cr .4 CLI 
04 oo 
M 04 -r-4 r-I 
j 
Lo 00 ý4 
as .,, 
N00, 
-,.. 3: 4 s., 
Lo M 
(13 0+)o 0 0) 4-l-, A t13 ýX -4 
ýr 43 0 (1) -1 
0 0,4 0 (04 Ora til. 0 p. 0 
04-1 
I bO C! 0 ý4 -4 
=1 rd 0 (134-1 4 F34 -4 -4 4,11,10 S. WW +ý 'Od 
"4" rl 3: 4.3 WE! 0"W00 4-1 
M W, 'r4 
40 to 0N S-4 .1 a) 0 
'o 
0 F, L. I. - a ri 0) 4 a) -I o es cl as 
0 
(a ftj Cl &4 ýN 05 
0- M t4 
0 was (1) ro 0.0 -. 0 t4 .0 v-1 
C) (LI 12) ý4 11) P4 C) 0 +') :%0 
to C3 0) 
ý (11 ýo 
0 r: li -, baD bO, -l 0- 
ý-s ý's M C3 04 0 ýo 4" 
(o 5' '" "d f' ' ty,, o ; zi 0 to 
: 
W: 
l ý? 2 ý', 0N 
-0 0.0 4" -4 -4 :3 i co 0 (. ) Aw ýn 40A0 a)., 4 0., 4 C) -H -. 1 00 to WX 
a) 0 (V rv Q :3 -4 
, KO (0 t- t- t- t- t- tý CD CO COC0 Co c> CD C> 00 C> 00 03 CM C, 3 cq 
n Ce) n C, 3 c, ) ce) ce> -d' -zf W) W) ul LO LC) n. 
C 
- t- t- t- t- t- tý- tý t- t- 
) Co Co Co 
'2<... .. Z'' 131 e 
L- ý, t- t' t- t- t-- t- Co Co CD Co Co Co t- 00 Co Co Co Co Co CD Co Co 
Co OD CD 02 00 CO CD Co Co Co Co Co Co OD cc 
ý4 
4-J 
1 
Country of Origin Year 60 61 62 63 64 
- 
65 66 
Algeria 6 3 2 8 9 4 6 
Angola - 1 - 1 2 2 3 Botswana - 1 2 
Burundi - - 2 2 
Cameroun 6 3 1 2 2 1 
Congo-Brazzaville - 1 - - 3 11 16 
Congo Kinshasa 11 2 1 3 - 2 1 Central African Republic 1 - - 1 4 - Chad I 
Dahomey - 1 - 1 1 1 Egypt 1 1 2 2 5 10 2 
Ethiopia - 1 - 1 - - - Gabon 1 - 
Gambia - - 2 3 
Ghana 6 3 2 6' 4 8 2 
Guinea 7 5 4 6 5 8 7 
Guinea (Bissau) 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Ivory Coast 3 - - 1 - - 1 Kenya 3 1 5 11 7 5 - Lesotho 1 - - 3 1 2 2 
Libya - - - - - - - Malawi 1 - - 1 
Mali 5 4 2 7 10 8 10 
Mauritania 1 - - 2 
Mauritius 1 1 1 1 
Malagasy 1 2 1 - I 
Mozambique - - 5 1 2 1 
Morocco 6 2 4 3* 3 5 
Niger - - - - 1 - 1 Nigeria 4 4 2 4 1 1 
Rhodesia - 1 2 3 2 
Rwanda - - 1 1 1 
South Africa - 1 5 2 3 3 
Senegal - 7 1 1 2 - Sierra Leone 4 1 - 2 2 
Somali Republic 6 3 3 6 3 6 7 
Sudan 4 7 1 
.2 
4 4 7 
South West Africa 1 - - 3 1 2 1 
Swaziland - - 1 
Tanganyika 1 1 3 9 5 16 13 
Zanzibar 5 - 4 8 10 
Tunisia 2 1 1 1 1 
Uganda 2 1 1ý 3 3 2 3 
Togo 3 - 1 - - - 1 Zambia - - - 3 1 3 
Blk. African Youth 2 2 - 3 1 1 1 
Blk. African Trade Un. 
Annual total 
- 
98 
1 
58 
r 
37 
- 
111 
1 
103 114 
1 
114 
General Total 637 
Source: A. Ogunsanwo, Chinalc: Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 270 (Table 2). 
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TABLE 13.4 
CHINESE DELEGATIONS-VISITTNG AF-RI-QAj-. QQUNTRTFS (1960-66) 
CoUntry Visited Year 60 61 62 63--- 64 65 66 
Egypt 5 10 5 6 7 8 8 
Xorocco 3 3 3 6 2 3 
Tunisia 3 1 - - .1 - Sudan 1 1 3 2 2 2 
Ghana 1 5 8 5 7 8 
Guinea 7 4 9 3 6 8 6 
Algeria 1 - 5 15 17 11 2 
ýPongo-Kinshasa 1 1 1 - - - - Ethiopia 1 1 2 - 2 - 1 Xali 1 '3 8 7 9 8 7 
Somali Republic 1 1 1 - 2 3 3 
Dahomey - 1 1 - 3 - - Niger - 1 - - 1 
Nigeria - 1 - - 2 
Senegal - 2 - 1 
Sierra Leone - 1 - - 
Tanganyika - 1 1 2 14 6 7 
Zanzibar - - - 1 
Togo - 1 1 - - - - Upper Volta - 1 - - 
Burundi - - 1 1 
Gabon - - 1 - 
Ivory Coast - - 1 - 
Uganda - - 1 1 
Kenya - - - 2 4 
Cameroun - - - - 1 
Central African Republic - - - - 1 4 - Congo-Brazzaville - - - - 4 8 7 
Zambia - - - - 1 1 Xauritania - - - - 3 
Hauritius - - - - 
Equatorial Guinea - - - - 
Libya - - - - - -. - 
Annual total 25 39 52 50 87 69 47 
General Total 369 
Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Pnlicv in Africa 
_1,958-71 
(London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 269 (Table 1). 
t 
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0 
TREATIES OF FRIFNDaHIP BETWEEN PRC AND AFRTCAN COUNTRIES 
Name of Country Date of Signature* Date of 
Co=encement, 
Guinea 
Ghana 
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Mali 
Tanzania 
13 September 1960 
19 August 1960 
2 October 1964 
3 November 1964 
20 February 1965 
1 July 1961 
28 March 1962 
9 January 1965 
20 April 1965 
9 November 1965 
** All treaties were signed in Beijing. 
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Chinese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (9.8% of China's total 
aid to Sub-Saharan Africa) during this period (1959-66). 
A few months after Sekou Tourifi-Is visit to China (February 
Ig6l), China sent 4,500 tons of rice, 10 cinema 
projectors, X-Ray apparatus, and 100 cases of 
pharmaceuticals to Guinea. r-Glr- 
Guinea's uncompromising policy against colonialism, 
neo-colonialism and imperialism, in contrast to the Soviet 
Union's moderate line, made it, in Chinese eyes, one of 
the more militant pro-Chinese countries of Africa. r-Oc- At 
a meeting of the World Peace Council (Stockholm: December 
1961), Guinea, like China opposed the Soviet proposal that 
the conference should be given the name of a 'Congress For 
Peace, National Independence and Disarmament' . 13,937 
The militant political relationship between Guinea 
and China developed side by side with strong economic co- 
operation between the two countries. In May 1963, two 
protocols relating to the Agreement already signed between 
Guinea and China were signed. It included a package of 
military aid for the liberation fighters of Guinea-Bissau 
and Cape Verde. "' A few months later, two large 
shipments of heavy Chinese goods arrived in Guinea and 100 
Guinean teachers went to China. s*11'-11 
In May 1964, the Chinese Minister of 
Education, visited Guinea. He concluded his visit by 
signing a new cultural agreement between the two 
countries. More aid was promised in the -field of 
education, and more grants of studentships to enable 
Guinean students to study in China. "-'ý111-1 
573 
Soon after the conclusion of the first Sino-Guinean 
economic agreement, Chinese agricultural e,.,. perts arrived 
in Guinea to help the country in the cultivation of rice 
and other crops. Chinese technical experts were also sent 
to work on other industrial- projects financed by China. r-1111 
By September 1964, the Chinese completed the construction 
of a cigarette and match factory in Conakry. --"ý This made 
Guinea self-sufficient in cigarettes and matches. 
In February 1965, China agreed to build a conference 
centre in Conakry. In January 1967, a Hydro-Electric 
station for supplying power to the region of the Djallan 
Highlands (Central Guinea) was completed. China's 
economic aid proved very useful to Guinea in its attempts 
to promote self-reliance and to combat the economic 
blockade mounted by hostile Western powers against it. 
Sekou Tour6 publicly acknowleged Guinea's debt to China on 
the occasion of Zhou Enlails visit... to Guinea (January 
1964). Sekou Tour6 expressed his thanks to the Chinese 
for their 'disinterested help' to Guinea's 'fight of 
consolidation' and 'rapid development'. F--ý116- 
If it is true that revolution can be 
neither imported nor exported, it. is 
just as true that revolutions, barn in 
similar historic conditions, based on 
the same principles, directed towards 
similar goals, necessarily partake of 
the same nature, are under the same 
banner and in one and the same 
historical current determining the 
nature and universal evolution. It is 
through Joining their awakened material 
and human faces that the Solidarity, 
uniting the PRC, and the Republic of 
Guinea is established, independently of 
the feelings of deep and true 
friendship, which bring together the 
peoples of China and of Guinea within 
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the framework of Afro-Asian 
relations. 
Chinese goodwill, aid and hard work was grudgingly 
recognised at the time even by Western analysts 
Few of the personnel of the communist 
bloc embassies or missions, except the 
Chinese, have attempted to employ local 
labour or have made much effort to 
learn local languages. 
The Chinese have an entirely 
different approach. They stress manual 
labour and do not hesitate to perform 
the humblest tasks, as in road- 
building, along with Guineans, in 
native villages, without PX or 
commissary privileges, earning no more, 
eating no better than Guineans they 
work with. They create an impression 
of frugality and austerity. As a 
result they are far more popular than 
western missions and their air- 
conditioned offices, big cars and the 
rest. SSD7 
Guinea was the first country in Africa in which the 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai found President Sekou 
Tour6 to be in agreement with him'-'--ý1- on the major issues 
affecting international relations. He found the 
ideological atmosphere in Conakry so agreeable that he 
felt free to spell out China's revolutionary assessment of 
the world in a manner similar to that which was to be 
adopted by the more flamboyant"' Lin Biao a year later 
(1065) 
the world situation today is favourable 
to the struggle of the peoples to win 
and preserve independence and freedom 
and unfavourdble to imperialism and new 
and old colonialism. The national 
liberation movements in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America have formed an 
irresistible torrent bounding the 
embankment of imperialism and 
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colonialism. The powerful national 
democratic revolutionary movements in 
these areas are effectively hitting at 
and weakeninS the imperialist forces of 
war and have contributed immensely to 
the cause of the people throughout the 
world in opposing imperialism and 
defending world peace. "' 
Indeed, Sino-Guinean relations during this period 
reached such a level of intimacy that China characterised 
Guinea as one of the leading progressive countries in 
Africa as well as in other parts of the world to join 
forces with it in order to strengthen Afro-Asian 
solidarity. 
13.3.1.4. Mal i 
From 1960 (the year of its independence) until the 
overthrow of President Modibo Keita in 1968, Mali was 
perhaps the only African country which openly took China's 
side as opposed to the Soviet Union's on most 
international issues - and especially those concerning the 
best means of struggle against colonialism, imperialism 
and neo-colonialism. During Zhou Enlails tour of Africa 
(December 1963-February 1964) Mali was perhaps the only 
African country to issue a joint communlqu6 fully 
endorsing China's international line. - 
During the brief interval (1958-60) of participation 
in de Gaulle's project of autonomy based on the system of 
Communaut6 Fran! pals Mali did not have any 
diplomatic or political contact with China. 
In June 1960, the French Sudan and Senegal formed the 
Mali Federation with Leopold Sedar Senghor as President, 
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and Modibo Keita as Prime Minister. The Federation, 
\C[60 
however, did not last long (20 June-20 Augusjý),,. Right 
from the beginning, Keita was actively eng&ged in 
preparing the ground for a break with the Communaut6 
Fr-aný7aise, because of ideological differencesl--113ý11 between 
his actively militant party of the Union Soudanalse 
(US)I--Icý-L and Sedar Sen7hor's moderate Union Pr-pgresscýlve 
S6n6galalse (UPS) - Internally, UPS advocated capitalist 
development policies. Externally, it sought closer co- 
operation with the colonialist and imperialist powers, and 
especially France. 1c" Unlike US, which saw Conzmunaut6 
Frangalse, (and the continued presence of French troops 
and bases) as 'disaster for Africa', "'"'-- UPS viewed them as 
a necessary step, and that 
(France] has realised in part the dream 
of the old African Emperors. It has 
done more; it has organised their dream 
of creating a federation out C) f 
individual countries and building a 
co mmo n spirit through the French 
language. ', -" 
US sought immediate independence from France, 4-`-1 
advocated socialist policiesn""-cll- for economic development 
for the Federation and urged continuous struggles against 
colonialism and neo-colonialisin in Africa, as well as in 
other parts of the world. As a result of these 
differences, US left the Federation and formed its own 
government in Mali-(20 August 1960). This was followed by 
the establishment of the Republic of Mali, with Keita, as 
President. The socialist orientation of the country was 
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written into its new constitution (approved by the 
Yational Assembly) which in part read as follows: 
The Republic of Mali is an indivisible, 
democratic and social State. it 
guarantees before the law the equality 
of all, irrespective of social origin, 
race, sex or religion. "-Icl 
The new government strongly condemned the neo- 
colonialist designs of the Colonial Powers. France's 
military bases were closed down and its troops were 
ordered to leave the country, whilst French policies and 
action against liberation fighters in Algeria were 
condemned. At the same time, UN came in for strong 
criticism for its passive role in the process of de- 
colonialisation. The United States' intervention in 
Vietnam was condemned. British policy in Rhodesia was 
vehemently attacked; the new government broke off 
diplomatic relations with Britain. Zionism and the 
aggressive role played by Israel in the Middle East with 
the support of the West were also condemned. --" 
Less than 5 weeks (25 October 1960)) after becoming 
President (20 September), Keita invited Ko Hua, China's 
Ambassador to Guinea, to Bamako (capital of Mali) where he 
discussed with him Mali's willingness to establish 
diplomatic relations with China. Two days later, (27 
October), the two countries established diplomatic 
relations at Ambassadorial level.. 
My government supports the efforts of 
the Government of the People's Republic 
of China to have her place restored in 
... the international community. This 
is a position of objectivity and 
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reason. It is in fact illogical and 
unthinkable merely to pledge the 
attainment of peace and security 
'without - admitting to international 
gatherings, ' which discuss the 
conditions for the maintainence of 
peace, representatives of a great and 
powerful nation such as People's China 
with a population of 650 million... Xy 
Government takes the firm position of 
opposing any division of territory for 
the sake of creating an artificial 
State which constitutes a permanent 
menace to peace and security. '--'ý 
Commenting on Mali's recognition of PRC*ý, 'Ia and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, "' People's DaI17 (18 October 1960) wrote as 
follows: 
The mutual recognition of China and the 
Republic of Mali not only marks a new 
development of friendship between the 
the Chinese and Mali peoples and opens 
up broad perspectives for relations of 
friendly co-operation between the 
Governments of the two countries; it 
also shows that the friendly relations 
between China and the newly independent 
African countries are growing 
rapidly. IF, I E-- 
On the occasion of a visit to Mali by a Chinese Trade 
Mission (February 1961), a Trade and Payment Agreement was 
concluded between the two countries, under which China 
agreed to export machinery, farm machines and tools, 
scientific instruments and electrical appliances, 
chemicals, drugs and medical apparatus, metalware and 
steel products'--'" etc., to Mali. In view of the fact that 
Mali had very little to export to China, and that its 
capacity to repay loans with foreign exchange was very 
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limited to say the least, this agreement was really an aid 
agreement in substance. --l-7 
Maderia Keita, Mali's Minister for the Interior and 
Information, visited China (September 1960) where he 
signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation 
between the two countries. r-1*3 Included in this agreement 
was an interest-free Chinese loan of $19.8 million. 
The agreement was followed by the arrival of experts from 
China (January 1962) to work on labour-intensive 
irrigation projects and the planting of rice, tea and 
sugar cane. `-ý-` China's aid was described by I'Essar, the 
official party organ of US, as a major contribution to 
Mali's efforts in the spheres of economic development and 
independence which 'is another form of the struggle 
against imperialism'. "' China's model of economic 
development was described by Foreign Minister of Mali 
(November 1964) as 
[a] most remarkable test of the 
capacity for development of 
underdeveloped countries., ----2ýý-' 
During Zhou Enlai's visit to Mali (16-21 Jnuary 1964), 
President Keita paid a warm tribute to China's aid 
pointing out the 
low cost of its technical assistance, 
for the readiness of its technicians to 
adapt themselves to the lives of our 
people, for the speed and competence 
with which the projects... are carried 
dut one by one, and all these are done 
without the slightest intention of 
interfering in our internal affairs. --`ýýa 
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Militant relations between the two countries drew closer 
especially after Mali refused to sign the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty <NTBT) (April 196-3), and urged small nations of the 
Third World to stand up against the collusion between the 
two Super Powers. 
In the face of the stubborn refusal of 
imperialism to disarm and its 
determination in defiance of the 
unanimous opinion of the peoples, to 
pursue the foolish policy of all-out 
disarmament... the strengthening of the 
self-defence capability of the Asian, 
African and Latin American countries 
becomes an urgent necessity. --ý,, 3- 
Relations between Mali and China were further consolidated 
when President Keita visited China (October ll-"-)64) where 
he, like Zhou Enlai earlier during the year (February), 
stressed that 
the situation is most favourable for 
revolution throuShout the continent of 
Africa. r-ý"-, 
At the same time, Mali reaffirmed its 
support for the r 
legitimate rights 
Republic of China in 
and for the just 
Chinese Government 
liberate their 
Taiwan. 
estoration of the 
of the People's 
the United Nations 
struggles of the 
and people to 
Own territory, 
China's success in exploding its first atom bomb (16 
October 1964) was viewed by Keita as a 'tremendous 
scientific political and moral success' c-- -In a New 
Year's message (1965) Keita stated that 
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the atom bomb of socialist China... was 
also the bomb of the peoples of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America and other 
parts of the world. --ý'-'ý' 
Mamadou Gologo, Mali's Minister of Information and 
Tourism, a strong admirer of the Chinese Revolution, 
called China's technological achievement a contribution to 
'world progress'. " 
The success of the Chinese people are 
the fruits of its real ism, its 
ingenuity, its will, its patience, its 
moral and physical courage. --ýý310 
Mali and China signed a Treaty cf Friendshipt-: ý', " (3 
November) at the conclusion of Keita's visit to China and 
an economic agreement in which China agreed to supply 
industrial equipment to Mali. f" This was in addition to 
a donation of $7.9 million'-ý3: 3 given by China to Mali (3 
November) during Keita's visit. In December, as part of 
the economic agreement, China sent workers to begift the 
construction of factories to make cigarettes and watches, 
and of refineries for sugar, vegetable oils and a cotton 
mill - "' 
Chinese experts received wages at an estimated 
s8o a month, roughly one-third the salaries of experts 
belonging to other socialist countries. "' By 1965, work 
on the construction of a sugar refinery and a cigarette 
and match factory had been thus completed, while at 
least 13 other projects were nearing completion - 
including rice plantations and several light industrial 
projects such as a ceramic factory, a textile mill and a 
brick factory. 11-7 
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13.3.1.5. Ghana 
Although Ghana became independent in March 1957, and 
like China had taken part in the historic Afro-Asian 
conference (Bandung: April 1955), it established 
diplomatic relations with China only in July 1960, -Three 
major factors would seem to account for the delay in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. 
China might have thought that in view of his 
strong attachment'--: 3113 to the Commonwealth, 
Nkrumah was unlikely to be an active opponent 
of colonialism and imperialism. It therefore 
adopted a 'wait and see' attitude towards 
Ghana. Unlike Xorocco (with which China was 
not stopped from establishing diplomatic 
relations despite its monarchical system for 
reasons already given), Ghana was not at this 
point central to the revolutionary and 
liberation struggles that were actually taking 
place in Africa. 
Until 1960, Nkrumah was no t favourably 
disposed towards communism or to the communist 
powers of the world ideologically and 
politically. 
... colonialism and imperialism 
[may) 
come in a different guise - not 
necessarily from Europe. --3: 3' 
Nkrumah's Pan Africanism, was strongly 
nationalist and: 
-African oriented in character. 
As such, it contributed little to the primacy 
attached by China to the idea of a united and 
solid Afro-Asian world against colonialism, 
neo-colonialism. and imperialism. 
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Until it became clear that his policy of support for 
UN intervention in the Congo(L) was a failure, Nkrunah was 
convinced that his fundamental aim of building a United 
States of Africa could be achieved in collaboration with 
the Western powers. It was only after Lumumba was 
murdered (February 1961) that Nkrumah realised that being 
weaded to peaceful political methods of achieving an 
independent and liberated Africa could only lead to an 
entrenching of the forces of neo-colonialism in the 
continent and an undermining of the forces of Pan 
Africanism and African unity. Influenced by events in the 
Congo(L), Nkrumah and his radical advisers reached the 
conclusion that the task of 'founding a Pan-African State' 
could not be accomplished through a search for the 
political kingdom alone. 
Neo-colonialism had become too potent 
in Africa... now he became convinced 
that without an economic revolution 
political independence would be 
impossible, and that economic 
independence could only come through 
Socialism! This was in agreement with 
China's viewpoint. 11"0 
Ghana's eventual disenchant meant with the West and 
realisation that the Communist world had unquestionably 
contributed to the achievement of African liberation were 
the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Ghana's 
policies, during the '60s, developed accordingly, 
coinciding with China's decision to continue its policy of 
uncompromising opposition to the imperialist powers in 
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preference to the Soviet Union's new approach of 'peaceful 
coexistence' with them. 
In this new political ambience, China and Ghana began 
their diplomatic relations <5 July 1960) which rapidly 
developed into a close relationship between like-mýnded 
states (1959-66). Huang Hua, a senior administrator in 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry who later (1978) became 
Foreign Minister, was nominated as China's first 
Ambassador to Ghana. In August 1961, Nkkrumah became the 
second (after Sekou Tour6 of Guinea) African Head of State 
to visit China. More than 100,000 Chinese peopleF111 
greeted Nkrumah on his arrival in Beijing (14 August). 
During this visit, Ghana reaffirmed its strong support for 
China's admission to UN. Its absence from the 
international organisation, Nkrumah argued 
raises the fundamental question of the 
structure of the General Assembly 
i tse 1f. 
On the occasion of Nkrumah's visit to China, the two 
countries signed Trade and Payment agreements as'well as 
an agreement on economic and technical co-operation 
(including provisions for an an interest-free loan of 
$0,6 million"ý3 and for experts__from. 'China to help 
diversify Ghana's agriculture which was then almost 
entirely dependent on cocoa). "' The financial loan was 
to be invested in an integral textile and knitwear factory 
and an enamel-ware factory, and in State farms. --A'-- China 
also pledged to train Ghanaians in China to take over the 
running of such projects. China agreed that its experts 
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in Ghana would only be paid maintainance allowances by the 
government of Ghana without any special privileges. 
These generous Chinese terms must have influenced 
the Soviet Union's easing of the restrictions on its aid 
in order to win Ghana's appreciation. The salary of 
Soviet personnel for which Ghana was liable was thus 
reduced by half, the Soviet government undertaking to pay 
the other half. "' 
In June 1964, China offered Ghana another interest- 
free loan ($22.4 million)11-7 aimed at enabling the 
achievement of some of the targets of its seven year 
plan. "' 
The cordial and militant relations between Ghana and 
China helped the f low of trade between the two 
countries. China's imports from Ghana steadily 
expanded during the period 1960 ($11.4 million) - 1965 
CS6.2 million); during the period 1ID57-65), its exports 
increased from $0.8 million to $13.5 million. ---F--1c11 
Sino-Ghanaian relations were consolidated further 
with Ghana's condemnation"' of the transfer of arms from 
Britain to India following the Sino-Indian border clash 
(October 1962). Nkrumah made his country's opposition to 
British military support for India clear when he said that 
he was 'distressed and saddened' by such a deal. At the 
same time, Nkrumah appealed to Britain to refrain from 
any action that may aggravate the 
unfortunate situation. 1--`2 
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It is worth noting that Ghana's position in this respect 
was influenced by its opposition to British intervention 
in the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country 
rather than by a predisposition in favour of China in the 
dispute itself. But Ghana*s specific objection had the 
effect of appearing to favour China at India's expense. 
Nkrumah's developing conviction that armed struggle 
and people's war were the only practical means for the 
achievement of a united and liberated Africa must have led 
him to refer to the Chinese leaders as his 'natural 
allies'. "' Whatever the precise nature of the 
ideological differences between Nkrumah and the Chinese 
leaders, Nkrunah recognised the fact that they 
were right in their view of the 
liberation movement. 0--r-it 
Nkrumah realised that China and not the Soviet Union 
was prepared to offer the services of practical experts in 
guerrilla warfare and people's wars. Soviet instructors 
were expelled (June 1962) from Ghana's training camp, 
Mankrong (which wa's opened in November 1961). Nkrumah had 
no reason to trust the Soviet Union's commitment to the 
idea that armed struggle was necessary because of its 
preoccupation with D6tente and advocacy of peaceful 
coexistence 
... the Russian instructors themselves 
proved to be a problem. They were 
given a car, a cook, a houseboy, and an 
unlimited supply of food and alcoholic 
drinks-"' 
The head of the camp in Mankong accused two Soviet 
instructors of 
wasting f ood and drink, of being 
arrogant and of bad behaviour. r-11- 
He 
was glad to see them leave in June., --Ir-7 
The first group of Chinese guerrilla experts led by 
Colonel Yen Lenga arrived in Ghana in October 1964. They 
set to work on giving training to liberation fighters in 
the major base at Halfalf-Assimi (a small village close to 
the border between Ghana and Ivory Coast>. '--r-, E" A few 
months later the base was removed to Obenemasce for 
security reasons. -I--- By January 1965 nearly 20 Chinese 
instructors and guerrilla experts were actively engaged in 
training liberation fighters. Takoradi, Ghana's port, 
was opened for the transport of arms sent by China to the 
liberation movements of the Congo(L), Portuguese colonies 
and Southern Africa. r-#--l 
Despite his claim to being neutral in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, '-'-ý Nkrumah seemed to be more favourably inclined 
to China's view of the world than to the Soviet Union'. 
As early as 1949, Nkrumah told members of the nationalist 
movement in Ghana to follow the advice of the Chinese 
leaders. 
Go to the people 
Live among them 
Learn from them 
Love then 
Serve them 
Plan with them 
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Start with what they know 
Build on what they have 
This would have been my advice to 
members of any nationalist and 
progressive party. r-l-*3 
Later, during the 160s, Nkrumah expressed the following 
view: 
Only China, with its huge population 
and massive land extent, combined with 
its noncompetitive, centrally planned 
system of production and distribution, 
has a rate of productivity that is 
making her a potential challenge to the 
only two powers whose weight counts in 
our present world. That is the reason 
why the United States refuses to admit 
China into the United Nations and why 
the Soviet Union is respectful of her 
attitude. "' 
On another occasion, Nkrumah stated that 
Ghana could learn much from the Chinese 
to help Ghanaians in their plans for 
the development of the country., r-1--'-- 
China's refusal to follow the Soviet Union's approach 
to international relations was welcomed by Ghana. During 
a visit to China (October 1963) by a Ghanaian Trade 
delegation, both China and Ghana Jointly reaffirmed their 
ideological alignment on major international questions. 
Both sides unanimously recognised 
imperialism as the source of war and 
the enemy of national liberation and 
world peace, and held that independence 
and peace can be won only when resolute 
struggle is waged against imperialism 
and colonialism. Both sides expressed 
unanimous support for all oppressed 
nations and peoples in their struggle 
against imperialism and colonialism and 
for national liberation. "-'--, -- 
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Like most radical and revolutionary leaders in Africa, 
Nkrumah felt that the Sino-Soviet dispute would have the 
effect of undermining the solidarity of liberation forces 
and the international support they were capable of 
attracting. Thus Nkrumah argued that the African 
orientation towards the Sino-Soviet Union dispute 
should be to seek the unity of the 
socialist countries, for it is only 
through this unity that they can 
support us in our struggle against 
imperialism and colonialism., --Ir--7 
Zhou Enlai received a warm welcome when he visited 
Ghana (11-16 January 1964). On this occasion, Nkrumah 
reaffirmed Ghana's support for China's stance on majorl--'--ý, 
international issues, **--'--51 its opposition to the support 
given by imperialist powers to India"' against China, and 
its condemnation of the British policy of thwarting the 
revolutionary forces in East Africa., ----, ' At the farewell 
banquet given in honour of Zhou Enlai, Nkrumah again 
expressed his admiration for China's economic, political 
and ideological methods. At the same time, he urged the 
use of China's experience not only for African liberation 
but also for African economic development. 
We have learned with interest the 
methods by which the people of China 
have mobilized their resources for the 
reconstruction of their country and the 
improvement of their living 
conditions... the example of China's 
determination, organisation, discipline 
and unity cannot be lost on Africa at 
this time. 
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13.3.1.6. Tanzania 
I-gather-that even the suits I wear 
have been adduced as evidence of 
pernicious Chinese influence ... some- 
times I wonder whether the Western 
countries are not rapidly developing an 
inferiority complex towards the eastern 
countries, and China in particular. --7: ý 
The national independence movement in Tanganyika 
effectively began only after the foundation (July 1954) of 
the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) with Julius 
K. Nyerere as its Chairman. TANU's objectives were listed 
as follows: 
to fight against tribalism, 
construction of a nation, 
attainment of a democratic government, 
promotion of African economic and 
cultural development, 
rejection of all forms of racism and 
discrimination, and 
stablishment of close ties between the 
Party and trade unions and co-operative 
organisations. 1-71 
TANU advocated peaceful negotiations rather than 
physical confrontation with the colonial powers as the 
appropriate method to be adopted in order to achieve and 
bring racism to an end. In the election of 1960 of the 
'Legislative Assembly', TANU won 70 out of a total of 71 
contested seats. Only one seat was won by United 
Tanganyika Party, (UPT>"-71 a pro-British party opposed to 
TANU. In December 1961, Tanganyika won its independence 
with Nyerere Prime Minister. A year later, he became the 
President of the Republic of Tanganyika. r--7- 
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On the day of independence (9 December 1961), 
Tanganyika recognised China. After a meeting between 
Huang Hua (China's Ambassador to Ghana) who attended the 
country's independence ceremony, and Nyerere, both China 
and Tanganyika agreed to establish diplomatic relations at 
the Ambassadorial level., ---7' 
Tanganyika's recognition of China was by no means 
based on the former's radical and progressive character, 
but rather on Nyerere's 'belief in the illogicality of not 
recognising a big countryI. LG--7, Ix However, the radical 
forces in the Tanganyikan government played an important 
part in Nyerere's recognition of China. Similarly, it was 
the radicals in the government and trade unionsc-721 of 
Tanganyika who persuaded Nyerere to invite Zhou Enlai to 
visit--113"O the country during the latter's African tour 
(December 1963-February 1964). Otherwise, until 1964, 
Nyerere had been regarded by the Western press as 
, moderate' and 'realistic' . 'r-1111" By virtue of both his 
education and his strong adherence to the Catholic 
religion, he was naturally pro-Western in his 
inclinations. 
Less than three years after Tanganyika's independence 
(9 December 1961) and only four months after the 
independence (10 December 1963) of Zanzibar which was 
swiftly followed by a revolution (12 January 1964), a 
merger took place between the -two (26 April 1964) first 
into the Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and 
subsequently (from October 1964) into the United Republic 
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of Tanzania. Nyerere became the new republic's first 
President, with Karume as First Vice-President. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a 
detailed discussion of the motives and forces underlying 
the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The factors 
(there is no one single reason) given below were at work 
in the emergence of political forces leading to the 
unification. 
Despite the progressive character of the AAPS- 
UMMAI--131-; ý coalition in Zanzibar and the 
moderate character of TANU in Tanganyika, both 
parties appeared to share the same objective 
of uniting the two territories with a view to 
consolidating their sovereignty and 
independence in the face of threats and 
disturbances from external sources. 
Nyerere perhaps hoped that the incorporation 
of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into a single 
nation would serve the purpose of preventing 
Zanzibar moving further in the direction of 
becoming a Marxist-Leninist state, '--1ý1*11 whilst 
at the same time a long standing ambition of 
Tanganyika could also be achieved through such 
a union. As far as the radical leaders of the 
AAPS-UMMA coalition were concerned, unity 
represented a major thrust in favour of 
consolidation of their revolution in East 
Africa. Babu, Zanzibar's Foreign Minister at 
the time, saw the union between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar as a necessary step in the 
revolutionary process as it unfolded itself in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. r-0111- 
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iii. Both countries faced serious economic 
problems. "Ilr- 
thought that 
The leaders of both sides 
the-pooling of their financial 
resources Zanzibar's economic advantage 
derived from its position as the world's major 
producer of cloves, accounting for for 80 per 
cent of the total world product ionlr, *31r, and 
Tanganyika's position as a producer of 
cereals, coffee, tea and cotton, and as a 
major producer of sisal - would ease their 
economic difficulties. 
iv. Both Tanganyika and Zanzibar shared the aim of 
toning down the adverse publicity given by the 
Western powers and the pro-Western r6gimes in 
Africa, labelling Zanzibar as 'Africa's first 
Cuball-'ý'7 or as the 'Red China Asentl. lr-O" This 
was particularly important because Tanganyika 
had already experienced an army mutiny against 
British officers in January 1964. As a result 
of pressure from Britain, Tanganyika 
cultivated friendly relations with Kenya and 
Uganda, its neighbours with a moderate and 
even pro-Western political orientation. It is 
likely that Nyerere believed that exercising a 
restraining influence on Zanzibar through 
union would be to the advantage of East Africa 
as a whole. Nyerere perhaps feared the 
involvement of imperialists and Big Powers in 
Zanzibar as in the case of the Congo. Unity 
between 'Tanganyika and Zanzibar would reduce 
the likelihood of such an undesirable 
eventuality. 
The Soviet Union, 
_, which 
had just begun to exert a 
great influence in the island of Zanzibar, viewed the 
foundation of Tanzania with a sense of apprehension. Its 
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disappointment was motivated by the fear that Zanzibar's 
merger with Tanganyika would undermine Soviet influence in 
the island as relations between the Soviet Union and the 
mainland <Tanganyika) had never been friendly. The Soviet 
Union also feared that Zanzibar might be spurred into de- 
recognisinS East Germany*'-19'3 under the influence of the 
leadership of the mainland. It is not surprising that, as 
Ogunsanwu noted after a series of interviews with the 
leaders, the Soviet Union attempted to blockade the 
reSion. "' 
Unlike the Soviet Union, 4--'" China recoSnised the 
union immediately after it came into existence. It viewed 
the union as an important step in strengthening the anti- 
imperialist front. Perhaps, China also hoped that the 
revolutionaries in Zanzibar would be able to push Nyerere 
further towards a positive and effective opposition to 
colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. At the same 
time, China hoped to exert more influence in the new 
united country at the expense of the Soviet Union. Thus, 
right from the announcement of the union (26 April 1964), 
China began to deal with the two parts - Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar - as a single undifferentiated sovereign 
political unit. As far as China was concerned, the coming 
into existence of 'the new United Republic of Tanzania' 
constituted a blow to US imperial ism-1- which had worked 
hard to breach the union. 
In June 1964, RA-s-hidi Kawawa, the Second Vice- 
President of the United Republic, led a Joint government 
delegation to China. On the occasion of his visit, China 
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offered two interest-free loans - one, of $14 million to 
aid Zanzibar (with 300,000 population); and, the other of 
-S'228 million'-'511: 21 for Tanganyika (with a population of 10 
million). This offer made Tanzania the largest recipient 
of China's aid in Africa in 1964 (40 per cent of the total 
aid given to the continent). At the opening of an 
exhibition of Chinese goods and products (Dar Es Salaam: 
July 1964), Rashidi Kawawa wrote as follows in the 
Visitors' Book: 
Tremendous strides have been made in 
China in the war against poverty, 
ignorance and disease, and it is 
probably safe to say that more has been 
achieved for ordinary people there in 
the last 15 years than in all the 
previous thousands of years of China's 
proud history. Ir-3"- 
In the military sphere, China showed its readiness to 
back Nyerere with military aid, and, if he also wished, 1--ý11-- 
training too, to replace the arms that were destroyed 
during the army mutiny against British officers. Tanzania 
welcomed the offer. China's military aid to Zanzibar 
before the union*---9-7 helped remove any possible suspicions 
on Nyerere's part which might have been provoked by 
Western propaganda against the presence of Chinese arms 
and military experts in Africa. In August 1964, Tanzania 
became the firstl---ý"Q African country (at State-to-State 
level)r-"-" to have official Chinese military aid and 
personnel training. 7C>0 
Not surprisingly, Tanzania's decision to accept 
China's military aid evoked a strong propaganda campaign 
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by Western powers warninS Nyerere of the undesirable 
consequences'a" of China's military presence in Tanzania 
for his government. This Western campaign was, however, 
much influenced by the fear that Tanzania would become a 
major base for southern African and Congolese liberation 
forces, among others. Dar es Salaam had in fact already 
become the major base for OAU's Liberation Committee. 
China's military aid to Tanzania not only stimulated 
Nyerere's government into adopting a more positive anti- 
imperialist stance, but also facilitated direct access to 
China's military aid to liberation forces. In the event, 
Nyerere's government largely ignored the anti-China 
campaign of the Western powers. 7,0: 2 In contrast to the 
Western powers, Tanzania viewed China's military presence 
as a major thrust in favour of African liberation. As for 
the fear of the risks to his government of accepting 
China's military aid, Nyerere, at a press conference (31 
August 1964) explained that 
the maximum risk the government, takes 
is that the army revolt. But my army 
revolted in January - it was not 
trained by the Chinese&--7c'ý3 [emphasis 
added) 
In the economic field, Sino-Tanzanian co-operation 
developed rapidly. Within six months of offering aid to 
Tanzania China promised in December 1964 to build two 
high-powered transmitters. -710,11 In January 1965, China 
agreed to help Tanzania establish a 5,000 acre State Farm 
at Ravu, capable of employing 700 people. 
Ckihd also 
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com,; k-, Yuc, ý-, Lo-% -Of - f, .:. ' an integrated 
textile mill. --"Or- When Babu, Tanzania's Minister for 
Commerce and Co-operation, led a Trade Delegation to China 
(February 1965), China agreed to buy from Tanzania 80,000 
bags of cotton (about a quarter of its total cotton 
production), sisal, tobacco, cloth and copra. In 
exchange, Tanzania undertook to buy Chinese textiles, 
building materials, hardware, bicycles, sewing machines 
and stationery. -7101'r- 
Faced on one side with Western pressure, and on the 
other with radical and pro-Chinese forces in ASP, TANU and 
in his government, Nyerere became much more progressive 
especially in the sphere of international relations. 
Nyerere became convinced that despite the ideological 
differences between the leaders of the two countries, 
China was a major world force capable of contributing to 
the achievement of the African aim of liberating the 
continent. Relations between Tanzania and China were 
cemented further when Nyerere paid his first visit to 
China"' (16-23_February 1965). During his visit as a 
head of State, Nyerere expressed his country's great 
appreciation of China's aid and experience when he stated 
that 
we are the more appreciative because we 
realise that the capital is not surplus 
to your own requirements, nor are your 
technicians otherwise unemployed. 
Certainly we on our side are anxious to 
learn what we can about China's 
development, in the hope that we shall, 
by its adaptation to our circumstances, 
be able to benefit from your 
experience. *71' 
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By the time Nyerere visited China (February 1965), 
relations between- the United States and Tanzania had 
reached their nadir as a consequence of direct American 
intervention in-the Congo (during late 1964), coupled with 
the anti-liberation activities of the United States in the 
rest of the continent. Tanzania recalled its Ambassador 
in the United States. -7'091 At a State banquet given in 
honour of Nyerere, Liu Shaoqi hailed Tanzania for its 
efforts to strengthen the unity of the 
African people and the solidarity of 
Asian and African people against 
imperialism land its) energetic support 
for the national liberation struggles 
of the peoples of the Congo(L), and of 
East, Central and Southern Africa. -71c' 
During Nyerere's visit, a Friendship Treaty between 
China and Tanzania was signed-71 " (20 February 1965). At 
the end of Nyerere's visit, China and Tanzania issued a 
Joint co=unIqu6 which reflected a substantial agreement 
between the two countries along the line advocated by 
China of an anti-imperialist revolution through armed 
struggle. The communlqu6 stressed that 
imperialism and colonialism would never 
be reconciled to their defeat and step 
down from the stage of history of their 
own accord... the facts have constantly 
taught the people that in order to win 
and safeguard national independence, 
the struggle against imperialism, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. must be 
carried through to the end... Cboth 
parties) pledged their support to the 
people of the Congo(L) in their just 
and patriotic anti-imperialist 
struggle, and strongly condemned out- 
side intervention in the Congo(L). --"zt 
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In relation to the convening of the second conference 
of Afro-Asian countries, both China and Tanzania: 
expressed C their] deep conviction that 
the forthcoming conference will 
contribute to the strengthening of the 
Asian and African countries' cause of 
unity against imperialism, to the 
promotion of economic co-operation 
between these countries and to the 
defence of world peace. 71ý 
At the same time the United States was strongly condemned 
for its imperialist plot by creating two Chinas while the 
UN was urged to restore the legitimate right of China's 
seat in the organisation. -71,4 
China promised7"r- in principle to finonm - and build 
the Tanzanian Railway-71"- -a project which contributed to 
a special-7'1'7 relationship between China and Tanzania and 
was to create a vital link for southern African liberation 
movements. Zhou Enlai's visit (re-scheduled in the place 
of the one he was unable to make in the previous year)-71" 
to Tanzania less than four months after Nyerere's visit to 
China had the effect of further consolidating the already 
rapidly developing relations between the two countries. -71131 
During Zhou Enlai's visit, Tanzania once again 
reaffirned-7ý111 its support for the idea of a second 
conference of Afro-Asian countries which had by then been 
scheduled to take place on 28 June 19r55. Indeed, when 
Zhou Enlai visited Dar es Salaam, Sino-Tanzanian relations 
had reached their peak. Tanzania had assumed an important 
place in China's plans to forge an active anti-imperialist 
front. 
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However, this special relationship was challenged, 
for a short period, by the differences between the two 
sides over the changes following the deposition of Ben 
Bella in Algeria (19 June 1965>. Unlike China7ý1 Tanzania 
did not come forward to recognise the new government under 
Boumedi6nne in a prompt manner. Like a number of radicals 
and progressives throughout Africa, Nyerere feared that 
the departure of Ben Bella, a major champion of national 
liberation movements, would reverse the positive and 
activist posture of Algeria against colonialism, 
imperialism and racism. 
The Algerian factor, however, did not seriously 
undermine Sino-Tanzanian relations, with clear proof 
coming from Algeria that it was no less committed to 
supporting national liberation movments under the new 
government than it had been before. In October 1965, 
China and Tanzania agreed that the second Afro-Asian 
conference should be postponed. -7ý`ý 
In November 1965, Rashidi Kawawa, Tanzania's Vice- 
President, paid a visit to China-7ý which further 
strengthened the special and anti-imperialist friendship 
between the two countries. Tanzania's support for the 
struggle in the Congo(L), the expulsion of American 
diplomats from Dar es Salaam, and the status enjoyed by 
Dar es Salaam as the headquarters of the Libertion 
Committtee of OAU, its tough policy against the South 
African government and hospitality to the liberation 
movements of southern African countries, its termination 
of diplomatic relations with Britain 7ý, & over UDI (December 
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1965), its refusal to sign the Test Ban Treaty--ýr-, 
contributed to the development of a solid and militant 
relationship between China and Tanzania. In the words of 
Zhou Enlai 
Tanzania has become a glorious banner 
in East Africa, a banner against old 
and new colonialism and for national 
liberation struggles. In the world 
arena, the United Republic of Tanzania 
has taken a clear-cut stand against 
imperialist policies of aggression and 
war, upholding Afro-Asian solidarity 
and defending world peace, and has made 
an active contribution in these 
respects... 
The imperialists and old and new 
colonialists are unwilling to see an 
independent Tanzania towering on the 
East African coast. They have brought 
political and economic pressure to bear 
on you and even resorted to frenzied 
and despicable subversion. But they 
have met with resolute counter-blows 
from the people of Tanzania. -7ý1r- 
13.3,1,7. Uganda 
Of all the political partiesr--ý17 involved in the 
struggle for independence in Uganda, only-7--21a the Uganda 
Peoples Congress (UPC) led by Milton Obote, despite its 
moderate character, -1ý1--' advocated a more positive anti- 
colonial and anti-imperialist policy geared to the goal of 
Ugandan nationalism embracing all the diverse peoples of 
the country. 
When independence (October 1962) was granted, Obote 
was appointed Prime Minister and the King of Buganda the 
President of the Republic of Uganda. During the first 
phase of the UPC government (1962-71), Obote appeared to 
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be moving towards the left. -73, - In the domestic sphere, 
the radical character of Obote's government was reflected 
in the decision (1968) to adopt socialism based an the 
concrete conditions in Uganda. -Ic" In 1970, Obote 
nationalised 88 important export companies and firms. -70ýý 
In the international sphere, Obote's government had 
always advocated policies based on a stance of positive 
non-alignment and anti-imperialist Pan-Africanism. At the 
same time, Obote advocated a tough line against the racist 
r6EIme in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and favoured a 
total isolation of South Africa. --: 3: 3 Obote 
was emphatic that South Africa could 
not be regarded as an independent 
African country any more than could be 
the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique 
and Angola - -7'ý, " 
In relation to anti-colonialist struggle, Obote 
offered Uganda as a base for all African national 
liberation movements. -7ýýIlr- Uganda however, was not 
strategically suited for the training of liberation 
f orces, 
- 
or for passing on military aid to various 
liberation movements in those areas which were still under 
colonial rule. During the struggle in the Congo(L) 
against Tshombe's government, Obote permitted the 
transfer'*" of arms and weapons through Uganda to the 
revolutionary forces based in Stanleyville. It was 
reported at the time that some of the guerrilla forces 
from the Congo had received training from the Ugandan 
army. -7: a -7 
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Like most of its early contacts with national 
independence movements in Africa, China forged its first 
links with Uganda (1958) at the AAPSO Secretariat. 7ý11; b 
Initially, China's links with Uganda had been with UNC, a 
nationalist militant party, led by Joseph William 
Kiwanuka. Kiwanuka was supported by China as the 
representative of the Ugandan national independence 
movement in Africa at Afro-Asian meetings and 
activities. `3' Kiwanuka. was among the 29 African 
delegations"' which visited China during 1958-59,. 
Despite China's continued association with UNC, Obote 
(the leader of the UPC) recognised PRC when Uganda became 
independent (9 October 1962). 7,41 At the same time, Obote 
challenged critics within his own party by supporting 
China's admission to UN. *7,4ý China established diplomatic 
relations with Uganda (18 October 1962) after a visit to 
Kampala by Ho Ying, China's Ambassador to Tanganyika. -? '"11 
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and Uganda, there was a marked increase in 
trade. By the end of 1963, China's imports from Uganda 
made it the largest buyer of Ugandan cotton (a quarter of 
the total production of cotton in Uganda). -7,411 
However, because of the moderate character of Obote's 
government during the early years of Uganda's independence 
on the one hand, and UPC's coalition with the 
reactionary"' YK Party (coupled with Obote's fresh memory 
of China's early association with UNC) on the other, no 
militancy was injected into the relationship during the 
first three years (1962-65). 
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This in fact changed following Obote's effective 
support711 for Gbenye's revolutionary government in 
Stanleyville. Thereafter Sino-Ugandan relations became 
closer. Uganda's acceptance of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda 
whom the Chinese supported 7, V7 contributed to the 
development of a warm relationship between the two 
countries. 
In April 1965, William Kalema, Minister for Works and 
Communications, paid a visit to China. This was the first 
visit to China made by a Ugandan government official. 7111ý 
During this visit, Kalema signed an economic agreement 
with his opposite number in China. -7,4'ý, Icluded in this 
agreement was an interest-free loan of $12.4 million, in 
addition to a donation of $2.99 million for Uganda's 
First-Year-Plan. -71-ý' 
Obote himself visited China in 1965 (11-16 June). In 
a joint communlqu6 armed aggression of the imperialist 
powers against the Congolese people was condemned. At the 
same time, China and Uganda reaffirmed their support for 
''* the national independence struggles 
of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, 
the so-called Portuguese Guinea, 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Equatorial 
Guinea, and other African countries 
still under colonial rule. -7'r-I 
During the GPCR period (1966-69), there was no significant 
development in Sino-Ugandan relations. Internal conflicts 
involýring Obote's supporters on the one hand and 
monarchical and conservative elements on the other, 
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absorbed much of the country's political energy during 
this period. 
13.3.1.8. Congo-Brazzaville7--z 
The Congo(B), independent since August 1960, was 
among the French colonie S7r. C3 which voted in favour of 
joining Communlt6 Frangalse. Anti-colonial forces in 
Congo(B) and outside alike felt strongly that the country 
continued to be economically and politically dependent on 
the French system of neo-colonialism. As a strong 
La 
supporter of mmundut6 Rrangalse, Foulberte Youlou the 
Francophile leader ofAUDDIA) was helped by the French 
authorities to become the country's President, despite the 
opposition 17 E. A of the nationalist, anti-imperialist and 
socialist parties such as the Nouvement Socialiste 
Af. ricalne (XSA), led by Jacques Opangual, and the PPL, led 
by Felix Tchikaya. 
Under Youlou's leadership, ConSo(B) became extremely 
hostile to communist movements and socialist countries. A 
month before <15 July 1960) Congo's independence, Youlou 
assured the imperialist powers of his firm anti-communist 
commitment by indulging in. a strongly worded attack 
against the role played by the communist powers711 in 
Africa, and especially in the Congo. 
Thus, it was not surprising to see Youlou's 
government, immediately after Congo(B)'s independence, 
recognise Taiwan, followed, less than a month later, by 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
states (10 September). It is worth noting that the Youlou 
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government also recognised 7J6C- PRC. China however, did not 
reciprocate becau se of its rejection of 'two China's'. 
Four years after independence (August 1960), Congo(B) 
not only withdrew"' its recognition of Taiwan and 
established-7'*" (January 1964) diplomatic relations with 
China, but also became one of the most militant and 
progressive countries in Africa. A popular uprising 
against the subservient rule of Youlou had swept the 
country ('The Three Glorious Days') in August 1963 and 
ended in the downfall of the government. In its place, a 
National Revolutionary Council (NRC) and a new government 
under the leadership of Alphonse Massembat Debat*7r, -" took 
power (8 December 1963). At a congress of the National 
Movement of the Revolution (NMR>, scientific socialism was 
adopted as the path of Congo(B>ls economic development. -7"a 
Following this revolutionary change, the relations 
between China and the Congo(B> rapidly improved. In July 
1964 an economic mission from the Congo(B) visited China 
where it was offered the equivalent of $5.2 million to 
enable the national budget to be balanced. `c-1 In 
September, Boukambou Julian, a leading member of the 
national Trade Union Confederation of the Congo(B) and 
First Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, paid a 
visit to China. Julian was warmly received and given 
assurance of China's strong support for the revolutionary 
government of the Congo(B)-111 At the same time, a seven 
member military goodwill delegation from the Congo(B), led 
by Major Mouz Abakani Felix, Chief of Staff of the Armed 
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Forces, also visited China (19 September). Felix told his 
hosts that he and 
his colleagues had come to acquaint 
themselves with the great work done by 
China since liberation. 70-0, 
President Debat himself visited China (September 
1964) to attend the National Day celebrations (1 October). 
In a joint communlqu6 issued on that occasion, China 
affirmed its 
firm support for the people of the 
Congo (B) in their heroic struggle 
against the imperialists' threats, 
interference, and subversion against 
the Congo(B). 711--l 
For its part, Congo(B) urged 
the restoration of China's legitimate 
rights in the United Nations and the 
just struggle of the Chinese government 
and people for the liberation of their 
own territory, Taiwan, as well as its 
opposition to the imperialists' plot of 
creating two Chinas. -71-Ir- 
President Debat also took the opportunity to affirm the 
Congo(B)Is 'readiness to take part in the 1965 second 
Afro-Asian conference'. -71--'-- The Congo(B) became the third 
African country [the others being Guinea (13 September 
1960) and Ghana (28 March 1962)) to conclude a Treaty of 
Mutual Friendship with China. "' 
During Debat's visit, too , China and the Congo(B) 
signed Economic a7nd Technical Co-operation Agreements 
under which China granted an interest-free loan of $26 
million to the Congo(B). "' The United States reacted to 
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the Congo(B)'s growing friendship with the communist world 
as a whole and with China in particular, "I" by closing 
down its Diplomatic and Cultural Mission in 
Brazzaville. -7'7111, This act of the American government, 
however, had the effect of pushing the Congo(B) further 
along the path of friendship with the socialist countries 
and of militant anti-imperialism. 
The hostile attitude of the United States towards the 
Congo(B), evidenced in the withdrawal of its diplomats, 
was viewed by China as a prelude to the overthrow of 
Debat's revolutionary government. On the occasion of the 
first anniversary (22 February 1964) of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between China and the Congo(B), 
Chang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister said that 
US imperialism is engineering a new 
subversive plot against the Congo(B). 
It has directed the puppet Tshombe 
clique to smuggle arms, sent special 
agents there and even tried to 
assassinate the leaders of the 
Congolese(B) government in a vain 
attempt to topple the revolutionary 
government of the Congo(B). -771 
China's aid to the Congo(B) grew at a rapid pace. In 
June 1965, China offered a sum of 5 million Francs aid to 
the Congo (B) 711 Much of this money was devoted to 
refugees expelled by the Congo(L) government. In July 
1965, the Chinese authorities held an exhibition in 
Brazzaville. China also pledged to build a major flagship 
project and a textile mill in Kisoundi (near 
B razzaville). 111 The textile mill project became the 
biggest employer of labour in the country77r. (capable of 
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employing 2,000 people and an average annual output of 3ý6 
million metres of fabric). -77C. Within a year of the 
coming into operation of China's economic aid, the Prime 
Minister of the Congo(B) claimed that the economic 
relations between the countries were already proving to be 
beneficial to the people. 
... we will continue to rely, for a long 
time, on the bi-lateral aid of all 
countries of the world, particularly 
France, ... and the Chinese People's 
Republic whose material aid has already 
proved... as effective. 777 
The relations between China and the Congo(B) became more 
and more progressive in character. Within a year of the 
overthrow of the Youlou government, Brazzaville had become 
the major base for African liberation forces of the 
Congo(L) and of Angola's MPLA. With the agreement of the 
Congo (B) government, China set UP (in 1965) three 
guerrilla training camps based in Bouanga, Dambona and 
Impfonda. They were placed under the supervision of Kan 
Mai, a Colonel in China's PLA and head of PRCIs military 
mission in Brazzaville. -7*7- 
13.3.2. China's Relations With oNon-proares5ivee States 
13.3.2.1. Morocco 
The dismissal-7-731 of the government led by Abdalla 
Ibrahim, the radical Prime Minister, (March 1960), and the 
enthronement of King Hassan II (who was less nationalistic 
and more favourably inclined to the Western powers-71; 11"1 than 
his father) stood in the way of the development of 
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political co-operation between China and Morocco with the 
aim of challenging Western influence and constructing 
Afro-Asian solidarity based on a policy of support for 
independence and liberation movements. Relations between 
China and Morocco gradually cooled off following the 
successful conclusion of Algeria's independence struggle 
in 1962, except in the sphere of trade and commerce. In 
May 1961 Lu Hsu-chang, the Chinese Vice Minister of 
Foreign Trade, visited Morocco with a view to improving 
the trade between the two countries. -71B3 By 1963, Morocco 
had become the third largest partner in China's trade with 
the Third World. 10ý; ý 
Morocco's status as a major trade partner of China 
did not alter China's policy of giving support-711 to 
revolutionary Algeria during the brief Algerian-Moroccan 
border war (October 1963). In fact, King Hassan II 
accused China of favouring Mahdi Den Barka, the leader of 
the Moroccan opposition party National Union of Popular 
forces (UNFP), who was a supporter of the Algerian-7113" 
revolution. 
13.3.2.2. Tiininfn 
After consolidating its position as the colonial 
power in control of Algeria, 7'Br- France expanded its 
control into neighbouring Tunisia where it imposed on the 
Bey (i. e. the Governor) the Parado Treaty and the La Marsa 
Agreement (1881). The Bey was thus dispossessed of all 
his prerogatives, and Tunisia was effectively7"" brought 
-616- 
under French colonial control in the name of aI French 
Protectorate'. 
Unlike Algeria, '71; 117 Tunisian opposition to colonialism 
did not take on a political character until 1920, when the 
Destour (or the Liberal Constitutional) Party (LCP) was 
founded with 'Tunisian Martydom' as its symbol. Its 
manifesto sought 
*' an elected National Assembly... a 
responsible Tunisian government, 
equality of Tunisians and Frenchmen at 
all levels and respect of basic 
liberties. -7*1*3 
Because of its conciliatory attitude to the French 
colonial power and its failure to launch a struggle for 
Tunisian independence, LCP was not able to put down 
political roots among the masses. 
The Tunisian independence movement assumed a more 
positive character in 1933 whenMCP was dissolved and a 
new party under the name of Neo-D. Ui-*()r- or the Neo- 
Constitutional Party (NCP) was established. NCP sought 
complete independence for the country. 
For over two decades, KCP campaigned for independence 
by organising and leading demonstrations and protests 
against the French colonial power. NCP leaders (including 
Bourguiba, the leader) and workers suffered imprisonment 
and many were killed. 71BISI 
Bourguiba was so violently anti-communist that he 
embarked on a foreign policy aimed not only at preventing 
China establishing diplomatic relations with Tunisia but 
also undermining, during the second stage of the Algerian 
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war of liberation, the militant relationship that China 
had with the Provisional Government of Algeria (which was 
based in Tunis), `ý` Bourguiba was critical of the close 
ties Algeria had with China. 7ý1 He went so far as to try 
to stop Algeria's FLN from havi-nS access to the arms and 
equipment supplied by China`51-ýý through Tunisia 
On many occasions we had to cover 
Chinese names on arms and equipment in 
order to Set permission for their 
access to Tunisia and then to Algeria. 
Bourguiba was too allergic to communism 
as a whole and to China in 
particular. -711 
Bourguiba was not only opposed to the close 
relationship between Algeria and China during the national 
liberation war, but also opposed to the use of armed 
struggle as the weapon for achieving national liberation 
because, in his words (June 1956), 
I t] he guerrillas in the mountains 
cannot hurl the French army into the 
sea. Their role is merely to act on 
France, on French public opinion, so as 
to persuade them that granting the 
people of Algeria the right to dispose 
of their own destiny is the lesser 
evil. Military action does not 
suffice, it resolves nothing. -7"', * 
Despite Bourguiba's opposition to FLN's method of 
armed struggle, however, Tunisia did provide bases for FLN 
guerrilla training and operations on the Eastern front. 
Tunisia was also the headquarters (from 1959 onwards) of 
PGRA which was carrying out the functions of a government- 
in-exile. Its support for Algeria's FLN led to a physical 
attack against Tunisia by French colonial forces (February 
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1958). China was quick to condemn France's attack against 
Tunisia. The CharS6 dlAffalres of PRC in Cairo called'on 
the Tunisian Ambassador to UAR to express the 
Chinese people's resolute support for 
the Tunisian people in their just 
struggle against the colonialists. 7'-"r- 
Tunisia's support for the Algerian war of national 
liberation should not, by any means, be interpreted as 
reflecting any political radicalism on the part of the 
government. As in the recent Libyan crisis (April 1986), 
in which the Arab masses forced all Arab governments, 
progressive and non-progressive alike to support Libya, 
the Tunisian government was forced rather than chose to 
support Algeria's armed struggle against the colonial 
power. Algerian independence was supported by a large 
number of Tunisians, some of whom even volunteered to join 
FLN. FLN leaders were able to make good use of the f act 
that Tunisia's support did not come from the government as 
such but rather from the mass of the people. 
PGRA ignored the anti-communist character of the 
Tunisian government and developed a close and comradely 
relationship with China against the wishes of Bourguiba. 
For its part, China tried to allay Tunisia's suspicion of 
communism and to persuade it to leave PGRA to develop its 
own links with China by sending, whenever possible, 
delegatloy6of Moslim C to-Tunisia after 
their pilgrimage to Mecca, or by offering such easy 
terms of trade that Bourguiba's government was unable to 
resist. Three Tunisian trade and cultural delegations 
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were received in China during the period 1958-59. lla-7 In 
November 1960, China and Tunisia signed a Trade 
Agreement. -7'ý'12' Other contacts between the two countries 
took place at AAPSO meetinSs. -7'ý1'91 
Such informal Sino-Tunisian contacts however, did not 
alter Tunisia's anti-China stance. In 1960, in addition 
to recognising the Taiwan r-6gime, 0010 Tunisia supported the 
United States' demand that the Tibetan rebellion should be 
discussed as an international question in UN. I'll, 
Tunisia's failure to recognise China, however, did not 
prevent Bourguiba from recognisinS China's 'great 
achievements and tremendous efforts'. 610: 2 
The presence of PGRA in Tunis seemed to have the 
effect of softening the Tunisian government's strong 
opposition to China. In May 1961, Wan , 
5Chuan-heng, a member 
of the Secretariat of the Chinese Womerts Federation, 
visited Tunisia where she met PGRA leaders as well as 
officials from the Tunisian government. 111110ýý Two months 
later (10 July) Mohammed MasmZ, di, Secretary of State for 
Information and Tourism, led a goodwill mission to 
China. 101 The delegation was received by both Zhou Enlai 
and Liu Shaagi .. 'aO's 
There was a significant improvement in relations 
between the two countries when France violently rejected 
the Tunisian demand for the return of the military base of 
Bizerta by dropping paratroops on the city of Bizerta 
while the French airforce bombed Tunisian positions and 
shot down a number of innocent civilians (19 July 1961). 
In a meeting with Ahmed Ml. stl7ri, Tunisian Ambassador to 
ti - 
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the Soviet Union (who had paid a visit to China during the 
Bizerta crisis), Chen Yj., the Chinese Vice-Premier, 
strongly condemned French aggression against 'Tunisia. He 
affirmed that 
the Chinese government and people 
f irmly support the Tunisian people in 
their Just struggle to recover the 
Bizerta military base and to defend 
their independence and sovereignty. ýOr- 
In his reply (23 August) to a message from Djelouli 
Fares, President of the Tunisian National Assembly, Chu 
Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
Peoples Congress, (NPC) strongly 'denounced the French 
action against Tunisia' and affirmed China's unequivocal 
support for the 
Tunisians' Just struggle to safeguard 
their national independence and 
sovereignty. 13,10-7 
In October 1961 China sent a gift of medical 
equipment and medicines worth 60,000 Yuan for the relief 
of the victims of the French attack against Tunisians in 
Bizerta. "DI In the following year (7 April 1962), China 
sent Tunisia more medical equipment. 1311: 11'ý31 
China's support for Tunisia's just struggle for 
recovering the Bizerta base, coupled with Sino-Tunisian 
contacts during the period 1960-62, had the effect of 
moderati-ng Tunisia's traditionally anti-China policy. 
This was evident from Tunisia's change of heart (from 
October 1962 onwards)""'")- over the question of China's 
admission to UN. 1311 Tunisia and China established 
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diplonatic relations (February 1964), following Zhou 
Enlai's visit to Tunisia (9-10 January 1964), On the 
occasion of the Chinese Prime Minister's visit, Bourguiba 
told hin that 
Whatever our differences... isolation of 
a great people like the Chinese and a 
great country like China would do no 
good for peace. "ý 
I 
The establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Tunisia and China was by no means based on a common 
approach on international issues shared by the two 
countries. On the contrary, Bourguiba hoped that China's 
presence in: 
ýUN 
would help reduce its revolutionary 6 
activities and increase its co=itment to the traditional 
rules of the international order. Bourguiba was also 
perhaps motivated by the hope that the radical movement in 
Tunisia would be calmed by Tunisia entering into 
diplomatic relations with a 'hardline' communist country 
such as China. 
The Tunisian government had already banned'3`1: ý-' (18 
July 1963) the Communist Party of Tunisia and adopted Ia 
much tougher policy' against the radical forces. It is 
possible that Bourguiba viewed Tunisia's policy of 
accommodation as a demonstration of the government's 
ability to adopt policies not liked by its Western allies. 
This particular step taken by Bourguiba was to the 
disadvantage of the United States, whilst it did 
contribute to China's attempt to increase the diplomatic 
containment of the West. For his part, however, Zhou 
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Enlai perhaps saw the presence of Chinese diplomats in 
Tunisia as an opportunity to mobilize and comunicate with 
radical forces inside the country and to consolidate 
China's vital aim of people-to-people relations. 
Press coverage in Tunisia of Zhou Enlails visit was 
largely devoted to comments on Tunisia's differences with 
China and opposition to China's international- stance - 
especially in relation to its opposition to the NTBT and 
support for armed struggle. 1311,11 However, differences 
between him and Bourguiba did not stop Zhou Enlai from 
finding ways of expressing common ground and shared aims 
between Tunisia and China: 
We Asian and African countries created 
brilliant cultures as early as the dawn 
of history. Today we are comparatively 
backward economically and culturally. 
This is the outcome of foreign 
aggression and oppression... the 
developing Asian and African countries 
will surely succeed in bringing about a 
new upsurge in their economies and 
cultures by mainly relying on their own 
efforts, while supporting and assisting 
each other. "Ir- 
Upon arrival in Tunisia (May 1964), 'the Chinese 
Ambassador presented to Bourguiba a letter sent by Liu 
Shaoqi, inviting him to visit China. The visit however 
never material ised. fal r- In December a group of Chinese 
experts arrived in Tunis, at the invitation of the 
government, to study projects planned in the agricultural 
and industrial spheres. al-7 
The fragile relations between Tunisia and China, 
however, did not last too long. Alarmed by Zhou Enlails 
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revolutionary predictions for Africa, and provoked by its 
Western friends, (especially the United States), ""110 the 
Tunisian government, less than a year after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with China, launched 
(February 1965) a vehement attack on China's role in 
Af rica. In his speech (12 February 1965) to the Central 
Committee of the Neo-DVstCJjr Party, Bourguiba attacked 
China's opposition to NTBT, accusing it of attempting to 
undermine peaceful coexistence and wor 1d peace. 
Ironically, Bourguiba attributed the escalation of the 
conflict in Indo-China to the role played by China, and 
not to the military aggresssion of the United States. a"ý' 
In July 1965 Bourguiba went even further by referring to 
China as 
a colonialist country camouflaged by 
ideology with the aim of subjecting 
Asia and Africa, and attempting to 
occupy India and all South East 
Asia. *32D 
In an interview with R6alit6, a French journal (11 
Septenber 1965), Bourguiba once again gave vent to his 
strong 'distaste' for China's role in Africa when he 
replied to the question 'is there Chinese infiltration in 
Africa? ' with the following statement: 
Yes, this is evident by China Is 
infiltration in every country to 
provoke difficulties, to expand 
existing contradictions, to arm and 
train guerrillas against established 
r-6, glmes. Chou En lai does not deny it. 
In fact he affirms this to anyone he 
meets, that Africa is becoming the 
field of revolution. Dýzl 
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Thus, it came as no surprise when Tunisia voted in favour 
of convening the Afro-Asian Conference in November 1965 
and against China' s plea f or its postponement. `11`2: 2 
Bourguiba's campaign against China was taken even to the 
extent. of Tunisia reversing its support for China's 
admission to UN, advocating a 'two China' solution. aýO 
Such a sustained anti-China campaign led Yao Nien, 
China's Ambassador to Tunisia, to protest strongly against 
Bourguiba's accusation and to demand an openr-"', I apology 
from the Tunisian government. Yao stated that 
President Bourguiba's words and deeds 
against China have seriously impaired 
relations between China and Tunisia. 
The Chinese government would like to 
repeat its advice to the Tunisian 
government and President Bourguiba: It 
is hoped that you will set store by the 
interests of the Sino-Tunisian 
friendship and Afro-Asian solidarity 
and put an end to all your words and 
deeds detrimental to friendly relations 
between the two countries. Otherwise, 
you will reap what you sow. 'ýr- 
The People's Daily (20 November 1965) viewed Bourguibals 
anti-China campaign as serving the interests of the United 
States and its allies against the wishes of anti- 
imperialist forces in Asia and Africa. E31ýr- Tunisia 
responded by stating that instead of protesting, China 
should 
stop its drive for subjecting its Asian 
neighbour to its domination and making 
trouble in Africa. *11ý17 
In January 1966, Bourguiba El Ibn, Secretary- of 
Foreign Affairs, threatened to break off diplomatic 
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relations if China continued to 'provoke Tunisia' or 
'slander his father, Chief of Statel. "-ý10 
Chinaý ignored Tunisia's threat to break off 
diplomatic relations and advocacy of a two-China policy-ýO 
as it -was already well on into GPCR which opened the way 
to a wider ranging challenge on China's part to diplomatic 
channels in the sphere of international relations. China 
launched a vigorous propaganda attack against the Tunisian 
government. Tunisia's anti-China campaign was viewed as 
an attempt to divert the attention of the Tunisian people 
from the government's policy of co-operating with anti- 
liberation forces 
In trying to use its opposition to 
China to direct the attention of its 
people and cover up its own crime of 
entering further into the service of US 
imperialism and Soviet revisionism and 
selling out the interests of the 
Tunisian and other Arab people, the 
Tunisian government will certainly come 
to no good. "ý'*Ilcl 
Angered by such a challenge, the Tunisian government 
demanded in vain an unreserved apology from China. "" At 
the same time, Tunisia imposed greater restrictions on the 
Chinese diplomatic staff in Tunis. *3: 31ýý 
official Tunisian newspaper, strongly criticised China's 
diplomatic presence in Tunisia and the breach of all the 
traditional diplomatic rules and conditions, by Chinese 
officials and objected to interference in the internal 
affairs of the country. 11ý1: 3: 3 
Tunisia's restrictions on the Chinese diplomatic 
mission did not last long because China had decided to 
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break off (26 September 1967) diplomatic relations with 
Tunisia, and withdrew all its diplomatic staff. ": 21L China 
also withdrew (14 September 1967) four coaches who were in 
Tunisia under a physical education agreement. 113-'-"r, 
Commenting on China's decision to break off diplomatic 
relations with Tunisia, People's Daily (December 1967) 
commented that 
severence of relations can do us no 
harm. We have no diplomatic 
relationship with the US, but we carry 
on just the same. Severence of 
relations will make a mess of things 
politically and economically for a 
given country, since we can then 
support the people of that country to 
make a revolution. 10al 
When the political 'mess' began in Tunisia during 
student riots and protests against the government (March 
1968), China gave propaganda support to all anti- 
government forces. `ý11 In turn, it was accused by the 
Tunisian government of provoking the student riots at 
Tunis University, and the disorders and attacks against 
the police and the army. 
13.3.2.3. 
Since independence (August 1960), Benin (Dahomey 
until 1975) has been noted for its political instability. 
During the period 1960-72 Benin was subjected to seven 
coups dl6tat, three of them in 1972 alone. Throughout the 
decade of the 160s Benin remained one of the most loyal 
supporters of Western powers, especially France, 61ý3131 in 
Africa. In January 1962, the government of Benin, under 
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the leadership of Hubert Marga, established diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. *11ý3'31 
After the overthrow of Marga's government by Sourou- 
Migan Apithy, 111 Benin establishedl, 4-1 diplomatic relations 
with China (October 1963). The new government's 
recognition of China must have been influenced by the fact 
that France had already set an example by entering into a 
normal diplomatic relationship with it. China, however, 
was not particularly impressed by the prospect of enjoying 
Benin's recognition and embassy in Beijing. Chinese 
leaders were aware that the essentially anti-comnunist 
character of the Apithy government would be an obstacle in 
the way of China's campaign for an anti-imperialist Afro- 
Asian front. In his message to Apithy, Zhou Enlai did not 
show much interest in the government of Dahomey. He laid 
emphasis on the need to provide 'friendship and co- 
operation between the two peoples, not co-operation 
between the two governments' . 19,11-12 A similar comment was 
made by People's Daily (15 November 1964) in the wake of 
Benin's recognition of China. 1111ý13 
Relations between China and Benin, however, did not 
last long. Following two military coups dl6tat (November- 
December 1965), the new government, alarmed, like Tunisia, 
by China's revolutionary hard line as revealed in the 
initial events of GPRC, decided (3 January 1966) to break 
off 'di-plomatic relationslý-4,1 with PRC. China believed the 
hand of the United States to be behind Benin's change of 
policy. US imperialism, in China's view, took every 
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possible opportunity/., isolateAin Africa and shore up the 
power of its own client r6gimes. 
Imperialism, headed by the United 
States is trying to stir up an adverse 
anti-China current in Africa so as to 
bring about a breach in normal 
relations between China and the African 
countries and undermine the militant 
friendship and solidarity between the 
two peoples. Dahomey's ending and the 
CAP's severence of diplomatic relations 
with China under the manipulation of 
imperialism are part of the adverse 
anti-China current. laAr. 
13.3.2.4. Central African Republic (CAR> 
CAR, a former French colony which was granted 
independence in 1960, initially (April 1962) recognised 
Taiwan. In August 1964, however, rCAR's government 
(under the leadership of David Dacko, one of the French 
r6gimels favourite African clients), initiated official 
contacts with PRC by sending a goodwilllý--' mission to 
Beijing. A month later (29 September 1964), China and the 
CAR established diplomatic relations, '", notifying Taiwan 
at the same time that PRC was the sole and legal 
representative of the Chinese people. -, - A Chinese trade 
and goodwill mission delegation visited (, ý, CAR soon 
thereafter. "' China extended an interest-free and long 
term repayment loan of $4 million to CAR when the economic 
situation deteriorated (1964-1965). E)u-" 
In the political sphereqCAR was included in the West 
African tour of a Chinese National People Is Congress 
mission (March-April 1965)-'-"1' soliciting support for a 
second conference of Afro-Asian countries (excluding the 
P- 
Aý, c 
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Soviet Union). CAR's support later during the year"r-: 2 for 
China's call for an Afro-Asian conference, was not based 
on a political understanding between the two countries. 
Rather, CAR must have believed that the longer such a 
conference was postponed, the better for the political 
forces in Africa opposed to the consolidation of a 
militant anti-imperialist Afro-Asian front. 
After the overthrow of David Dacko (1 January 1966) 
by Jean Bedal Bokassa, CAR became even more loyal to the 
West and rabidly anti-communist. Within a week of 
assuming power, Bokassals government severed diplomatic 
relations with China (6 January 1966). Bokassa justified 
the rupture on the grounds that even if there had been no 
couP, President Dacko 
sooner or later would have been 
eliminated by the pro-Chinese 
extremists. *"-' 
13.3.2.5. Burundi-Rwanda 
What were the actual ideological motives behind 
China's friendly overtures to the oppressive monarchical 
. r6Ei me of 
Burundi in contrast to its indifference 
bordering on hostility towards the Republic of Rwanda with 
an overwhelming majority of its population which could 
only be classified as poor peasantry? In order to 
establish the extent to which China's relations with both 
Burundi and Rwanda were guided by ideological 
considerations, it is necessary to review their historical 
and political development. 
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Throughout the period 1600-1959, Rwanda's history was 
bound up with Burundi Is. Under the Treaty of Versaillest 
both territories were turned over to Belgium (1919). 
Following the example of the Congo (1960-61), the twin 
Belgian colonies of Burundi and Rwanda demanded complete 
independence. Unlike Burundi, the national independence 
movement in Rwanda, led by the two parties Rwanda National 
Union (UNAR) and the Democratic Association of Rwanda 
(RADER) was opposed to Belgian colonialism. 'Or-r- The twin 
territories became independent in July 1962 - the Kingdom 
of Burundi in the South, and the Republic of Rwanda in the 
North. "' Independent Rwanda was plagued by political 
instability from the beginning. In 1959, the Tutsi 
minority (15%) and the Hutu majority (85%) clashed in a 
bloody civil war which ended with the political separatism 
of the Hutu peasant society from the Tutsi pyramidal 
monarchical order. In the course of this transformation, 
the Tutsi were brutally executed, murdered and 
oppressed. "Ir-l' A mass exodus of the Tutsi f rom Rwanda to 
the South, i. e. northern Burundi, took place. In 
November 1963, influenced by the revolutionary struggles 
then taking place in the neighbouring Congo(L), the 
Rwandan refugees based in Burundi (nicknamed 
I Cockroaches') launched a guerrilla attack on the Rwandan 
government. The guerrillas were defeated with the aid of 
Belgian military reinforcements. A large number of them 
was masffacred by the Rwandan troops. 1111r-'ý The relations 
between Rwanda and Burundi degenerated soon thereafter. 
-631- 
China supported the Tutsi of Rwanda and the Kingdom 
of Burundi in this struggle. ý"" Rwanda's strong anti- 
communist policy, including its recognition of Taiwan, "r--2 
its close association with the West and Eespecially 
Belgium which was the major target of revolutionary forces 
in Congo(L)I its hostile relations with Burundi, and 
strategic access to Burundi enjoyed by the liberation 
fighters in the Congo(L) were the main factors underlying 
China's pro-Burundi policyý, ": 3 and the opening of 
diplomatic relations between the two governments (21 
December 1963), and China's anti-Rwanda orientation. 
The assumption of power by Alban Nianoya as Burundi's 
new Prime Minister (replacing Pierre Ngendamdumwe who 
retired in early 1964) who was favourably disposed to 
China*", '-' facilitated the establishment of diplomatic ties 
between the two countries. Like China, Niamoya also 
called (November 1964) for a world-wide conference to ban 
nuclear weapons. In October 1964, the two countries 
signed an Agreement on Trade and Payments, under whose 
provisions China promised to supply cotton, textiles, 
maize, rice, pharmaceutical products, steel and machines 
in exchange for Burundi's cotton, coffee, hides, peanuts 
and other raw materials. "' Andr6 Mugumbu, Director of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, visited 
China (December 1964) with the aim of deepening the trade 
and economic co-operation between China and Rwanda. 
Burundi however was not given financial aid -or loans by 
China. 'B'--*3 
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China's interestal--131 in Burundi lay in its strategic 
location'ý111111 in relation to the areas in which the 
liberation forces in the Congo(L) were active. "-71 The 
Queen of Burundi was welcomed to China twice in 1964. Her 
meeting with Liu Shaoqi during her second visit (June 
1964) was believed to have been described by the Chinese 
authorities as 'a most friendly talk' . 197ý 
flowever, friendly relations between 
China and Burundi did not last long. In January 1965, 
Nawami, the King of Burundi, issued a precipitate order 
arresting Niamoya and other pro-Chinese elements among the 
Tutsi. It was clear that he was motivated by a desire to 
eliminate radical elements in the country opposed to the 
monarchy and fear of China's hardline against African 
governments which were regarded as non-progressive in 
character. '-" 
At the same time, Burundi suspended diplomatic 
relations with China (29 January 1966). 
Relations between the two countries rapidly 
deteriorated with Burundi's accusation--7- that China was 
behind the assassination of Ngendaumwe, Burundi's new 
Prime Minister (7 January 1966). China protested against 
Burundi's 'unwarranted suspension of diplomatic 
relations' *111 simultaneously denying any involvement in 
the assassination of Ngendaumwe. --- China made it clear 
that it regarded friendly relations with the Royal 
government of Burundi to be far too important to be 
subjected to risk through involvement in anti-government 
activities. 
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China has consistently supported the 
Royal government of Burundi in the 
struggle to oppose imperialism 
colonialism and neo-colonialism and to 
safeguard national independence and 
State sovereignty... 
Evidently, the Burundi authorities 
have taken this action as a result of 
submission to the pressure of the US 
and Belgian imperialists... who have 
from the outside tried to undermine it, 
by every conceivable means. 177 
Bearing the revolutionary situation in the Congo(L) 
in mind, China hoped that Burundi would reverse its 
decision to suspend diplomatic relations with China. A 
statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (31 
January 1965) stressed that whenever 
[ t] he Royal government of Burundi 
wishes to have the relations between 
our two governments resumed, the 
Chinese government will give it 
sympathetic consideration. We are 
convinced that nothing can disrupt the 
friendship between the peoples of China 
and Burundi and that the conspiracy of 
the US and Belgian imperialism is 
doomed to failure. *3-713 
With the overthrow of the newly-crowned King Xwami Natri V 
(20 November 1969)"' by Michael Micombero who became 
Burundi's new Prime Minister, friendly relations were once 
again restored between the two countries. Micombero 
proclaimed Burundi a Republic, naming himself 
President. *""" 
The coup was fiercely opposed by Mobutu's r6gime in 
L6opoldville for fear that Burundi might once again become 
a base for the training of revolutionary guerrillas of the 
Congo(L) and for conveying arms to them from abroad., El-l 
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The new government of Micombero promptly restored 
diplomatic relations with China. After a lapse of five 
years, China's diplomatic mission was established in 
Burundi once again in October 1971. 
During the turbulent years of GPCR, 1311ý1ýý China had 
already made the decision that in the sphere of foreign 
relations it would only deal with anti-imperialist 
countries and, in particular, countries which were 
important for liberation and revolutionary struggles. 
This new policy prevented China engaging in special 
efforts to cultivate the friendship of *moderate' and 
unpredictable governments. Burundi was regarded as 
belonging to the latter category especially after it 
ceased to be important in the aftermath of the effective 
suppression of the revolutionary forces in neighbouring 
Congo(L) and the cessation of guerrilla activities. 
The Congo(B), to which the defeated rump of the 
national liberation movement of the Congo(L) retreated, 
became the focus of revolutionary attention, though no 
concrete struggle was in fact launched. Thus, Burundi, 
important for China's Africa policy until 1965, sank into 
unimportance after 1966. 
13.3.2.6. 
During the first stage (1955-59) of Sino-African 
relations, the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and the Sudan was not motivated by any 
direct or clear political and ideological 
consideration. "" During the initial phase (1959-63) of 
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this period (1959-66), China showed little interest in 
promoting good political relations with the Sudan. "IIIA 
Sudan's refusallý01-- to allow arms originating in socialist 
as well as other countries, destined for the anti- 
government forces in the Congo(L), to pass through its 
territory, constituted a major barrier to political co- 
operation between the Sudan and China. -Ilr- 
Sino-Sudanese relations began to take on a political 
hue only when Sudan, as an African co-founder of the 
Bandung Conference, supported the convening of a second 
Afro-Asian conference (initially scheduled to take place 
in June 1965), following Zhou Enlails visit"" to the 
Sudan (January 1964). General Ablanad who reciprocated 
with a visit to China three months later (May 1964), was 
received less enthusiastically than other African leaders 
such as Sekou Tour6, Kwame Nkrumah and Modibo Keita. 
The Sudan's close ties with the West, and its 
friendly relations with the Soviet Union, 61,911 acted as 
disincentives to the deepening of Sino-Sudanese economic 
relations. Thus, whenAIDboud visited China, no offer of 
financial help was made to the Sudan; nor was a Friendship 
Treaty concluded between the two countries. The joint 
communication issued at the end of his visit contained 
little indication of common ground between the two 
countries on major international issues. -I31"! At a banquet 
given (18 May) by President Mbboud, Zhou Enlai, however, 
managed to say that 
the leaders of China and the Sudan have 
held cordial and sincere talks on 
international questions of common 
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concern and on the relations of 
friendship and co-operation between the 
two countries. We have reached 
identical views on the- questions 
discussed... In the face of intrigues 
and interference by imperialism and new 
and old colonialism. ., the Asian and African peoples will always support 
each other in their struggle to win-and 
safeguard national independence. 63ý10 
China was particularly appreciative of the Sudan' s 
acceding to its request through Egypt8-11 for permission to 
transport arms through its territory to the Gbenye 
government based in Stanleyville., B'ýý'-' The Sudan's change 
of heart on this matter took place after General Aboud was 
overthrown (October 1964) as a result of a mass uprising. 
However, China itself was no longer in need of safe 
passage for its arms through the Sudan because Tanzania 
had already become a major base for such purposes. ý'Icll 
13.3.2.7. Somalia 
Both the Northern and Southern parts of Somalia won 
their independence in 
- 
June 1960 from Britain and Italy 
respectively. The two parts of the country underwent a 
merger in July under the name of the Democratic Republic 
of Somalia, with Abdullah Osman as President, and Ali 
Shermake as Prime Minister. Both had been leading figures 
in the Somalia Youth League (SYL), founded in May 1943, 
which carried the main responsibility for the anti- 
colonial struggle. 
China promptly recognised the new Republic. 
Ignoring Taiwan's request for recognitionlo-1--t Somalia 
reciprocated PRCI s gesture by recognising it as the only 
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representative of the Chinese people. Understandably, 
Somalia did not wish to recognise Taiwan also; such a 
policy would have gone against the grain, given Somalia's 
own concern that the two territories into which it had 
been artificially divided by the colonial rulers should 
become united into a single political entity. Somalia and 
China established diplomatic relations in December 
19 6 0. In July 1961, a municipal delegation visited 
China. "' The delegation was told by Peng Chen, Mayor of 
Beijing, that 
[ w) e underwent the same experience of 
suffering from imperialist and 
colonialist oppression in the past. 
The common task confronting us today, 
now that we have both been liberated, 
is to safeguard and build our national 
independence. We should support and 
help each other. "`ýO 
During the period 1960-63, Sino-Somali relations were 
mostly limited to cultural contacts. In 1962, nearly 50 
per cent of a total of 400 scholashipsB51ý given by China 
to Africa went to Somali students. In January 1963, a 
Chinese cultural &nd goodwill mission visited Somalia 
where it signed a Cultural Co-operation Agreement between 
the two countries. 
Sino-Somali relations in the political and economic 
fields began to develop in 1963 when Somalia turned aginst 
the West"Ic"I following Britain's support for Kenya in the 
territorial dispute between Somalia and Kenya. 
Rejecting an offer of aid from Britain (1964), Somalia let 
-638- 
it be known that it intended to increase exports to earn 
foreign currency. 'ý100 
A Somalia delegation, led by Ali Mohammed Hirav, 
visited China in May 1963. The visit resulted in the 
conclusion of a Sino-Somali Trade and Payments Agreement, 
under which China undertook to export textiles, daily 
necessities, metal products, machinery, chemicals, medical 
equipment and tea to Somalia in exchange for Somali oil 
seeds, cereals, frankincense, myrrh, gum Arabic, hides and 
minerals. 'ý'cll 
In August 1963, when Shermarke, the Prime Minister, 
visited China, 'Olr- Somalia received an offer of an 
interest-free loan worth $22 million.! 5i">c- It was even 
reported"'O-7 that Shermarke was pledged military aid in the 
wake of the withdrawal of Western aid from Somalia and the 
growing Soviet interest'ýIclcl in the area. During this 
visit, Shermarke was told by his Chinese hosts that 
Callthough we have internal 
difficulties and are shut off from most 
parts of the world, we are prepared and 
willing to give you whatever is 
possible. '-""' 
When Zhou Enlai visited Somalia (February 1964), -s"Il 
China gave the Somali government a sum of $3 million'5111 as 
a subsidy to cover a part of its budget deficit. Provoked 
by Western support for Kenya in the Somalia-Kenya 
territorial dispute, Radio Somalia took the opportunity 
provided by the Chinese Prime Minister's visit to 
broadcast to its listeners that 
.1 
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freedom is not achieved by remaining 
%seated, it is achieved by throwing 
bombs. If you are a brave man... rise 
against the hyena who is picking flesh 
from your bones. "ý 
The militant and radical atmosphere which Zhou Enlai 
witnessed in Somalia perhaps led him to sum his assessment 
of Africa's revolutionary potential in a speech 
(Mogadisco: 3 February 1964) as follows: 
We have witnessed the African people's 
strong will to fight imperialism and 
old and new colonialism; we have seen 
the strong desire of the African people 
to build up their respective countries 
and the marked success they have 
achieved... the African continent, which 
gave birth to a glorious civilisation 
and suffered from most cruel colonial 
aggression and plunder, is now 
undergoing earth-shaking changes. More 
than thirty African countries have 
become independent, and those African 
peoples still under colonial oppression 
and partition are waging heroic 
struggles to win independence and 
freedom. Revolutionarm 1: )rcsiDe-cts are 
added] 
During a visit to China by Awil Haji Abdullah, the 
Somali Finance Minister, an undertaking was given by his 
hosts agreeing to help Somalia complete the Gelib- 
Sahlambut road, build a textile factory, and start a State 
rice farm. ý` During the drought which struck Somalia in 
early 1965, China donated 1,200 tons of rice and 438 cases 
of drugs and medical equipment for the relief of famine 
victims. "" In July 1965, -President Abdoullah Osman paid 
a visit to China, where he told his hosts that "the PRC 
government truly reflects the will of 700 million Chinese 
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people". sl"%'- Osman supported'911-11 China's proposal that the 
second conference of Afro-Asian leaders should be convened 
in October 1965. 
In the final analysis, however, the moderate 
character of the Somali government, on the one hand, and 
on the other, China's eagerness to win the support of 
Kenya and Ethiopia"" (Somalia's hostile neighbour), for 
convening a second Afro-Asian meeting, stood in the way of 
close relations developing between China and Somalia 
during this period. 
13.3.2.8. Kenya 
Kenya was the first sub-Saharan African country in 
the post-War period to experience the use of armed 
resistance and guerrilla war (Mau Mau: 1952 onwards) 
against colonialism. This resistance, however, proved to 
be short-lived (1952-1956) and was carried out on a 
limited scale. The colonial power was well placed to 
undermine the Mau Mau resistance by exploiting the 
contradictions among nationalist leaders. 
Kenyan opposition to British rule began in 1920 with 
the founding of the Association of Kikuyu Youth (AKY). -IS, 
In 1924, AKY transformed itself into the Kikuyu Central 
Association (KCA), 111 with Harry Thuku as its leader who 
was succeeded by Jomo Kenyatta in 1928 as General 
Secretary. "'" KCA was a 'tribal' organisation which, at 
the time, did not speak for the Kenyan people as a whole-. 
Only the Kikuyu were admitted to its ranks. 531ýý 
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KCA protested against the massive exploitation of 
'tribal land' by white settlers, and against European 
missionary inf luence. 'ý! *-'ý It was outlawed in 1930. 
Kenyatta, its leader, went to London (to represent KCA) 
where he remained f-or 16 years. ýý11 As the African 
struggle for independence gathered momentum after the War, 
Kenyatta returned to Kenya to lead the Kenya African Union 
(KAU), a political party which was founded in 1943.0: 2r- 
Meanwhile the Kikuyu feelings of economic and social 
grievance"'12' led to the growth of the militant nationalist 
Mau Mau movement which launched armed resistance against 
the colonial power in the Kikuyu homeland on the highlands 
of Kenya (1952). The immediate objectives of the Mau Mau 
insurrection was to recover the fertile land of the Kikuyu 
people which were forcibly occupied by the colonial power 
and to bring to an end the maltreatment suffered by the 
native population at the hands of the authorities. "-ý'7 The 
Mau Mau insurrection became a formidable force by 1953. 
Nearly 20,000 fighters were engaged in active fighting. 'ý111111 
Contrary to Western propaganda discrediting it as 'an 
outbreak of savage activists', the Mau Mau movement swore 
'war against (the colonial] system"ýa'ý' and represented a 
'protracted struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism'. "' 
The colonial power negated Mau Mau demands and 
invoked a state of Emergency which, in the event, was 
prolonged over a period of seven years. All political 
parties were banned and their leaders arrested. sOý11 
Kenyatta, the most prominent among them, was kept in 
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prison from 1953-1961.111ý1=, New Pass Laws were introduced, 
police powers were extended, African and pro-African 
publications were suppressed. Over 100,000 'squatters' 
were evicted from white-owned f armland. 91ý1-1 More than 
15,000 non-combatant Africans were killed, and more than 
80,000 were sent to concentration camps. 4E0: 2bIcL 
By 1956, the insurrection, following the capture of 
Dedan Kimathi, the Mau Mau leader, had begun to 
disintegrate, 111ý1r- before being militarily defeated by the 
colonial power. 
The anti-colonial movement in Kenya failed largely 
because it was confined to one section of the population 
rather than representing all of Kenya's different people. 
KAU, however, emerged as a nationalist party eschewing the 
regional character of r)KC Leaders of non-Kikuyu 
extraction'5111 JoinedýKAU which was re-christened the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU). '91ýý' Oginga Odinga had 
already become known as the most outspoken nationalist 
leader in Kenya against British colonial Oginga 
Odinga led the Kenyan delegation to the second conference 
of AAPSO [Conakry, 19601. 
Anxious to prevent the nationalist forces becoming so 
radical as to pose a permanent threat to its economic and 
strategic interests in the continent, Britain decided, in 
its own interest, to grant independence to Kenya under 
Kenyatta's leadership. Kenya -became independent in 
December 1963,14ith Kenyatta as Prime Minister and Oginga 
Odinga as Minister for Home Affairs. Within a few months, 
-643- 
the former made himself President and Oginga Odinga Vice- 
President. 
Chinese propaganda gave support to the Mau Mau 
movement when it was oppressed by the British 
authorities. "' When the Mau Mau movement of anti- 
colonialism gave way to Kenya-wide nationalism from 1956 
onwards, China supported f-ýKANU. `-4-0 Contacts between 
Chinese representatives and representatives of the Kenya 
national independence movement, however, began only in 
1958, following the establishment of AAPSO based in Cairo. 
China was particularly attracted to Oginga Odinga'3"" who 
was clearly a radical and militant nationalist leader. In 
August 1960, Oginga Odinga visited China. 'ý-*ý He was full 
of admiration for his hosts and their socialist 
achievements. 
*** the Chinese showed me factories, 
communes, co-operatives; they showed me 
their plans for housing, for dealing 
with unemployment, how they organise 
farming and small industry, how 
government worked at village level; how 
plans for factory and agricultural 
production was worked out. It was 
impossible not to be impressed with 
life in China. So many of the problems 
of poverty and illiteracy were those of 
our people, and these problems were 
being overcome at an impossible 
rate. "" 
In February 1961, Zhou Enlai sent a message to Oginga 
Odinga reaffirming China's 'support for Kenyan 
independence and the release of Kenyatta' . 111, aA 
In 
September 1963, two months before Kenya became independent 
(12 December) a twenty-member KANU delegation visited 
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China. During this visit, Kenya was praised by the 
Chinese for its 'heroic struggle' against 'colonial 
enslavement and for independence and freedoml. Sbisr. 
China recognised Kenya immediately after it received 
independence Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, 
attended the Kenyan independence ceremony. China 
established diplomatic relations with Kenya soon 
thereafter (14 December 1963); and, in April 1964, Wang 
Yu-l_, ien, China's first Ambassador to Kenya arrived in 
Nairobi. "" 
The first Kenyan delegation to China (after the 
former's independence) was led by the militant and pro- 
Chinese Oginga Odinga (May 1964). As a result of the 
visit, Kenya received from China an interest-free loan 
estimated at $25 million, a further 'grant' of $2.8 
mi 111 on, 1: 1'"I' the resources required to establish a 
technical school for 1,000 students, credit financing for 
a chain of food processing plants, a radio station, and 
the resources needed for the construction of a hospital 
with 200 beds. ý11'ý' Upon his return to Kenya, Oginga Odinga 
reiterated his early admiration for the Chinese model and 
experience. 
... ten years ago, China was poor, but 
because the people accepted 
villagisation and worked hard in 
groups, China is now one of the richest 
countries in the world. 1r-cl 
Not long after Oginga Odinga's visit, (7 August 1964), a 
Kenyan government goodwill mission, under the leadership 
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of Ramagi Achieng Onako, paid a visit to China with the 
aim of bringing China and Kenya close together. 13r-I 
However, neither China's aid to Kenya, nor the 
presence of radical forces such as Oginga Odinga in the 
Kenyan government could act as a counterweight to 
President Kenyatta's pro-Western bias in politics. -'Irlý The 
relations between China and Kenya were therefore not 
destined to become intimate. Oginga Odinga and 
Kenyatta had already clashed over the Kenyan government's 
request to Britain to put down the mutiny in the Kenyan 
armed forces against their British officers (January 
1964), and on the agreement between the two governments 
over the defence of Kenya. 'ý'F--' 
Not long after Kenya became independent, Oginga 
Odinga, who had played a major role in the development of 
Sino-Kenyan relations became the focus of criticism from 
the ruling circles in Kenya for his radical and pro- 
Chinese inclinations. -ý11--ý 
In . 1965, Kenyatta was successful in his effort to 
undermine radical forces in the country, including Oginga 
Odinga, who virtually left the government and KANU to form 
the Kenya Popular Union (KPU), a new political party 
(March 1966), "most dedicated to the just demands of all 
the people of Kenya" 
free hand to promote 
in Kenyan politics. 
Zhou Enlai's rc 
made in February 1964 
in Africa. It became 
SPS. C_ Kenyatta. was thus lef t with a 
moderation' (i. e. anti-commi nisn) 
ývolutionary predictions for Africa 
alarmed most pro-Western governments 
a target of criticism in Kenya also. 
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The appearance of a pamphlet in Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Kenya (March 1965), allegedly published in 
Albania with China's help, labelling Kenyatta, Nyerere, 
, 06, Kaunda, Obote and Banda as 'imperialist stooges't 7 
heightened Kenyatta's antipathy towards China, although it 
was unlikeýly that China was involved in the publication of 
a pamphlet denouncing Nyerere'9'r-O and Obote. -'I'r--9 China 
denied that it had anything to do with the publication of 
such a pamphlet, claiming that it had been forged by its 
opponents in order to undermine Sino-African relations. 'Dr-I 
In March 1966, a motion was tabled in the Kenyan 
Senate and adopted by the government to the ef f ect that 
Zhou Enlails revolutionary statements (during his tour of 
Africa in 1964) were behind 'a number of coups, crises and 
assassinations' ever since, and calling on the government 
to sever diplomatic relations with China. ýIr-l 
China's protest`ý"ý-' was ignored by the government of 
Kenya. The relations between China and Kenya rapidly 
deteriorated and were eventually suspended (22 June 
1967). '! "" China's revolutionary assessment of Africa, 
reinforced by GPCR, intensified Kenyatta's government's 
hostility towards it. Mao's works were burned in Kenya5lý,, 
and Li Chieh, China's Char-g6 d'Affalr-es, was ordered (22 
June 1967) to leave the country. 'ý, '-r- The Chinese Embassy 
in Kenya registered a strongly worded protest against 
Kenya' s anti-China actions, without denying that it had 
distributed Mao's publications or revolutionary 
statenents. 
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I it was at] the request of the Kenyan 
people that the Chinese Embassy has 
supplied them with Chairman Mao Tse 
Tung's works and badges with his 
profile. This is entirely the normal 
function of an Embassy in promoting 
friendship between the two peoples and 
is in complete accord with 
international practice. 's", -1- 
In the same statement, the Chinese Embassy in Namibia 
argued that 
Mao Tse Tung's thought is Marxism7- 
Leninism of the era in which 
imperialism is heading for total 
collapse and socialism is advancing 
towards victory... the eager desire of 
the peoples of Kenya as well as of 
Africa and the rest of the world to 
study Mao Tse Tung's thought in quest 
of the way for opposing imperialism and 
seeking national salvation represents a 
great historic current no force can 
hold back. The stronger your 
obstruction and opposition, the greater 
the peoples efforts to make further 
exploration and study. Your 
obstruction and opposition will only 
result in setting yourselves further 
against the people. You will come to 
no better end. ', ---7 
13.3.2.9. Malawi 
Malawi was granted independence (July 1964) before 
Zambia, its neighbour (October 1964). Malawi has since 
been under the rule of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, an 
absolute dictator utterly loyal to the West and especially 
to Britain-ý"--13' He became one of the most outspoken 
Af rican 1 eaders- against communism, an enemy of African 
liberation movements, and a friend of the South African 
racist r6gime. Malawi refused to join OAU because of its 
condemnation of apartbeid. ""c- 
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Despite the reactionary character of Banda's 
government, it was reported-1-7c, that, during the early 
years of independence, China was keen to establish 
diplomatic relations with Malawi and to establish an 
Embassy in Zomba. Although no conclusive evidence can be 
found to suggest that China adopted unusual means to 
achieve this end, it is likely that China appreciated the 
geo-strategic significance of Malawi as an important and 
convenient base for Mozambique's liberation fighters. '071 
Malawi was opposed to China on ideological grounds from 
the beginning, as was evident in the Banda government's 
recognition of two Chinas. 9-7-: 2 
China's attempts to establish diplomatic relations 
with Malawi were believed to have included an offer of an 
interest-free loan of $18 million. 51--: 3 Assuming that such 
an offer was in fact made, the notivation underlying it 
could not have been to win Malawi's support in UN, but 
rather to gain access to the strategically important area 
which was situated within it, for the Mozambican 
liberation fighters. The standard interpretaion of 
China's move in Western analysis, that China's offer of 
aid represented an attempt to win Malawi's support in UN 
(at a time when China was not particularly interested in 
restoring its seat in the organisation), would appear to 
be a misjudgement. After all, China did not approach 
other African countries - e. g., the Ivory Coast and 
Burkind Faso (formerly Upper Volta) - which, like Malawi, 
had opposed China's admission to UN during the mid-160s. 
At the same time, it is hardly likely that China 
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overlooked Banda's outburst on the wars of national 
liberation then taking place in Indo-China. 
It is not the Americans, but the North 
Vietnamese and Chinese who stand in the 
way of peace. "-71 
Nor was it likely that China ignored the fact that Banda 
was prepared to offer Xalawi as a base for the operations 
and activities against liberation forces in neighbouring 
colonies by imperialist and racist forces. "-7r, China and 
Xalawi are yet to establish diplomatic relations. 1ý7C- 
13.3.2.10 Zambia 
The independence of Zambia was to be not only a great 
achievement for its people, but also to contain the 
makings of a great victory for national liberation 
movements in the region which were desperately in need of 
access to arms and equipment coming from or through 
Tanzania, especially Angola. 'ý1-7-7 Britain was well aware of 
Zambia's strategic vulnerability from the point of view of 
the imperialist and colonialist powers, of encroachment by 
anti-imperialist national liberation forces active in the 
region as a whole. To Zambia's north was Tanzania, an 
actively anti-colonialist country which gave hospitality 
on its territory to African liberation movements, to its 
west was Angola where armed struggle was already well 
advanced. In the years immediately preceding the granting 
of independence, the forces of anti-colonialism in Zambia 
(Northern Rhodesia) were becoming more and more radical 
even though they were under the leadership of Kaunda whose 
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natural political inclinations were Imoderatel and pro- 
Western in character. Rather than stoke any further the 
dangerous fire of radicalism in Zambian nationalist 
politics, Britain hastily granted independence to its 
northern Rhodesian territory in 1964. 
Until 1958, the African National Congress (ANC), 
founded in 1946, had played the effective role in the 
national independence movement in Northern Rhodesia. In 
ý4 1958, a split occurred in 6 ANCZ as a result of friction 
between Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda, its two main 
leaders, Kaunda being the stronger anti-colonialist and 
nationalist-"' When the Kaunda-led section of ANCZ 
rejected the British proposal for a Federation of Northern 
Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, Kaunda was imprisoned 
(1958). Within a year he was released. 
In 1960, Kaunda formed the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) which led the country to 
independence"' (24 October 1964). China recognised 
Kaunda's government and the new Republic (20 October 1964) 
even before it was inaugurated. The Chinese Ambassador to 
Tanzania, who had already visited Zambia (June 1964), 
returned to attend the independence celebrations. 'D'3cl 
Zambia too, promptly announced the decision to establish 
diplomatic relations withWRC (25 October 1964). `511" 
In November 1964, China opened its Embassy in Lusaka. 
cir,,,, 
L'i-Chen, the f irst Chinese Ambassador, arrived in the 
country (March 1965). -'113`1ý Since then, relations between 
China and Zambia have remained consistently positive. 
China's overtures to Zambia were motivated by its interest 
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in providing aid to liberation fighters in Angola and 
Zimbabwe and a desire to extend its already well 
established diplomatic relations with Tanzania further 
into southern/central Africa. 
In August 1965, the first official delegation from 
independent Zambia! 91ý1: ý led by E. H. K. Mudenda, Minister of 
Agriculture, "' visited China. This was followed a year 
later (31 July 1966) by another Zambian goodwill mission 
to China led by Justin Chimba, Minister of Commerce and 
Industry. '3111 Reuben Chitandika Kamanga, Vice-President of 
Zambia, led another delegation to China (19-22 August 
1966). An agreement was signed providing for cultural co- 
operation between the two countries. '91311, Zambia announced 
in October 1966 that China had offered economic and 
f inancial aid. -ý1*1`7 
By 1966, Sino-Zambian relations had gelled into a 
kind of special relationship. During the latter part of 
the 160s, China viewed Zambia as a major base for 
extending support to and establishing relations with a 
number of liberation movements in southern Africa. On the 
question, more fundamental to China's view of the 
ideological differences between the Soviet Union and 
itself, however, Zambia was to be only of peripheral 
significance to China's anti-Soviet campaign during the 
170s. 11' 
In June 1965, during its campaign in Africa in favour 
of convening a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, 
China found Zambia (like Tanzania) to be in favour of its 
postponement. China however, did not allow Zambia's lack 
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of enthusiasm for the conference to interfere with the 
smooth progress of its diplomatic relations in the larger 
interests of the national liberation and anti-imperialist 
forces in the region as a whole. 
13.3.3. Zhou Enlails ToUr of Africa (Decpynhpr IMS to 
The purpose of our rush to Africa is to 
enhance the mutual understanding 
between China and the friendly African 
countries, strengthen the traditional 
friendship between the Chinese people 
and the African people, further develop 
the relations of friendship and co- 
operation between China and the African 
countries, increase our knowledge and 
learn useful things from the African 
people. "-3"ý'3' 
In December 1963, Zhou Enlai paid a visit to 10 
African countries. ""s)-c> His African sojourn lasted nearly 
two months (14 December 1963 -4 February 1964). It was 
the first visit to Africa by a Chinese Prime Minister 
leading the largest ever official mission from China to 
visit Africa. "' In Algeria, Zhou Enlai put forward 
China's ideological conception and principles of State-to- 
State relations with Africa. He listed the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence, widening their scope 
to include the overall aim of constructing the broadest 
possible united front against colonialism and imperialism. 
The- Sino-Algerian Joint cO=unIqu6 (27 December 1963) 
contained the following main points: 
C China] supports the African 
peoples in their struggle to oppose 
imperialism and old and new colonialism 
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and to win and safeguard national 
independence; 
2. it supports the pursuance of a 
policy of peace, neutrality and non- 
alignment by the government of the 
African and Asian countries; 
3. it supports the desire of the 
African peoples to achieve unity and 
solidarity in the manner of their own 
choice; 
4. it supports the African countries 
in their efforts to settle their 
disputes through peaceful consultation; 
5. it holds that the sovereignty of 
the African and Arab countries should 
be respected by all other countries and 
that encroachment and interference from 
any quarter should be opposed. "-31-ý 
Four considerations are set forth below in an attempt 
to clarify the objectives of Zhou Enlai's visit to 
Africa, '21`3'ýa carrying the torch of militant Afro-Asian 
solidarity inspired by uncompromising anti-imperialism. 
Diplonatia recognition: This was important 
for China not only to win the support of 31 
African countries in UN or to secure State-to- 
State relations with them in order to promote 
trade, commercial and economic co-operation 
with them; but also. and DerhaDs even more 
important, to persuade governments and 
national independence movements which were 
prepared to listen to the voice of anti- 
imperialism - to draw up firm and positive 
resistance to the imperialist powers under the 
leadership of the United States. 'All the 
- 
world's forces opposing us imperialism 
unite'. "" For China hoped that the role of 
the United States in the Congo(L)'sllý" and its 
support for France during the Algerian war 
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of national liberation would constitute 
evidence to Africans (including 'moderate' 
-Africarfs) of the need to unite against the 
forces of imperialism. 
Si no-So viet dispute: One of the main 
objectives of Zhou Enlails visit to Africa was 
to explain China's position both on the Soviet 
Union's policy of D6tente and on NTBT. The 
latter was particularly important to China, as 
many African countries were about to sign 
NTBT. 'ý" Zhou Enlai hoped that direct talks 
would persuade more African countries to join 
China's oppositon to the NTBT. 
Sino-Indian dispute: Explaining China's line 
on its border dispute with India, a major 
power in the Afro-Asian and non-alignment 
movement, was another objective of Zhou 
Enlails sa-far'i to Africa. India, as well as 
the imperialist powers, was already engaged in 
active propaganda throughout the world, 
branding China as an 'aggressive' and 
I dangerous' enemy. 
V. Tht- second confex: ennp nf Afto-Asian Powers: 
Perhaps the most important objective of Zhou 
Enlai's trip to Africa was to win African 
suport for the convening of a second Afro- 
Asian Bandung-type conference in the hope that 
a militant united front in opposition to the 
leading anti-liberation forces could be 
established with continent-wide support. The 
campaign for a second Bandung-type conference 
was not only the major objective of Zhou 
Enlai's visit to Africa, but it also 
constituted the principal ingredient of 
China's role in international relations as a 
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whole during the period 1963-65. In addition 
to his tour of Africa (1963-64), Zhou Enla-i, 
in 1965, visited Africa twice within an 
interval of three months. The first visit was 
to Algeria (March 1965) scheduled to be the 
venue of the Afro-Asian conference, and Egypt. 
(April 1965). "5111 The second visit was to 
Tanzania, the Sudan, and Egypt. 51011, (June 
1965). 
China viewed Afro-Asian solidarity as consisting of 
popular forces (i. e. national independence, liberation and 
revolutionary movements as well as peoples' organisations) 
on the one hand, and on the other, of governments of 
independent countries. In other words, united front from 
both above and below. This, in its view, was the only 
practical means for bringing about a genuine understanding 
between oppressed peoples and nations in order to 
combat imperialism and old and new 
colonialism; to oppose aggression and 
intervention; to demand the withdrawal 
of foreign troops and removal of 
foreign military bases; to support the 
national liberation movement; to defend 
world peace; and to live in friendship 
in accordance with the [five] 
principles of peaceful coexistence., --- 
China hoped that the second Afro-Asian conference would, 
unlike the much more compromising and conciliatory', 000 
Non-Al igned Summit Confrence (Belgrade: September 1961), 
adopt policiels and resolutions positively opposed to the 
policy of D6tente with imperialist powers and in support 
of 
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an all-round condemnation of 
colonialism and imperialism. '-Ca 
China regarded a second Bandung-type conference not only 
as an alternative to non-alignment, but also as an 
alternative to UN itself. China argued that UN had failed 
to make any effective contribution to oppressed peoples 
and nations. A Joint communlqu6 (28 January 1965) between 
China and Indonesia, on the occasion of a visit to 
Djakarta by Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of China, stressed 
that 
E t] he f acts show that the United 
Nat i ons cannot ref lect the anti- 
imperialism and anti-colonialist desire 
of the people of the world, nor can it 
organisationally reflect the reality in 
which the new emerging and 
revolutionary forces have far 
outstripped the decadent forces. It is 
an organisation manipulated by the 
United States and other big powers. lc'Oý3 
China's initial campaign for a second Bandung-type 
conference began as early as April 1961, even before the 
first Non-Aligned Summit in Belgrade (September 1961). 1111ý` 
The reason it launched it was provided by the Treaty of 
Friendship between China and Indonesia, signed in Djakarta 
(1 April 11961) in which the two countries urged that it 
was 
very necessary... to convene the second 
Afro-Asian conference in the shortest 
time. ")" 
Indonesia, however, started its own campaign for a second 
conference only after it failed to win overwhelming 
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support for its claim to West Irian at the Belgrade 
Su mmi t. In V961, China was much more eager and 
determined than Indonesia to promote the idea of convening 
such a conference with the aim of providing the basis for 
moral (and even material)- encouragement to national 
liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
We not only have our own tasks - China 
and Indonesia both have territory, 
Taiwan and West Irian respectively, not 
yet liberated - we have also greater 
tasks: the national liberation 
movements waged by our brothers in 
Asian, African and Latin American 
countries need our help. '<><"F 
Despite their initial reluctance to support the 
convening of a second Bandung-type conference, both UAR 
and India followed the example of Indonesia by adding 
their support to it (September 1962). India hoped that 
the conference would provide an opportunity to win over 
African and Asian countries to its side in its dispute 
with China. 
The conclusion of NTBT (25 July 1963), partly in 
response to a major demand put forward at the Belgrade 
conference, represented a major obstacle to China's 
efforts to convene an Afro-Asian conference which could be 
depended upon to condemn negotiations on disarmament 
without the participation of non-nuclear countries. 1-1-so 
The chances of a second Bandung-type conference became 
even slimmer when Egypt and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), two 
founding members of the first Bandung Conference, began 
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TABLE 1.3.6 
7T4nU RN-LATIS AFRTCAN TOUR (DECEMBFR 1963 - JANUARY 1264) 
Country Visited Da. te 
Egypt 19-21 December 1963 
Algeria 21-27 December 1963 
Morocco 27-30 December 1963 
Tunisia 9-10 January 1964 
Ghana 11-16 Jantýary 1964 
Mali 16-21 January 1964 
Guinea 21-26 January1964 
Sudan 27-30 January 1964 
Ethiopia 1- 4 February 1964 
Somalia 
After visiting Morocco, Zhou En-lai went to Albania. 
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their own campaign"0110 (October 1963), not for a second 
Bandung-type, but for second Belgrade-type conference. ', "" 
China needed to make a special effort and undertake 
an intensive campaign if the much-desired second Afro- 
Asian Bandung-type conference was to materialise. with 
this objective in mind, Zhou Enlai went to Africa. In 
Egypt, the first country that he visited (14 December 
1963), Zhou Enlai praised'"" ---ý Nasser's prominent role in 
Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity, and for Egypt's 
participation in the First Games of the Newly Emergent 
Forces"" organised in Indonesia (November 1963). 
Nasser was, however, displeased that Zhou Enlai had 
completely failed to mention the first Conference of Non- 
Alignment which Egypt viewed as a great achievement. Nor 
did Zhou Enlai make any reference to the forthcoming 
Second Belgrade-type Conference for which Egypt, along 
with India and Yugoslavia were engaged in winning the 
support of Afro-Asian powers. 
Despite his reluctance and lack of enthusiasm for a 
second Bandung-type conference, Nasser, however, agreed 
that such a conference should take place, and praised the 
'Ten Principles' of the First Bandung Conference. 
However, Nasser insisted that more time should be allowed 
in order to prepare the ground for a second Bandung-type 
conference. He insisted that it should take place only 
after the second Non-Aligned (i. e. Belgrade-type) Summit 
Conference (Cairo being its proposed venue) -(1964). 
At the same time, Nasser expressed the hope that as 
one of the prominent founding powers of the First Bandung 
Conference, as an African country, and as AAPSOI s 
headquarters, Egypt would be called upon to play host to 
the second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference. Zhou Enlai 
ended his visit to Egypt without extracting a definite 
promise that a second Bandung-type conference would be 
held. However, both China and Egypt agreed that the 
Bandung Conference marked an 
illustrious turning point in the Asian- 
African people Is united struggle 
against imperialism. The fundamental 
interests of the Asian and African 
peoples lies in the further 
strengthening of the Asian-African 
solidarity, mutual support and closer 
co-operation between them. The two 
parties express their determination to 
take time to work for the preservation 
of the Bandung spirit. l<>'114 
In Algeria, (21-27 December 1963), despite the 
militant relations between China and Algeria which 
developed before and after Algerian independence, and the 
common ground shared by China and Algeria on all major 
issues dividing the world, 'Ic"'-- Zhou Enlai found that Ben 
Bella had some reservations about a second Bandung-type 
conference. He did not wish to Jeopardise his relations' 
with the Soviet Union, which were becoming a major source 
of economic and military aid to Algeria. 1-1- Algeria's 
support for a Bandung-type conference without the Soviet 
Union, as advocated by China would, in all likelihood, 
undermine Algerian-Soviet relations. In addition to this 
major consideration, the special relationship between 
Nasser and Ben Bella must also have militated against a 
clear commitment on Algeria's part in favour of convening 
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in the very near future another Bandung-type Afro-Asian 
conference. 
Zhou Enlai concluded his visit too, without 
extracting a clear-cut and unequivocal assurance of 
support for such a conference from his Algerian hosts. In- 
a joint communlqu6 (27 December 1963), the two leaders 
noted 
with satisfaction that since the 
Bandung Conf erence the cause of Af ro- 
Asian solidarity has developed 
tremendously... land both are] 
determined to increase their efforts to 
develop the Bandung spirit and 
reinforce Afro-Asian solidarity. lc"-7 
Algeria did not Join the campaign for convening such a 
conference until July 1964 when Algiers was selected as 
its venue. 
In the wake of the reluctance he met with in Algeria 
and Egypt, Zhou Enlai became rather more conciliatory in 
his subsequent statements on non-alignment to which he 
referred in more positive terms as contributing to the 
emergence of a militant Afro-Asian united front. At a 
press conference (Algiers: 26 December 1963), Zhou Enlai 
explained that China was not opposed to a non-aligned 
(i. e. Belgrade-type) conference as long as it led to a 
commitment to playing a progressive role and to positively 
responding to peoples' struggles throughout the world. In 
that sense, both conferences, Zhou Enlai argued, could be 
mutually compatible. 
Being a co=itted country China will 
obviously not participate in a 
conference of non-aligned countries. 
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We support the result of the f irst of 
non-aligned countries, in opposing 
imperialism, defending world peace, 
combatting colonialism and supporting 
the national liberation movements. I 
believe that the conference of non- 
aligned countries, should it take 
place, would follow the policy of the 
previous conference; otherwise it would 
fail to play the progressive role of 
arousing the people of the world to 
struggle. "' 
At the same press conference, Zhou Enlai also made it 
clear that an Afro-Asian (i. e. Bandung-type) conference 
could be more positive and progressive in character. 
In our opinion the second Afro-Asian 
conference, should it take place, would 
render the Ten Principles of the f irst 
Afro-Asian conference more specific, 
and play a still bigger role in the 
tasks of accelerating the end of 
colonial rule, further liquidating the 
colonial forces in Asian and African 
countries and promoting economic co- 
operation among Afro-Asian 
countries. '""ýýEemphasis added] 
In Morocco (27-30 December) and Tunisia (9-10 January 
1()64), Zhou Enlai failed to get any commitment on the 
projected'lc': ý' conference. However, he succeeded in 
Setting Tunisia' s recognition of PRC as the sole 
representative of the Chinese people. '--ze 
In Ghana (11-16 January 1964), however, Zhou Enlails 
campaign for a second Bandung-type conference received an 
enthusiastic and favourable response. Nkrumah and Zhou 
Enlai urged that 
an Afro-Asian conference was necessary 
and that active preparations should be 
made to convene it. 1411-ý 
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In addition to giving the proposed second Bandung-type 
Afro-Asian conference his endorsement, Nkrumah also 
expressed the hope that it would be expanded to include 
Latin American states. 1 0-: 2.4 
Nkrumah's proposal however, seemed to be impractical, 
and the outcome of such a far-flung tri-continental 
conference could be neither controlled, nor predicted. 
China was already experiencing great difficulty in its 
attempt to convene a Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference; 
the addition of Latin America would only add to the 
problems, obstacles and disputes already faced by China. 
At the same time, a tri-continental conference along 
the lines suggested by Nkrumah night even undermine the 
very concept of a Bandung-type meeting. An Afro-Asian- 
Latin-American conference, though based on the Bandung 
principles, would appear to many - especially those 
reluctant or opposed to a second Bandung-type conference - 
as another Non-Aligned (i. e. Bandung-type) Conference. 
The inclusion of Latin America in the conference could 
well have the effect of diluting the basis of Afro-Asian 
solidarity in the shape of AAPSO. 
Furthermore, Nkrumah's suggestion would require more 
time to implement, and China was in a hurry. China's 
leaders f elt that time was running out f or the idea of a 
second Bandung-type conference to get a grip on the 
imagination of Afro-Asian leaders, especially because 
Nehru and Tito were well on their way to preparing the 
ground for a second Bandung-type non-aligned conference. 
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Nkrumah's proposal also had the disadvantage of giving the 
Soviet Union time to bring influence to bear an countries 
to support its participation in such a conference. 
Finally a tri-continental conference would, by its very 
nature, provide greater opportunities to the Soviet Union 
or Soviet-sponsored (and Soviet-dominated) international 
organisations to participate in it and influence its 
proceedings and this would inevitably result in a serious 
set-back to China's aim of preventing the Soviet Union or 
its avowed supporters taking part in the conference. 
Despite all these difficulties, China agreed with Nkrumah 
that 
the convening of an Afro-Asian-Latin 
American people Is anti-imperialism 
conference was desirable. 'O-ýr- 
China would, in all probability, have been more 
enthusistic about a tri-continental conference provided it 
felt sure that such a conference would result in a 
militant united front against colonialism and imperialism 
capable of brushing aside the temporising influence of the 
Soviet Union and the conservative or Imoderatel elements 
in the non-aligned movement. For, as far as China was 
concerned, struggles waged by the peoples of Africa and 
Asia were by no means separable from those in which the 
peoples of Latin America were engaged. 
The African peopFle's anti-imperialist 
struggle is inseparable from that of 
the Asian and Latin American peoples. 
Their formation of a broad anti- 
imperialist united front in the 
struggle will inevitably promote a 
greater upsurge of the national 
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liberation movements in the three 
continents. 110ý6'- 
Zhou Enlails next stop was Mali (16-21 January 1964) 
where he was received well, and his campaign for a second 
Bandung-type conference given strong support. Both 
countries expressed their determination to make such a 
conference a major success for "the independent countries 
of Asia and Africa". Mali was the only African 
country to support the convening of a Bandung-type Afro- 
Asian conference before a second Belgrade-type non-aligned 
summit. I'll 
In Guinea (21-26 January 1964), Zhou Enlai found 
Sekou Tour& to be much in favour of a second Bandung-type 
conference. A joint communiqu6 stressed that 
conditions are ripe for the convocation 
of a second Afro-Asian conference and 
that active preparations should be made 
towards this end. 1131ý; ýý 
In the Sudan - one of the six African countries that 
took part in the first Bandung conference - too, Zhou 
Enlai was able to get agreement on the holding of a second 
Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference., --- 
In Ethiopia (30 January -1 February 1964), one of the 
founders of the Bandung Conference and an influential 
member of OAU, "'O"I Zhou Enlai did not appear to be worried 
about Haile Selassie's direct criticism of China's 
revolutionary role in Africa, its refusal to sign NTBT, 
and its conflict with India. '1'0: 311ý What mattered was the 
Emperor's agreement to support the convening of a second 
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Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference. At a State 
banquet given in his honour, Zhou Enlai expressed the view 
that despite the fact that 
Eolur countries differ in social 
systems, and the policies we pursue are 
not completely the same, but as we are 
getting together our aim is to seek 
common grounds and to try to eliminate 
or reserve our differences for the time 
being. 
Zhou Enlails Ethiopian visit was also notable for his 
success in winning Haile Selassie$s support against the 
wishes of the United States, a great ally - for China's 
admission to UN. The Emperor "found it unacceptable to 
ignore representation of 700 million peoplell. '110ý161ý 
The Emperor expressed the Ethiopian 
government's point of view that the 
legitimate rights of the People's 
Republic of China in the United Nations 
must be reinstated if this would-be 
world organisation is to fulfill 
effectively its mission in accordance 
with its Charter. "0*1-- 
However, strong American influence on the one hand, and on 
the other, the Emperor's fear of Zhou Enlails 
revolutionary hardline' 10: 2"7 stood as barriers to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
Ethiopia during the phase of Sino-African relations under 
discussion. "" However, this step was eventually to be 
taken in 1970, when China's foreign policy became somewhat 
more flexible, and there were indications of a softening 
towards it on the part of the United States. 1c"I On this 
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particular occasion, the United States was opposed even to 
the issue of a Joint communlqu6 by China and Ethiapiall"O 
Somalia, which was the last country (1-4 February) on 
Zhou Enlai's African itinerary on this occasion, not only 
gave strong support to China's campaign for a second 
Bandung-type conference'"I but also identified itself 
with China on the major issues affecting international 
relations. 1'11Aý2 
Zhou Enlai concluded his tour of ten African 
countries' '11`a after winning the support of eight of them: 
Egypt and Algeria (albeit reluctantly), Ghana, Mali, 
Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. He was also able to 
persuade Tunisia to recognise PRC, and Ethiopia to support 
PRCIs admission to UN. 
Zhou Enlails African odyssey was followed by an Asian 
tour. After leaving Somalia, he visited Burma (14 
February 1964), Pakistan (18 February) and Sri Lanka (28 
February). All three countries supported the convening of 
a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference. 11011 
In his report to the Joint Session of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress and the 
Plenary Meeting of the State Council (April 1964), Zhou 
Enlai summarised his impression of his African and Asian 
travels (December 1963-February 1964) in the following 
terms 
Our visit was crowned with full success 
and attained the desired 
objectives... we found everywhere that 
the Bandung spirit was deeply 
embedded... in the peoples' hearts and 
that the Afro-Asian peoples' cause of 
unity against imperialism had developed 
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greatly. Leaders of many Asian-African 
countries hold that the time is ripe 
for convening a second Asian-Africn 
conference and active preparations 
should be made to this purpose. "Ollr- 
Zhou Enlails tour of Africa was followed by a Preparatory 
Meeting for the second Afro-Asian conference (Djakarta: 
10-15 April 1964). This meeting was attended by Algeria, 
Cameroon, Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt Guinea and 
Morocco. I "I At this meeting, Chen Yi, China's Foreign 
Minister, enumerated five tasks to be accomplished by the 
proposed conference: 
C to] further strengthen unity and co- 
operation, and adopt concrete measures to 
support the Asian and African peoples who are 
still under colonial rule, in their struggles 
for national independence. 
[to] further strengthen unity and co-operation 
in order to oppose outside interference, 
safeguard State sovereignty and consolidate 
national independence. 
I to] carry out economic, cultural and 
technological co-operation on the I basis of 
the3 principles of equality, mutual benefit 
and non-interference in each others internal 
affairs, and without imposing any political 
conditions and privileges, and graduai*ly 
develop an independent national economy and 
take the road of regeneration through self- 
reliance. 
iv. [ to] strengthen friendly co-operation in 
international affairs on the basis of the Ten 
Principles of the Bandung Conference and 
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strive f or ou r rightful position in 
international organisations. 
V. [to] further strengthen unity and co-operation 
in order to oppose the imperialist policies of 
aggression and war, and to defend world 
peace. "01-7 
China' s position at this meeting was indeed 
formidable, to say the least. The Soviet Union was not 
invited"c"" to the conference. This was a set-back not 
only to the Soviet Union but to India and Sri Lanka, its 
leading supporters. 101*'-" The Soviet Union protested 
against such a decision. It argued that two-thirds of its 
territory lay in Asia; its Soviet territory consisted of 
40 per cent of the continent of Asia. It further argued 
that the Soviet/Asian republics were autonomous states, 
and as such, were entitled to be represented at a 
conference of Asian states. 101-10, For the first time, the 
Sino-Soviet dispute spilled over into a conference at 
which non-socialist powers were present. "Or" Also, f or 
the first time, China found itself well-placed vis A vis 
the Soviet Union on a State-to-State level in the Afro- 
Asian world. 
At this meeting, India argued that its support for 
the Soviet Union's participation in the conference was 
motivated by the following considerations: 
A large part of the Soviet Union lay in the 
continent of Asia; 
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The Soviet Union was already a member of 
various African-Asian organisations at the 
peoples' level (e. g. the African-Asian Film 
Festival, the African-Asian Workers' 
Conference, the African-Asian Games and so 
on). 
iii. The Soviet Union would make a worthy 
contribution to all that we are striving 
f or. I Or. -- 
India's support was, however, not based so much on the 
rather it 'was based oný its own dispute with 
China and the fear that the latter might forge ahead as 
the leading power in the Afro-Asian world. 
In contrast to India's position in favour of the 
Soviet Union's participation in the projected second 
Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, Chen Yi, the head of 
the Chinese delegation argued that 
There were eight autonomous Asian 
republics in the Soviet Union but 
they were not sovereign states.. 
The [second] African-Asian con- 
ference was to be a conference of 
Heads*of States and that required 
f ormal participation by the 
country concerned. it was 
therefore a different matter from 
peoples' meetings such as film 
festivals, etc. 
iii. The Soviet Union had not supported 
a very reasonable proposal made by 
the Afro-Asian countries in its 
leading bodies and agencies. And, 
strangely enough, the Soviet Union 
had linked its rejection of this 
proposal with the question of 
China's membership of the UN. 
China had already made its stand 
clear on a number of occasions, 
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that it was quite ready to allow 
the overall interests of the Afro- 
Asian countries to be considered 
first, without placing its own 
interests in the way. 
V. But even if the Soviet Union were 
to change its attitude and support 
Africa and Asia in this, China 
would still not agree to it being 
invited. A country could not be 
invited just because it supported 
Africa-Asia or as a recognition of 
the debt owed to it. Such 
sentiments ought to be catered for 
on other forums, and not by 
inviting it to an Afro-Asian 
Conference. I c"Ir-: 3 
Similarly, the Guinean delegate argued in support of 
China that even though the relations between Guinea and 
the Soviet Union were excellent, the latter was 
nevertheless a European country... if 
the Soviet Union lay in Asia, the same 
might be said of the US with its 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico etc. in Asia. 'Or-11 
The Guinean delegate added that, despite the fact that the 
Soviet Union stretched across from the eastern border of 
Poland to Siberia. 
politically it was a single entity, and 
the capital of the Soviet Union is in 
Europe. "" 
At the same time, he continued, Soviet participation would 
create division among Afro-Asian countries"c"Ir- rather than 
uniting them. This, he pointed out, had already happened 
in previous Afroý--Asian solidarity meetings at the people- 
to-people level. 
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At this Preparatory Meeting, however, China refrained 
from antaSonising those countries in favour of 
participation by the Soviet Union. 1-S7 For tactical 
reasons, China made an effort to restrict its opposition 
to inviting the Soviet Union to the conference in 
accordance with the spirit of the preparatory stage of the 
conference. This proved to be the correct approach on 
China's part, because too great an obsession with the 
Soviet Union at such an early stage would almost certainly 
have reduced the chances of the conference taking place at 
all. 
China however, began to raise its critical voice 
against the advocates of the Soviet Union' s participation 
after the Preparatory Meeting. The People's Daily (31 May 
1964) responded to India's argument in favour of the 
Soviet Union's participation by reminding Nehru that he 
himself had been opposed to the Soviet Union's 
participation in the Bandung Conference ten years before, 
when he, speaking about the composition of the First Afro- 
Asian Conference at a press conference (Djakarta: 30 
December 1954) pointed out that 
Soviet Asia was not invited because 
politically it was part of a European 
unit, namely the Soviet Union. "01131 
At the Preparatory Meeting it was decided that the 
Conference would take place- in Africa. In July 1964, 
Algeria was chosen by OAU as the host country. 'Or-ý The 
Conference was originally scheduled to take place in 
February 1965.1'01" but because of the very short time 
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availableý!. for--. preparation,, Algeria requested that the 
Conference shou ld be delayed'O"l until 29 June 1965. 
Partly to keep up the momentum of China's campaign in 
favour of the forthcoming second Bandung-type conference 
conference, and partly to attend the Anniversary (1 
'November 1964) 
., of 
the Algerian Revolution, Chen Yi, 
China's Foreign Minister, led a delegation to Algeria (1-6 
September 1964). 1'01ý1 
During the four month period preceding the 
Conference, scheduled for June 1965, China intensified its 
campaign. . 
In March, Zhou Enlai visited Algeria, where he 
found that the atmosphere of December 1963 had changed 
into one of enthusiam for a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian 
conference. "O'"' 
A National People's Congress delegation from China 
visited Mali, Guinea, the Central African Republic and 
Ghana, at about the s6Lme time and for the same purpose. 
During the period May-June 1964, Chinese Vice-Foreign 
Minister visited Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo(B), 
and CAR. " "" In June, as has already been noted, Zhou 
Enlai visited Tanzania, the Sudan, and Egypt. 
At the final preparatory meeting held in Algiers (8 
June 19651-, it was, decided that a preparatory meeting of 
Foreign Ministefý; would-be le-1-d-fi-ve days (24 June)-before 
the actual Conference (29-Jund"). - 
China's AfroAs! ýin---a0pirations- and its lptst-minute - 
campaign, were-; _-g-ivqn- --a -_by sudden. 
pol. itical_ 
developmen -thý --toTjnt: rv whe-r6- -tne-- 
C6 eren was to be 'tsý'in -ce 
held. Oiý 19 trune---1665, Houari -Bounedi6nne, 
Vice-Prepident 
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of Algeria and Defence Minister, deposed Ben Bella, the 
Algerian President. 
In its eagerness that domestic political developments 
should not be allowed to influence the fate of the 
conference, China recognised without delay the 
Revolutionary Council and the new government of Algeria 
under the leadership of Boumedi6nne. 11111-r- China could not 
afford postponement of the Conference, especially because 
support for the Soviet Union's participation in it was 
increasing day by day. '10c-f- 
Egypt, as a co-founder of the first Bandung 
Conference, made a request to the effect that in view of 
the sudden change of government in Algeria the conference 
should be postponed. ""' Egypt's position in the matter 
was not only influenced by the close friendship that 
prevailed between Nasser and Ben Bella but also by the 
fact that it was not enthusiastic, in the first place, 
about a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian Conference. 
Despite Boumedi6nne's revolutionary inclination, 
progressive Afri_can countries feared that Algeria might 
turn the clock back, and cease to be a major base for 
guerrilla training and liberation movements. Thus China's 
immediate recognition of the new Algerian government (and 
its insistence that the Conference should be held as 
scheduled) was questioned even by its friends such as 
Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania which viewed the deposition of 
Ben Bella 'with disfavourl. la*-111 
By the time the preparatory meeting of Foreign 
Ministers was to be held, (24 June), most Afro-Asian 
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members (including Ghana and Tanzania'1071ý but not 
Indonesia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and of course 
China) were in favour of a postponement' 071 of the 
Conference. As a consequence it was eventually postponed 
until November. 
The postponement of the Conference was seen as a set- 
back for China, and a victory for India and the Soviet 
Union and their supporters who wanted more time in order 
to gain more support for the Soviet Union's participation 
in the Conference. Algeria, however, viewed the 
postponement of the Conference as a set-back for the 
colonial and imperial powerslc, -7ý which tried to undermine 
Afro-Asian solidarity. Algeria was optimistic that 
postponement would allow more time to reconcile other 
differences between the participant countries, and thus to 
reinforce Afro-Asian solidarity at the expense of the 
imperialist powers. 1--7: 31 
By November 1965, new developments had emerged which, 
paradoxically, led China to seek a further postponement of 
the Conference. 
China was convinced that it would not be 
possible to get a unanimous resolution passed 
condemning the United States-led imperialist 
powers, and supporting armed resistance for 
liberation, because the influence of the 
Soviet Union, India and the champions of 
D6tente on Afro-Asian states was rapidly 
increasing. As far as China was concerned. an 
Afro-Asian conference which would not adopt 
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4 
resolutions condemning US imperialism, 
... would be a waste. 
"11-711 
In a letter (22 October 1965) to leaders of 
African and Asian countries, Zhou Enlai 
explained China's reasons for requesting a 
postponement in a clearer manner. 
China sincerely hoped that the 
conference could be held on November 5 
and could turn out a success. 
Unfortunately since the end of June the 
situation has grown more and more 
complicated... new tensions and 
conflicts have occured between certain 
Afro-Asian countries during the period, 
and even now there exist among Afro- 
Asian countries differences... over a 
series of questions of key importance 
to the success of the second Afro-Asian 
Conference, e. g. whether a non Afro- 
Asian country is entitled to 
participate in the Afro-Asian con- 
ference, whether the second Afro-Asian 
conference should have anything to do 
with the United Nations and whether it 
is necessary for the conference to 
condemn the imperialists... and 
particularly to condemn the us 
imperialist aggression in Vietnam... It 
can be said that the present 
circumstances are more unfavourable to 
the holding of the conference than 
those which prevailed in June... 11: 11-71 
ii. China had not been able to convince the 
majority of participants expected to attend 
the Conference that they should oppose the 
invitation of U Thant, "1111-- Secretary General 
of UN, to the Conference. UN was viewed by 
China, along with Indonesia, as an instrument 
of the imperialist powers. Following 
Indonesia's withdrawal from UN (January 1965), 
China and Indonesia had already started a 
campaign for the establishment of an 
alternative UN, under the name of the New 
Conference of the Emerging Forces (CONEFO). 
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During the period June-November 1965, 
advocates of the Soviet Union's participation 
in the Conference. -rapidly-increased 
in number. 
Even Algeria, China's close friend and host 
country, started to press for the presence of 
both the Soviet Union and China at the 
Conference. "0'" 
iv. The Indo-Pakistan clash over Kashmir 
(September 1965) was another obstacle to the 
Conference. It was anticipated that the 
conflict between Pakistan and India, both 
founding members of the first Bandung 
Conference, would undermine the second 
Bandung-type Afro-Asian Conference. 
V. Finally, the coup d'6tat in Indonesia (31 
September 1965), which clearly represented the 
beginning of the end of the rule of Sukarno, a 
strong supporter of a second Bandung-type 
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African people an the one hand and colonialism 
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We are now in a great new era of world 
revolution. The revolutionary upheaval 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America is 
sure to deal the whole world a decisive 
and crushing blow. ' 
The main developments during the 1965-66 period, 
including the escalation of national liberation wars in 
Indo-China as moved from 'threat to 
action', " the worsening of the ideological dispute between 
China and the Soviet Union, the deterioration of 
diplomatic relations between China and a number of pro- 
Western African countries, ý China's failure to convene a 
second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, A and the 
revolutionary wave in China accompanying GPCR, contributed 
to the emergence of a new phase (1966-69) in Sino-African 
relations. 
14.1. People-to-People Relations or 'United Front 
Bel" 
14.1.1. Relations between China and Natinnnl TAhera 
In the Soviet Union they had told us 
that the decisive factor is weapons. 
When I got to Itunbi (a military 
training camp in Tanzania) where there 
were Chinese instructors, I was told 
the decisive factor was the 
people ..... now I agree with the 
Chinese. r- 
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14.1.1.1. Guinea-Bissau and-Cape Verde 
PAIGC was the only national liberation movement 
belonging to the Conference of Nationalist Organisations 
of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP)r- which was free from 
serious frictions within its leadership. It was not 
rivalled by any other organisation in the country. 
Amilcar Cabral, PAIGC's Secretary General, was an 
important factor in the unity of the organisation. Thus, 
during the period 1966-69, PAIGC was the only national 
liberation movement belonging to CONCP to carry through 
its armed struggle without being undermined by 
factionalism or splits. By the end of the 160s, PAIGC was 
able to control two-thirds of the rural area of Guinea- 
Bissau. '7 
Throughout the GPCR period, China continued its 
material support for, and training of, PAIGC liberation 
fighters through both Guinea and OAU's African Liberation 
Committee (ANC). ' 
Angola 
Spl i ts within its leadership, 31 including the 
departure of Savimbi (March 1966), to form his own 
movement (UNITA) seriously weakened FNLA's early strength. 
Under the dominant leadership of Holden Roberto, moderate 
and pro-Western in orientation, "'0 supported by Mobutu of 
Zaire, FNLA spe nt much of its energy during the latter 
part of the '60S fighting with MPLA and UNITA - rather 
than actively promoting struggles against Portuguese 
colonialism. "' During this period, FNLA hardly exerted 
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any influence in, or had any impact on, the national 
1 iberation struggles in Angola. 'ý 
The overthrow of the pro-Western government of 
Congo(B) in August 1963 and the independence of Zambia 
(October 1964), the other strategically important country, 
provided fresh opportunitiesla forrXPLA during the period 
03- 
1966-69. By the end of the 160s, /'NMPLA became 
unquestionably the leading and most progressive liberation 
movement in Angola. It gave Angolan 'nationalism a 
Marxist content'. "49- 
In 1964, from the northern enclave of Cabinda 
bordering on Congo(B), MPLA began its military activities 
and guerrilla operations against the Portuguese colonial 
power. By 1966, 
L 
: 
ýPLA 
was able to establish 20 bases both 
in the north of Cabinda and in the east, along Zambia's 
borders with Angola. 'r- 
VXMPLA's 
general and widespread armed strikes did not, 
however, gain momentum until 1968. During the intervening 
period (1966-68), MPLA seriously addressed the task of 
strengthening its leadership and organisation. At the 
same time, it was looking for more bases in territories 
adjoining (especially in Zambia) Angola from where 
guerrilla operations could be launched more easily and 
effective ly. 
VW 
In 1966, (\MPLA obtained Zambia's consent to launch 
attacks on the Portuguese colonial-power in the provinces 
of M LA . pxico and'- 
Cuamdo-Cubango. In February 1968, f.,, MP 
transferred its headquarters from the Congo(B) to the 
interior of Angola, where it began a successful and wide- 
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spread guerrilla struggle"' especially in the strategic 
areas of Moxico, Cuando-Cubango and Luanda. "' By 1970 the 
MPLA was in control of at least one third of Angola. 10 
VAS- 
At the same time, in the intrnational fieldt"'MPLA was 
gaining support from most of the anti-colonialist 
countries - especially Egypt, the Soviet Union, and Mali. 
In 1971, its growing internal and international popularity 
led OAU to recognise it as the leading liberation movement 
of Angola-` 
to- 
While JýMPLAp during the 1966-68 period. was thus 
engaged in strengthening its political and military 
positic3n, 2"I UNITA, basing its strategy an self-reliance, 
with the peasantry as the main force, ýý was already 
engaged in active guerrilla operations from within Angola. 
Perhaps this was the reason why UNITA had closer relations 
with, and was given more support by Chinaý--a or by 'Maoist 
groups in Europe'-ýý1'4 A report (30 September 1968) by 
H,:; Inhua News Agency pointed out that: 
The patriotic armed forces of the 
National Union for Total Independence 
(UNITA), which was built in Angola two 
years ago , have attached great 
importance to arousing masses, 
strengthening political work and 
persevering in armed struggle. After 
going through the difficult and 
tortuous course of fighting in the past 
two years, they are now active in the 
areas of Luanda, Moxico and Cuando- 
Cubango in the northern and southern 
parts of Angola. ýý'r- 
However, it must be emphasised that throughout the 
decade of the 160s, China did notý-- publicly and actively 
identify itself with one Angolan national liberation 
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movement to the exclusion of the others, even though UNITA 
seems to have received more of China's attention. 27 MPLA 
and UNITA were also supportedý21ý1 and encouraged, and their 
struggles [which, during 1968-69, cost Portugal $302 
million (i. e., 50% of the Portuguese military budget, for 
maintaining its 180,000 men)]ý'ý, were given equal importnce 
in Chinese propaganda. 
Mozambique 
FRELIMO, too, like other national liberation 
movements in southern Africa, faced, for a short time, a 
rival. The Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) 
sprang up as a result of splits within FRELIMO's 
leadership. ý', ý COREMO- accused FRELIMO of adopting 
ladventurist armed strugglel.:: 31 
Unable to win support from, or recognition by OAU, 
COREMO looked upon China as an i=ediate source of aid and 
hence adopted a pro-China stance. ý1ý2 Thus, for example, 
COREMO's Deputy Chief was known to have declared that 
C t) he methods of the Eight Route Army 
and the Vietnamese national Liberation 
Front are right for Africa. The 
Russian methods are wrong - they are 
partly afraid of the peasants and 
crushed and collectivised them. The 
Chinese had to build a National 
Liberation Army on solid peasant 
support, they taught us we had to 
utilise 30 million Africans in Southern 
Africa. " 
China, however, showed little interestý31 in COREMO. 
Its support for, and identification with, FRELIMO as 
unquestionably the leading national liberation movement in 
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Mozambique continued.: 21r- Through Tanzania FRELIMO 
continued to receive the largest portion of China's aid to 
national liberation movements in all Portuguese 
colonies. ý31-- 
As friction:: 3--l within its leadership rapidly 
disappeared, FRELIMO became strong in the political as 
well as the military fieldsO*3 by the early 170s. COREMO 
faded away, " having lost its momentum even during 
Mondlane's lifetime. " 
14.1.1.4. Zimbabwe/Emuthf-rn Rhodesia 
During the period under consideration (1966-69), 
Zimbabwe became the f irst instance of an African country 
in which China directly favoured one national liberation 
movement more than its rival. China openly identified 
itself with the aims and objectives of ZANU and not with 
ZAPU which received support from the Soviet Union. The 
reason for this lay not so much in the fact that an 
ideological dispute was raging between China and the 
Soviet Union, but rather in 'the fact that, from its 
guerrilla bases in Zambia, ZANU was the first national 
liberation movement to launch a full-scale <April 1966) 
guerrilla war in Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia. ZANU 
guerrilla fighters trained in China-"' played a leading 
role in the war. 
ZAPU denounced ZANU's action as 'irresponsible' - and 
as being dictated by 'pro-Chinese extremists' . 1"' ZANU 
continued its guerrilla operation against, and offered 
active resistance to, the illegal Southern Rhodesian white 
minority r6gime. It forged a link with China during GPCR. 
During early 1966, ZANU sent its third group of guerrillas 
for training to China. " In January 1969, a team of eight 
Chinese instructors arrived in Tanzania to train the 
Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU's military 
wi ng. 
14.1.1.5. Namibia 
Namibia which was formerly under German colonial rule 
(until 1914), has been under South African occupation ever 
since. The national independence movement in Namibia did 
not opt for armed struggle as the ultimate means for 
liberation until the South African authorities refused to 
comply with the 1966 decision of the International Court 
of Justice which affirmed that South Africa had no legal 
claim to maintain its control over Namibian territory. " 
The South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO), 
founded in April 1958, with Sam Nujoma its leader, and the 
South West Africa National Union (SWANU), founded in 
February 1958 under the leadership of Fanuel Jairetuncia 
Kozonguizi, have been the leading nationalist movements in 
Namibia. "-- 
Initially, SWANU seemed to be more militant and 
better organised than SWAPO. China supported it and took 
an interest in its activities. -, -- 
China' s direct contacts with SWAYU took place at the 
second Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference (Conakry: 
11-15 April 1960). at which Kozonguizi was elected to the 
Executive Committee along with Liao Chleng. chih (China), 
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Ouandie (Cameroon), Oginga Odinga (Kenya), Joshua Nkomo 
(Zimbabwe), Ahmed Tlili (Tunisia) and Patrice Lumumba 
C Congo (L) I 
At the AAPSO Conference (Moshi: February 1963), 
representatives from China showed considerable interest in 
SWANU. They regularly held meetings with Kozonguizi 
during intervals in the Conference., ";, 
I 
At the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples Solidarity 
Conference (Havana: January 1960>, -- SWANU openly 
expressed its pro-Chinese character. It was among the 
delegations which openly attacked the Soviet Union's 
collusion with the United States 'under the guise of 
peaceful coexistence' At this conference, Kozonguizi 
strongly opposed any resolutions which would fall short of 
a condemnation of the targets of the national liberation 
movements. Otherwise, Kozonguizill argued, 
It will be useless to go away from here 
with these general, watered-down so- 
called "unanimous" declarations. `ý 
At the same time, Kozonguizi argued that armed struggle 
was the only effective means of liberation. 
The independence of Africa is not 
complete... because of that the armed 
struggle in that continent of my birth 
is not complete. Asia will never see 
peace unless the imperialists are 
driven out by force. Latin America, 
except Cuba, will always remain in the 
US hands without armed struggle... 
Because of its militant and anti-Soviet position, 
SWANU was expelled at the AAPSO Council meeting held in 
Nicosia (February 1967). s--, 4 
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The resignation of Kozonguizi as President, of SWANU 
(July 1966) in protest against the moderaterO leaders of 
the organisation gave a boost to the fortunes of SWAPO as 
the leading national liberation movement in Namibia. FIrý 
SWAPO was soon recognised by the African Liberation 
Committee as such. ---7 
China, however, never openly expressed its 
identification exclusively with either SWAPO or SWANU, 
because both organisations advocated armed resistance and 
expressed admiration of China's successful strategy of 
people's war. A leading founder of SWAPO told Hutchison 
(Dar es Salaam: February 1971) that 
Ewle all read Mao, as a practicD manual 
of guerrilla warfare, just as we read 
British accounts of the Malaysian 
campaign - to show us how the enemy 
thinks. We respect China's revolution, 
as we respect all revolutions, and can 
learn from it. r-15, 
Moral and material support was extended to both 
organisations. r-'ý' 
14.1.1.6. Azania 
As has already been pointed out, '"', despite ANCIs 
moderate character China's main concern was to see both 
organisations -f-ANC and (\ PAC - united by their common 
target. Although this remained China's position duringVý\k 
GPCR, it effect-ively seemed to lean more towards the 
bý-ý militant PAC. During this period, two PAC missions 
visited China and returned with $20,000 on each 
occasion. '" 
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In Cairo (November 1966) PAC, along with the 
organisations of eight African national movements (viz the 
Basutoland Congress Party, the Bechuanaland Peoples' 
Party, the Mozambique Revolutionary Council, the Swaziland 
Progressive Party, SWANU, ZANU, and an Angolan group), 
reacted to their exclusion from the seminar 'Africa: 
National and Social Revolution' (24-29 November 1966), 
under the Soviet Union's sponsorship, by issuing a joint 
statement in protest. The statement criticised 'peaceful 
coexistence' and the 'revisionist line* advocated by the 
Soviet Union vis A vis national liberation struggles. 
The interest of the Soviet ruling 
clique in the affairs of the African 
revolution is dictated by its need to 
secure international backing for its 
foreign policy, is oriented to the 
object of maintaining friendly 
relations with US imperialism and 
entering into a 'Holy Alliance' with it 
to prevent J ointly, as two Super 
Powers, the spread of revolution in the 
colonial and semi-colonial world. --ý2 
The impact of the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) on ANC played a major part in the latter's moderate 
character. Gý31 
[ý-. 
SACP always identified itself with the 
Soviet Union's line of peaceful 3neans of liberation. 
PAC's radical character was viewed byj-., SACP as disruptive 
of the revolutionary struggle and dictated by Chinese 
opportunists at the expense of liberation struggles. SACP 
argued that 
[t1he oppressed people of our country 
and all honest revolutionaries are 
indignant at the unprincipled backing 
given by the Chinese government to 
certain discredited splinter groups of 
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Southern Africa. These groups are 
known to all, including the Chinese 
communists, for their racialism, anti- 
communism and disruption of the 
liberation struggle. By associating 
with them, the Chinese leaders only 
expose their own opportunism and lack 
of principle. "' 
In Khartoum (January 1969), at the World Council of 
L-0- 60- 
Peace which was held Jointly witht-AAPSO, WAC was among 
four other national movementsr-r- which directly attacked 
the proposal of the Soviet Union for an 'International 
Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements of the 
Portuguese Colonies in Southern Africa' . "-1ý4-PAC viewed 
such a proposal as an attempt on the Soviet Union's part 
calculated 
to control the liberation struggles of 
the Portuguese colonies and Southern 
Africa in order to further Soviet co- 
operation with the United States for 
their joint domination of the world. ", ' 
ONA- 
It is worth noting that a militant faction in PANC 
also attacked the Soviet Union's collusion with US 
imperialism and stressed that China's methods and means of 
liberation were the correct ones for African liberation 
and that the co-operation between the Chinese and South 
African peoples 
- would continue to grow until our 
common enemies and the imperialists, in 
particular US imperialism, the leader 
of the imperialists in their global 
strategy, have been wiped off the face 
of the earth. The establishment of the 
Peopleýs Republic of China was a 
monumental and indelible achievement in 
the struggle for national independence 
and world peace. 'It was a great 
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inspiration to all revolutionaries 
throughout the world. -a 
14.1.2. China and AAPSO 
The failure to convene a second Afro-Asian conference 
and the growing influence of the Soviet Union on AAPSO 
contributed to the lessening of China's enthusiasm for a 
collective and militant Afro-Asian united front vis A vis 
the policy of D6tente and in favour of firm action against 
colonialism and imperialism. 
Ideological debates between China and the Soviet 
Union at the meetings not only of the Soviet Union- 
sponsored international organisations but also ofMAPSO 
during the period under consideration (1966-69), became 
much sharper, more direct and confrontational to the 
extent of China eventually boycotting their meetings. 
At the World Council of Peace (WCP) meeting, (June 
1966), China's insistence that the United States and its 
allies should be resisted and not appeased, was 
reJected-11 For China, the need to attend WCP meetings 
was thus obviated. -I"O 
China's only remaining practical and immediate hope 
of counter-balancing the Soviet Union's dominant position 
in WPC and other international organisations lay in the 
fact that AAPSO numbered among its members several which 
were directly affected by colonialism, imperialism and 
neo-colonialism. 
The Soviet Union's efforts to undermine or even to 
eliminate China's influence, did not stop with the steps 
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it took to sponsor other international organisations. The 
Soviet Union also attempted to influence Third World 
countries against China. The Soviet Union's initial 
attempt towards this end faced a set back when the first 
Afro-Asian-Latin American conference (the Tri-continental 
solidarity conference) initiated 71 by AAPSO (Havana: 
January 1966) strongly condemned the line on peaceful 
coexistence with the United States and its 
all ies. -112 The General Declaration of the 
conference stated that: 
... the present international situation 
is favourable to the anti-imperialist 
revolutionary struggles. It roundly 
condemns US imperialism as the sworn 
enemy of the people of the world and an 
international gendarme... The oppressed 
nations and peoples have the right to 
wage popular armed struggles to defeat 
imperialism and its lackeys. 7*1 
Hailing the conference, the People's Daily (18 January 
1966) wrote as follows: 
The broad masses of the Asian African 
and Latin-American regions have become 
increasingly convinced that armed 
struggle is the correct path for the 
oppressed nations and oppressed peoples 
to win independence and liberation, and 
they have firm faith in people's war as 
the most active way to deal with US 
imperialism and its lackeys. Many 
delegates showed by their own 
experience that it is necessary to use 
revolutionary violence to answer the 
counter-revolutionary violence of US 
imperialism and its lackeys, that the 
independence and freedom of all peoples 
can only be won by armed f orces, and 
that only by armed f orce can their own 
independence and freedom be defended. " 
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In April 1966 the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the 
Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association 
(AAJA) was convened in Beijing. This meeting adopted firm 
resolutions against the imperialist powers and urged 
active support for liberation movements engaged in armed 
struggle. 7r- 
The f irst71-3 formal split in K AAPSO, caused by Sino- 
Soviet differences, began at a meeting (June 1966) of the 
Permanent Bureau of the Afro-Asian Writers' Organisation 
(AAWO). At this meeting the Soviet Union, in a move 
designed to undermine China's vigorous influence within 
the AAWO, attempted to engineer the transfer -77 of its 
permanent bureau from Colombo (capital of Sri Lanka, 
0A 
Ceylon as it then was) to AAPSO's permanent secretariat in 
Cairo. The Soviet Union hoped that by doing so, it could 
LL ýJ- 
increase its own influence oihAAWO in an ambience of close 
Soviet-Egyptian brotherhood. The Soviet Union was then 
already in the final stages of completing the construction 
of the Aswan Dam. Towards this end, the Soviet Union 
mobilised a small conciliatory group, consisting of 13 
countries" in AAWO to hold a meeting in Cairo (June 1966) 
which called for a general meeting to be held in Baku in 
the Soviet Union. "-' The meeting also adopted a resolution 
inviting non-Afro-Asian members as guests. - 
China, along with most of the AAWO members condemned 
the Soviet Union's policies of thus breeding estrangement 
between China and Third World countries. A decision was 
made to hold an Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting in the 
same month (26-27 June 11966) in Beijing as a counter- 
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measure against the Cairo meeting. -1 Unlike the meeting 
in Cairo, the Beijing meeting was attended by 161 
delegates and observers from 53 countrieslllý (26 African 
countries were represented). 1ý131 It was decided at this 
meeting that the next conference ofýAAWO would be held in 
China in 1967. Also, at this meeting, the Congo(L), 
Angolan, Sawaban (Niger) and other forces engaged in 
struggles against imperialism and reaction were given 
moral support. In August of the same year an Executive 
Secretariat of the AAWO Bureau was established in 
Beijing. " 
In opposition to the scheduled/\AAPSO Council Meeting 
(February 1967) sponsored by the Soviet Union, China 
organised (14 January 1967) a meeting in Beijing of AAWJ 
delegates from 20 countries, at which the 'Soviet 
revisionist line'- was condemned and all Asians and 
Africans were urged to 'sink their differences' for the 
sake of solidarity and unity against US imperialism. " 
The cýnvening of the AAWO meeting (Cairo: June 1966) 
against China's wish that it should be held in Colombia) 
marked the first active move on the Soviet Union's part 
against China being the host of the Fourth AAPSO 
Conference in the following year (1967). The second 
active move by the Soviet Union consisted of the 
pressure'EI-7 that it brought to bear on the 8th session of 
the Council ofrAAPSO (Nicosia, 
- 
Cypruer: February 1967). It 
was decided at this meeting that the Fourth Conference of 
AAPSO would be held in Algiers and not Beijing. The 
Soviet Union initially suggested Hanoi (the capital of 
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DVR) as the venue of the conference, hoping perhaps that 
this would create friction between China and Vietnam. DVR 
however, rejected the Soviet proposal. " 
China declared that the decision to hold the 
conference in Algiers was illegal and that it represented 
an effort on the Soviet Union's part to split the Afro- 
Asian peopids movement for solidarity against 
imperialism-" At the same time, the Chinese Committee 
for Afro-Asian Solidarity declared that the fourth meeting 
of AAPSO would take place in Beijing as planned. 
The Soviet Union, however, failed to get enough 
support for holding the conference in Algiers. Most Afro- 
Asian members viewed the proposal as having been dictated 
by the Soviet Union as part of a wider strategy of 
reinforcing its campaign in favour of D6tente. At the 
same time, Algeria, the would-be host, did not seem very 
enthusiastic about convening the conference either. 
According to Belqacem Kaddour (Secretary General of theM6ocýaVi 
a rd Ffie r-. 4- 4,,. r 
aýAfro-Asian Solidarityl\in the FLN party of Algeria, and 
currentlyffice Chairman of the AAPSO Secretariat) this was 
because 
Ef I or our part we could not see how we 
could be reconciled with the United 
States in favour of D6tente when the 
latter had been actively aggressive in 
Indo-China, the Congo(L) and in the 
Middle East, by directly providing 
Israel with all possible means of 
support against Arab countries during 
the June 1967 war. -9"c" 
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14.1.3. China's Policy Towards Prnh1g-mqtjn Afrjean. 
States 
(China's 'Anti-State' Policy) 
14.1.3.1. Nigeria - 
(Biafra) 
In the later stages of the Nigerian civil war, China 
gave its moral support to the Biafran separatist movement 
against the government in Lagos. It is well known that 
Biafran separatism received indirect support from the 
United States and direct support from its allies - France, 
Portugal, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. 
Interestingly, whilst UNITA at least had an anti-colonial 
flavour, Biafra hardly had anything in common - 
politically or ideologically - with China. Not only was 
the Biafran movement not based on a national ity-based 
construction in political terms, but also Biafra - 
paradoxically, like federal Nigeria itself - was pro- 
in character. '" 
With the exception of Tanzania, Zambia and the Ivory 
Coast, '31--l all other African countries were either neutral 
or supported the Federal Government. China's close 
friends in Africa Mali, Guinea, Congo(B) and Algeria 
(with the exception. of Tanzania and Zambia) - supported 
the Federal Government. 511*11 Outside Africa, even China's 
ideological allies - Vietnam, North Korea and Albania - 
refrained from taking sides on the issue. 'ý-' Why then did 
China support Biafra? 
Before any systematic answer can be attempted, 
perhaps it would be useful to consider the factors 
underlying the eruption of the Nigerian civil war (1967- 
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1970) with a view to identifying the political and 
ideological motivations (if any) of the Biafran movement. 
From its independence (October 1960), Nigeria had 
always been riven by political and economic struggles 
between the three major societies encompassed by it - the 
Hausa-Fulami in the north; the Yoruba in the West; and the 
Ibo in the south and the east. The first Nigerian 
government was a coalition of two opposing political 
parties - the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) 
based in the southern and western regions of the country; 
and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NCP). Tafewa Balewa, 
the NCP's leader, became the Prime Minister of the 
coalition government. 
Opposition to the Federal Government grew to menacing 
proportions within the army. In January 1966, Tafewa 
Balewals government was overthrown. The new r6glme, led 
by General John Aguiyi Ironsi, an easterner (Ibo), 
advocated a powerful central government. In a divided 
country, this was to prove impractical. Ethnic and 
regional differences not only affected the relations 
between different parts of the country but also endangered 
the security of a large Ibo minority living and working in 
the northern part of Nigeria amid an increasingly hostile 
Hausa-Fuleni population. 
A second military coup took place later during the 
year (July,. 11966), led by General Yakaubu Gowon, who did 
not belong to any of the three major societies of Nigeria 
but hailed from a less populous and peripheral society; 
Ironsi's government was overthrown. Gowon embarked on a 
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policy of decentralisation of power and a return to a 
federal arrangement. However, by the time this coup 
occurred, the situation in the northern region had 
deteriorated to such an extent that thousands of Ibo 
residents were massacred. Nearly two million Ibos fled to 
eastern Nigeria. " 
Attempts by General Odumegwu Ojukwu, the commander of 
the armed forces in the eastern region, to gain central 
financial grants in order to cope with the flood of Ibo 
refugees bore no fruit. The situation became even worse 
when the country was divided into 12 states (May 1967); 
for under the new arrangement, the eastern region under 
Ojukwu would no longer control the revenue accruing from 
the petroleum producing areas. On 30 May 1967, General 
Ojukwu proclaimed the independence of the entire eastern 
region under the name of Biafra. Six weeks later (6 July 
1967) the conflict developed into a full scale civil war 
which lasted until January 1970, involving an estimated 
1,500,000 casualties. 
Even before General Ojukwu decided to form the 
Biafran government, Shell and American Overseas, the 
multi-national petroleum corporation (with US and British 
shares) had assured him that they would be prepared to pay 
a proportion of the petroleum royalties to Biafra rather 
than to the Federal government. "-1-7 
It took China more than a year (i. e., until September 
1968) to announce publicly"5"a its support for the Biafran 
$government' against the Federal government which had not 
yet established diplomatic relations with China. 
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There were three major reasons for the delay in 
China's decision to support the Biafran side in the 
Nigerian civil war: 
Prior to the coup d'6tat China had established 
contact with two parties from different 
regions in Nigeria. One of them was the 
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), 
led by Aminu Kano. Kano was among the 
Nigerian delegates who had previously visited 
China. The other was the Dynamic Party in the 
eastern region, led by Dr. Chike Obi, who had 
also paid a visit to China on different 
occasions. 'ý"3' Support for Biafra would have 
undermined China's relations with NEPU. 
Neutrality seemed to be the appropriate 
policy. 
It went against the grain of African 
nationalism (as viewed from the capitals of 
African countries) for African states to 
recognise the sovereignty of Biafra. Hasty 
recognition1c'c" of Biafra on China's part would 
have implied support for the fragmentation of 
one of OAU's most important members. Support 
for Biafra would also constitute an indication 
of China's willingness to recognise a state 
within a state. This would have amounted not 
only to a direct intervention in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state and a breach of 
one of China's main principles, 1101 but also to 
an undermining of the logic underlying China's 
claim that Taiwan had no right to separate 
existence as a sovereign state even were it to 
renounce its claim to sovereignty over the 
mainland of China. In 1967, the Sino-Soviet 
dispute had not yet reached a stage at which 
the Soviet Union's support for the Federal 
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Government would automatically propel China in 
the direction of offering support to the 
secessionist movement. - China had no illusion 
about the pro-imperialist character of Biafra 
when it eventually gave it recognition. The 
statement issued in Beijing recognising the 
secessionist government contained no 
referencellý to the political character of the 
Biafran war. China's justification of its 
stand on Biafra seemed to stem from 
humanitarian grounds rather than political 
grounds. China accepted the assessment that 
the mass of the Biafran people were being 
oppressed and massacred by the federal troops. 
Covert support given by the United States 
through the CIA and other private 
organisations as well as by other Western 
private agents1cla was another factor 
compelling China's initial stance of 
neutrality. Under such circumstances, China 
could not afford to take Biafra's side which 
would have not only called into question its 
revolutionary and anti-imperialist 
credentials, but also, on a less ideological 
and more practical level, provided some 
justification of the United States' continued 
support of Taiwan as an independent sovereign 
state. The fact that Nigeria was the third 
largest market for Chinese goods must have 
figured as a powerful deterrent against a 
precipitate recognition of Biafra. 11011 
It is understandable that a delegation from Biafra which 
went to China (October 1967) seeking military support 
returned empty-handed. ', cl- 
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Why did China eventually (from September 1968) decide 
to support Biafra? Three reasons, identical with those 
underlying China's earlier non-recognition of Biafra, led 
to China's subsequent support for Biafra - an as yet 
unestablished and pro-Western separatist government, 
against the established and anti-co=unist Federal 
Government of Nigeria. 
China's recognition of Biafra (23 September 
1968) came at a time (after the Soviet 
invasion in August of Czechoslovakia) when 
Sino-Soviet relations were fast deteriorating 
and the Soviet Union had established itself as 
the major supplier of military aid to the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. China viewed 
the Soviet Union's association with the 
Federal Government of Nigeria as clear 
evidence of what China had begun to 
characterise (from 1968 onwards) as 'Soviet 
social imperialism'. 
In its first report in support of the 
Biafra war, Hsinhua News Agency (23 September 
1968) claimed that the Soviet Union 
has been pursuing a policy of neo- 
colonialism in Africa. In order to 
squeeze into Nigeria and share the 
spoils with US and British imperialism, 
it has openly supported the federal 
military government's war of genocide 
against the Biafran people. "01-- 
Two months (July 1968) before China recognised 
Biafra, the United States government, 
perturbed by the growing influence of the 
Soviet Union in Nigeria, announced that it too 
was on the side of the federal government, 
thus removing any possibility of China being 
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accused of making common cause with the 
imperialist United States by taking Biafra's 
side. China viewed the shifting position of 
the United States as an example of the Janus- 
faced character of imperialism when it came to 
a question of protecting its own interests. 
In the wake of China's recognition of Biafra, 
Hsinhua (23 September 1968) wrote as follows: 
US imperialism has always regarded 
Nigeria, a big country in Africa with 
the largest population and rich in 
resources, as one of its major targets 
for infiltration in Africa. After the 
outbreak of war between the Federal 
Nigerian military government and 
Biafra, us imperialism actively 
supported British imperialism's armed 
intervention. At the same time, it has 
been pursuing a double-faced policy so 
as to reserve its political and 
economic interests in Nigeria and to 
reap the spoils of victory. While 
courting Biafra, us imperialism 
repeatedly assured the Federal military 
government that it recognised the 
Federal Government as the sole legal 
government of Nigeria. Since June this 
year, seeing that the war situation in 
Nigeria tipped in favour of the Federal 
Government, it gave the latter further 
support and pressed Biafra to 
surrender. "0-7 
China's decision to recognise Biafra was 
perhaps also influenced to a degree by its 
friendly relations with Tanzania and Zambia, 
which - along with the Ivory Coast and Gabon - 
were the only African countries to recognise 
(April-May 1968) Biafra. 111,13 
... the victims of US and British 
imperialism and Soviet revisionism in 
supporting the Federal Nigerian 
military Government's massacre of 
Biafran people Chad] aroused the 
indignation of the Biafran people and 
the people of Tanzania and Zambia and 
other African countries. "031 
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The recognition of Biafra by these countries was 
influenced by their rv-IVU16VO*rN., against the Federal 
Government which had refused to negotiate with Biafra 
instead of massacring innocent people in the region. "a 
The only ideological reasoning - and a tenuous one at 
that - behind China's policy stemmed from the fact that 
Biafra was pitted against an established military r6glme. 
14.1.3.2. Congo-Kinshasa [Congo M-now Zaire] 
The failure of the revolutionary struggle in the 
Congo(L) - from 1966 onwards, following US-Belgian action 
in co-operation with the L6opoldville government against 
the Stanleyville government, the Congo(K) - led the active 
anti-governrnent forces to urge that 
It is more necessary than ever to close 
the ranks of the African revo- 
lutionaries still further in a firm 
fight against the reactionary forces 
who serve imperialism and have brought 
shame to our people. "' 
Whilst China was actively campaigningllý for support 
against the Mobutu r-6Eime which it viewed as a 'US puppet 
chiefbai. n', " the Soviet Union - which had already 
recognised the government led by Mobutu and established 
diplomatic relations with it (3 December 1967)"1 
succeeded in persuading Mulele like Gizenga before him"r- 
to reach a peaceful accommodation with the central 
government. Again, the Soviet Union found itself in an 
embarassing situation. Lumumba was eventually murdered 
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because of the presence in the Congo of the UN forces, 
which had the support of the Soviet Union. In October 
1968, Pierre Mulele, after mediation by the Soviet Union 
and the Congo (B), returned to I. 6opoldville under a 
guarantee of safe conduct and amnesty. However, this was 
not the case. A few days after his arrival Mulele, like 
Lumumba, was executed. ""Ir- 
14.2. gtate-to-State Relations or a 'United Front From 
Above ' 
14.2.1. China's Relati 
14.2.1.1. Egyl2t 
Egypt was the c 
continued diplomatic 
amba<-:;, -, adorial level""'7 
experienced ambassador 
ons with 'Progressive' States 
mly country in the world which 
relations with China at the 
f 
I-Vx- during týGPCR. Huang Hua, a most 
who had served in Ghana, was sent 
to Cairo to replace Chen Chin-kang. "II This was perhaps 
related to the following considerations: 
Egypt was the first African and Arab country 
to break the diplomatic containment of China 
by imperialist powers by recognising and 
establishing diplomatic relations with it. 
Thus, Egypt must always have been viewed by 
Chinese decision-makers as a symbol of the 
opening of Sino-African relations. 
The strategic significance of Egypt as a geo- 
political link between African and Arab 
countries and indeed as a country occupying a 
pivotal place and playing a central role in 
the Afro-Asian world as a whole, must also 
have been on the minds of China's decision- 
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makers when the decision was made to continue 
China' s relations with Egypt at the 
ambassadorial level even during GPCR. 
Egypt was AAPSOI s headquarters. AAPSO was 
China's remaining major ideological asset in 
the Third World after its failure to have a 
second Afro-Asian conference convened in 1965. 
The withdrawal of the Chinese Ambassador from 
Egypt and lack of proper Sino-Egyptian 
diplomatic relations would, in all likelihood, 
have lessened China's communication and 
contacts with Afro-Asian activists in AAPSO 
based in Cairo. At the same time, it would 
provide fresh opportunities for the Soviet 
Union to deepen its penetration of the 
organisation, especially because the Soviet 
Union was already enjoying a great deal of 
influence in Egypt. 
iv. Sino-Egyptian relations had already suffered a 
setback during Nasser's anti-communist 
campaign (1958-59), though they improved 
subsequently (1959-66). Recalling China's 
Ambassador at such a juncture would almost 
certainly have led to greater friction between 
Egypt and China and alienated the leaders in 
Nasser's government. 
V. Egypt's reputation in China's eyes as a 
progressive country was still intact, 
especially after the second non-aligned 
conference (Cairo, 1964) adopted a militant 
policy condemning colonialism, imperialism and 
neo-colonialism, and supporting armed struggle 
as a practical means for achieving liberation. 
In addition to opposing US imperialism which 
was linked to the policy of the United States 
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in the Middle East, Egypt actively supported 
the pro-Lumumba forces in the Congo(K) against 
the Mobutu government. When he was re-elected 
(15 March 1965), Nasser promised to devote his 
energy to the continuation of Egypt's anti- 
imperialist struggle. "I'-` 
vi. Finally, in the domestic sphere, Egypt put 
forward (from 1966 onwards) economic plans and 
practical policies based on scientific 
socialism including the establishment of 
agricultural communes and national socialist 
firms in the industrial field. 
It must, however, be stressed that the continuous 
diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level between 
the two countries should not be interpreted as evidence of 
a lack of concern on China's part for other progressive 
countries in Africa during the period of the GPCR because 
it happened to be represented only at the level of Charg6s 
d' A-ffalres- In fact, in the political and economic 
spheres, Egypt attracted much less active concern from 
China than other African countries such as Tanzania. 'ý"' 
The Arab-Israeli war (June 1967), involving Egypt's 
courageous resistance to Israeli forces invading it (with 
the United States), convinced China that Egypt was serious 
about its militant anti-imperialist stand. 
On the eve of the Israeli invasion of Syria (27 May 
1967), the government of PRC issued a statement strongly 
condemning Israeli and American aggression against. the 
Arab peoples and countries. '-ý" 
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Following the Israeli invasion of Egypt and Syria (5 
June 1967), the Chinese government issued another 
statement strongly supporting the Arab cause. A mass 
demonstration, attended by more than 1.2 million people 
was organised in China to condemn Israeli-American 
aggression in the Middle East. '-azz The United States and 
Britain were strongly condemned for their role in the 
creation of Israel and for their alignment with the 
Zionist state of Israel. 
Israel is a product of the US and 
British imperialist policy of 
aggression. After World War II Israel 
could not have existed at all without 
US imperialist fosterage, and it would 
never have dared to launch an attack 
against the Arab states without 
imperialist support. '-ý*3 
At the same time, the Soviet Union was accused by 
China, (and many Arab nationalists) 12', ' of collusion with 
imperialism while 'feigning support' for the Arabs. 
The editor of Peking Review (23 June 1967) argued that: 
As the Palestinian peoples' struggle 
moves vigorously forward, Soviet 
revisionism has made greater efforts to 
apply its tactics of sham support for, 
and real betrayal of, the Arab 
people. "-ýI- 
China urged Arab countries to resist not only the 
forces of imperialism, led by the United States, but also 
the forces of 'Soviet revisionism'. It accused the Soviet 
Union of the betrayal of the Arab cause at the decisive 
moment. The Chinese argued that instead of providing Arab 
countries with weapons and arms to resist the alliance 
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between Israel and the United States, the Soviet Union - 
in collaboration with British imperialism -u rged them to 
accept a peaceful solution. As f ar as China was 
concerned, 
It was with malicious intent that the 
Soviet revisionists had given aid to 
the Arabs in the past in order to help 
huge profits in their political 
schemes. Now they had been unmasked 
they were again seizing support for the 
Arabs in ýorder to destroy them again. 
The Arabs had not forgotten that during 
his visit to Cairo last year, Kosygin 
pledged that the Soviet Union would 
defend its friends with all the weapons 
in its hands and that Arab people could 
always look for assistance from the 
Soviet Union. Facts had proved all the 
gallant Soviet promises to be sheer 
lies. "' 
When the United States out off food aid to Egypt, 
China promptly despatched 250,000 tons of wheat to 
Cairo, ""' in addition to making an offer of an interest- 
free loan to Egypt Of $10 million without conditions or a 
date for repayment. 1 ý310 China's political and economic 
support was deeply appreciated by Egypt in the 'face of a 
mighty imperialist conspiracy'. '*" 
14.2.1.2. Algefria 
For a brief period (October-November 1965), the 
militant and warm relations between China and Algeria were 
undermined because of the latter's support, contrary to 
China's desire, for the convening of a second Afro-Asian 
Bandung-type conference in November 1965. China viewed 
Algeria's stance on this question as 
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A gross violation of the principle of 
achieving. a consensus of opinion 
through consultation. 'ý 
Algeria's support for convening the conference in 
November was not directed against China and the other 
advocates of postponement. Algeria's insistence on not 
postponing the conference derived from its concern with 
the wide publicity that had been given to it in Algeria 
and abroad. Its postponement could appear as a setbolr-k 
for the Algerian government in international relations. 
Otherwise, Boumedienne, known as a 'penny pincher', 
would not be willing to spend so much money on a 
conference the success of which was put in doubt by a 
number of issues of fundamental importance on which Afro- 
Asian states appeared to be divided among themselves-"' 
After all, it was during Ben Bella's rule that Algeria had 
agreed to play host to the conference. Ben Bella wanted 
the conference to take place in Algeria in order to 
increase his own popularity. 'a-, * 
Algeria's strong support for national liberation 
movements as well as the deep-rooted relation between 
China and Algeria going back to the days ofpýI, Nls struggle 
against French colonialism contributed to the continuation 
of militant relations between China and Algeria during 
GPCR. 
In December 1965, a Chinese medical team consisting 
of thirty five doctors arrived in Algeria to replace the 
first team which had been in Algeria since October 
1964. ýýf- By the time the Chinese medical team left 
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Algeria, more than 4,500 hospital cases and 60,000 out- 
patients had been-given treatment. 1ý11-- 
Chinese medical personnel and doctors have been 
extremely popular among Algerian patients because of their 
simple life, their hard work, and genuine care for 
Algerian patients. ""' When an Algerian patient had a 
serious illness, s/he would be advised to see a Chinese 
doctor. 
In August 1968, another Chinese medical group 
consisting of 50 members arrived in Algiers. 1*10 
At the same time, from September 1965 onwards, China 
began constructing the first major building project in 
Algiers, a 'Palace of Exhibition' covering an area of 
37,000 square metres. 'ý'ý 
In September 1966, China undertook the construction 
of a ceramics factory in Guelmal-410 (east Algeria), 
financed under the terms of the Chinese interest-free loan 
of 1963.1" 
In April 1967, as a part of its earlier offer of $50 
million (1963), ": 2 China gave Algeria $2ý6 million in 
foreign currency. This was followed by another $2 
million (June). 11,1 This was described in an Algerian 
statement as the first occasion on which a socialist 
country had ever offered this form of assistance to a 
developing country. Other socialist countries were urged 
to follow suit. "A"- It is worth remembering in this 
connection that China had previously offered 
foreigncurrency to some other developing countries, such 
as Egypt (1956) and the Congo(K) (1964). 1111r, 
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14.2.1.3. Mali 
The warm Sino-Mali relations which developed during 
the first half of the '60's on a common anti-imperialist 
ideology, ", 11-7 continued duringf\GPCR, during which China's 
challenge to 'non-progressive' r6gimes reached its zenith. 
China did not seem to be particularly concerned with the 
growing influence of the Soviet Union in Mali. '"121 Even 
Mali's approvall"' of the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia, presumably under Soviet pressure, did not 
undermine the relationship between Mali and China. The 
presence of China's agricultural and technical personnel 
in Mali was perhaps enough to offset Soviet influence. 
Like most African states, Mali never openly 
identified itself with the Soviet Union or China. 
However, if Mali did perhaps reluctantly approve of Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, it also openly opposed its 
advocacy of peaceful coexistence as well as NTBT. Mali 
refused to be a signatory to NTBT. "--cl, 
Mali's support for national liberation wars and its 
opposition to the policy of D6tente with the imperialist 
powers continued to animate and revitalise the 
relationship between the two countries. During the 160s, 
Mali and China were the major supporters of revolutionary 
-Sawaba 
(Niger). "" Like China, Mali expressed outspoken 
condemnation of the coup dl6tat by which Nkrumah (Ghana: 
February 1966) was overthrown. Keita viewed the overthrow 
of Nkrumah as having been engineered by the imperialists 
against a government that worked hard to defend its 
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country's political and economic independence. He pointed 
out that 
We will always side with the people who 
are fighting in defence of their 
country to freedom and dignity, to 
counter imperialism and colonialism. lr"ý 
China's exports to Mali increasedlr-: ý from $8.9 
million in 1965 to $10.6 million in 1968.1r-, 4 At the same 
time, the number of Chinese experts in Mali increased from 
155 to 1,500.11' 
In June 1966, Mamadou Medeira Keita, Minister of 
Justice, led a Malian delegation to China. During this 
visit, Mamadou Keita hailed the Chinese nuclear test 
earlier during the year as a 'guarantee for the 
safeguarding and naintainence of peace I. I Ir-1- The 
delegation ended its visit by signing an economic 
agreement between China and Mali. Under this agreement, 
China pledged to furnish additional loans including a 
credit of $3 million""--7 to Mali's Central bank to help 
Mali tide over its desperate shortage of hard currency-Ir-13 
In February 1967, China completed the construction of 
a match factory which had been begun in January 1966.111 
In the same month, the final phase of the first sugar 
refinery in Mali was completed. It began processing some 
400 tons of sugar cane daily. "-10 In May 1967, China 
completed the building of a cinema with a capacity of 
2,500 seats. Later during the same year, (December 
1967) a medical group consisting of 19 persons arrived in 
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Mali from China. 111: 2 By November 1967, China had completed 
the construction of an hotel, '*--- 
China's generous aid to Mali evoked the following 
tribute by Ousmane Ba, Foreign Minister. when he claimed 
(July 1966> that 
In Mali we have no fear of co-operation 
with the Chinese whose technicians have 
a great respect for our people, are 
most courteous and discreet, act with 
dignity and have at no time interfered 
with our internal affairs, which is 
more than can be said f or many other 
agents of foreign technical 
assistance. "--' 
At the opening of a Chinese exhibition in Bamako (27 
January 1968), President Keita praised China for its 
assistance to his country's efforts to build an 
independent national economy. He pointed out that the 
Chinese aid has never required us to 
give an account of what we did at home 
and abroad and Chinese technical 
assistance is practical. No words can 
qualify such economic assistance, which 
is adapted to our local conditions. "-r- 
Within a period of a little over two years (February 
1966-May 1968), Chinese experts in Segou (150 miles from 
Bamako) completed the construction of a textile combine 
comprising more than 20 buildings capable of employing 
3,200 workers and producing a million metres of cloth a 
year at an estimated cost of $16 million given in the form 
of interest-free credit. 1r-l- 
In May 1968 China agreed to finance a railway line 
linking Mali with Guinea. This was much desired by Mali 
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as it is a land-locked country with no direct access to 
the sea. 
Initially, Mali and Guinea had sought the aid of the 
Soviet Union for this project. The Soviet Union, however, 
after surveying the project, declined to provide aid for 
it. I C-77 The Soviet Union perhaps found the project to be 
far too costly, and not in its own political and strategic 
interests. Unlike Egypt, the strategic position of which 
warranted a huge commitment of resources by the Soviet 
Union for the construction of the Aswan Dam, land-locked 
Mali offered no great attraction to the Soviet Union. 
China's commitment to build and finance the project 
came when a Guinean-Malian Joint delegation led by Ousmane 
Ba, the Malian Foreign Minister, paid a visit to China. Ic-10 
The cost of the project was estimated at $50 million. "119 
In August (1968) the first group of Chinese surveyors 
arrived in Guinea. "'7- 
The project, however, never materialised. The 
initial reasons for this lay in the difficulties posed by 
Senegal's refusal to let the Dakar-Bamako railway line be 
used for transporting equipment and for meeting other 
requirements of the project. "71 During this period, 
Senegal was hostile to all three countries concerned in 
the project - China, "' Guinea and Malil-7- - because of 
their 'progressive' character. 
The main reason, however, was that by the time China 
completed the required survey in Mali (November 1968), 
Keita's government had been overthrown (19 November 1968). 
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The coup came at a time when Sino-Malian relations 
were developing favourably not only in the economic and 
political spheres - including Mali's support for the 
GPCR'l-7A - but also in the military sphere. During the 
period 1967-68, the two countries worked closely together 
for the creation of a Mali militia which was to be 
supplied with uniforms and arms by China. 17r- The militia 
in Mali was begun by a section of the youth which led 
demonstrations against the bureaucrats and pro-Western 
officials who favoured the capitalist road for the 
country's development. 1-7- 
A Malian delegation led by Mamadou Diakite, Minister 
Delegate for Defence and Security to the the Presidency of 
the Republic of Mali"'7-7 - visited China (June 1968) to 
arrange for the transfer of military aid promised by China 
and also perhaps to discuss with the Chinese leaders the 
best means and strategies for establishing a successful 
militia in Mali. 
By the time the coup dl6tat took place (November 
1968), the militia had grown to twice the size of the 
army. This was not acceptable to many 
traditionalist'-7'ý' officers, and certainly not to those who 
led the coup, under the leadership of Moussa Traore who 
feared Keita's 'Marxist' drive in the country. The new 
r6gime claimed that the aim of the coup was 
... to end the radicalisation of the 
Marxist r68-Ime ... After following a 
policy of balance between the Marxist 
and moderate elements. the f ormer 
President decided in August 1967 to 
govern with the backing of the toughest 
of the Marxists. 113,41, 
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Following the coup, relations between China and Mali 
cooled. But they did not deteriorate, partly because 
by the time (November 1968) the coup occurred, China's 
foreign policy had already begun to move (particularly 
after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia August 
1968) towards an emphasis on State-to-State relations 
without regard to the political orientation of other 
States, and partly because the new government claimed to 
continue along the progressive lines of the Keita r6gime, 
especially in relation to its opposition to colonialism 
and imperialism. The friendly relations between the two 
countries was to continue into the next phase of Sino- 
African relations. I ea- 
14.2.1.4. Guinea 
The overthrow of Nkrumah represented a loss of one of 
the most actively anti-imperialist leaders in Africa in 
ideological terms. Ghana's importance as a base for 
providing support to national liberation movements in 
Africa and for the training of their freedom fighters had 
become far less important - even during Nkrumah's time 
because Guinea had rapidly developed into a major base in 
the region for national liberation movements, especially 
in relation to PAIGC. 
Guinea was one of the few countries not only in 
Africa but in the world whose relations with China 
remained unaffected throughout GPCR and remained 
unaffected by China's challenge to the prevailing 
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international order. Three major factors contributed to 
the close relations between China and Guinea which 
continued during the dynamic period of GPCR. 
The Nkrumah fantnr! Both China and Guinea 
strongly condemned the new r6glme which 
overthrew Nkrumah. They re-affirmed their 
unequivocal support for the return of Nkrumah 
to power. Guinea was even prepared to send 
its soldiers to 'help the Ghani'an people' to 
free themselves 'from military traitors backed 
by Western power'. 1*3a In Conakry (March 
1966), President Sekou Tour6 stressed that 
we will always side with the people who 
are fighting for independence and their 
right to freedom and dignity, to 
counter imperialism and colonialism. 113,11 
At the same time, Guinea took the lead in 
Africa for campaigning against the new 
government in Ghana. Sekou Tour6 insisted 
that 
the attitude of each nation towards the 
rebellion of the military traitors of 
Ghana will be our criterion for judging 
the honesty of each state and their 
relations with Africa. 'Or- 
Until the early 170s, China was mostly 
concerned with promoting warmer relations with 
countries which were progressive in character 
at the political and economic levels, and 
strategically important for national 
liberation movements. Guinea was not-only the 
major strategic point of access (if indeed not 
the only one) and base for the liberation 
movement of PAIGC, but was also the strongest 
supporter of the movement which, during this 
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period (1966 onwards), began its most 
effective and intensive armed struggle and 
guerrilla operations against the Portuguese 
colonialists. "" 
Guinea's support for GPCR was a contributory 
factor to its militant relationship with China 
during this period. In fact, Guinea itself 
launched (January 1967) its own 'cultural 
revolution' and formed its own 'Red Guards' - 
Jeunesse du Rassembl emen t D6mpcratique1"-1' 
(JRDA). JRDA was viewed by Sekou Tour6 as 
the true pioneers of the economic and 
cultural revolution. ", 00 
Sekou Tour6's campaign should not, however, be viewed 
as an indication of the comparability of the objectives of 
Guinea's 'cultural revolution' and China's GPCR. The aim 
of Sekou Tour6ls 'Cultural revolution' represented an 
attempt to reinforce Guinean-Islamic culture and education 
vi, s A vis French culture and educational influence in the 
country. '11331 
However, Sekou Tour6l s emphasis on cultural change 
certainly provided the Political atmosphere in which China 
was able to consolidate its relations with Guinea and 
express its ideological desire without any feeling of 
resentment. 
In China, in celebration of the Guinean National Day 
(2 October), Camara Foda Isiaga. Char-&6 d'Affaires of the 
Guinean Embassy, expressed (2 October 1967) Guinea's full 
support of GPCR: 
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the greater the success of the cultural 
revolution, the stronger would be 
China's support to the progressive 
countries recently liberated or 
struggling against imperialism. 1010 
During his visit to China (May 1968) Ousmane Ba, 
Guinea's Foreign Minister, reaffirmed Guinea's support for 
GPCR initiated by Mao Zedong. 1v-11 
Aid promised by China and construction projects by 
Chinese experts which had begun before GPCR were either 
completed or near completion during this period. '"ý 
In November 1966, Ismael Tour&, Guinea's Minister of 
Economic Development paid a visit to China, during which 
he signed four more Sino-Guinea economic agreements. 
Included in these agreements was an interest-free loan of 
$1.5 million-""'ý 
At the same time, Chinese agronomists were engaged 
(from 1966 onwards) in developing paddy fields under the 
Guinean Government's plan for growing rice in an area 
totalling 40,785 hectares in 12 regions. "O, 111 In the summer 
of 1967, the number of Chinese experts in Guinean 
agriculture reached the figure of 3,000. "Os 
In January 1967, a Chinese government delegation paid 
a visit to Guinea to attend the opening of the Kinkon 
hydro-electric power station and Tinkisso dam financed by 
China and built by its experts in co-operation with 
Guinean workers. "ýIr, At the inauguration (28 January 1967) 
of this project, Sekou Tourd praised the Chinese personnel 
for their responsibility and commitment to the work. 
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Bombs nay destroy the power station as 
well as the dam. But what remains 
indestructible and imperishable, and 
what the Chinese workers have brought 
to us is the example of their great 
moral qualities, which have enriched 
the spirit and awareness of 
responsibility of the Guinean 
people. "ý-7 
Sekou Tour6 expressed admiration for China's 
experience and deep appreciation of the role played by 
Chinese experts especially in the agricultural sphere 
where most African needs lay. 
At present Guinea does not need big 
technical measures in her agriculture 
because our peasants have not reached 
such a level. We want small technical 
measures that are suitable to their 
level, to raise agricultural 
production. China has rich experiences 
in developing agriculture so we want to 
profit by the Chinese presence in 
Guinea to find such measures as are 
suitable for the farming and rural 
conditions of our country to develop 
our agriculture. "3113 
In February 1968, with Chinese help, a tea plantation 
and a tea f actory were opened in Macenta. In the same 
year, - the Chinese 
built another tea factory in Dabola, 
with an annual capacity of 3,500 tons. "-31 
In July 1968, a Guinean military delegation paid a 
two-week visit to China. This was followed in September 
by a Chinese delegation to Guinea. ýý10- 
In Conakry (2 October 1968: Guinea's National Day) 
Chinese personnel completed the construction of- the 
biggest public building in Guinea. This earned the 
Chinese the following tribute by Abdoula, a Guinean 
worker: 
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I worked with the French, Americans, 
Russians and Germans, but I never in my 
life met experts as good as the 
Chinese. What is always in their minds 
is the interests of the Guinean 
people. ýO' 
In the same year (October 1958), 34 Chinese medical 
experts arrived in Guinea in addition to those already 
working in different parts of the country. ýaý 
In 1969, China gave fresh promises of assistance in 
more projects including a 200,000 ton cement factory, the 
modernisation of the Conakry-Karkan railway line, 2'0ý the 
port of Conakry, and 'a vast agricultural development 
programme'. ý"' These projects were to be financed by a 
Chinese offer of an interest-free loan of $45 million. 206ý 
Indeed, during this period (1(9,66-6(-)), Guinea became the 
largest African recipient of China's aid. -aOr- 
14.2.1.5. Ghana 
Sino-Ghanaian relations, which reached their most 
militant level during the preceding phase (1959-66), 
reached a turning point at the beginning of the GPCR 
period. While he was on his way back to China after 
visiting Vietnam, where he condemne&210-7 American 
involvement in Indo-China, Nkrumah heard the news that his 
government was overthrown (24 February 1966). 
The coup brought to an end the militant relations 
between Ghana and China. It ended the role of Ghana under 
Nkrumah' s leadership as an ideologicalý"" ally of China. 
It brought into power an openly pro-Westernýa'O and 
strongly anti-communist r6Eime in Ghana. 
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China believed that the coup had been instigated by 
the imperialists who wanted to re-establish colonialist 
rule over the 30 already independent African countries. 21,11 
Chinese technical experts were searchedý" by 
Ghanaian soldiers, and ordered by the new r6gime to leave 
the country. 51"ý About 430 Chinese personnel, including 13 
guerrilla instructors who were training liberation 
fighters, alleged to be involved in subversive activities 
in the country"", were expelled from the country. ý'A 
Along with the Chinese experts, 1,100 Soviet experts and 
technicians were also expelled. ýIr- 
The new r6glme ignored the fact that the Chinese 
personnel, including guerrilla instructors, .# were in 
Ghana at the requestý"- of a legal and popular government. 
In fact, China reminded the new government of Ghana that 
,*, the military experts as well as the 
economic and technical experts sent by 
the Chinese government to work in Ghana 
were despatched at the request of the 
government of the Republic of Ghana in 
pursuance of the relevant agreement 
signed by two countries. They always 
worked in accordance with the 
arrangements made by the Ghanaian 
government -I I-' 
China' s direct and open condemnation of the new 
government in Ghana was not followed by a complete 
withdrawal of diplomatic staff. ztlla This was perhaps 
motivated by hopes entertained by Chinaý'- and 
'progressive' governments in Africa e. g. Tanzania, Maliztý210 
and Guinea`111 that Nkrumah would regain power. 
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However, , circumstances seemed far from f avourable for 
Nkrumah's regaining power. In October 1966, China had to 
withdraw its diplomatic mission from Ghana following the 
new r6gine's suspension of relations with China and 
recognition of Taiwan. MýZ: 2 
14.2.1.6. Congo (B) 
If Tanzania (and Zambia)Mý: 31 were the major bases for 
China's support of liberation movements in southern Africa 
(including eastern Angola) Congo(B) was the only possible 
base during the latter half of the 16o's for both the 
revolutionary forces in the neighbouring Congo(K) and the 
1: 01 
liberation fighters off-*PLA in northern Angola. 
These revolutionary forces in the Congo(K) by 1966, 
became entirely dependent on the Congo(B) for providing 
the only strategic access for any revolutionary struggle 
that could be waged against the Mobutu government. 
Burundi, which had provided another front, became hostile 
to them and their supporters, including China. ý; "211 
As for Angola, the Congo(K) was becoming more and 
more pro-imperialist and opposed to any active liberation 
L-N& 
forces such as those of f-, MPLA which it had already 
expelledý2ýar- from its territory. 
By virtue of the strategic situation occupied by the 
Congo(B) in relation to the national liberation forces of 
the Congo(K), and its shared orientation with China on 
major international issues, it became one of the few 
African countries to establish warm and co-operative 
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relations with China in the economic, political and 
military fields during the dynamic period of GPCR. 
10 delegations - governmental and non-governmental - 
from the Congo(B) visited China, whilst 7 Chinese, 
delegations visited the Congo(B)ýýIr- during this period. 
China's exports to the Congo(B) leapt from nothing in 1965 
to $4.9 million in 1969.111 Chinese technicians continued 
their work on projects which began following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
the Congo(B) (1964 onwards). 
In January 1966 China agreed to construct a 
broadcasting station in the Congo(B). Within a short 
period (March 1967), the project was completed. ý2ý" Ii was 
named 'The Voice of the Congolese(B) Revolution'. ý"211 This 
station was to be used for revolutionary campaigning in 
support of liberation forces in the Congo(K), Guinea- 
Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and other countries in southern 
Africa. ý` 
In August 1966, Mouyabi Andre Georges, President of 
the National Assembly of the Congo(B), visited China in 
order to consolidate Sino-Congolese relations and promote 
further the economic co-operation between the two 
countries. ý"' In the same year, 23 persons were sent from 
the Congo(B)ý_" to China to receive training in the 
administration of the textile combine which was being 
fabricated with Chinese assistanceýýa and handed over to 
the Congolese government (May 1969) as a symbol of the 
'crystallisation of friendship' between China and the 
Congo(B). "' 
-792- 
In February VD68, China signed an agreement with the 
Congo(B) for the construction of a dockyard. ý311, China 
also extended to the Congo(B) an interest--free loan 
(August 1968) of Sl million for financing state farms2ýr- 
which were being set up with the help of the Chinese 
experts. At the same time, a Chinese medical team 
consisting of 20 doctors and equipped with Chinese 
medicine, was working in the country. ýa-7 
The relations between the two countries became even 
closer when the Congo(B) announced in 1967 the creation of 
a militia, the -Teunesse du Houvement do la R6volution 
(JMNR) China was invited to train and arm the militiaý*` 
which 'openly professed admiration for Chairman Xao'. -ýas' 
At the same time, China was already involved in 
training African guerrilla forces in the camps of Bouanga, 
Dombona and Ipfonda in the Congo(B). ýAIO 
In June 1968, a high-level military delegation 
visited the Congo(B) from China to attend the 4th annual 
celebration of the Congolese(B) People's Army Day (22 June 
1968). In July, Major Alfred Raoul visited ChinaýAl from 
the Congo(B). Reinforcement of the militia must have been 
the major subject considered during both reciprocal 
visits. 
However, as in the case of Mali, the militia of the 
Congo(B) was also short-lived. It ceased to exist 
following theýresignation of Massamba-Debat.: 2A: 2 
It is, however, worth pointing out that Debat's 
resignation was not directly related to the continuance of 
the militia. Quite the contrary. It was his increasingly 
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moderateýAý1' character which made him subject to direct 
criticism even by the daily newspaper, Diapanda&?, &A the 
organ of the national revolutionary council ORO, which 
he had founded in December 1963. 
The new government under the leadership of Marien 
Ngouabi was more inclined to 'scientific' socialist 
construction. In December 1969, CNR was dissolved and 
replaced by the Partl Congolais du Tr-avall (PCT) which 
announced that its ideology was based an a 'Marxist- 
Leninist orientation'. The name of the country was 
changed from the Republic of the Congo(B) to the People's 
Republic of the Congo(B).: 211 The 'People's Militia' was 
incorporated within the army and renamed Union do la 
Jeunesse Socialiste du Congo. ý, 416- 
This change did not affect the relations between 
China and the Congo(B), nor did it cause any 
dissatisfaction on the former's part with the abolition of 
the militia. The termination of the militia in the 
Congo(B) (December 1969) coincided with the bringing to an 
end of the people's militia of the 'Red Guards' in China 
(1966-69). 
Thus, the relations between China and the Congo(B) 
continued to be friendly and warm. In fact, the 
Congo(B)'s relations with China, under the leadership of 
Ngouabi became even closer than before. Perhaps, China 
was pleased to see Debat resign. Debat had begun to 
soften towards the Soviet Union and seemed to develop a 
liking for pro-Soviet ideological posture. ý11-7 
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Only a month after the resignation of Debat, Alfred 
Raoul, the new Prime Minister, paid a three-week visit to 
China (21 September-14 October 1968). During this visit 
Raoul signed an agreement on economic and technical co- 
operation between the Congo(B) and China. ý110 
At the UN General Assembly (November 1968), the 
Congo(B) was one of the strongest voices in favour of the 
restoration of China's seat. ý; 111'111 Alphonse Ongogou, the 
delegate of the Congo(B) pointed out that the Jiang Jieshi 
r6glme 
... had no right at all to represent the Chinese people... Taiwan is reduced to 
an American colony. ý; ýr-101 
14.2.1.7. Tanzania and the Tanzam Railway 
During the second half of the 1 601 smr-I as armed 
struggles in southern Africa were rapidly developing and 
intensifying, China gave a great deal of importance to its 
relations with Tanzania for reasons which have already 
been discussed. During the 1966-69 period, Tanzania's 
position as the centre of gravity of China's Africa policy 
remained unaltered. 
Tanzania was perhaps the only country not only in 
Africa but in the world as a whole (with the exception of 
Vietnam, North Korea and Albania) to develop extremely- 
close relations with China in the economic, military and 
political spheres on the basis of a shared anti- 
imperialist orientation. Tanzania's unquestionable and 
active support for armed struggles in southern Africa 
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played an important part in guiding China's ideological 
alignment with it. 
... legal independence is not 
enough... the freedom we seek must be 
freedom for the peoples of Africa 
without distinction of race, colour or 
religion... coexistence is irnponnible! 
if the African peoples of Soutýh Africa 
and Rhodesia have no human rights to 
govern themselves then what is the 
basis C3 f Tanzania's existence. of 
Zambials, of Kenya's and so on. -2r-ý 
As far as China was concerned, the lesson for 
Tanzania of the coup which overthrew Nkrumah was that it 
should have become 'more determined and resolute' in its 
struggle for a 'final victory' over imperialism and neo- 
colonial ism. 
Tanzania's anti-imperialist stance during the initial 
stage of this period (1966-69) manifested itself in a 
condemnation of what it saw as British conspiracy which 
allowed Ian Smith to make the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDDýr--- (November 1965). Britain retaliated 
by suspending a $20 million loan to Tanzania. 
In a move clearly intended to step into the breach 
thus created by Britain, China offered (June 1966) 
Tanzania a $5.6 million interest-free loan, and a grant of 
$2.8 million. This 
showed that China was a valuable friend 
in time of need and increased her 
standing in the country. 
This offer came after a visit to China (4 June 1966) by a 
Tanzanian government economic delegation led by Paul 
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Bomani, Minister for Economic Affairs. -ý07 Earlier during 
the year (May 1966), China had given Tanzania a donation 
of $85,000 for the development of the University of Dar es 
Salaamýs'E' and supplied it with scientific instruments and 
illustrative material. ýr-'O In July 1966, China agreed to 
construct a new shipping line with an initial capacity of 
t1.5. million and two 10,000-ton vesselsýr-111 with the aim 
of 
I increasing] the invisible earnings of 
the two countries, reduce imperialist 
control of shipping and hence arbitrary 
changes. 
In 1967, Chinese aid personnel completed the 
construction of two printing offices. ýýIr-ý In February 
1968, a leather shoe factory built with China's help was 
also completed. "I In less than two years (July 1966- 
February 1968). China had completed the construction of a 
textile mill in Tanzania. This was the largest project in 
East Africa and was named the Friendship Textile 
In August 1968, the Chinese aid officials completed the 
construction of a pharmaceutical laboratory supplied with 
Chinese medicines. ýIlr- In October (1968), an agricultural 
tools factory built by Chinese experts, was completed. ý2r", 
In addition, many more farming projects, buildings and 
industrial constructions were completed or were brought to 
near completion. Paulo Mwaluko, Tanzania's Ambassbdor 
to China was moved to pay a special tribute to the Chinese 
experts. 
Tanzanians have now become accustomed 
to the excellent hard work, dedication, 
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high skills and selfishlessness of the 
Chinese technicians and workers. 121--" 
A similar tribute was also paid by Nyerere 
... the thing which most impresses Tanzanians about Chinese workers who 
are now in our country is their 
enthusiastic hard work. ýIr-'O 
In the military field, China provided moreý710 weapons 
to Tanzania during this period under consideration (1966- 
69), whilst Chinese experts were engaged in training 
Tanzanian soldiers.: 27 " In 1970, China responded to 
Tanzania's appeal for arms by sending two squadrons of 
MIG-17 type interceptors and more pilots and military 
experts-"' 
During the dynamic period of GPCR, Nyerere was among 
the few heads of state to visit China (18-22 June 1968). 
During this visit, Nyerere expressed strong opposition to 
the Nuclear Test Ban Treatyý(NTBT) 
... we have opposed this treaty not 
because we want to reserve our right to 
make, or receive nuclear weapons. We 
have neither the ability nor the wish 
to do so. We have opposed it because 
it is an unequal treaty, which cannot 
even contribute to the cause of 
peace.. The relation which we seek 
between ourselves and the rest of the 
world is a relation of equality. It is 
mainly for that reason that Tanzania 
has opposed the treaty against the 
spread of nuclear weapons. We regard 
it as a most unequal treaty. It asks 
non-nuclear nations... to renounce the 
right to make or process nuclear 
weapons. But it does not ask nuclear 
powers to destroy the weapons they 
already possess, and worst of all, it 
does not ask the, nuclear powers to 
pledge that they will neither use, nor 
threaten to use, nuclear weapons 
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against states which agree to sign the 
treaty. ý1-7ý 
Nyerere left his audience in no- doubt that Tanzania was 
not only close to China but also opposed to the Soviet 
Union. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Soviet 
Union's ambassador to China, along with ambassadors from 
its allies (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, East 
Germany, Poland and Bulgaria) walked out of the reception 
given to Nyerere in Beijing. ý'7- 
In the same speech, Nyerere attacked Western 
propaganda against the Sino-Tanzanian friendship and their 
characterisation of Tanzania as a satellite of China, a 
I Big power' . 
The friendship between Tanzania and the 
Peopids Republic of China is a 
friendship between equals. Perhaps for 
that reason some other nations of the 
world find it hard to understand: they 
are always trying to suggest that 
Tanzania is a satellite of China or.... 
alternatively... that our friendship is 
about to break. This is probably an 
expression of wishful thinking and an 
assumption that friendship is 
exclusive... that you cannot be friends 
with many nations if these are not 
themselves close friends. ý'7r- 
Tanzania's anti-Western or anti-imperialist and anti- 
colonialist position was reinforced by Nyerere's new 
policy Oebruary 1967) of de-Westerni sat i oný-7" based on 
self-reliance. This was embodied in the famous Arusha 
Decl-aration which stressed 
socialism, nationalisation, rural 
development, an end to elitism, new 
educational directions and a greater 
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attention to the agricultural 
sector. ý-7-7 
Tanzania's ambassadors to Western countries were 
temporarily recalled. A youth league known as the 
'Green Guards' was formed. '2-7R 
In response to criticisms that the Arusha Declaration 
was based on Chinese philosophy, Nyerere explained that it 
was based on the Tanzanian people's 
needs,... but if it is Mao Tse-Tung, 
brothers, learn from it... go all the 
way to Peking. ý*Icl 
During this period, Tanzania was one of the most 
active campaigners in UN for China's reinstatement in the 
organisation. The Tanzanian delegate to UN repeatedly 
condemned the occupation of the Chinese island of Taiwan 
by the United States. At the 23rd Session of the UN 
General Assembly (11-19 November 1968), Danieli, the 
Tanzanian representative denounced the United States for: 
,,. obstructinS land] delaying... the 
restoration [of the] ... legitimate 
rights [of China] ... the United States 
must be held responsible for this and 
should be condemned ... Taiwan is a 
province of China and is now completely 
under US military occupation. ý' 
14.2.1.7.1. TanZam Railway 
Two things convinced me that socialism 
can be built in Africa and that it is 
not a Utopian vision. One is that 
capitalism _is 
uft-imately incompatible 
with the real independence of Africa. 
The second thing that encouraged me was 
China ... China is providing an 
encouragement and an aspiration for 
younger and smaller nations which seek 
to build socialist societies. ý63ý 
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In September 1967, China officially pledged to 
Tanzania and Zambia that it would help consruct the 
Tanzanian-Zambian Railway (the TanZam Railway). The 
initial cost of the project, estimated at $405 million was 
to be given by China ($135 million to Zambia and $280 
million to Tanzania) as an interest-free loan. Its 
repayment was to begin in 
This is the most far-reaching and important aid 
project and aid offer yet committed by China to any 
African country since the beginning of Sino-African 
relations. 
While, in the long run, the project would promote 
economic co-operation and mutual benefit for China and 
eastern and southern Africa, in the short run, it was much 
more politically and ideologically motivated in favour of 
liberation movements against the colonialist and racist 
. r6gimes of 
the region. China signed (September 1967) the 
agreement at a time when its world view was much more 
explicitly orientated along political and ideological 
lines and it was less concerned with diplomatic and trade 
gains as such. 
Undermining the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful 
coexistence with imperialism by provoking and encouraging 
further liberation wars in the region must have been in 
the minds of the Chinese decision-makers, as much of their 
campaign during this period was directed against the 
Soviet Union and, since 1968, Soviet 'social imperialism'. 
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Not surprisingly, Western countries took a radically 
different view of the aim of the project as such. They 
viewed it as -1 China' a Troj an Horse in Af rical ,Ia bridge 
for Support to Black terrorists', or as 'Chinese economic 
colonialism' in the name of economic aid. 2011 However, as 
Hutchison noted, 
... there was no striking discrepancy between what China was actually doing, 
and what her critics said she was 
doing, and as I watched the 
relationship between China and Tanzania 
develop, it seemed to me highly 
beneficial for the African country. --2ar- 
In response to the Western propaganda campaign 
against China's links with Tanzania and its determination 
to build the TanZam Railway, Nyerere said on one occasion 
(July 1969): 
To us China is a friend in need. Take 
for example the railway between 
Tanzania and Zambia. We tried very 
hard to get it built by the Western 
powers. But we failed. The Chinese 
are ready to build it for us. But the 
West now does not want China to build 
it. So, should we go without a 
railway? ýi"31', 
In the economic field, the project would greatly 
reduce Tanzania's dependence on Western aid and enhance 
its economic independence. It would also stimulate the 
economic development of the southern part of the mainland, 
as more Tanzanians would be attracted to exploit its 
agricultural potential. 
For Zambia, the project was highly important for the 
country's economic and political independence. 
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The completion of the railway line will 
be of tremendous significance to 
Zambia's future as a strong, prosperous 
and truly independent nation, to the 
fraternal relations of Tanzania and 
Zambia, to the growing brotherly 
nations in east Africa and to the 
friendly ties between us in this part 
of the world and the Chinese people. =9@17 
Land-looked as Zambia was, it was almost exclusively2QQ 
dependent on the white minority r6, TIme of Rhodesia and on 
the Portuguese colonialists in the territories of Angola 
and Mozambique for access to the sea. 
Until January 1973, when the Rhodesian authorities 
closed the borders with Zambia as a reaction against 
guerrilla forces operating from Zambian bases, Zambia's 
foreign trade was carried on over the rail bridge at 
Victoria Falls involving a long journey through Rhodesia 
to the sea at Mozambique. 
China hoped that the project, which would provide 
alternative access for Zambia's trade and economic 
relations with the outside world, would encourage it to 
undertake more positive action against colonialism and 
racism in the area without fearing economic retaliation by 
the racist r-6glmes of Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Initially, Tanzania had approached Britain and Canada 
(1965) for help with the railway project, but its request 
had been turned down.: 2'Epc> 
Tanzania had also sought Soviet help in vain. zý101 The 
Soviet Union was already engaged -in the construction of 
the Aswan Dam. Perhaps it was in no position to become 
involved in another major project, especially when Soviet- 
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Tanzanian relations were not particularly close, unlike 
those between China and Tanzania. I 
Initially Zambia, despite its desperate need for the 
project, was somewhat reluctant to become so vastly 
indebted to China. Kaunda's moderate character and 
Western tendencies wereAtoo pronounced to permit too 
close a friendship between Zambia and China. It was not 
until he visited China (June 1967), that Kaunda became 
enthusiastic about the project and more friendly towards 
China. 2`1ý1 Kaunda was offered an interest-free loan of $15 
million to be used for constructing a road from Lusaka to 
the Baroste Province. ý; "ýIa 
Following Kaunda's visit, relations between China and 
Zambia became much more friendlyý'ý11 and even acquired a 
progressive sheen, at least in relation to China's concern 
with the liberation struggles in the region. 
14.2.2. China's Relations with 'Non-ProgrP-_,. -tfvPI States 
14.2-2-1. Mauritania 
During the period when GPCR was in progress# 
Mauritania was the only country in Africa not only to 
recognise and establish diplomatic relations with China, 
but also to promote warm relations with it. Second only 
to Somalia, "' Mauritania, among $non-progressive' 
countries, was of no strategic significance to anti- 
colonialist liberation forces which were recipients of 
economic aid from China during this period. 
Like most of the French colonies in West Africa, 
Mauritania Joined the French Community of 1958. Two years 
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later (November 1960), Mauritania opted for independence. 
In co-operation with the French authorities, Mokhtar Ould 
Daddah, the leader- of tfie Mauritanian People's Party 
(MPP), became President of the country. ý"'" 
Under French influence, Mauritania remained strongly 
anti-communist and pro-Western in its political character. 
On the day of its independence (28 November 1960), 
Mauritania established diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. ý" 
In February 1965, a meeting of 13 African French 
speaking countries took place at Nouakchott, the capital 
of Mauritania, the major objective of which was to find 
ways and means of containing conmmunist influence in 
central and western Africa. ý1ý1'131 Tshombe's insistence that 
there should be no communists in Zaire before the Belgian 
troops withdrew from the country was strongly supported at 
this meeting. ý111 
China's opening of diplomatic relations with France 
(27 January 1964) was an important factor underlying 
Mauritania's recognition of it (July 1964). 
For its part, China wanted to establish diplomatic 
relations with Mauritania as a part of its intensive 
campaign in favour of convening a second (Bandung-style) 
Afro-Asian conference. The opening of Sino-Mauritian 
relations began with a visit by an agricultural mission 
from China to Mauritania (June 1965). ý, Ccl 
At the Preparatory meeting of Asian and African 
countries (Algiers: 24 June 1965) f or the second Af ro- 
Asian conference scheduled for 28 June 1965, Chen Yi, 
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China' s Foreign Minister, met his counterparto the 
Mauritanian Foreign Minister. ý01 The establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Mauritania and China must 
have been among the subjects discussed between the two 
ministers. In the following month (19 July), diplomatic 
relations were established between the two countries. 0`02 
Mauritania's recognition of China was certainly not 
welcomed by the United States and other countries opposed 
to China. For them, Mauritania had now joined the 
B03 
opposition club of the advocates of one China. 
Ould Daddah must have been impressed by the 
favourable economic aid terms offered by China to 
neighbouring Mali and Guinea. In August 1966, China 
agreed to send experts to help Mauritania to develop its 
rice cultivation in the Valley of the Senegal River. mOA 
In February 1967, a Mauritanian delegation led by 
Briane Mamadou Wane, Foreign Minister, visited China, 
where he said that 
The Mauritanian delegation is firmly 
convinced that the unprecedented great 
proletarian cultural revolution 
movement initiated by the great 
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in China with a 
population of 700 million is of 
extremely profound and far-reaching 
international significance. The 
delegation sincerely wishes China still 
greater achievements in revolution. *'Or- 
During this visit, Wane signed an economic and technical 
co-operation agreement with China in addition to culturai-1 
and trade agreements. aO, -- The economic agreement included 
an an interest-free loan of $4 million*1411-7 which was to be 
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used for developing rice cultivation, land reclamation and 
the construction of a 13 kilometre long dam in the Rosso 
region. 
It was unlikely that a Western power would have 
offered such economic help to a poor and thoroughly 
backward country such as Mauritania, especially in view of 
the fact that there was no economic or immediate strategic 
advantage to be gained by so doing; Mauritania's pro- 
Western tendencies alone were not enough. 
In October 1967, President Ould Daddah became the 
second African head of state after Nkrumah (February 
1966), to visit China during the heyday of the Cultural 
Revolution. China's easy and generous terms of economic 
aid must have reinforced Ould Daddah's opposition to 
colonialism and imperialism and Mauritania's support for 
national liberation movements in the remaining colonies in 
Af rica, ý113131 
At the same time, he affirmd his country's strong 
support for the restoration of China's seat in UN and 
congratulated his hosts on GPCR.: 2, D'; ', Ould Deddah was 
presented by the Red Guards with a French translation of 
quotations from Mao Zedong. *111- 
In November 1967 a Chinese medical team consisting of 
24 persons arrived in Nouakchott. ý311 This was followed by 
China's offer of an Interest-free loan of $5 million. ý'-ý 
In February 19bd C; hina delivered 200 tons ot 
agricultural machinery to Mauritania. These included 
trucks, tractors and bulldozers for use on an experimental 
farm in the Rosso region and the first section of a 4,000- 
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hectare Chinese aid project for stock-breeding and rice 
cultivation. ý1: 3 China also presented (February 1968) 
Mauritania with educational materials, including equipment 
and machinery for physics teaching in secondary 
schools-"' 
At the same time, trade between Mauritania and China 
developed. Demand for Chinese goods - because of their 
low price, easy terms, and above all their appeal to 
African needs (non-luxury) - must have been behind the 
fast increase of trade between China and Mauritania. 
China's exports to Mauritania began with only 10.8 million 
in 1966. In 1969 they reached $9.5 million. ý%" 
14.2.2.2. Soma 11 a 
Whereas Mauritania did not have any relations with 
China until the begining of this stage, Somalia was the 
only 'non-progressive' African country to continue 
relations with China on a friendly basis during the GPCR 
period. Apart from Mauritania, Somalia was the only other 
'non-progressive' African country to receive China's aid 
during the period 1966-69. 
Neither the moderate character of the government, nor 
its tendency of leaning to the side of the Soviet Union - 
especially in the military sphere3"r- - had a disruptive 
effect on Sino-Somali diplomatic relations. Close 
relations_ between the United States and Ethiopia, the 
conflict , between Somalia and Ethiopia, the absence of 
diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China, and 
China's support"' for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 
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constituted the main factors which contributed to good 
relations between- China and Somalia. At the same time, 
China was perhaps also drawn to Somalia because it was one 
of the few 'moderate' African governments which did not 
show any hostility towards GPCR. 
- Chinese experts continued their work on agricultural 
projects in Somalia. In September 1966, a Somali 
delegation led by SheiKV) M. M. Hussein, President of the 
Somali National Assembly, paid a visit to China. 0118 In 
August 1967, Chinese experts began the construction of 
experimental stations for growing rice and tobacco, 
completing the projects in 1969. ý"'-cll Ali Alido Mohammed, 
the Somali Minister for Public Works, was all praise for 
Chinese experts, who, according to him, 'had been working 
for Somalia heart and soul I. In Mogadisco (March 
1968), Chinese experts had completed the construction of a 
National Theatre (with a capacity of 1,200 seats). It was 
fully equipped by China and given as a gift to Somalia. ý" 
A Somalian worker paid the following tribute to China: 
Only China can complete a big building 
project like this in such a short span 
of time. ý3ý11 
Another worker said that 
I have never seen experts of any other 
country do work like carrying dirt and 
ramming on a construction 
In May 1968, China offered an interest-free loan of 
$1.83 million to Somalia, repayable over ten years from 
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In March 1969, Chinese experts began the 
construction of two well-sinking projects. 012r, 
- During this period, China experienced great 
ideological upheaval internally. This was also reflected 
in China's foreign policy and its attempts to re- 
conceptualise its international role in the light of the 
great domestic political changes sweeping the entire 
system. However, even as the country was in turmoil, 
China was racked by internal tensions among the leadership 
(e. g. Lin Biao's sudden rise and fall - 1968-72), China's 
foreign policy in Africa as elsewhere was far from 
logically consistent in every respect. If the alignments 
and changes described above appear on the surface to be 
somewhat unsystematic, it is hardly surprising in view of 
the enormous difficulties involved in bringing external 
orientations into mesh with overall policy requirements. 
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Country of Qr Year 67 (58 fag 
Algeria 1 2 
Angola - 
Botswana I 
Burundi I 
Cameroun 
Congo-Brazzaville 8 
Congo Kinshasa 2 
Central African Republic - 
Chad 
Dahomey 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 2 4 
Guinea (Bissau) 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Malawi 
Kali 6 3 
Mauritania 3 
Mauritius 
Malagasy 
Mozambique 
Morocco 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rhodesia 
Rwanda 
South Africa 3 
Senegal 2 
Sierra Leone 
Somali Republic 5 
Sudan 3 
South West Africa 1 
Swaziland 1 
Tanganyika 8 3 
Zanzibar 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Togo 
Zambia 5 2 
Blk. African Youth 1 
Blk. African Trade Un. - - 
Annual total 97 12 
General Total 81 
Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China',:; Policy in Afrie--a-1958-71 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 
. 
1974). 
p. 270 (Table 2). 
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Country Visit; 
_-d Year 67 --68 60 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Sudan 
Ghana 
Guinea 3 4 2 
Algeria 
Congo-Kinshasa 
Ethiopia 
Mali 2 
Somali Republic 2 1 2 
Dahomey 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Tanganyika 6 2 8 
Zanzibar 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Burundi 
Gabon 
Ivory Coast 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Cameroun 
Central African Republic 
Congo-Brazzaville 3 3 
Zambia 2 3 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Equatorial Guinea 
Libya 
Annual total 17 14 19 
General Total 50 
Source: A. Ogunsanwo, ChfnaIQ PolicX in Africa 1098-71 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
p. 269 (Table 1). 
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